Norway: NATO in the North

Norway: NATO in the North? Karsten Friis Thanks to Paal Sigurd Hilde for valuable comments and suggestions, and to Ole Martin Stormoen for research assistance. Several of the sources of this chapters are in Norwegian, and the qutations are transaltated by the author. Introduction When the NATO allies agreed to deploy troops to the Baltic states and Poland in 2014 to deter against potential Russian aggression, Norway did not ask for a similar arrangement. Despite bordering the heavily militarised Kola peninsula, Norway is now the only NATO country neighbouring Russia without a permanent allied presence. Why is this so? This chapter will discuss the background for this policy, which often is summarised in the claim ‘Norway is NATO in the North’, and question if Norway really is NATO in the North in terms of deterrence. The chapter will discuss current Norwegian threat perceptions and various security policy orientations that may contradict each other. Norway seeks to signal peacetime control and situational awareness of the High North to the rest of NATO, but also to attract allies to training and exercises. Furthermore, Norway seeks to signal both deterrence and restraint, as well as reassurance, to Russia. These different security policy concerns may not always be easy to combine into a coherent policy. Setting the context: Norway and Russia The historical experience of Russia, as represented in the Norwegian public discourse, still plays a part in today’s policy formulations. Before the 1917 Russian revolution, there was significant trade and people-to-people contact between the Norwegian and Russian settlements across the border in the North. Some of this was reduced with the establishment of the Soviet Union, but it did not end. In stark contrast to, for instance, Poland, Norway has never experienced war with Russia. On the contrary, Soviet troops liberated Northern Norway from the Nazi occupation in 1945 and withdrew to the pre-war border shortly after. This was apparently the only front from which the Soviets retreated after the war. This unique history with Russia is still being referred to in the Norwegian public debate today. At the beginning of the Second World War, Norway declared neutrality, as it had during the First World War, but the Nazi invasion in 1940 and the following five-year occupation profoundly influenced the public mood after the war. Norway became a signatory partner to the Washington Treaty and the North Atlantic Pact establishing NATO in 1949. Nonetheless, before joining NATO, Norway announced its so-called base policy: there should be no permanent allied bases in Norway in peacetime. This came as a response to a formal enquiry from the Soviet Union regarding the issue (Skogrand, 2004:161). By making this unilateral declaration, Norway demonstrated a certain understanding of the Soviet concern about Western militarisation of the northern flank, and kept some national political manoeuvring space between the two superpowers. Despite instances of Soviet pressure, it was the Norwegian government that defined more precisely what the base policy meant in practice throughout the Cold War. The base policy became a pillar of the Norwegian defence policy, and part of what has been named the combined ‘deterrence and reassurance’ strategy (Holst 1966). In short, this strategy sought to balance deterrence with reassurance that Norwegian territory would not be used to launch an attack against strategically important Soviet military installations on the Kola peninsula. However, to compensate for the absence of allied bases, Norway encouraged significant allied training and exercises in Norway. These primarily took place in Troms county and, to a lesser extent, in Finnmark county, bordering Russia. Finnmark county is about the size of Denmark, so by keeping the main military activities in Troms, Norway offered the Soviet Union significant warning time should it suspect a Western attack. Similarly, when it was agreed that the US Marine Corps could pre-position military materiel for a brigade in Norway in the 1980s, the initial idea was that it should be stored in Troms county. However, the Norwegian government decided instead that it should be stored in central Norway, about 700 kilometres from the Russian border. The reasoning behind this decision was the very same: to reassure the Soviet Union that the equipment was in no way part of an offensive military build-up. At the same time, the government presented the pre-positioning, and other measures taken to secure swift allied reinforcements, as a precondition for the base policy (Molvig, 1994:8). Without credible reinforcement plans, the base policy could not be sustained. The deterrence measures were, in other words, an explicit part of the reassurance policy. The Norwegian Cold War defence concept was static and territorial, with a large build-up of defence infrastructure in strategic places in Northern Norway, aimed at halting an expected Soviet advance into Norway in case of war. Seen in isolation, this was arguably a classical deterrence by denial concept – albeit with limitations in terms of capacity and strength. A potential Soviet attack was to be halted in Troms, but the Norwegian Army only expected to be able to hold the line for a few weeks’ time before it would need allied reinforcements. This is debated among scholars, however, since Norway never planned a substantial defence at the actual border, nor in Finnmark county. Furthermore, Norwegian deterrence cannot really be separated from NATO’s, since allied reinforcement was the very cornerstone of the Norwegian defence. Taken together, this could arguably make deterrence by punishment a more fitting term. Nonetheless, seen in isolation at least, the Norwegian strategy in Troms was to prevent further advancement of Soviet troops, i.e. denial. In