Discovering Challenges in democratization and
elections of Somaliland
Mustafe Osman
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirement of the degree of
Master of Arts in Human Rights and Conflict
Management
At the
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy
2016
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First and for most thanks belongs to Allah! Second, it is with immense gratitude that I acknowledge the
support and help of my Professor Andrea De Guttry for the continuous and endless supports he gave
me throughout the Master program.
In addition, very big thanks goes to my friends, Mohamed Hashi, Mukhtar Abdi, Kaltuun Shiikh and
Sharma’arke those gave me tireless supports in designing, collecting and analyzing data collections,
questionnaires and interviews and without them it will be difficult for me to get direct and fresh
information regarding the topic of the thesis. Thank you so much again and again.
Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife Hibo Ahmed. Her support, encouragement,
quiet patience and unwavering love were undeniable. Her moral and emotional supports are deep in my
mind and I will never forget it. I thank my parents, mom Khadra and dad Osman, for their faith in me
and allowing me to be as ambitious as I wanted. It was under their watchful eye that I gained so much
drive and an ability to tackle challenges head on.
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STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICITY
I confirm that all materials presented in this thesis are my own creation and incorporate my own ideas
and judgments. The information herein is true, correct and accurate to the best of my knowledge. Any
work adopted from other sources is properly cited and referenced as such as I am aware that
plagiarism is a crime and can be ground for expulsion
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Abstract
Somaliland is a leading de facto state championing the adoption and practice of democracy in the
Greater Horn. Since 2002, Somalilanders have been going to polls in five consecutive elections and
elected two local municipalities, one parliament and two presidents. The prevalence of free and fair
elections as well as constitutionally changed governments is unique to Somaliland. Democracy has not
been imported or injected into Somaliland; in fact there has been very little external support towards
their goal. Somaliland’s democratization has been motivated by the indigenous Somali political system
which has existed for centuries. This system had facilitated Somaliland’s state and peace building as
well as laid the foundations for democratization in Somaliland. Post 1991, Somaliland’s traditional and
clan leaders played a major role in the peace building and reconciliation processes of the country and
they successfully managed it. They reconciled the clans, ended hostilities and took the lion’s share on
the formation of the first and the second Somaliland governments. From 1991 up to 2001 Somaliland
was using a hybrid system which gave more power to the traditional clan leaders. After 2001, however,
a transition from clan politics to modern multiparty democratic system begun and still continues today.
This thesis will explore the relations between these two systems and their compatibility. It will also
highlight the influence of clans and Somali traditional systems on the democratization process and its
impact on future developments in Somaliland.
The practice of democratization in Somaliland started after the adoption of the Constitution of
Somaliland in 2001. Elections followed but democratization didn’t evolve much because of numerous
and frequent challenges delayed the elections and sometimes caused conflicts. This research aims to
discover the challenges of Somaliland’s democratization and election processes emphasizing on the
electoral processes.
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Table of Contents
Background ............................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
1. Somali Traditional Governance Systems .......................................................................................... 10
1.1. The Impact of Colonization on Somali Traditional Governance Systems ................................. 11
1.2. Thirty years of Unity and governance Changes in Somaliland (1960 – 1991) ......................... 13
1.3. The Rise of the Somali National Movement (SNM) and its Peculiarity...................................... 13
1.4. The Collapse of the Somali State and Re-emergence of Somaliland as a Defacto State (1991 –
2001) ................................................................................................................................................. 16
1.5. The role of the traditional governance in Peace and State building in Somaliland 1991 – 200118
2. Post 2001 Democratization and Election Challenges in Somaliland................................................. 24
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 24
2.2. First phase of the Democratization of Somaliland’s Political System 2001–2005 ..................... 25
2.2.1. The First Local Governanment Elections in Somaliland (December 2002) .......................... 26
2.2.2. The First Presidential Election ............................................................................................. 28
2.2.3. The First and the Last Parliamentary Election for the next 24 years.................................... 29
2.3. The Second Phase of the Somaliland democratization process (2005 – present) .................... 29
2.3.1. Second Presidential elections 2010 ..................................................................................... 31
2.3.2. The Second Local District Elections 2012 ........................................................................... 33
2.4. Evaluation and analysis of the Somaliland democratization process ........................................ 33
2.4.1. Systemic challenges to democratization of Somaliland ...................................................... 36
2.4.2. Technical Challenges of Somaliland’s Democratization ...................................................... 40
3. Conclusion........................................................................................................................................ 43
4. Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 47
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Acronym
A.P.D
Academy for Peace and Development
C.I.I.R
Catholic Institute of International Relations
C.R.D
Center for Research and Dialogue
E.U
European Union
I.C.G
International Crisis Group
I.G.A.D
Inter Governmental Authority on Development
I.R.I
International Republican Institute
N.F.D
Northern Frontier District
N.E.C
National Election Commission
S.N.L
Somali National League
S.N.M
Somali National Movement
SO.R.A.D.I
Social Research and Development Institute
S.S.D.F
Somali Salvation Democratic Front
U.C.I.D
Ururka Cadaalada Iyo Daryeelka
U.D.U.B
Ururka Dimuqraadiga Umadaha Bahoobay
U.S.A
United Stated of America
U.S.C
United Somali Congress
U.N.D.P
United Nations Development Program
W.S.P
War-torn Society Project
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Background
The people of Somaliland share the same history with other Somali speaking people in the Horn of
Africa. The Somali people have no written records of their history, but possess a rich oral tradition of
poetries and narratives. However, without written records, as many Somali authors noted, the task of
writing about the history of Somalia becomes very difficult.1 The population of the Somali people is
estimated to be at about 8 million; they are scattered on the eastern parts of the Horn of Africa,
between the river Awash in eastern Ethiopia and Lake Tana in northern Kenya.2 The Somali people are
also regarded to be a demographic exception to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa because of their
homogeneity in ethnicity, culture, religion and language. This homogeneity and peculiarity of having
one ethno-cultural background is considered a privilege and national pride to the Somali people..3
Before Islam reached the shores of the Horn of Africa, the Somali people had no religion and traded
with the Pharaohs and with India. The land belonged to anyone and everyone can reside wherever
possible. The claims to land in Somali culture began only after the advent of Islam, which the Somalis
took as their religion. ‘The question of land ownership’, writes Nuradin, ‘was not one that came up often
before Islam arrived on the shores of the country: the land belonged to the clan families dwelling on it.
However, from the time Somalis became Muslims the land was said to belong to Allah and not to the
people living on it. This opened the entire territory to every Muslim regardless of his or her origin.’4
Thus, the first Somali boundaries were created and were based on religion. The Somali people and
other Muslim communities have been living in the ‘Somali’ region ever since and their pastoralist
lifestyles had them moving from one place to another.
After the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 on the ‘Scramble for and partition of Africa’, the Horn of Africa
and eastern coasts of Somalia attracted the major super powers of Europe. The Somali inhabited areas
became competitive grounds for every super power to implement their hegemonic projects and deepen
influence. As I. M. Lewis pointed:
“In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the superpowers competing in the region were
the British and the French. Their primary interest centered on control of the Nile waters. The
British were installed at Aden and sought to prevent, or minimize, the French influence on the
adjacent Somali coast. They used their allies, the Italian, as an additional means of countering
French ambition. The French had somewhat similar relationship with the Russians, who at this
Nuradin Farah, Somalia a nation without state: “To Whom Does Somalia Belong?” A Novelist’s Account of the Somali
Conflict 2007, p 7, Accessed on December 2015 at: http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:241192/FULLTEXT01.pdf
2 Lewis, I.M, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, 2008, p 1
3 Hassan Ahmed, K, In Quest for a Culture of Peace in the IGAD Region: The Role of Intellectuals and Scholars: Somalia: A
nation in search of a state, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2006, p 163
4 Nuradin Farah, Somalia a nation without state: “To Whom Does Somalia Belong?” A Novelist’s Account of the Somali
Conflict, 2007, p 7 Accessed on December 2015 at: http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:241192/FULLTEXT01.pdf
1
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time had a lively interest in the Horn of Africa. To safeguard the supply of Somali mutton for the
Aden garrison, in the 1880s the British signed ‘protection’ treaties with a number of northern
clans. The French and the Italian did likewise”.5
The colonial powers dismissed the Somali people’s claims to land (before and after Islam). They
negotiated access to the Somali territories with the elders and clan leaders in exchange for protection
and small commodities. ‘From then on,’ Nuradin observed, ‘the colonialists had the authority to claim
ownership of the land and required all Somalis to carry identification cards as British, Italian or French
subjects, as well as making them apply for visas if they wanted to travel between the different Somaliinhabited colonial territories.’6 Although Somalis have many things in common, their perspectives on
public administration and governance differed. Their perspectives varied according to their colonizers,
Britain (northern Somalia/Somaliland) and Italy (southern Somalia). The difference created major
conflicts between the statesmen and the public leaders. As Lewis writes, ‘there was a wide divergence
between Italian and British practices in administration, bureaucratic procedures, accounting, law etc.
