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This dissertation investigates how violence against a given territory or group of people becomes acceptable to leaders and their publics. Some wars are launched only reluctantly, and support dwindles once the high human costs are... more
This dissertation investigates how violence against a given territory or group of people becomes acceptable to leaders and their publics. Some wars are launched only reluctantly, and support dwindles once the high human costs are revealaed. Others, however, are undertaken with a sense of urgency and righteousness. The brute violence employed appears not only acceptable, but even necessary. The second post-soviet war which was launched against Chechnya in 1999 was such a war. The thesis employs and develops a post-structuralist version of securitization theory. This approach emphasises securitization as an intersubjective and ongoing process of legitimation, not an instance or a moment. The social construction of Chechnya and Chechens as 'terrorist' is conceptualized as a collective endeavour. Not only statements by the Russian leadership, but also historical representations as well as those of the wider political elite, journalists and experts contributed to this rough categorization. In the final chapter the thesis investigates how this linguistic categorization materialized in the brutal practices employed during the Second Chechen War.
About the Book This book provides an in-depth analysis of how mobilization and legitimation for war are made possible, with a focus on Russia's conflict with Chechnya. Through which processes do leaders and their publics come to define... more
About the Book


This book provides an in-depth analysis of how mobilization and legitimation for war are made possible, with a focus on Russia's conflict with Chechnya.

Through which processes do leaders and their publics come to define and accept certain conflicts as difficult to engage in, and others as logical, even necessary? Drawing on a detailed study of changes in Russia’s approach to Chechnya, this book argues that ‘re-phrasing’ Chechnya as a terrorist threat in 1999 was essential to making the use of violence acceptable to the Russian public. The book refutes popular explanations that see Russian war-making as determined and grounded in a sole, authoritarian leader. Close study of the statements and texts of Duma representatives, experts and journalists before and during the war demonstrates how the Second Chechen War was made a ‘legitimate’ undertaking through the efforts of many. A post-structuralist reinterpretation of securitization theory guides and structures the book, with discourse theory and method employed as a means to uncover the social processes that make war acceptable. More generally, the book provides a framework for understanding the broad social processes that underpin legitimized war-making.

This book will be of much interest to students of Russian politics, critical terrorism studies, security studies and international relations
An analysis of Russia's response to globalization. This book explores how Russian domestic politics shape this international engagement. Thematically, the focus is on Russia's external engagement with areas of policy relating to... more
An analysis of Russia's response to globalization. This book explores how Russian domestic politics shape this international engagement. Thematically, the focus is on Russia's external engagement with areas of policy relating to globalization, namely energy, climate, health, direct foreign investment, finance, and international terrorism
This project examines the prospects for Russia-Western practical cooperation against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and, more broadly, for a rapprochement between Russia, NATO and key NATO member states post-Crimea. The analytical point... more
This project examines the prospects for Russia-Western practical cooperation against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and, more broadly, for a rapprochement between Russia, NATO and key NATO member states post-Crimea. The analytical point of departure is two-fold: Firstly, the project will examine how Russia’s longstanding rejection of a ‘Western’ world-order, along with various Western leaders’ increasing depiction of Russia as an ‘adversary’, shape the two parties’ room for manoeuvre with respect to practical collaboration on the ground in Syria. Secondly, and operationalizing ‘the West’ as two key ‘Atlanticist’ member states in NATO, the United States and Britain, it will examine how Russian and Western domestic debates constrain governments and political leaders’ scope for action, and their ability to adjust their commenced policy paths in Syria. When adversarial statements about ‘the other’ are voiced by state leaders in an international setting, they are often portrayed in the media as being reflective of that particular leader or government’s position alone. In this project, we suggest that the dynamics of Russia-Western relations cannot be properly understood without alsoconsidering how states’ security policies are empowered and limited by domestic security policy debates. The project will provide an up-to-date, in-depth analysis of how contemporary Russian, American and British security policies are being constituted and constrained by domestic debates. Furthermore, it will trace how domestically negotiated security policies materialize in actions on the ground in Syria. Against the backdrop of the empirical analysis, publications from this project will discuss the likelihood of these states finding common ground against IS in Syria, and the prospects for Russia-Western rapprochement more generally
... For two recent reports, see Ingmar Oldberg, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Power House or Paper Tiger', FOI Report (Swedish Defence Analysis Institute) (June 2007); and Alyson Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, and... more
... For two recent reports, see Ingmar Oldberg, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Power House or Paper Tiger', FOI Report (Swedish Defence Analysis Institute) (June 2007); and Alyson Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, and Mikhail Troitskiy, 'The Shanghai Cooperation ...