peacetime, the armed forces consisted of about 30–40 000 personnel, including conscripts. However, about 350 000 reservists could be mobilised to take up arms in case of war. In addition, there was a ‘total defence’ concept, whereby 200 000 or so civilians could be mobilised to support the military. Large parts of the civilian infrastructure and resources were to be transferred to military use in case of war. For instance, any bus, truck, tractor or car with four-wheel drive was registered as an asset for the Army in case of war. In total, about 20–30% of the population would be involved in defending the country (Bogen and Håkenstad 2015:32). This was a huge military apparatus for a population of about 4 million people. In 1992, Norway had as much as 1 division and 13 brigades; 12 submarines, 5 frigates, 30 MTBs, and 30–40 other vessels; about 30 costal fortresses; 61 F-16 and 20 F-5 fighter jets; and over 200 Leopard and Patton tanks (Forsvarsdepartementet, 1992). However, in the years after the Cold War, it gradually became apparent that this structure was not financially sustainable. The equipment was also aging, and far less effective than it appeared on paper (Diesen 2011:21). The armed forces were in dire need of reform. The post–Cold War reform of the Norwegian armed forces was a slow and painful process. There was resistance from both traditionalists inside the military and the political class to organisational and doctrinal change. There were heated debates over the role of the armed forces in a new security environment and a slow and challenging orientation towards deployment abroad in international crisis management. As a net receiver of allied help during the Cold War, the Norwegian military apparatus was unprepared for the increasing demand from NATO to contribute internationally (Bogen and Håkenstad, 2015; Egeberg, 2017; Græger, 2016; Rottem, 2007; Ulriksen, 2002). The main challenge for the armed forces during these years was perhaps that the government and parliament repeatedly passed decisions regarding the structure and size of the military, but failed to follow suit with sufficient funding to implement these decisions. This made reform difficult to implement, and the chief of defence was unable to deliver as expected. Nevertheless, Norway manged to contribute a significant number of troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and later in Afghanistan, in addition to participating in a number of smaller missions with NATO, the EU and the UN. The Navy participated in NATO operations in the Mediterranean and off the coast of Somalia; and the Air Force participated in operations in Afghanistan and Libya. Norwegian Special Forces has also been engaged in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Middle East. The Norwegian armed forces gradually became focussed on international operations, while according less priority to territorial defence. Engagement, rather than deterrence, was considered the best security policy towards Russia. In the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, the overarching goal after the Cold War was to help bring Russia into the fold of democratic countries. A lot of money and political prestige was invested in building good relations with Russia on all levels: people in the northern regions got special permits to cross the border, trade increased, environmental clean-up of nuclear waste was sponsored, cultural exchanges took place, fishery management cooperation improved, and military cooperation increased. Several High North strategies were implemented. The political peak of this period was the diplomatic breakthrough to settle a 40-year border dispute in the Barents Sea in 2010. This proved the existence of shared interests, political goodwill, and pragmatism on both sides, which never had existed before. Like the rest of the West, Norway interpreted the Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008 as an anomaly rather than as an indication of what was about to come. In some military circles and in the Ministry of Defence, people voiced concern, and Norway never stopped its surveillance of and intelligence collection on Russia in the North (Hilde and Widerberg, 2014). Nevertheless, the dominant position in the Norwegian public discourse was that Russia was on the path to liberal democracy – it was just a slower and more cumbersome processes than in Eastern and Central Europe. This representation of Russia changed abruptly in 2014. Representations of Russia after Crimea On 26 February 2015, the then Norwegian Defence Minister, Ine Eriksen Søreide, stated on CNN, ‘We are faced with a different Russia. I want to warn against the fact that some people see this as something that is going to pass. The situation has changed. And it has changed profoundly.’ Furthermore, she insisted, ‘there is no going back to some sort of normality or some sort of back to normal business. Because that normality does not exist’ (CNN, 2015). The tougher stance towards Russia met with some resistance in the Norwegian public debate. The sudden change after Crimea was a blow to much of the political, economic, cultural and personal investments Norway and Russia had made. Some found the defence minister’s words to be too harsh and confrontational. Typically, critics argued that Russia would likely consider such language, and the Norwegian and NATO armament and deterrence efforts, provocative, and the comments would thus have escalatory, rather than deterrent, effects. These voices have nonetheless remained relatively marginal, primarily located at the far right or far left of the political spectrum. However, people in the North tend to have a more positive attitude towards Russia than those they often refer to as the ‘elites in Oslo’. The new representation of Russia as ‘profoundly changed’ has nevertheless become established