These were not easily resolved and there was often considerable friction between British- and Italian –
trained personnel.’7
Adopting the western style of governance and leaving the local and traditional cultures aside would
transpire into a ‘mistake’ in Somali politics and state formation. No attention had been given to consider
how appropriate the Eurocentric state framework would prove in the local setting.8 Since Somali people
had little or no experience in modern state governance and management of the public affairs, the newly
formed “Somali state inherited most of the practices and behaviors of the colonial powers”. 9
This ‘mistake’ took 29 years which then resulted in a full collapse of the Somali state in 1991. Though
many efforts were made to understand why the Somali state failed, we still do not have sufficient
answers. As Lewis indicates, ‘it is easier, of course, to appreciate these issues in retrospect after the
collapse of Somalia and failure of every effort to resurrect a functioning state … So, there is no sign that
national and international authorities grasp the problem posed by Somali traditional politics’10
Lewis, I.M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, 2008, p 28
Nuradin Farah, Somalia a nation without state: “To Whom Does Somalia Belong?” A Novelist’s Account of the Somali
Conflict, 2007, p 8 Accessed on December 2015 at:
http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:241192/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
7 Lewis I. M., Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, 2008, p 34
8 Ibid p 34
9 Nuradin Farah, Somalia a nation without state: “To Whom Does Somalia Belong?” A Novelist’s Account of the Somali
Conflict, 2007, p 8 Accessed on December 2015 at:
http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:241192/FULLTEXT01.pdf
10 Lewis I.M., Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, 2008 , p 34
5
6
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The Somali people had traditional indigenous laws and ways to manage their affairs. They didn’t have
any understanding or knowledge on modern state systems, which most other African states did gain
after the 1960s. Somalis do have a unique culture, but they practice it differently and that produced
different results in different regions such as democratization in northern ‘Somaliland’ and chaos and
instability in southern Somalia. In this study, I will a) elaborate on the democratic history of Somaliland,
and b) the differences in the democratic history between Somaliland and the southern Somalia.
Somaliland was a British Protectorate that gained independence on 26 June 1960, and four days later,
on 1 July 1960, united with the Italian Somali colony in the south. The Unification of Somaliland and
Somalia had been perceived at the time as the first step towards the vision of a ‘Greater Somalia’ in
which all five11 Somali speaking territories would be united under one Somali state12. The unification
was seen by somalilanders as a political mistake made by the people of Somaliland because the major
offices of the President and Prime Minister, as well as the capital went to the south.
The pan-Somali idea failed in thirty years of the unified Somali territories also due to the deadly wars
with neighboring state of Ethiopia. In 1991, civil war broke out which resulted in the fall of the
Government of Somalia. Northern Somalia seceded from the unification and declared itself to be a
separate state called Somaliland. Thus, state building efforts with a vision to become a democratic
state began in Somaliland. The first ten years had traditional governance structures13, while
democratization and elections were gradually developing. Ibrahim records the political development,
‘the transformation of the representative democracy in Somaliland into a popular one based on direct
elections started with the formation of Political Associations that can compete to become the three
parties allowed under the constitution.’14
Elections are very important to the democratization process. They enable citizens to choose their future
leaders and make their governments accountable. Since 2002, Somaliland has conducted five
elections: one parliamentary, two district council and two presidential elections with smooth power
transfers.15 In this study, I aim to explore and understand the democratic challenges which Somaliland
has faced and why all elections get delayed from their schedules.
The five Somali territories are British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Northern Frontier District NFD which was ruled by
British under Kenya, Ogaden, a Somali region under Ethiopia and Djibouti which was a French colony.
12 WSP International, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities , Red Sea press Inc., Asmara 2005
13 Jama Ibrahim, H., Somaliland Electoral Laws 2009, Progressio
14 Ibid, 43
15 Joshua O, et al, Elections and conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013, Princeton University. Accessed on December 2015
at https://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/other/591c-Elections-and-Conflict-SSA-2013.pdf
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1. Somali Traditional Governance Systems
Traditional governance systems have existed in Somali for hundreds of years. They were mainly based
on agreements and resolutions made by clan leaders settled in specific areas of the region. The
unwritten agreements and resolutions comprise the ‘Xeer’ which is the traditional legal system of
Somalia. They are customary laws and practices memorized and stored in the minds of the traditional
clan leaders and elders of Somali.16 The authority to produce ‘Xeer’ mainly lay with the clan elders who
were also the governing bodies of every issue in the community. The traditional governance of the
Somali people took place in community councils known as ‘Shir’, translates to ‘the gathering’, which
required every male elder to attend when necessary.17 The decision-making process in ‘Shir’ was
democratic and participatory and all male adults were allowed to participate equally. “These councils
provided a governing structure that acted as a means of enforcement of law and justice, as well as the
decision and lawmaking body”.18
Public administration was limited to the urban areas. The larger population continued to follow the
‘Xeer’.19 Bradbury defined ‘Xeer’ as ‘traditional law agreed upon by the clans in each area, and
dependent on the deliberations of elders who gather to resolve specific problems within a clan or
between clans.’20 The Somali are Muslim and they practice Islamic Sharia Laws within their system of
traditional customary laws which also influenced ‘Xeer’. Rebecca noted how “Sharia law played a
pivotal role in the evolution on the Somali communities’ traditional laws. It shaped the ‘‘Xeer’’ through
the amalgamation of the traditional Somali custom and that of the Islamic Sharia, and has projected it in
its domain” .21
The highest authority in Somali traditional governance systems is the Guurti, a council of clan elders.
The Guurti’s decisions are made through the consensus of its members. It mediates complex inter-clan
conflicts, makes and enforces laws or actions, and can even call on the Shir to resolve conflicts
between clans. Bradbury notes,
‘These clan councils continue to function within Somali society particularly in the context of state
collapse and in the absence of state institutions. In many areas of post-collapse Somalia and the
World Bank, Traditional Governance in Somalia South Central Somalia, Report, 2005 , p 3, Accessed on December
2015 at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/153065/southcentralsomalia.pdf
17 Rebecca, R. Understanding state building: Traditional governance and the modern state in Somaliland, Ashgate
Publishing Company, 2014, p 68
18 Lewis, I.M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, New York
2008, p 9
19 World Bank, Traditional Governance in Somalia South Central Somalia, Draft Report , 2005 , p 3–4 Accessed on
December 2015 at: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/153065/southcentralsomalia.pdf
20 Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building,
2008, p 11
21 Ibid, p 11
16
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clan system provides a “structure for inter-group relations and governance, for organizing and
managing violence and for organizing trade” through Shir and Guurti.’22
The traditional governance systems have existed throughout Somali inhabited territories and a majority
of Somalis in the rural areas use it to regulate all social interactions in the absence of the state. They
are rarely used in the urban areas as they were centres of the colonial administration away from
traditional influences. The subsequent Somali governments did not endeavor to build upon the
indigenous system of governance, but instead introduced the Western style of governance.23
1.1. The Impact of colonization on the Somali traditional Governance Systems
The Somali people in general are unique and homogenous, but there are differences because their
social structure is composed of clans and sub-clans. Therefore, it is difficult to understand
contemporary Somali politics and governance systems without understanding their clan systems and
traditional governance structures first. They are intrinsic to the process of state building in Somaliland.24
It is also important to examine the colonial and post-colonial governance structures of the entire Somali
territory including the clan political systems also the contemporary system of governance which guided
the democratization of Somaliland and engendered the current political status.
The British came to Somaliland after agreements were signed between the different clan leaders
following which Somaliland became a British Protectorate. According to WSP International, ‘For most of
the periods of British rule in Somaliland, very little potential activity was either permitted or encouraged.