After the crises in Ukraine, and despite the Georgian government’s allegedly more pragmatic attitude towards Russia, official statements from Moscow increasingly project Georgia as hostile. This may be the result of the Kremlin stepping... more
After the crises in Ukraine, and despite the Georgian government’s allegedly more pragmatic attitude towards Russia, official statements from Moscow increasingly project Georgia as hostile. This may be the result of the Kremlin stepping up a propaganda campaign to put pressure on Georgia, but it is also linked to growing perceptions of Georgia as becoming an agent of NATO. Moreover, Russia’s increasingly insistent rhetorical and practical support for the independent status of the two Georgian breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is still framed with reference to Kosovo as a tit-for-tat in a conflict with the West. In parallel with this hardening in Russian views, there is hardly any diplomatic contact between Russia and Georgia. The regional multilateral frameworks have become dysfunctional, obstructed by polarization. Further Georgian NATO integration could entail an increasing risk of war, unless frank discussions and engagement with Russia can be promoted
In current popular analysis, Russian foreign policy is explained from within: even in our presentations today, it is Russia’s relations to Europe, to the West, to China etc, that we address – it is not how these entities relate to Russia... more
In current popular analysis, Russian foreign policy is explained from within: even in our presentations today, it is Russia’s relations to Europe, to the West, to China etc, that we address – it is not how these entities relate to Russia - As if Russia’s every move can be explained solely with reference to Russia itself. Identity scholarship often has a similar problem: we dissect the articulation of identity in one political entity and then look at what conditions of possibility such identifications create for foreign policy action This is a very useful exercise. But somehow - when watching developments - you get the sense that the processes of othering (-of construing the other as a threat-) in one political entity is tied to such processes in other political entities. We miss something if we study what the states do in isolation from each other. There are probably important interaction effects that we need to take into account if we want to explain the direction of Russian foreign policy
"The Nordic Pearls" - independent bilateral cooperation institutions - will, in a conference series in the course of 2015 and 2016, address different aspects of Nordic-Russian relations int the past and present.
... Moscow: Zvenya Publishing House, 1999, p. 7. Page 16. Julie Wilhelmsen and Erika Fatland, eds 16 ... On 9 January, Che-chen armed groups counter-attacked, and penetrated the settlements of Shali, Argun, Germenchuk and Mesker-Yurt. ...
... For two recent reports, see Ingmar Oldberg, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Power House or Paper Tiger', FOI Report (Swedish Defence Analysis Institute), June 2007, and Alyson Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang... more
... For two recent reports, see Ingmar Oldberg, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Power House or Paper Tiger', FOI Report (Swedish Defence Analysis Institute), June 2007, and Alyson Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang & Mikhail Troitskiy, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organiza ...
How does a security dilemma dynamic between parties deemed not to hold hostile intentions toward each other emerge and escalate? This article investigates Russian official discourse on NATO engagement in Europe post-Crimea (2014), and its... more
How does a security dilemma dynamic between parties deemed not to hold hostile intentions toward each other emerge and escalate? This article investigates Russian official discourse on NATO engagement in Europe post-Crimea (2014), and its impact on security interaction in the Arctic. We also examine how Russia represents NATO intentions and actions in a context seen by Russia as a relation of war. We identify the effect of these changing representations of self and other for the emerging securitization dilemma in relations between Russia and NATO, arguing that they have replaced uncertainty about NATO’s hostile intentions with certainty. Although Russia still articulates the Arctic as a unique cooperative region, there may be little space left for non-conflictual Russian action when encountering NATO in the Arctic. We highlight the agency and importance of evolving political rhetoric in creating a dangerous situation where lethal conflict can occur between parties who do not seek it...