Norwegian policy, and has been repeated in several government statements and documents. For instance, the most recent government white paper on foreign and security policy states that ‘Norwegian-Russian relations will continue to have their ups and downs in the years ahead. Russia’s desire to be the dominant power in what Moscow regards as its sphere of influence conflicts with international principles relating to the right of countries to determine their own foreign policy and choose their own alliances’ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017:15). Similarly, the Ministry of Defence’s current long-term military plan describes a resurgent Russia, aiming to regain major power status and willing and able to use force to maintain political dominance and influence (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016:28–29). However, the government has also been arguing in favour of a combined deterrence and dialogue approach, both bilaterally and in NATO. After the Russian annexation of Crimea, Norway joined the EU sanctions regime and suspended all bilateral military cooperation with Russia. However, bilateral cooperation on fishery management, search and rescue and incidents at sea has continued, and the direct hotline between the Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarters and the Russian Northern Fleet remains open. Norway has also repeatedly stated that it does not consider Russia to be a military threat to Norway today. In NATO, Norway has been supportive of Secretary General Stoltenberg’s combined deterrence and dialogue approach to Russia, even if the meetings in the NATO-Russia Council not have proven very fruitful. The diplomatic channels must remain open, is the argument. This approach resonates well with the Norwegian ‘deterrence and reassurance’ tradition: there is no contradiction between a firm stance and an open approach. On the contrary, it is thought that a firm, but stable and predictable military stance will enhance dialogue and reduce the chances of misunderstandings and escalation. This argument makes sense for NATO, which represents a formidable military power. Another question is whether Norway, after the last 20 years’ radical reorganisation and downsizing of its armed forces, is able to provide credible ‘firmness’ against a rapidly modernising Russian military. Threat perceptions in Norway Russian military activity in the High North has increased steadily since 2008, when the current Russian defence modernisation process began. This includes deployment of new submarines and planes, construction of new bases, deployment of new mobile new precision-guided missiles, increased training and exercises, and generally increased activity at sea and in the air. During the Zapad 2017 exercise, more military equipment and troops were moved to the Kola peninsula than ever since the end of the Cold War. This included, for the first time, the mobile Iskander missile system, which also has nuclear capability (Lunde, 2018). The Russian military’s Northern Fleet currently consists of 8 strategic and 22 tactical submarines and about 30–40 surface combatants of various kinds and sizes, 3 regiments of fighter jets, 5 helicopter squadrons, 3 air defence regiments, 2 mechanised infantry brigades and one naval infantry brigade (IISS, 2018:200–201). While a substantial concentration of military force, it is still far less than during the Cold War. The three infantry brigades would not have capacity to expand much beyond their home bases without the kind of reinforcement from other military districts that was demonstrated during Zapad 2017. Russia has demonstrated a significantly improved ability to compensate for having fewer and smaller units with rapid reinforcement ability over significant distances. The most important assets of the Russian Northern Fleet at Kola are the strategic submarines and the bases and infrastructure supporting them. The protection of this strategic deterrence is naturally a cornerstone of Russian defence planning. In other words, the Russian military presence and build-up in the North is not directed against Norway, even though it happens to be very close to the Norwegian border. Hence, from a Norwegian perspective, the military challenge is the asymmetry between Russia and Norway in terms of military strength. Should a crisis erupt between the West and Russia, it would most likely also have consequences in the North, even if it not was initiated there. Such ‘horizontal escalation’ is what Norwegian defence planners fear the most: in other words, that Norway would be pulled into a conflict due to circumstances in other parts of the world. In such a situation, the Northern Fleet could be used, for instance, to attack allied sea lines of communications across the Atlantic, which would be crucial in the event of war. The most debated scenario is that the Russian side, in an attempt to protect its nuclear assets in the High North, will establish what has been called the ‘bastion defence’, a denial zone stretching from the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap up to Kola (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015:52). Denying NATO access north of the GIUK line would allow Russia to protect its strategic submarines – but Norway would end up more or less ‘behind enemy lines’. At the very least, Norwegian air and sea manoeuvre would be severely hampered. Military planners also regard a partial extension of land defence into Northern Norway as likely in such a scenario. One could, for instance, envisage the deployment of mobile air defence systems in Northern Norway as part of an offensive defence of the Kola bases. In such a scenario, allies would have difficulty providing reinforcements to Norway due to the Russian denial efforts in the North Sea. A second scenario often mentioned in the debates is