The colonial authority exercised control through a system of indirect rule relied upon traditional
leadership structures.’25
The British were not interested to colonize Somaliland fully, but rather controlling the coastal areas
which connected to the Red Sea. However, Britain did deploy a few soldiers to the hinterland of
Somaliland during the war against the Dervish.26 Rebecca described this as, “following the defeat of
the Dervish the British moved their administrative centre from the coastal port of Berbera to the interior
city of Hargeisa, signaling their intention to shift their focus to establishing an authoritative presence
throughout the entirety of the territory rather than only the coast.’27
Bradbury, M. Becoming Somaliland, Indiana University Press, 2008, p 15
The Center for Research and Dialogue and Interpeace, Search for Peace South: Community-based Peace Processes in
South-Central Somalia, 2008, p 12,
24 Bradbury M. Becoming Somaliland, Indiana University Press, 2008, p14
25 Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, A vote for Peace: How Somaliland Successfully hosted its First
Parliamentary Elections in 35 years, 2006, p 9
26 A Somali rebel force led by Mohammed Abdulle Hassan against the colonial occupations in Somali territories.
27 Rebecca, R. Understanding state building: Traditional governance and the modern state in Somaliland, Ashgate
Publishing Company, 2014, p 77
22
23
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The British continued to neglect Somaliland’s internal affairs and had little interest in maintaining law
and order. The traditional Somali structures of clans and governance were, however, utilized in the
administration of the territories with little British presence. In the beginning of the British colony, there
were only around three British residents in Somaliland; they were in charge of three districts. Towards
the end of the colonial rule, the number of British residents increased to five administrating six
districts.28 Lewis writes, ‘Somaliland, Britain’s “Cinderella of Empire”, where there were no European
settlers in contrast to the thousands of Italian in fascist Somalia, remained an essentially Somali
territory very different from cosmopolitan Somalia.’29 Rebecca also argued that it was ‘because of the
weak and inconsistent nature of British administration of the territory, the dominance of the clan
governance system persisted in many areas, and many traditional practices continued relatively
uninterrupted throughout the colonial rule.’30
On the other hand, the Italian colonization of southern Somalia was different than that of the British in
the north. It was done with the intent of first expanding into Ethiopia, but was then turned into a settler
colony in which land was acquired and plantations established to relocate the surplus population at
home31. The different colonial histories of the Somalis resulted in different legacies and ways of
managing their affairs, but these differences have not been assessed in-depth.32 According to Rebecca:
‘In the south, the heavily invested Italian colonizers ruled through both force and patronage,
depending upon Somali population for their plantation workforce. Through conscription, forced
labour displacement and financial incentives, the Italian administration disrupted pre-existing
forms of social, economic and political control, especially that exercised by the clan.
Infrastructural development deemed necessary for the economic benefit of the plantations was
carried out. And rudimentary education enforced so as to ensure a trained pool of labour’.33
Unlike in Somaliland, the traditional governance structures and clan systems in the south were not
allowed to grow and accommodate the social, political and economic systems of the people. Although
there are arguments indicating that Italians did much better than the British in terms of building social
infrastructures, but as indicated earlier in this paper, the aim of this thesis is to elaborate on the Somali
governance structures and their traditions as well as the legacies left by the European colonial powers
but not the development and social infrastructures they left.
Ibid p 78
Lewis, I.M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, New York
2008, p 30
30 Ibid p 79
31 Ibid P 79
32 Fox, M.J. The Roots of Somali Political Culture, First Forum Press, 2015, p 4
28
29
Rebecca, R. Understanding state building: Traditional governance and the modern state in Somaliland, Ashgate
Publishing Company, 2014
33
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1.2. Thirty years of Unity and Governance Changes in Somaliland (1960 – 1991)
After years of colonial occupation, the Somaliland British Protectorate gained its independence on 26
June 1960. It then united with the Italian trusteeship in the south. Although there were some people
those advised against the immediate unification but they were not listened because people were highly
overwhelmed by nationalism and the hope of Greater Somali State.34 Within few days the Somaliland
state disappeared and became part of Somali Republic. Immediately after the union disagreement
started because the somalilanders felt that the union is disadvantage and they did not get their share
on the higher political posts. According to WSP International,
‘Politically, Somalilanders entered the union at a disadvantage. Despite Somaliland’s preference
that a single Act of Union be agreed by both governments prior to merger, this fundamental step
was never taken. A presidential decree entitled the ‘Law of Union of Somaliland and Somalia’
submitted to the combined legislatures failed to win their approvals, and the matter was
ultimately referred to the people in a problematic referendum.... when the referendum was held
in June 1961 to approve the new, joint constitution, the Somali National League 35 (SNL), decided
to boycott it. Of the 100,000 recorded voters in Somaliland, over 60% opposed the constitution,
72% in Hargeisa, 69% in Berbera, 66% in Burao and 69% in Ceerigaabo. As a vote of
confidence in unity with the south, Somaliland had given a resoundingly negative verdict.
Nevertheless, the vote was carried by the southern majority.’36
Finally, the referendum was however finalized and the majority in the south voted for the Union
whereas the north voted against the Act of Union. The first attempt at a coup was by the northern
military officers to restore the status of an independent Somaliland.37 Seven years after independence,
the Isaaq clan got the first and only Prime Minister that Somalia ever had. In 1969, the second
President of Somalia was assassinated by one of his bodyguards and several days later a group of
army officers seized power and installed Major General Mohammed Siad Barre as the head. The
military rule suppressed the people in northwest Somalia which led to the formation of Somali National
Movement SNM.38
1.3. The Somali National Movement (SNM) and its peculiarity
The Somali Armed Forces was defeated in 1977 in the ‘Ogaden War’ between Somalila and Ethiopia.
The Ethiopian forces were being aided by the USSR and Cuban military forces. After the defeat, the
military rule of Mogadishu increased the centralization of resources and power and imposed restrictions
and use armed forces against the whole population. The Somali people then had to turn to their clans
WSP International,“Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities” , Red Sea press Inc., Asmara, 2005, p 09
Somali National League (SNL)was one of the political parties that was active in Somaliland before the unification
36 Ibid. p 9–10
37 Lewis, I.M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, New York
2008, p 35
38 Shinn, David H. Somaliland: The Little Country that Could, Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington DC.
2002, p 96, Accessed on January 2016 at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/anotes_0211.pdf
34
35
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for protection from the government troops.39 One of the rebellion organizations engendered was the
Somali National Movement (SNM), which used clan forces to protect the population from the military
government. The thesis will only be focusing on the Somali National Movement, because its nature and
structure was different and unique compared to other rebel organizations in Somalia.
SNM was formed in London on 6 April 1981 and according to (Bradbury 2008 cited in Drysdale, 1994:
p, 136) the purpose of organizing was to overthrow the Siad Barre regime, which was common to other
rebel groups such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and United Somali Congress
(USC). The SNM, however, was unique because it practiced traditional governance systems and was
internally democratic from the beginning.40 The SNM had five leaders over the course of the insurgency
and each leader was elected according to the SNM Constitution, the transition of leadership was done
in a peaceful manner.41 The internal democratic practices of SNM helped its survival and succeeded its
war against the dictator government.42 The 10 years between the beginning of SNM in 1981 and the
collapse of the Somali government in 1991 is fundamental to the creation of Somaliland and the state
building processes; even if it is less reported by the media and scholars. Bradbury writes,
‘This period was formative in creating a ‘political community’ of shared interests, particularly
among the Isaaq people that broke away from Somalia in 1991. Shaped through a decade of
insurgency, a common “struggle” against repression and life in refugee camps, the existence of a
political community provided a foundation for political and social recovery that other areas of
Somalia have lacked. The particular nature of the SNM as a politico-military movement also
influenced the form of polity that emerged in Somaliland after the war.’43
In order to win the guerrilla war as well as get the local people to support it, the SNM established an
advisory body called the Guurti, which politically, socially and economically represented the Isaaq clans
and sub-clans. The Guurti was instrumental in winning the guerrilla war as well as garner the local
people’s support. It actively contributed to the fight against Siad Barre’s military government and
provided moral, logistic and military support to the SNM fighters44. The Guurti played a significant role
within and outside the SNM. They managed all social and political conflicts within the organization as
well as mediated inter-clan conflicts. Their strategy in the civil war was integral to the social, political,
Rebecca, R. Understanding State Building: Traditional governance and the modern state in Somaliland, Ashgate
Publishing Company, 2014
40 Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, Search for peace: Peace in Somaliland: An indigenous Approach
to State-Building, 2008, p 13–4
41 Ibid. p 14
42 Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, Pillars of peace: Democracy in Somaliland Challenges and
Opportunities, 2010, p xiv
43 Bradbury, M. Becoming Somaliland, Indiana University Press, 2008, p 50
44 Marleen, R. and Ulf, T. Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order: The Case of Somaliland, 2010, p 728 Food
Agriculture Organization on behalf of Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. January 2016 Available Online at:
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/Renders%20Terlinden%20Somaliland%20Statehood%202010.pdf
39
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cultural and historical framework of Somaliland.45 The SNM created alliances with its neighbouring nonIsaaq clans to minimize the effect of clan politics which was used by Siad Barre to remain in power
while he mobilized his clan, Daarood.46 A significant example of the SNM’s alliance strategy was the
peace talks initiated between the representatives of Isaaq sub-clan, Dhulbahante Garaad and
Habarjelo in the early 1990s. They were held in the towns of Qararo, Danood, Gaashaamo and
Gawlalaale in Ethiopia. And, in the late 1990s, the talks were held in the Ethiopian town of Gashaamo
between Dhulbahante and another Isaaq sub-clan, Habar Yonis. These initiatives led to alliances
between the SNM and its neighbouring clans. And these alliances then became the foundation of the
peace building process after the collapse of the government in 1991.