How does a security dilemma dynamic between parties deemed not to hold hostile intentions toward each other emerge and escalate? This article investigates Russian official discourse on NATO engagement in Europe post-Crimea (2014), and its... more
How does a security dilemma dynamic between parties deemed not to hold hostile intentions toward each other emerge and escalate? This article investigates Russian official discourse on NATO engagement in Europe post-Crimea (2014), and its impact on security interaction in the Arctic. We also examine how Russia represents NATO intentions and actions in a context seen by Russia as a relation of war. We identify the effect of these changing representations of self and other for the emerging securitization dilemma in relations between Russia and NATO, arguing that they have replaced uncertainty about NATO’s hostile intentions with certainty. Although Russia still articulates the Arctic as a unique cooperative region, there may be little space left for non-conflictual Russian action when encountering NATO in the Arctic. We highlight the agency and importance of evolving political rhetoric in creating a dangerous situation where lethal conflict can occur between parties who do not seek it...
Building on a discourse-theoretical reading of securitization theory, this article theorizes and examines how two political entities can become locked in a negative spiral of identification that may lead to a violent confrontation.... more
Building on a discourse-theoretical reading of securitization theory, this article theorizes and examines how two political entities can become locked in a negative spiral of identification that may lead to a violent confrontation. Through mutual and multifaceted securitization, each party increasingly construes the other as a threat to itself. When this representation spreads beyond the military domain to other dimensions (trade, culture, diplomacy), the other party is projected as “different” and “dangerous” at every encounter: positive mutual recognition is gradually blocked out. Military means then become the logical, legitimate way of relating: contact and collaboration in other issue-areas are precluded. Drawing on official statements 2014–2018, this article investigates how Norwegian–Russian relations shifted from being a collaborative partnership to one of enmity in the High North. The emerging and mutual pattern of representing the other as a threat across issue-areas since...
This article analyzes how Moscow has extended its rule over Chechnia since the beginning of this century. Within the larger understanding of this rule as imperial in form, the current distinct contractual relationship between the Russian... more
This article analyzes how Moscow has extended its rule over Chechnia since the beginning of this century. Within the larger understanding of this rule as imperial in form, the current distinct contractual relationship between the Russian center and Chechnia is substantiated as one based on kinship. I argue that the Putin-Kadyrov relationship is a generic case of patronage but highlight the local imprint that such relations acquire by tracing how Chechen kinship practices inform this case.
How does war become a legitimate undertaking? This article challenges the interpretation of securitization as a narrow, linear and intentional event by re-engaging the post-structuralist roots of Copenhagen School securitization theory.... more
How does war become a legitimate undertaking? This article challenges the interpretation of securitization as a narrow, linear and intentional event by re-engaging the post-structuralist roots of Copenhagen School securitization theory. To uncover the social process that makes war acceptable, the framework presented in this article is informed by securitization theory but foregrounds the web of meaning and representation between a myriad of actors in society to unearth the contents – and changes – in how war is articulated and carried out with public consent. This matters not only for the question of how war becomes a legitimate undertaking, but also for the very practices through which the war is fought: the emergency measures that are enabled in a discourse of existential threat. The article re-visits the Second Chechen War to illustrate how war is made logical and legitimate to leaders and their publics.
Our analysis builds on in-depth, systematic scrutiny of official statements and documents in Norway and Russia.1 For Norway, the data are statements, press releases, speeches etc. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Prime... more
Our analysis builds on in-depth, systematic scrutiny of official statements and documents in Norway and Russia.1 For Norway, the data are statements, press releases, speeches etc. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Ministry of Defense (MoD). For Russia, we draw on transcripts and statements from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including the public appearances of the Minister and Deputy Ministers, transcripts from press briefings, “answers to the press,” and official statements and “comments”), as well as transcripts from the President’s public appearances, and news documents from the Ministry of Defense. On the Norwegian side we have examined documents that include references to both Russia and the Arctic; for Russia, we have studied documents that include references to Norway or the Arctic—the difference being due to the far higher number of documents on the Norwegian side.