a smaller bilateral conflict between Russia and Norway, often depicted as ‘too big for Norway but too small for NATO’. This would be, in other words, a conflict below the Article 5 threshold, where one could envisage various forms of ‘cannon boat diplomacy’ or hybrid threats. The latter, best described as the use of several means of power (both civilian and military) in a synchronised fashion, and at varying intensity, targeting weak and critical points in the adversary’s national infrastructure, is often discussed in relation to Russian security policies these days (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2016). A small state can relatively easily be ‘bullied’ by a bigger state, through everything from cyberattacks to threatening military positioning. In the case of Norway, the Svalbard archipelago is of particular concern, as the islands are far away from mainland Norway and difficult to protect. However, mainland Norway could also experience such lower-level use of force, through cyber or other means, as a way of exerting political pressure (Muller, Gjesvik and Friis, 2018) Hence, even if Norway does not consider Russia to be a military threat today – any defence planner needs to take sudden political shifts into account and prepare for the worst. As always, politics change much faster than military armament processes. Norwegian deterrence The term ‘deterrence’ was explicitly pronounced and began to be emphasised in official Norwegian defence vocabulary in 2016 when the new long-term plan for the armed forces was launched. In the previous long-term plan, published in 2012, the phrase used to define the main purpose of the armed forces was ‘war-preventing threshold’. Even though deterrence had been mentioned in previous long-term plans and strategy documents since the end of the Cold War, there is little doubt that the Russian aggression against Ukraine from 2104 on changed the Norwegian defence discourse. But how has this materialised into the Norwegian defence posture? By 2014, the Norwegian Army had been reduced from 13 brigades to one (Brigade North) comprising three manoeuvre battalions and support units, while its fighter jets, submarines, tanks, and artillery, and much of its other equipment, were aging or out of use. The Army had become primarily an expeditionary force, although it maintained some presence in the North. But it did not have much fighting power against a conventional adversary like Russia. This largely remains the situation today. However, the government decided already in 2008 to replace the aging F-16 fleet with 52 F-35s. This fighter jet alone, with its many joint warfighting features, will boost not only air power, but also land and sea power. These jets represent the most expensive Norwegian purchase of anything to date – but they will significantly increase Norway’s national fighting capacity, and thus deterrence by denial. The first jets were delivered in 2017. Furthermore, five new frigates were commissioned in the period 2006–09, and in 2017 it was decided to buy four new HDW 212 submarines from Germany. The government has also decided to replace the fleet of P3 Orion maritime patrol planes with five new P8 Poseidon, thus increasing both surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capability. According to many observers, the Army is the loser in this procurement game. It is small and in dire need of better combat air defence, new tanks, helicopters and artillery. Currently, only the latter is about materialise, as a contract recently has been signed with the Korean producer of the K9 Thunder howitzer. The guns are expected to be operational in 2021. The Army brigade is small and vulnerable, and of the three manoeuvre battalions, one is planned to be primarily staffed by reservists (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2017). The brigade is also geographically split between Northern and Southern Norway, leaving one of the mechanised battalions about 1500 km away from the Russian border. Most worrying, though, is perhaps the Army’s vulnerability against precision-guided cruise missiles. Today the Army’s air defence is marginal, significantly reducing its combat potential in case of conflict. According to many critics, the relative weakness of the Army is particularly concerning because NATO reinforcements of land forces will take a long time to deploy in the North. In other words, Norway has invested in air and sea assets, domains where NATO could assist quickly, rather than in the land domain where it is the most vulnerable’ (Børresen, 2016). Nonetheless, the Norwegian defence budget has increased over the last few years. According to the current government, it has increased by 24% since they took power. The defence budget for 2018 is NOK 55 billion (ca EUR 5.5 bn). The current long-term plan envisages a total increase in defence spending of about NOK 165 billion (ca EUR 16.5 bn) over a 20-year period. Despite the high numbers, the defence budget equals only about 1.56% of the Norwegian GDP. Norway has of course signed on to the Wales ambition of aiming towards spending a minimum of 2% of the GDP on defence by 2024. Due to this increase and the extraordinary expenses related to the purchase of F35 jets, Norway is currently not too far off the curve to meet this goal. However, as the F35 budget will be reduced as the planes are delivered, the defence expenditure curve will flatten unless new investments are made. At this stage, no plans for any significant new investments have been made. The mentioned new submarines and P8 Poseidon procurements are not sufficient in and of themselves to keep the defence budget on track to reach 2% by 2024. Therefore, it is currently more likely that the Norwegian defence budget will remain about 1.6% of the GDP over the next several years. Defence investments are not made