The SNM’s foresight was integral to the long lasting peace between the Isaaq and non-Isaaq clans in
Somaliland. It focused all its energy on resolving local problems and differences in the north. The
traditional clan elders and their local systems were the driving force and the only functioning system.47
The reconciliation, peace building and state building processes in Somaliland started when the Siad
Barre government was still in power and the SNM was working from the fringes which it continues to
the present time. Somaliland’s traditional leaders have also played a big role in every important issue in
the country such as peace building, reconciliations and state building.48
In southern Somalia, the United Somali Congress (USC) was one of the strongest rebel organizations
against the Government of Siad Barre. It was established in Rome and was dominated by the Hawiye
clan. The USC captured the capital, Mogadishu, in January 1991.49 The USC did not practice the
Somali traditional systems inside or outside the organization, but their leadership was factionalized,
despite them all being Hawiye.50 The USC had no clear political agenda and the internal factions were
evoked soon after the collapse of Barre’s regime. The USC was then divided into two parts headed by
Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aydid. This division led to the first civil war among the Hawiye
and within the USC, which was responsible for over 30,000 deaths, the displacement of tens of
Rakiya, O. Seizing the Moment: A Case Study on Conflict and Peacemaking in Somaliland Occasional Paper: Peace
Building Series No. 3, 2010, p 6, January 2016http://www.future.org/sites/future.org/files/Somaliland%20Peacebuilding.pdf
46 Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, Search for peace: Peace in Somaliland: An indigenous Approach
to State-Building, 2008, p 28
47 Lewis, I.M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, New York
2008, p 75
48 Michael, W. ‘State Formation in Somaliland: Bringing Deliberation to Institutionalism’, PhD Thesis Development Planning
Unit, UCL, 2011 p 130
49 The Center for Research and Dialogue and Interpeace, Search for Peace South: Community-based Peace Processes in
South-Central Somalia, 2008 p 9
Lewis, I.M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, New York 2008, p
77
45
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thousands more, and the destruction of Mogadishu (Bradbury2008 cited in Drysdale, 1994, p. 38).51
There was no hope for peace and reconciliation after the devastation of the civil war, the Somali
National Army had also divided into clans and the people supported their respective clan militia. The
region was in shambles as CRD reported, ‘Throughout south-central Somali, looting and criminality by
armed gangs and militia led to massive displacement, eventually resulting in a catastrophic famine that
claimed an estimated 250,000 lives.’52
More than 15 international conferences were held outside Somalia. They attempted to bring peace and
stability back to the south and central Somalia, but were lacking the traditional indigenous systems of
governance which are immanent in the culture of the general native population of Somalia. The peace
and reconciliation initiatives of Somaliland however were made and led by local traditional leaders with
no external involvement. This simple comparison not only shows the difference between the SNM and
other Somali rebel groups, but also that the Somaliland democratization process was based on their
traditional indigenous systems.
Somaliland’s peace building efforts, which were done at no cost as well as locally oriented, does not
easily compare to the internationally organized expensive peace conferences and state building
initiatives of southern Somalia. For Somaliland, all the peace conferences ended well, while those in
the south failed to bring peace and change the seemingly intractable situation. Lewis noted this aspect,
‘Of the many factors involved, a crucial difference here is clearly the dominant role played in Somaliland
by the local authorities, the “stakeholders” in the pompous jargon of developers’.53
1.4. The Collapse of the Somali State and re-emergence of Somaliland as a Defacto
State (1991 – 2001)
After Ten years, 1981 – 1991, of military struggle for the control of the northwest Somali regions,
Somaliland fell into the hands of the SNM and the Somali central government collapsed completely.
The SNM and the local people were not prepared for the multiple challenges which emerged as the
aftermath of the struggle and fall of the central government. The main cities were destroyed by
bombardments and raids from Siad Barre’s military forces; even the main streets were resembled
minefields. The displaced people were in refugee camps in Ethiopia; the major cities of Hageisa, Burao
and Berbera were almost empty due to the massive displacement and the socio-economic breakdown
The Center for Research and Dialogue and Interpeace, Search for Peace South: Community-based Peace Processes in
South-Central Somalia, 2008 p 9
52 Ibid. p 9
53 Lewis, I.M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, New York
2008, p 95
51
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of the entire country.54 The SNM had no clear political vision to reconstruct and manage the territory
after its goal to overthrow the Barre regime was achieved. During the war, SNM also initiated talks with
the USC in the south to form an alliance and establish an approximation of a federal state. However, on
January 1991, USC unilaterally declared a government without consulting SNM. The SNM along with
the general population in the north changed their attitude and met in Burao where they declared the
independence of Somaliland on 18 May 1991.55
The initial years post independence was difficult for Somaliland in terms of post war reconstruction.
Once again, the traditional leaders of Somaliland played a significant role in restoring hope, building
long lasting peace and reconstructing the country.56 According to Academy for Peace and Development
(APD) report, without the support of the traditional leaders, SNM alone could not manage the peace
building, reconciliation and state building processes in Somaliland. And thus, the first transitional
government was formed under the leadership of SNM.57 The new administration was successfully
established but the biggest challenge remained, which was to rebuild the infrastructure of economic
services and pay incentives and salaries of the armies and other government employees.58 The new
SNM leadership faced a tough challenge in managing a country devastated by war for 10 years, with a
large number of the population displaced and numerous others killed.59 According to War-Torn
Societies report released in 2005:
“Somaliland in 1991 was a scene of awesome devastation. Those who chose to struggle back
from the refugee camps in neighboring Ethiopia found their homes demolished, their belongings
looted, their land sown with mines and unexploded munitions. In Hargeisa [the future capital of
Somaliland], a town of nearly 300,000 people, barely 10% of the structures remained intact,
leaving only a vast field of blasted rubble strewn with explosives. Less than 1% of its prewar
population still lived there. Burao, to the east, has suffered roughly 70% destruction. [….]
Hospitals, schools, clinics and wells had all been destroyed, government offices ransacked,
bridges were blown up, and roads mined and made impassable.”60
Fortunately, the people of Somaliland believed that the reconciliation and peace building processes
have allowed them to carefully think about the future of Somaliland because of their long and difficult
Rakiya, O. Seizing The Moment: A Case Study on Conflict and Peacemaking in Somaliland, Occasional Paper: Peace
Building Series No 3, 2010, p 16
55 International Crises Group, Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership, Africa Report N°110, 2006, p 6. January 2016
available http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5544~v~Somaliland__Time_For_African_Union_Leadership.pdf
56 Lewis, I. M. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society, Colombia University Press, New York ,
2008, p 93
57 Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, ‘Democracy in Somaliland Challenges and Opportunities: Pillars of
peace’, Somali Program Report, 2010, p XIV
58 Rakiya, O. Seizing the Moment: A Case Study on Conflict and Peacemaking in Somaliland, Occasional Paper: Peace
Building Series No. 3, 2010, p 19
59 Abokor A, et al, Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections, Progressio: London,September
2006, p 9
60 WSP International, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities, Red Sea press Inc., Asmara, 2005 p 24
54
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past of colonial administration, civilian misrule and military dictatorship61. On one hand, this scenario
brought the people of Somaliland together, mainly the Isaaq clan comprising the majority in Somaliland,
and they were determined to manage their issues internally rather than receive international support.
On the other hand, the attention of the international community was mainly focused on improving the
security situation and providing humanitarian aid to the southern parts of the country where the capital
is located.62 These factors of no external involvement and locally driven and owned efforts, gave an
appropriate platform to the Somaliland reconciliation process and state building.