Our analysis builds on in-depth, systematic scrutiny of official statements and documents in Norway and Russia.1 For Norway, the data are statements, press releases, speeches etc. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Prime... more
Our analysis builds on in-depth, systematic scrutiny of official statements and documents in Norway and Russia.1 For Norway, the data are statements, press releases, speeches etc. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Ministry of Defense (MoD). For Russia, we draw on transcripts and statements from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including the public appearances of the Minister and Deputy Ministers, transcripts from press briefings, “answers to the press,” and official statements and “comments”), as well as transcripts from the President’s public appearances, and news documents from the Ministry of Defense. On the Norwegian side we have examined documents that include references to both Russia and the Arctic; for Russia, we have studied documents that include references to Norway or the Arctic—the difference being due to the far higher number of documents on the Norwegian side.
close to the Norwegian border. In October/November, Norway hosted the largest NATO military exercise since the 1980s, involving 50 000 troops, 150 aircraft, 65 ships and 10 000 on-land vehicles. At the same time, a US-led military... more
close to the Norwegian border. In October/November, Norway hosted the largest NATO military exercise since the 1980s, involving 50 000 troops, 150 aircraft, 65 ships and 10 000 on-land vehicles. At the same time, a US-led military exercise, “Northern Screen,” was held in Troms, in North Norway, involving the aircraft carrier Harry S Truman. It is fair to say that what some call “the New Cold War” has metastasized to the North.
The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has already obstructed cooperation across a range of issues. Could it also affect state interaction between Norway and Russia in the Arctic—an area and a relationship long... more
The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has already obstructed cooperation across a range of issues. Could it also affect state interaction between Norway and Russia in the Arctic—an area and a relationship long characterized by a culture of compromise and/or cooperation? Here we start from the theoretical premise that states are not pre-constituted political entities, but are constantly in the making. How Russia views its own role and how it views other actors in the Arctic changes over time, calling for differing approaches. That holds true for Norway as well. To clarify the premises for interaction between Russia and Norway in the Arctic, we scrutinize changes in official discourse on Self and Other in the Arctic on both sides in the period 2012 to 2016, to establish what kind of policy mode—“realist,” “institutionalist,” or “diplomatic management”—has underlain the two countries’ official discourse in that period. Has Norway continued to pursue “balancing” policies...
There has been much discussion as to whether NATO's current forward deployment and pattern of exercises in the east along Russia's borders are sufficient to 'deter Russia', but very little discussion about... more
There has been much discussion as to whether NATO's current forward deployment and pattern of exercises in the east along Russia's borders are sufficient to 'deter Russia', but very little discussion about what effect these efforts have. In this chapter we examine how NATO's recent preoccupation with deterrence has been received by Russia and what consequences this may have for future relations between the two actors. The crises in Ukraine, Russia's use of military power and the annexation of Crimea triggered a new dynamic. Dormant historical perceptions of the other as 'aggressive and expansionist' were reinforced, pre-existing narratives on the sources of the crisis were exacerbated and spurred a reliance on deterrence as the core strategy on both sides. While NATO's increasing military presence on its eastern flank is not very impressive in numerical terms, Russia has reacted by taking measures to counter this new challenge. In the Russian view, NATO still enjoys a clear conventional advantage at the aggregate level, and any build-up closer to Russia's borders by an 'aggressive and expansionist' NATO must be met by increased deterrence. At the same time, the fact that Russia currently lacks the military strength for strategic offensive attacks against NATO countries seems to be unimportant in NATO's reasoning (Golts 2016). Russian leaders underline that Russia has neither the military capability nor political, economic or real ideological interests in launching a strategic offensive against the West, and have repeatedly held that the measures taken are of a purely
Abstract This article investigates how Russian foreign policies are shaped in a two-level interactive social game. Russian foreign policies take their cue from ingrained identity positions articulated by the state leadership and... more
Abstract This article investigates how Russian foreign policies are shaped in a two-level interactive social game. Russian foreign policies take their cue from ingrained identity positions articulated by the state leadership and negotiated in domestic debates, but they are also informed by interaction with other states. The article explains the shift in Russian policies away from pragmatic cooperation with the West in Syria from autumn 2015 onwards. While the Russian leadership initially sought such cooperation, the prominence of anti-Western discourse in Russia following the crisis in Ukraine as well as the West's rejection of Russia in this period spurred Russia to act independently in Syria.