overnight. Equipment is rarely available off the shelf, and planning and procurement processes are complex and slow. Unless plans for new investments are made soon, or there is a substantial increase in activity, the likelihood of Norway’s reaching this target by 2024 is slim. Politicians therefore typically prefer to point to another statistic, namely per capita spending in NATO, according to which Norway ranks second after the United States. They also point to the fact that Norway does meet the other NATO goal of spending at least 20% of its defence budget on major equipment. This percentage is expected to increase to about 36% by 2020. The fact that Norway is buying significant amounts of American armaments, and is a key source of strategic intelligence from the North, has thus far somewhat shielded Norway from some of the most intense political pressure from the United States in NATO. However, NATO’s Secretary General has made it clear that the extraordinarily high Norwegian GDP should make it easier, not harder, to reach the 2% target (Dagbladet, 2018). As recently as the 1990s, Norway was spending more than 2% of its GDP on defence, but this appears much harder to achieve today. In 2016, the major opposition party, the Labour Party, in keeping with its traditional position on strategic and foreign defence matters, voted in favour of the current long-term defence plan and the associated budgetary frame. There are therefore no major political forces that champion a significant increase in the defence budget. There is a certain grass-roots engagement for a stronger commitment to the 2% target in several political parties, but these forces do not appear strong enough to make significant changes. Prime Minister Erna Solberg has repeatedly stated that Norway is committed to the Wales target, but she clearly also relies on the vague formulation of ‘aiming to move towards the 2% guideline’. With an aging population and a gradual diminution of income from the petroleum industry, Norway tends to prioritise welfare over warfare. For Norwegian politicians, preserving the current level of social security is a higher priority today than defence. Investments in welfare and growth also pay off in terms of results – and hence votes – in a way that defence does not. The latter is an insurance of which you do not see the benefit until its needed. It rarely gets you re-elected. Furthermore, in real numbers, Norway does spend a significant amount of money on defence. And this amount has increased substantially the last few years. Many are therefore of the opinion that the current level of spending, along with planned increases, should be sufficient to build a credible defence. At this stage, it seems only external pressure – either from the United States or as a result of further deterioration of the security situation in Europe – could make Norway increase its defence budget more than planned. Table: Norway’s defense expenditures as percentage of GDP (NATO, 2017) Year % of GDP All figures drawn from NATO’s annual statistics, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm Absolute numbers in EUR Converted from NATO-reported numbers in USD, using the average USD/EUR exchange rate for 2017 (0.887) as reported by the European Central Bank, see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html millions 2005 1.7 4333 2006 1.5 4446 2007 1.5 5211 2008 1.4 5651 2009 1.6 5496 2010 1.51 5765 2011 1.51 6415 2012 1.47 6336 2013 1.48 6570 2014 1.51 6507 2015 1.46 5159 2016 1.54 5379 2017 Figures for 2017 are estimates. 1.62 5941 Extended deterrence through NATO Even increasing its defence budget to 2% of the GDP, Norway alone cannot put up a deterrence that would alter Russian calculations when it comes to protecting its strategic defence. Preservation of its nuclear capability will remain a top priority for Russia, not least given NATO’s conventional superiority. No Norwegian defence posture will alter these defence plans significantly. Nonetheless, even under a bastion defence scenario, Norwegian and NATO defence structures could impact Russian operational calculations. For instance, a proper land defence in Northern Norway could convince Russia to establish its denial zone ‘only’ through air and sea assets. Deterrence in Norway therefore largely relies on NATO – as it always has. This is also clear from the official Norwegian documents. For instance, the 2017 Annual Report of the Chief of Defence states that ‘credible deterrence is secured through an active alliance policy which is predictable, long-term and conflict-preventive. NATO is the core of Norway’s ability to provide credible deterrence’ (Forsvaret, 2018:10). Moreover, the current long-term plan states that the role of the armed forces is to ‘secure credible deterrence with a basis in NATO’s collective defence’ (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016:22) Furthermore, it states that ‘the foundation for Norwegian security is NATO. A modern defence which is part of a strong and credible alliance has a deterring effect and reduces the likelihood that we end up in a situation where Norway’s or allies’ security is challenged and must be defended with military force’ (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016:5). Similarly, the foreign policy white paper states, ‘The Norwegian armed forces must be able to carry out assignments within Norway as needed, contribute to credible deterrence, and help maintain Norway’s role and expertise in the Arctic. At the same time, Norway must have close ties to key allies. Allied presence in the North strengthens NATO’s credibility, and regular exercises must be carried out based on defence plans’ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017:29). Norway otherwise seeks security through NATO in two ways: by actively contributing to NATO on all levels, and by encouraging allied