1.5. The Role of Traditional Governance in Peace and State Building in Somaliland
1991 – 2001
The Independent State of Somaliland was declared on 18 May 1991. The history of Somaliland then
followed a new route to development and democracy and people decided to get their state and
government back. Though this was not an easy task with enormous difficulties, the people of
Somaliland managed the situation through the use of Somali traditional governance systems. As
mentioned earlier in this paper, the traditional governance systems were active throughout the history
of Somaliland: from colonial times until the collapse of the Somali government, and then after, during
the rebuilding of Somaliland as a state. Since 1991 up to 2001, traditional leaders were the highest
authorities in Somaliland which even selected and built the government and the parliament and brought
the territory out of widespread violence and instability in the southern parts of Somalia for the last two
decades. They led all the reconciliation meetings and peace agreements between and within clans
which resolved all national problems.63
This was a very important period for the current State of Somaliland, but my thesis focuses only on the
role of the traditional leaders in the state formation and democratization processes. First, in addition to
restoring hope, the SNM lifted the economy and enabled its rapid expansion. Small businesses
boomed and trade of livestock with Middle East resumed.64 However, small conflicts within the SNM
occurred several times and the government was unable to resolve them because of their limited
authority and power; and the SNM fighters had not yet been disarmed. These small clashes became
inter-clan conflicts and war between two clans within Isaaq affecting the towns of Burao and Berbera.65
According to Raqiya,
International Crises Group, Somaliland: Democratization and its Discontents, 2003, p 8
International Republican Institute, Strategy for international democratization support in Somaliland, 2014, p 14
63 Mercy Crops, Somalia: Engaging Grassroots Traditional Governance Initiatives, 2010 p 1 Accessed on December 2015 at
https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Somalia.pdf
64 Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, Search for peace: Peace in Somaliland: An indigenous Approach
to State-Building, 2008, p 43
65 Ibid. p 44
61
62
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‘The government took no action to prevent the Burao and Berbera wars and seemed to be
helpless as Somaliland threatened to slide towards wholesale civil war, as had happened in the
south. Early on, however, clan elders began to take a grip on events. Their first interventions in
both Burao and Berbera had come to nothing, but as it was clear that the government was
incapable of solving the problem, the elders took on the mission themselves. This began one of
the most remarkable political processes, which in less than a year was to lead to a complete,
non-violent change in government and the establishment of nationwide peace, with the
beginnings of the creation of a structure to enforce it.’66
The failure of the SNM-led interim government to solve conflicts and clan differences in Somaliland
provided an opportunity to the traditional leaders to step up when the government disintegrated.
According to Bradbury, ‘The authority of the Somaliland elders arose from the failure of the first SNM
government and a country paralyzed by the conflict in Berbera.’67 Moreover, traditional and clan elders
got the chance to influence all the negotiations and state building processes. It allowed them to
participate at the negotiation table next to the military leaders and all conferences concluded with clanbased consensus and clan representation was agreed upon unanimously. Moreover, the ‘mandate’ of
state building and establishing order shifted from the actors of war and the government to traditional
and clan elders. “The collapse of the SNM gave way to form intervention by the elders, who started
negotiating among themselves in order to broker a ceasefire and to re-establish a measure of
governance.” 68
Traditional leaders and elders known as ‘Guurti’ took the responsibility to call all Somaliland clans, both
Isaaq and non-Isaaq, to a national conference in Borama and then established a new government with
new leadership in 1993. The representatives of the clans agreed to form a presidential system of
government with bicameral parliament in which the upper house of the parliament will comprise the
elders and traditional leaders. The members of both houses were appointed based on clan power
sharing. The establishment of Guurti, the highest organ of the new state, become a successful step
which traditional and clan leaders moved to penetrate the country’s political arena. The Article 09 of the
Borama National Charter indicated the structure of the government; it put the House of Elders (Guurti)
as a higher organ of the state.69 From then on, they remained as the final mediator and arbitrator in all
Rakiya, O. Seizing The Moment: A Case Study on Conflict and Peacemaking in Somaliland, Occasional Paper: Peace
Building Series No. 3, 2010 p 23
67 Bradbury, M. Somaliland: Country Report, CIIR, 1997, p 29
68 Marleen, R. and Ulf, T. Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order: The Case of Somaliland, Food and Agriculture
Organization on the behalf of Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 2010, p 728 –9, : Accessed on January 2016 at
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/Renders%20Terlinden%20Somaliland%20Statehood%202010.pdf
69 Somaliland National Charter, 1993 Borama Conference. Access on January 2016 at
http://www.somalilandlaw.com/somaliland_national_chartercha.htm#Title
66
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institutional, political and clan conflicts.70 Most importantly, in 1993, a Somaliland National Charter was
agreedin the Borama conference which became the first hybrid system of government.71
Together with the traditional leaders, the SNM-led government was able to bring peace back to Burao
and Berbera. They reconciled the conflicting parties and then transferred their governing powers to the
civilian government led by former Somali Prime Minister of 1967 – 1969, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal.
According to the APD, ‘These endeavors lead to the establishment of embryonic government
institutions and practical policies for the initiation of basic public services.’72 The Egal administration
immediately implemented the national charter and began the establishment of the national army and
disarmament of the clan militias in Hargeisa and Awdal. The new administration differed from previous
administration in terms of inclusiveness and participation, both in the parliament and in the executive.
As Jimcaale noted:
‘The new government differed from the previous SNM administration in two ways: First, it
possessed a broader base in terms of political participation and representation; although the
smaller and minority clans were not represented at the Boorame Conference, non-saaq clans
were given better representation compared to the previous administration. Secondly, the role of
traditional clan leaders was institutionalized in one of the central political institutions of the state,
as a check on the executive and the elected representatives.’73
However, not all clans were satisfied with the Egal administration and its formula of power sharing. The
former President Abdirahman Tuur and his clan Habar Yoonis were not fully satisfied because of being
given less seats in the parliament as well as the executive, which they did not expect: Habar Yoonis got
one minister in the cabinet. In addition, nomination of some members in the cabinet those strongly
opposed Tuur’s administration increased the difference between Habar Yoonis and the Egal
administration.74 Though the new administration did achieve certain levels of success, the Borama
Conference did not lead the country into peace and stability. As Rakiya observed ‘... those who
perceived Borama as a loss, in particular Tuur and the Habar Yoonis clan to which he belongs, were
quick to distance themselves from the new government and to express their opposition by stating their
refusal to cooperate with the new administration.’75
Ibid. p 731
Jimcaale, C. ‘Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions’, WSP International Rebuilding Somaliland
Project 2005, The Red Sea Press, 2005, p 64
72 Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, Democracy in Somaliland Challenges and Opportunities: Pillars of
peace, Somali Program Report, 2010 P, XIV
73 Jimcaale, C. ‘Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions’, WSP International Rebuilding Somaliland
Project 2005, The Red Sea Press, 2005, p 65 - 66
74 Ibid. p 66
75 Rakiya, O. Seizing The Moment: A Case Study on Conflict and Peacemaking in Somaliland, Occasional Paper: Peace
Building Series No. 3, 2010, p 28
70
71
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For the first year, the Egal administration worked well and progressed on areas of demobilization of
clan militias, strengthening government institutions and collecting revenue. But peace did not last long
and fighting broke out in November 1994 in Hargeisa which spread to Burao in March 1995. The roots
of the conflict are quite complex but a few immediate causes were: the power struggle over the
Hargeisa airport between Idagale (inhabitants of the airport area who belonged to the Isaaq clan) and
the government. Civil war broke out when the government attempted to impose its authority over the
airport and the militia. Unresolved issues of power sharing within the government and the power
struggle over strategic resourceful areas like Burao, the second capital of the Somaliland, were among
the factors that caused the war.76 According to Bradbury’s country report:
‘The war has involved the heaviest and most protracted fighting since the end of the conflict with
Siad Barre in 1991. Tens of thousands of civilians fled Hargeisa and Burco, many going to
Ethiopia from where they had returned in 1991. Some estimates put the number of people killed
in Burco alone as high as 4,000. There has been widespread destruction of property rehabilitated
since 1991. Hargeisa and Burco became divided towns. New arms flowed into the region as the
opposition received support from Aideed77 and the government acquired weapons from Eastern
Europe. The war harmed a rapidly expanding economy, causing currency devaluation, inflation in
the west and a retraction in international assistance programmes. In the east trade was curtailed,
hurting small businesses. Government budgets were also severely affected: the government
allegedly spent US$4.5 million re-equipping the army. Perhaps the most immediate damage was
the loss of confidence among Somalilanders who had believed that fighting was over’.78
Unlike previous conflicts in Berbera and Burao, the Guurti could not resolve the conflict developing in
Burao and Hargeisa between the government and Habar Yoonis militias. Although, Garhajis79 clan
elders in the Guurti wanted to negotiate with the government in good faith with the goal to end the
conflict, they were unable to gain confidence from their own militia (APD, 2008: 23; cited Bryden and
Farah 1996: 11).80 The clan militia saw their elders in the House of Elders (Guurti) as supporters of the
government and Egal’s administration which neutralized their impartiality. This time, there was no
unified system of approaching the conflict and different actors attempted to solve the civil war crisis
dawning on the land. The Peace Committee for Somaliland,81 the Guurti and other clan leaders had
different ideas on resolving the conflict. From May 1996, a peace process started with the help of the
Bradbury, M. Somaliland: Country Report, CIIR, 1997, p 25
He was the leader of the United Somali Congress USC which controlled Mogadishu. As Tuur was the leader of the SNM
and due to the informal talks between the SNM and Aideed led USC, Tuur and his clan were able to gain support from
Aideed.