... In the case of Movsar Baraev, war and violence totally dominated his experience of adult life. ... invasion of Afghanistan many had rallied to defend their fellow Muslims, inspired by the ... Faced with growing opposition from the... more
... In the case of Movsar Baraev, war and violence totally dominated his experience of adult life. ... invasion of Afghanistan many had rallied to defend their fellow Muslims, inspired by the ... Faced with growing opposition from the radical warlords who could subsidise their small armies ...
This article examines how understandings of the rule of law are shaped in the Chechen diaspora in Norway. Taking as our point of departure studies of legal pluralism and the co-existence of traditional Adat, religious Sharia and Russian... more
This article examines how understandings of the rule of law are shaped in the Chechen diaspora in Norway. Taking as our point of departure studies of legal pluralism and the co-existence of traditional Adat, religious Sharia and Russian secular law in Chechnya, we examine the effect of living in a host country by asking: How do members of the Chechen diaspora, here defined as conflict-generated diaspora, view and internalize legal models in Norway? What type of state governance do they see as ideal for themselves and for Chechnya in the future? Further: what might the underlying explanation for their choices be? We assume that just as different waves of violence in Chechnya created different diaspora communities that today exhibit specific social, cultural and political traits, the latest wave of forced emigration to Europe after the post-Soviet Russo–Chechen wars may have made specific imprints on the legal preferences of this diaspora. The picture that emerges from our in-depth in...
This dissertation investigates how violence against a given territory or group of people becomes acceptable to leaders and their publics. Some wars are launched only reluctantly, and support dwindles once the high human costs are... more
This dissertation investigates how violence against a given territory or group of people becomes acceptable to leaders and their publics. Some wars are launched only reluctantly, and support dwindles once the high human costs are revealaed. Others, however, are undertaken with a sense of urgency and righteousness. The brute violence employed appears not only acceptable, but even necessary. The second post-soviet war which was launched against Chechnya in 1999 was such a war. The thesis employs and develops a post-structuralist version of securitization theory. This approach emphasises securitization as an intersubjective and ongoing process of legitimation, not an instance or a moment. The social construction of Chechnya and Chechens as 'terrorist' is conceptualized as a collective endeavour. Not only statements by the Russian leadership, but also historical representations as well as those of the wider political elite, journalists and experts contributed to this rough categorization. In the final chapter the thesis investigates how this linguistic categorization materialized in the brutal practices employed during the Second Chechen War.
Does not require abstract Published; 16.march 2016 Citation: Kristin Haugevik & Julie Wilhelmsen (2016). «Oljefondet og utenrikspolitikken». Internasjonal Politikk, 74, 1: 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.17585/ip.v74.414

And 46 more

En knapp måned etter valget av Donald Trump som USAs neste president har spådommene om den liberale verdens endelikt og radikale utenrikspolitiske endringer stilnet noe. Det er blitt påpekt at valgkamp har sin egen logikk og at Trump... more
En knapp måned etter valget av Donald Trump som USAs neste president har spådommene om den liberale verdens endelikt og radikale utenrikspolitiske endringer stilnet noe. Det er blitt påpekt at valgkamp har sin egen logikk og at Trump kanskje vil moderere seg så fort han sitter i presidentstolen.