exercises and training in Norway. Even during the period of international crisis management in the 1990s and 2000s, critics argued that Norway’s primary aim in contributing was not to support counter-terrorism and peace in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Rather, it was argued, the objective was more national: by contributing to NATO, Norway could expect NATO’s support in return if needed. Or, put in another way, if Norway had chosen not to contribute to the international operations over these years, it would have lost much political goodwill and prestige, not least vis-a-vis the Unites States, and this would have infringed on Norwegian security. This line of reasoning was certainly not limited to Norway. Many European states that participated in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya had a limited interest in the actual achievements on the ground. Participation in itself was more important than operational effects on the ground (Egeberg, 2017). In a non-paper entitled ‘Strengthening NATO – raising its profile and ensuring its relevance’, Norway proposed an initiative in NATO in 2008 for the alliance to pay somewhat more attention to its own territory and periphery. The initiative did not accomplish much at the time, but it shows that Norway remained focussed on collective defence and regional security also during the ‘int ops years’ in the 1990s and 2000s (Hilde and Widerberg, 2014; Widerberg, 2015). There was a Norwegian frustration at that time that the High North was more or less forgotten in NATO. Norwegian NATO officials often anecdotally illustrated this by referring to a map that apparently hung in the NATO HQ that included only the southern half of Norway. The map has since been replaced. Since 2014, all this has changed. Norway has strongly supported the return to collective defence in NATO through the Readiness Action Plan, the designing of new Graduated Response Plans, the reinvigoration of the NATO Response Force, the Enhanced Forward Presence, the Framework Nation Concept, and all the other new NATO initiatives. In particular, Norway has championed a reform of the NATO Command Structure to make it more functional to conduct collective defence tasks. In addition, Norway has pushed for an improved maritime posture, including the transatlantic maritime sea lines of communication. The decision by the NATO Defence Ministers in 2018 to establish a new NATO command for the Atlantic to support allied reinforcements was celebrated as a victory in Norway. By constructively supporting the reform of NATO to make it a better fit for the collective defence of the 29 allies, Norway is also contributing to overall NATO deterrence. The second way of securing NATO deterrence in Norway is to make sure allies have first-hand knowledge and awareness of the situation in the North. This is done partly though massive intelligence collection against the Russian Northern Fleet, and partly through hosting of allied exercises. For the former, Norway has two sophisticated intelligence collection ships operating 24/7 in the North. In addition, it has several radars and sonar and listening installations for signal intelligence, as well as the P3 Orion planes and other assets. Knowledge of the development of the Russian weapons systems in the High North is obviously valuable throughout NATO, as most weapons systems are also used in other Russian Military districts. Allied exercises and training have always been important for Norway, as mentioned. They are considered a precondition for the base policy, and also for the credibility of the NATO defence plans. Allied reinforcements in case of crisis need to be trained to be credible. Thus, this activity is crucial to build credible deterrence in the North. The at times extreme climate presents different challenges for equipment and personnel than most other places. Without awareness and proven ability to operate under such circumstances, alliance commitments may become hollow. Norway therefore regularly hosts allies both bilaterally and through NATO exercises, although exercises are much less frequent than on the eastern flank. In 2018, however, Norway will host the next iteration of NATO’s high-visibility exercise Trident Juncture involving about 36 000 troops and focusing on defence of the northern flank. This exercise will expose many allies to the Norwegian environment, allowing them to gain valuable operational experience. It will also signal NATO resolve and commitment to collective defence of the northern flank, which is important for Norway. Before Trident Juncture, the largest exercise had been the biannual Norwegian-led Cold Response drills, which involved 15 000 troops in 2016, including 3 000 US personnel. Another important event is NATO’s Dynamic Mongoose, an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise, which takes place annually in the Norwegian Sea or North Atlantic. In 2017, Northern Norway hosted Europe’s largest air exercise that year, the Arctic Challenge, with about 100 planes and 1000 personnel from 11 countries. This exercise also included Swedish and Finnish airspace, building on the weekly cross-border training between fighter jets from Luleå in Sweden, Rovaniemi in Finland, and Bodø in Norway. NATO’s deterrence on the northern flank is based on punishment – not denial. It will take time before reinforcements are able come to Norway’s assistance. While Norway had an element of deterrence by denial capacity during the Cold War, this is hardly the case today. However, Norway’s membership in NATO obviously plays an important deterrent effect in and of itself. Engaging Norway would imply engaging NATO, and thus opening up several flanks. Most importantly, it would imply engaging the United States. Norway, like many other smaller allies, in practice relies on the commitment of the United States for