78 Ibid. p 25
79 Idagale and Habar Yoonis are both sub clans of Garhajis clan of Isaaq
80 Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, Search for peace: Peace in Somaliland: An indigenous Approach
to State-Building, 2008, p 23
81 The Peace Committee for Somaliland has its origins in a series of consultations within the Somaliland diaspora in early
1995. In the absence of any genuine moves towards reconciliation between the government and opposition, and the
apparent failure of the Somaliland elders to intervene, these consultations concluded that there was a need to convene an
independent mission to try to broker dialogue between the warring parties. The Peace Committee defined itself as a
committee of 'intellectuals', and received its mandate from a conference of Somaliland intellectuals held in London in April
1995.
76
77
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Peace Committee, in both Burao and Hargeisa, through inter and intra-clan dialogues and meetings.
For the Hargeisa conflict, the meetings were between Idagale and other clans of Hargeisa who backed
the government, and the Burao meetings were between Habar Yoonis and Habar Jeclo.82 The Guurti
had announced a call for a national conference on October 1996 to which all clans and communities
were invited. Although there were mixed reactions to the conference, it did occur and lasted until
February 1997.83
The Hargeisa Conference formally ended the two year war between 1994 and 1996. The conference
was similar to the Borama Conference which produced clan representation and clan-based power
sharing. The conference, in particular, addressed the grievances of the Habar Yoonis clan and minority
representation in the governement. The Habar Yoonis, as a result of the conference, gained five more
parliamentarians and four cabinet posts and several other ministerial assistant posts. Unlike the
Boorame Conference, the Hargeisa Conference was organized and financed by the government and
hosted more delegates than in Borama. The Hargeisa Conference did not change the leadership but reelected President Egal and named Dahir Riyale Kahin as the new Vice President on February 1997; the
House of Representatives and the House of Elders were also re-elected and given five and six year
terms respectively. Lastly, the Borama National Charter was replaced with a provisional Constitution
which would be validated by referendum. The new provisional Constitution introduced a multiparty
political system with periodic elections.84 According to Somaliland’s electoral handbook, ‘Article 151(1)
of the interim constitution stated that it would be implemented for a period of three years and then it
would be but to the nation in a referendum.’85
In May 1999, President Egal proposed a constitutional democratic multiparty system. Egal emphasized
that upcoming parties will not be clan-based prohibiting religious affiliations and encouraging
representations of all Somaliland clans.
86
Egal motivated the people to support the upcoming
Constitution and the multiparty democratic systems. ‘The transition to a multiparty democracy with
Somaliland’s desire to gain international recognition, arguing that the international community would not
recognize Somaliland’s independent status unless it adopted such a system’.87 The people got the
courage to hope for the future and voted in the referendum for the new Constitution. ‘In that context, the
Bradbury, M. Somaliland: Country Report, CIIR, 1997, p 31
Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace, Search for peace: Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach
to State-Building, 2008, p 24–5
84 Jimcaale, C. ‘Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions’, WSP International Rebuilding Somaliland
Project 2005, The Red Sea Press, 2005, p 6–7
85 Jama Ibrahim, H. Somaliand Handbook of Electoral Laws, p 13
86 Mark, W. and Steve, K. ‘Beyond Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State in Somaliland’, in, Africa Spectrum, 2010, p 41
January 2016 at: http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/247/247
87 ICG, Somaliland Democratisation and its discontent, 2003, p 12
82
83
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overwhelming endorsement of the new constitution (over 1.183 million “yes” votes out of nearly 1.19
million ballots cast, or 97 per cent) sent an unmistakable message’.88
However, Somaliland politics entered a new era of democratization and constitutionalism which allowed
the citizen to choose their representatives for the parliament and public offices as well as the
presidential office. Despite the transformations, the role of traditional leaders as a pivotal force for
stability and state building in Somaliland still existed in many spheres. In the next part of the thesis, I
will explore the democratization process, elections and challenges that Somaliland has faced.
88
Ibid. p 12
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2. Post 2001 Democratization and Election Challenges in Somaliland
2.1. Introduction
It is important to first clearly define democracy and democratization before attempting to understand the
process of democratization in Somaliland. ‘Democracy’ is a Greek word composed of two sub-words
‘demos’, which means people, and ‘kratein’ which means to govern or rule. Therefore, democracy can
be understood as the government of the people. As Abraham Lincoln famously said, it is the
‘government of the people, by the people and for the people’. In other words, democracy is a form of
governance exercised by the people and serving the interests of the people.89 According to Butros
Ghali, ‘Democratization is a process which leads to a more open, more participatory, less authoritarian
society. Democracy is a system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and
mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people’.90 According to Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration on Democratization:
‘Democracy is a universally recognized ideal as well as a goal, which is based on common
values shared by peoples throughout the world community irrespective of cultural, political, social
and economic differences. It is thus a basic right of citizenship to be exercised under conditions
of freedom, equality, transparency and responsibility, with due respect for the plurality of views,
and in the interest of the polity’.91
Since May 1991, the people of Somaliland have been committed to establishing democracy and a
democratic political system in Somaliland. As the international community was occupied dealing with
security and humanitarian challenges in southern Somalia, Somaliland had relatively less international
support, despite its fragile situation.92 Nevertheless, democracy in Somaliland was a major objective of
the SNM. The first SNM led government was tasked to draft a Constitution and prepare the country for
democratic elections within two years, but it failed due to other circumstances and took another 10
years to draft and then be approved by the public.93
From the Borama National Charter in 1993 up to the death of President Egal in 2002, the political
scenario in Somaliland had not fully stabilized and the country appeared to struggle with endless
political instability and transitions. The development of Somali politics, in general, threatened
Somaliland’s claim of being a sovereign state. People from Somaliland were not allowed to participate
in Somali peace conferences nor challenge the performance of the Somaliland government; the
government imposed strict security measures and emergency laws to protect the country’s hard-won
Becker. P, and Roveloson, A. What is democracy?, trans Andriakamelo Rarivoarisoa Alice, Antananarivo, 2008 p 4
Accessed on February, 2016 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/madagaskar/05860.pdf
90 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, An Agenda for Peace, United Nations:New York, 1995, p 1
91 Universal Declaration on Democracy adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council in September 1997 in
Cairo, Accessed on February, 2016 at: http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/democracy.pdf
92International Republican Institute, Strategy for international democratization support to Somaliland, 2014, p 15
93 Social Research and Development Institute – SORADI, Somaliland: Facing the Challenges of Free and Fair Elections,
2010, p 13
89
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peace and stability. The approval of the Constitution in 2001, scheduling of elections as well as the
multi-party system has changed the internal politics significantly, proposing another way forward for the
future. A large number of the population supported the transition and voted for the Constitution in the
referendum and the subsequent elections. Although Somaliland is not internationally recognized, it did
not hinder the process of democratizing the country. ‘In fact, the democratisation of Somaliland’s
political institutions was considered a necessary step towards achieving recognition and a bulwark
against reunification.’94 The Constitution of Somaliland, Article 9(1) clearly states that Somaliland is a
democratic state in saying “the political system of the Republic of Somaliland shall be based on peace,
cooperation, democracy and plurality of political parties”. 95
After the adoption and approval of the Constitution in 2001, within three years, the politics of
Somaliland changed from selected clan-based representation to an elected democratic representation.
District elections were held in December 2002, the presidential and vice-presidential election in April
2003 and the parliamentary elections in September 2005.96 Elected officials came to public offices and
it was the first multi-party democratic system in Somaliland and the first in the history of Somali after
thirty years.97 Therefore, this thesis categorizes Somaliland’s democratization process into two phases.