«Politikkens fremtid vil avgjøres i Asia.» Slik åpnet en mye lest artikkel i Foreign Policy fra 2011, signert USAs utenriksminister Hillary Clinton. Artikkelen spådde at amerikansk utenrikspolitikk det neste århundret, først og fremst... more
«Politikkens fremtid vil avgjøres i Asia.» Slik åpnet en mye lest artikkel i Foreign Policy fra 2011, signert USAs utenriksminister Hillary Clinton. Artikkelen spådde at amerikansk utenrikspolitikk det neste århundret, først og fremst ville dreie seg om Asia og Stillehavet. «Akkurat som Asia er avgjørende for USAs fremtid, er et engasjert USA også avgjørende for Asias fremtid», skrev Clinton. Obama-administrasjonens signaler om en dreining mot Asia gikk ikke upåaktet hen i resten av verden. Også i de nordiske landene var effekten observerbar. Et konkret utslag var økt satsning på Asia-kunnskap, og særlig Kina. I Norge anla for eksempel både Institutt for Forsvarsstudier og NUPI egne Asia-sentre. Også her i Internasjonal Politikk så vi en «Asia-effekt». Redaksjonen har de siste fem årene mottatt påfallende mange fagartikler med særlig Kina som tema.
Forskningsresultater bør så langt det er mulig formidles til offentligheten. Gjerne i en tilgjengelig form, men uten at funnene eller analysen overforenkles. Den slags forskningsformidling foregår i dag i flere kanaler. Forskere... more
Forskningsresultater bør så langt det er mulig formidles til offentligheten. Gjerne i en tilgjengelig form, men uten at funnene eller analysen overforenkles. Den slags forskningsformidling foregår i dag i flere kanaler. Forskere kommuniserer faglig innsikt gjennom foredrag og undervisning, i kommentarer til media og som deltakere på seminarer og i paneldebatter. Mange forskere er også kompetente brukere av blogger og sosiale medier, hvor allmennheten kan nås uten kompliserende mellomledd. En kanal for forskningsformidling forblir likevel i en ubestridt særstilling: Det vitenskapelige tidsskriftet.
I skrivende stund - mars 2016 - er det norske oljefondets oppgitte størrelse på 7066 milliarder kroner. Tross økonomiske nedgangstider - Finansdepartementet bekreftet nylig at staten i 2016 må gjøre uttak fra fondet for første gang -... more
I skrivende stund - mars 2016 - er det norske oljefondets oppgitte størrelse på 7066 milliarder kroner. Tross økonomiske nedgangstider - Finansdepartementet bekreftet nylig at staten i 2016 må gjøre uttak fra fondet for første gang - fremstår summen fortsatt som svimlende høy. Internasjonalt og sett i forhold til folketallet er Norge en finansstormakt. Oljefondet har en stor del av æren for dette og for det høye velferdsnivået norske borgere nyter godt av. Spørsmålet om å øke bruken av «oljepenger» for nasjonale formål er da også et tilbakevendende tema i ordskiftet her hjemme. Et mindre debattert, men om mulig enda mer innfløkt spørsmål, er om Oljefondet allerede er eller burde være et virkemiddel i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Og hvis ja, hvor bevisst og hvordan skal Oljefondet brukes for best å ivareta det relativt brede spekteret av norske interesser på den internasjonale arena?
Når dette nummeret av Internasjonal Politikk utkommer er det gått en knapp uke siden Nobels fredspris for 2014 ble delt ut i Oslo. I år deler indiske Kailash Satyarthi og pakistanske Malala Yousafzay prisen for sin kamp mot undertrykkelse... more
Når dette nummeret av Internasjonal Politikk utkommer er det gått en knapp uke siden Nobels fredspris for 2014 ble delt ut i Oslo. I år deler indiske Kailash Satyarthi og pakistanske Malala Yousafzay prisen for sin kamp mot undertrykkelse av barn og ungdom og for barns rett til utdannelse. «Barn skal gå på skole, ikke utnyttes for økonomiske formål,» skriver Nobelkomiteen i sin begrunnelse, og fortsetter: «I verdens fattige land er 60 prosent av befolkningen i dag under 25 år. Det er en forutsetning for en fredelig utvikling globalt at barn og unges rettigheter respekteres. Særlig i konfliktområder bidrar overgrep mot barn til at konflikter føres videre gjennom generasjoner.» Vi mener det er på tide at barn løftes frem ikke bare på den internasjonale politiske dagsorden, men også innenfor fagfeltet internasjonal politikk.