support in case of war. Today no other allies have the military strength to contribute significantly to the reinforcement of Norway. Norway has therefore actively engaged the US, both through NATO and bilaterally, to secure its continued security commitment. Bilateral defence cooperation The most concrete bilateral military tie between the United States and Norway is arguably the above-mentioned American prepositioning of military equipment in central Norway, the so-called Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N). Eight storage facilities contain trucks, armoured vehicles, tanks, munitions, and various support materiel (United States Marine Corps, 2015). The equipment has been used in Iraq and other places over the years, but is now stored in caves, fit and maintained and ready for use on short notice. In addition, in 2017, around 330 US Marines began training rotations at the Værnes military airfield. These permanent but rotational troops have a strong symbolic value, as they signal American commitment to the defence of Norway. Their presence has triggered some debate in Norway as to whether the semi-permanent presence of US Marines constitutes a break with the base policy. In particular, the political left has expressed concern that this move increases tensions in the region and brings Norway too close to the security policies of the United States. Also, Russia, predictably, complained, stating it saw the deployment ‘as an element of the US-led military preparations that have intensified against the background of the anti-Russian propagandist hysteria’ (Russian embassy in Norway, 2017). One Russian politician even hinted at the possibility of a nuclear response (TV2, 2016; The Independent Barents Observer, 2017). The government has rejected this criticism, partly by pointing to the insignificant military force 330 Marines 700 kilometres from Russia represents, and partly by stressing that the deployment is in line with the base policy – adding that it is up to the Norwegian government to define this policy at any time (Regjeringen, 2017). Norway has also strengthened bilateral relations with the United Kingdom. This includes cooperation with maritime patrol aircraft and training of British personnel in Norway. The UK has had a semi-permanent presence at the Bardufoss Airfield for almost 50 years, the so-called Clockwork base, where helicopter staff are trained in winter conditions during the winter months. These activities, in addition to some new initiatives with France, the cooperation with Germany over the new submarines, the ongoing close relations with Netherlands, and the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), all contribute to an improved defence structure and thus enhanced deterrence. But there is little doubt that it is the US that represents by far the most important security guarantee for Norway. Conclusions: Is Russia deterred in the North? The key question is whether the measures discussed above are sufficient to deter potential Russian aggression in case of a crisis. According to the Norwegian Chief of Defence, Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, Norwegian defence readiness is improving. ‘In 2013, we were ill prepared. Now the trend has turned (…) We have increased out readiness somewhat. Now a third of the needs are resolved. But we have a long way to go’ (Forsvarets Forum, 2018). After he presented the armed forces’ annual report in March 2018, a newspaper summarised it as follows: ‘The ability of the armed forces to deter, to have a credible preparedness to handle crises and conflicts, is still not good enough, and will at the earliest be so in 2020’ (Aftenposten, 2018). The main national asset contributing to national deterrence in the short term is the F35. As more and more planes become operational in the next few years, with their missile systems, stealth abilities, and surveillance capabilities, they will represent a conventional deterrence. However, the planes are vulnerable. There are currently not enough shelters for them, and they only have two certified airfields from which to operate under normal circumstances. Until more shelters and better air defence systems are in place, the planes can be pacified relatively easily in case of conflict. The modern frigates are similarly vulnerable targets for precision guided cruise missiles and cannot alone deter military aggression. As mentioned, the Army is very small, dispersed geographically, and without adequate combat air defence systems. In short therefore, it is NATO, and more specifically the United States, that represents the main deterrence in the North. The slogan that Norway is NATO in the North can therefore hardly be said to apply to deterrence or combat ability. Rather it applies to peacetime surveillance and intelligence collection. Norway is NATO’s ears and eyes in the North, but hardly the main deterring factor. Why then did Norway not want allied bases in Norway when the four other allies bordering Russia and Belarus did? As this chapter has shown, Norway’s position has certain historical explanations. Norway has always sought a careful and balanced approach towards Russia. This policy has also given Norway some more national political room for manoeuvre, with certain channels to Russia other allies have lacked. The question is whether this applies equally in today’s international security environment. Russia has gone from being a status quo power during the Cold War to being a revisionist power today. That could make it more dangerous. But it is also much weaker militarily and financially, and therefore unable to sustain a large conflict with the West on several fronts. It is only its nuclear weapons that give Russia a major power status. Russian elites appear to feel that the West, the EU and NATO are encroaching on them, not to mention liberal