The first phase is the replacement of the clan selected officials into elected officials from 2002 district
elections, 2003 presidential elections and later 2005 parliamentary elections. The second phase is the
post 2005 election up to current political situations of the country.
2.2. First phase of Democratization of Somaliland’s Political System 2001 – 2005
The democratization of Somaliland started with the approval of the Somaliland Constitution. Article 1(1)
of the Somaliland Constitution clearly defines Somaliland as an independent state saying:
‘The country which gained its independence from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland on 26th June 1960 and was known as the Somaliland Protectorate and which
joined Somalia on 1st July 1960 so as to form the Somali Republic and then regained its
independence by the Declaration of the Conference of the Somaliland communities held in Burao
between 27th April 1991 and 15th May 1991 shall hereby and in accordance with this Constitution
become a sovereign and independent county known as “The Republic of Somaliland”’.98
This gives the people of Somaliland a sense of freedom and independence from the rest of Somalia
dissolving the union of 1960 unilaterally. In southern Somalia, the international community was
attempting to restore peace and stability which led to the formations of the Transitional National
Bradbury, M. Becoming Somaliland, Indiana University Press, 2008, p 184–5
The Constitution of Somaliland 2001, Article 9(1)
96 Abokor A, et al, Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections, Progressio: London, September
2006,, p 4
97 Bradbury, M. Becoming Somaliland, Indiana University Press, 2008, p 184 - 185
98 Constitution of Somaliland 2001, Article 1(1)
94
95
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Government in 2000 and then the Transitional Federal Government in 2004. The leaders of Somaliland
then were moved to hold the referendum of the Constitution and then the democratic elections.99.
According to the Constitution, the democratization process in Somaliland began with the district election
in December 2002. Article 9(2) of the Constitution limits the political parties to only three national
parties100, hence the district elections were aimed at producing the municipal council and three national
political parties which would contest the presidential and parliamentary elections.101 These elections
were the first of its kind in thirty years and moved the country from clan-based governance to a multiparty Western style of governance.102 The legal foundation of Somaliland’s democratization was the
Constitution which stated that the politics of Somaliland be based on peace, cooperation, democracy
and multi-party political system, but it is not enough for a full-fledged process of democratization to
occur. The process was incomplete, but did achieve some success; the people voted twice in a year to
choose their leaders: December 2002 for the district elections and April 2003 for the presidential
election. The productions of electoral laws were parallel to the practice, and people were both doing
and learning from their practice. It was challenging for political elites to prove their commitment to
genuine democratization.103
2.2.1. The First Local Government Elections in Somaliland (December 2002)
The 2002 district and municipality election was the first election in Somaliland. The Somalilanders were
required to elect their district commissioners and the three political parties which would contest the
upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. It was held soon after the ratification of the
Constitution in 2001.104 Apart from conducting elections, the parliament and the government were
occupied in the development of electoral laws which could make the transition smoother. In addition,
the Constitution had loopholes and contradicting articles which presented another challenge to the
democratic process of Somaliland. For example, the limit of political parties to just three contradicted
the right of every citizen to freely form political associations which was guaranteed by the Constitution,
but the selection of independent candidates was not permitted. The disaffected citizens would suffer as
there would be no choice beyond the three official political parties. In addition, the Constitution did not
Abokor A, et al, Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections, Progressio: London,September
2006,p 4
100 Constitution of Somaliland 2001, Article 9(2)
101 Lewis, I.M, Becoming Somaliland, Indiana University Press, 2008, p 185
102 Maxamed, Ibrahim, Somaliland’s Investment in Peace: Analysing the Diaspora’s Economic Engagement in Peace
Building, 2009, p.8
103 ICG, 'Democratization and its Discontents', Africa Report 66, International Crisis Group, Nairobi/Brussels (28 July), 2003,
p 14
104 International Republican Institute, Strategy for international democratization support in Somaliland, 2014, p 16
99
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have a provision to determine which political party would stand for election if a conflict arose within a
party which could result in a split, as it happened recently with the Kulmiye105 party.106
The lack of a system to enable citizens to participate in the formation of political associations which
would lead to a fair and transparent method of limiting the associations into the three main political
parties posed major challenges to the parliament and the government. There were major and various
challenges inherent in the transition to a democratic system and conducting smooth elections. These
challenges ranged from weak or fragile electoral laws, insufficient capacity and experience of the
National Electoral Commission and the absence of voter registration and census107 to little international
support which other democratizing countries often had. Regardless of these challenges, the elections
were held peacefully when compared to several other African countries.108
The government’s commitment to conduct local district elections attracted the attention of the
international community. The European Commission was interested in supporting the establishment of
democracy and elections in Somalia but later understood that it was a complex situation which could
result in renewed conflict. It provided support and co-financed the local district elections in 2002 with
the Somaliland government and provided some technical assistance to the National Electoral
Commission through the German Organization for Technical Cooperation and trained election workers
and domestic observers.109 In addition to pre-election capacity building and support to the
administration of electoral processes, the international community was active in the observation of the
2002 poll. They showed interest and readiness to assist the local district elections because they wanted
to correct their lack of support for the previous peace conferences and the 2001 referendum. 110
As noted earlier, a large amount of effort was required in the pre-election preparations which were then
carried out by the government. ‘Outside technical assistance and expertise, as well as funding and
training from such quarters as the European Commission and International Republican Institute IRI,
helped to carry Somaliland through an important learning curve.’111 A total of six political associations
competed in the elections namely the Ururka Demoqradiga ee Ummadaha Bahoobay UDUB (the ruling
party), Ururka Cadaalada iyo Daryeelka UCID, Kulmiye, Sahan, ASAD and Ilays. The election to the
On 26 October 2015, nearly half of the cabinet ministers including the Minister of Foreign affairs and deputy ministers
resigned from their posts because of internal conflict within the Kulmiye Party and they claimed that the President refused
internal democracy in the election of the party’s 2017 presidential and vice presidential candidate.
106 WSP International, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities , Red Sea press Inc., Asmara, 2005 p 70
107 International Republican Institute, strategy for international democratization support in Somaliland 2014, p 16
108 Jama Ibrahim, H, Handbook on Somaliland Electoral Laws, 2009, p 14 –7
109 International Republican Institute, Strategy for international democratization support in Somaliland, 2014, p 17
110 Bradbury, M. Becoming Somaliland, 2008, p 188
111 International Republican Institute, Strategy for international democratization support in Somaliland, 2014, p 17 –8
105
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council was a closed list, and in the final vote count the ruling party, UDUB, won the majority, while
Kulmiye and UCID came second and third, respectively.112
2.2.2. The First Presidential Election
The first presidential election was a stepping stone towards the multi-party democratization of
Somaliland. The plan was to conduct the presidential and the parliamentary election together in
January 2003, a month before the government term, but the allocation of parliament seats into regions
was disagreed upon and caused the two elections to be held separately. The parliament tenure was
increased to two more years whereas the House of Elders term was also extended to three years in line
with the Constitution. In addition, the timetable of the presidential elections was amended and elections
were rescheduled due to incomplete electoral legislation and lack of preparedness of the political
parties.113
The capacity of the National Election Commission did increase and they also learned from the local
district elections. To avoid mistakes from the last election, they raised the number of polling stations to
reduce the long queues and late closing, and even imposed prison punishments on double voting. The
competing parties were the top three associations in the local government elections: UDUB, the ruling
party, Kulmiye and UCID as opposition parties. The parties competed aggressively in their campaigns.
The UDUB was accused of using public funds for their campaign and Kulmiye was accused of
aggressive clan-based campaigns.114 Unlike the local government election, the European Union was
not willing to support the presidential election. ‘Given the timing and sensitive political nature of
Somaliland’s presidential election within the broader Somalia context,115 the European Commission did
not provide financial or programmatic support to the 2003 election as it did in 2002’.116
On 14 April 2003, the people of Somaliland went to polling stations throughout the country (with the
exception of three districts in Sanaag and two in Sool) to elect the Somaliland President and Vice
President for the next five years. The voting ended peacefully and votes were counted with a presence
of both domestic and international observers who reported favorably on the polling conduct. Although
SONSAF, Somaliland elections review report 2011, p 11
Bradbury, M. Becoming Somaliland, 2008, p 190
114 SONSAF, Somaliland elections review report 2011, p 12
115 This time the European Union was busy funding the fourteenth Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya,
facilitated by Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) but some individual European Commission member
states did provide support via technical assistance and voter education initiatives, and DFID provided financial support to the
electoral process.