Norge og verden utenfor I 1814 er Napoleonskrigene i Europa inne i sin siste fase, og i november samles stormaktene i den kjente Wienerkongressen for å få orden på maktforholdene i Europa. Noen måneder før har et nytt Norge fått sin... more
Norge og verden utenfor I 1814 er Napoleonskrigene i Europa inne i sin siste fase, og i november samles stormaktene i den kjente Wienerkongressen for å få orden på maktforholdene i Europa. Noen måneder før har et nytt Norge fått sin grunnlov og sin egen konge. Stormaktsspillet var avgjørende for Norges selvstendighet. Forholdet mellom Norge, Danmark og Sverige ble flittig diskutert i parlamenter og i diplomatiske kretser rundt om i Europa. Skandinavia stod midt i den europeiske stormen frem mot 1814, en periode preget av internasjonal uorden. 200 år senere har vi, uten sammenligning forøvrig, også opplevd en sommer preget av sterk internasjonal uro. På norske avisforsider har den ene krisen avløst den andre som toppsak: i Ukraina, på Gazastripen, i Syria og i Irak. Som i 1814 har vi med all tydelighet fått bekreftet at Norge ikke er en isolert øy i verden – kriser og konflikter internasjonalt påvirker i høyeste grad oss «her hjemme». Norge forventes å svare og ta stilling til det som skjer i andre deler av verden. Og vi påvirkes av det som skjer, enten det er direkte gjennom det nye sanksjonsregimet mot Russland, syriske flyktninger som kommer til Norge eller anmodninger fra våre allierte om å yte humanitaer bistand i Irak.
Ut fra almenne forestillinger skulle en kanskje tro at det er en enkel sammenheng mellom trusselbilde og omleggingsprosess, der det første styrer det siste. Slik er det ikke. Når vi studerer ordskiftet om forsvaret av Norge over tid,... more
Ut fra almenne forestillinger skulle en kanskje tro at det er en enkel sammenheng mellom trusselbilde og omleggingsprosess, der det første styrer det siste. Slik er det ikke. Når vi studerer ordskiftet om forsvaret av Norge over tid, synes det styrende elementet vel så mye å vaere hvem vi må stå sammen med, som hvem som truer oss.
Den arabiske verden er i endring. Opprøret i regionen, nå veletablert under navnet «den arabiske våren», har fått et omfang og en utstrekning få kunne spådd i forkant. Det som startet som et moderat folkeopprør i Tunisia vinteren og våren... more
Den arabiske verden er i endring. Opprøret i regionen, nå veletablert under navnet «den arabiske våren», har fått et omfang og en utstrekning få kunne spådd i forkant. Det som startet som et moderat folkeopprør i Tunisia vinteren og våren 2011, spredte seg med overraskende fart og styrke til andre land i regionen.
Internasjonal Politikk har fra og med dette nummeret fått nytt redaktør-team. Vi er stolte over å ha overtatt ansvaret for det ledende skandinavisk-språklige fagtidsskriftet innenfor fagområdet internasjonal politikk, og har gått i gang... more
Internasjonal Politikk har fra og med dette nummeret fått nytt redaktør-team. Vi er stolte over å ha overtatt ansvaret for det ledende skandinavisk-språklige fagtidsskriftet innenfor fagområdet internasjonal politikk, og har gått i gang med oppgaven med stor iver.
Faget internasjonal politikk er i bevegelse. Det skyldes i stor grad at de tradisjonelle rammene for hvordan internasjonal politikk og relasjoner kan og bør studeres, stadig utfordres og utvides. Mens det tidligere var relativt vanntette... more
Faget internasjonal politikk er i bevegelse. Det skyldes i stor grad at de tradisjonelle rammene for hvordan internasjonal politikk og relasjoner kan og bør studeres, stadig utfordres og utvides. Mens det tidligere var relativt vanntette skott mellom jurister, økonomer, historikere, samfunnsvitere og filologers forskning på internasjonal politikk, opererer disse nå i større grad på den samme faglige arenaen og innenfor det samme akademiske ordskiftet.