values, which threaten the power base of the incumbent regime. This paranoia feeds Russian foreign and security policies, the production of fake news, trolling and cyberattacks. The government’s strong foreign and security policy is highly promoted domestically – functioning as a substitute for an impotent domestic policy. With such a political system there is always a risk of miscalculation, risk-taking and aggressive policies. ‘Patriots’ in intelligence, hacker groups or semi-private security firms may take initiatives that escalate beyond their control. Such ‘irrational’ behaviour is perhaps the main security risk stemming from Russia in the years ahead. If so, one can ask if ‘rational’ deterrence would work. Arguably, the top military ranks will remain professional and make sure that the military forces operate professionally as well. If so, military-to-military deterrence will continue to be relevant. However, the risk scenarios in the High North, as discussed here, are hard to deter against. Nothing will be more important for Russia in the event of conflict than to protect its nuclear and second-strike capabilities. If hostilities already have broken out, conventional deterrence in Norway is unlikely to prevent Russia from doing what it deems necessary. As mentioned, a stronger Army, deployed at strategic places in Finnmark and Troms, possibly supported by other joint assets such as F-35s, may nonetheless have a certain limiting impact on the tactical deployments of Russian assets. In the other possible scenario, a smaller bilateral hybrid war situation, Norway would have to cope alone. F-35s or other heavy weaponry would probably not be relevant. A relatively mobile ground force with sufficient firepower would most likely be the best tool to resolve the situation, perhaps with the help of Special Forces, the Home Guard and special police forces, depending on the situation. The best deterrent against this scenario is presence on the ground at the right places, quick response time, mobility – combined with sufficient firepower to pose a threat. Arguably, Norway does not possess this kind of deterrence either. The best deterrent is therefore probably the risk (from a Russian perspective) of escalation into an Article 5 situation, if it begins harassing Norway too harshly. Not surprisingly, a Norwegian operational concept has long been to ‘establish an Article 5 situation’ in case of a bilateral crisis with Russia. Without NATO, Norway has few options. Norway is therefore not NATO in the North in terms of deterrence. It does not have the force to make much of a difference in case of war – and is therefore less relevant in preventing war from breaking out as well. Nonetheless, as I have argued, a stronger land force could impact some tactical considerations on the Russian side of the border. But it is also unlikely that the relative stability in the High North is primarily a result of successful deterrence. Arguably, reassurance, engagement and cooperation on commonly defined areas have contributed as much to stability. Both the Soviet Union and now Russia primarily have sought security of their strategic assets in the North. This is best achieved through stability and predictability and by adhering to international regimes. Despite certain symbolic nationalist episodes (such as the planting of a Russian flag on the Arctic sea bed), Russia has acted in accordance with international law in the Arctic. The Arctic Council, for instance, has continued to function more or less as before, despite the tenser geopolitical climate (Wegge and Keil, 2018). Russia is probably also recognising that if it begins challenging international rules of the game in the Arctic, it could attract more presence from the US, the UK and other NATO allies. This could increase tensions on yet another front. As a result, Russia appears to accept Norwegian military and intelligence activity in the North as long as Norway keeps others at a distance. From a Norwegian perspective, continued signalling of reassurance towards Russia makes sense for similar reasons. Today Norway has good situational awareness and handles the peacetime situation well, including the occasional intercept of Russian flights. Norway does not wish the High North to become an area of regular interactions between NATO and Russian military forces, nor does it wish to become a bystander in a big power game in the North. It must therefore maintain a delicate balance by (1) signalling peacetime control and situational awareness to the rest of NATO while (2) also trying to attract allies to training, exercises, and commitment of troops. At the same time, Norway needs to (3) signal deterrence towards Russia with NATO and (4) show some restraint and signal reassurance. These four concerns need to be combined in one policy, as they easily contradict each other. Creating a coherent defence policy was challenging enough during the relatively stable Cold War period, but at a time when the international security landscape is rapidly changing, new weapons technologies are emerging and military postures evolving, this has become much more demanding. Norway now needs to continuously assess all four dimensions in terms of national security policies, NATO policies, armament and defence plans, and military operational practises – while facing an increasingly unpredictable Russian neighbour. The shared interest in keeping the High North stable and peaceful is what keeps this balance stable today – but should these interests change, Norway could face a significantly deteriorated security situation in its neighbourhood. Deterrence alone cannot prevent such a development.  Bibliography Aftenposten (2018). “I fjor forsvant 660 hoder i Hæren, Sjøforsvaret og Luftforsvaret. Det er bare ett av Forsvarets problemer”, 4 April. 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