Droner er ikke et nytt fenomen – tidlige eksemplarer av arten har vært i bruk helt siden første verdenskrig. Derimot har bruken av droner økt ekspansivt de senere årene, både for militære og sivile formål. Droner er bare et eksempel av... more
Droner er ikke et nytt fenomen – tidlige eksemplarer av arten har vært i bruk helt siden første verdenskrig. Derimot har bruken av droner økt ekspansivt de senere årene, både for militære og sivile formål. Droner er bare et eksempel av mange på en bredere teknologiseringstrend i internasjonal politikk og samfunn. I dette nummeret av Internasjonal Politikk har vi viet Fokusspalten til et dypdykk i teknologiseringen av humanitært arbeid. I det humanitære feltet er teknologiseringstrenden forholdsvis ny, og spalten belyser hvordan droner og teknologisering på den ene siden kan bidra til bedre oversikt, at hjelp kommer frem og er mer målrettet, at sivile lidelser reduseres og at et fredelig utfall kommer et steg nærmere. På den andre siden, og som flere av bidragene synliggjør, fører også teknologien med seg nye problemstillinger og utfordringer.
Denne utgaven av Internasjonal Politikk setter søkelys på to tema som begge ligger tidsskriftets hjerte nær: Fagartikkelseksjonen handler om EU som arena for og premissleverandør for europeiske lands utenrikspolitikk. Fokusspalten handler... more
Denne utgaven av Internasjonal Politikk setter søkelys på to tema som begge ligger tidsskriftets hjerte nær: Fagartikkelseksjonen handler om EU som arena for og premissleverandør for europeiske lands utenrikspolitikk. Fokusspalten handler om hvilke utviklingstrekk som vil prege verden og det internasjonale samfunnet i tiden fremover. I sentrum for begge seksjoner står Norge og norsk utenrikspolitikk: Hvordan påvirkes Norge av prosesser i EU, og hvordan forholder EU seg til Norge sammenlignet med andre utenforland? Hvordan vil norsk utenrikspolitikk se ut åtte år frem i tid?
Noen temaer i internasjonal politikk er lett tilgjengelige for folk flest og kan formidles gjennom enkle overskrifter. Andre er mer kompliserte. Folkeretten og det såkalte maktforbudet er et eksempel på det siste. Når Russland nylig... more
Noen temaer i internasjonal politikk er lett tilgjengelige for folk flest og kan formidles gjennom enkle overskrifter. Andre er mer kompliserte. Folkeretten og det såkalte maktforbudet er et eksempel på det siste. Når Russland nylig plasserte sine tropper på ukrainsk territorium og argumenterte – blant annet med henvisning til 'humanitær krise' – for at dette var en legitim handling, er det en illustrasjon på hvor lett folkeretten kan bli offer for staters politiske spill. Det viser også hvordan tolkningen av folkeretten endrer seg over tid, og hvordan ulike aktører fortolker den stilt overfor ulike internasjonale konflikter og kriser.
In October 2016, international media reported that the Russia– US diplomatic dialogue over Syria had collapsed, with both sides holding the other party to blame. While the US State Department observed that ‘everybody’s patience with... more
In October 2016, international media reported that the Russia– US diplomatic dialogue over Syria had collapsed, with both sides holding the other party to blame. While the US State Department observed that ‘everybody’s patience with Russia has run out’, Russia’s Foreign Minister criticized the United States for using ‘a language of sanctions and ultimatums while continuing selective cooperation with our country’ (CNN 2016). The breakdown and the statements that ensued marked the endpoint of a turbulent diplomatic year, which had begun with a brief handshake between presidents Obama and Putin at the UN General Assembly late in September 2015. In the months following that handshake, Russia and the US-led coalition participated in talks and activities aimed at finding a negotiated solution to the civil war in Syria as well as to defeat international terrorism there.