116 International Republican Institute, Strategy for international democratization support in Somaliland, 2014 p 17
112
113
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the NEC was criticized for weak administration of the polling stations, they did finally announce the
results on 19 April, and the UDUB won by a margin of eighty votes over Kulmiye.117
2.2.3. The First and the Last Parliamentary Election for the next 24 years
The election of the House of Representatives was another important milestone in the democratization
process of Somaliland. The parliament election was delayed several times because of incomplete
electoral laws, disagreement on district and regional boundaries and the lack of a clear formula to
distribute the 82 parliamentary seats to the regions. This election of the House of Representative was
symbolized to be the final stage of democratizing the country and also because it was the last round of
transformation from clan politics to multiparty democracy. As APD pointed out, ‘The elections for the 82seat House of Representatives symbolized not only the final stage in Somaliland’s laborious transition
from clan-based power-sharing to multiparty politics but – in a very real sense – the arrival of a
competitive, democratic electoral culture in the country.’118 After the district and presidential elections
were completed peacefully, almost two third of Somaliland’s democratization is achieved.
Soon after the polling stations were closed and voting ended, the attention of the people was on the
NEC to announce the results. The Chairman of the NEC announced that the result would be released
after 14 days four more days as the electoral law says the announcement should take within 10 days.
The NEC staff and the party agents were exhausted from counting the votes and the number of
candidates was more compared to the previous election: the presidential and the district election which
was a closed list. On 4 October, the NEC announced the first results starting with Saaxil Region,
Sanaag, Awdal, Togdheer and later Hargeisa on 14 October. The UDUB won 33 seats, Kulmiye 28
seats, and UCID 21 seats—giving the opposition a combined majority of 49 seats.119
2.3. The Second Phase of the Somaliland Democratization process (2005 – present)
The first phase of Somaliland’s democratization ended in September 2005 when the newly elected
parliament came to office and the first round of elections finally ended peacefully. As explained earlier,
the first round of elections transformed Somaliland politics from a clan system of governance to a
multiparty democratic system and this took four years to happen. The second stage of democratization
was supposed to either change the elected officials or re-elect them or some of them for the second
term to run the public offices. As the local councils were elected in 2002 with five year terms, the
second local government elections were expected to be held since 2007. Unfortunately, the NEC and
the government failed to arrange the elections on time; and they prioritized the presidential elections
which resulted in the elected councils to stay in office for ten full years. The continuous delays in
Bradbury, M. Becoming Somaliland, 2008, p 194
APD, ‘A vote for Peace: How Somaliland Successfully Hosted its First Parliamentary Election in 35 years’, in Dialogue
For Peace, 2006, p 6
119 Ibid. p 33–4
117
118
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elections created political crises in Somaliland but this encouraged the political parties to negotiate and
reach agreements instead of referring to the Constitution.
‘The numerous postponements of the local elections have not only denied the voters a second
chance to exercise their democratic right to elect new local councils, but also undermined the
progress of Somaliland’s democratization and decentralization process. This has created a
widespread public disappointment with the local democratic process and dissatisfaction with the
current local councils, whose legitimacy is often brought to question.’120
The postponement and delays were not only limited to local government elections but the presidential
and the parliamentary as well. The presidential election was more sensitive than the local council and
parliamentary elections and the parties contested on numerous issues like the extension of the Guurti’s,
the President’s mandates, the nomination of the new Electoral Commission and voter registration. All
these issues were caused by the postponement of the presidential elections. These challenges and
delays caused the people of Somaliland to feel disappointed with the democratic transition and get
confused about the democratization and constitutionalism which they voted for. As Haroon et al,
observed, ‘The failure to hold the election would have had dire consequences for Somaliland’s political
stability and credibility on the international stage, particularly in relation to its quest for international
recognition as an autonomous independent state.’121 The Constitution was put aside with last-minute
changes and deals facilitated by the international community and Somalilanders.122 Fadal also pointed
out that, ‘The most critical period was recognized as the last three years beginning from 2008 through
2010 when persistent political crisis almost stalled the development of Somaliland in all fronts.’123
The transition from a clan-based system to a constitutional multi-party system is not fully occurred in
Somaliland. Though the first phase of the transition was held peacefully in a short period of time, the
second phase, however, had many challenges as well as uncertainty in Somaliland’s politics. The
people of Somaliland were struggling to make Somaliland a democratic state with democratic
institutions, but their goals were challenged by incompetence and low capacity of such democratic
institutions. Building a new democratic state with its institutions is a lengthy and complex process
requiring patience and attention on every step to be taken.124 Fadal said,
Haroon, Y. and Bradbury, M. Public Perception of Local Councils in Somaliland, 2011, p 6 – 7 Soradi accessed on
February 2016 at
http://soradi.org/attachments/article/70/REFLECTIONS%20AND%20LESSONS%20OF%20SOMALILAND%E2%80%99S.p
d
121 APD, Vote for Peace II: A Report on the 2010 Somaliland Presidential Election Process, 2012, p 7
122 Ibid. p 14
123 Fadal, M. ‘Reflections and lessons of Somaliland’s: Two decades of sustained peace, state building and
democratization’, SORADI, 2011 p 1 accessed on February 2016 at
http://soradi.org/attachments/article/70/REFLECTIONS%20AND%20LESSONS%20OF%20SOMALILAND%E2%80%99S.p
df
124 Ibid. p 1
120
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‘Despite a decade-long intense engagement in democratization in Somaliland and the
expectation that its institutions have attained comfortable levels of maturity and consolidation,
shortcomings still abound and sometimes develop into crisis situations due to some fundamental
legal gaps that are related to basic constitutional principles.’125
The second phase of Somaliland’s democratization started with the presidential election in 2010,
after seven years of the first presidential election in 2003. Five of the seven years was mandated
and legal and the remaining two were overdue and its legality is still questionable. After the
presidential election, the local government election followed after 10 years in 2012; the
parliamentary elections have been delayed the most as the first parliament election was in 2005 and
the next one is scheduled for 2017. If the elections were to happen in 2017, the parliament elections
would be seven years. In order to understand the complexities surrounding the democratization of
Somaliland including the causes of election delays, I will highlight the circumstances and challenges
of both, presidential and local government elections and will compare them to previous elections
and systems.
2.3.1. Second Presidential Elections 2010
The first elected President and Vice President came to office in April 2003 and were mandated to
execute the office up to March 2008. The next elections were planned for mid March 2008 in
accordance with the Constitution which allowed one month for the transition of power before the
presidential term come to an end on 14 April 2008. The poor preparation for the elections made it
impossible to hold them on this date. Hence, both elections were postponed to new dates. The new
date for the local government election was set on 1 July 2008 and the presidential elections on 31
August 2008; due to prevailing technical and capacity related issues they did not occur as well. The
NEC and the political parties then negotiated an eight-point agreement on June 2008 which postponed
the local government elections indefinitely and prioritized the presidential elections to be held first on 29
March 2009. On 29th October 2008 a suicide attack targeted the Presidential Palace, UNDP office and
Ethiopian Liaison office in Hargeisa which again disturbed the process and led to the perception of the
event by the people as a total attack against the existence of Somaliland. 126
Shortly after the 2008 terrorist attack, the NEC recognized the recurring difficulties in the registration
process such as numerous multiple registrations by the intending voters. The NEC decided to consult
the concerned parties on the issue. However, the NEC was seen to be biased and impartial with poor
capacity and competence to manage the elections which led the political parties to deviate quickly from
the eight-point agreement. The political situation of Somaliland had now become exponentially
Ibid. p1
Walls, M. and Kibble, S. Somaliland Change and Continuity: Report by International Election Observers on the June
2010 Presidential Elections in Somaliland, Progressio: London, 2011, p 16
125
126
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complex. The NEC suggested 31 May 2009 as the election date which was initially requested by the
President. The current and previous dates were just two months apart but Kulmiye, the largest
opposition party, objected. The NEC was scrutinized by the public as well as the donors as
disagreements regarding the dates between the parties became the norm, adding to the public
frustration with their organizational capacity resulted eventually in donors withdrawing their funds. The
intractable nature of the situation caused the Guurti, which had a legal mandate to extend the
president’s term, intervene. It extended the President’s term to 29 October 2009. The NEC followed the
Guurti’s mandated extension and announced the election date for 27 September 2009.127
The NEC continued to face challenges in gathering a clean voter registration data and other
technicalities which continued to delay the elections. The people’s dissatisfaction was imminent; they
demanded a new electoral commission. A series of violent protests broke out in several towns including
Hargeisa, the capital. Even the international community and donors suggested the dissolution of the
NEC as they failed to hold elections. On 30 September 2009, the parties, again, came to the
negotiation table and signed a new agreement and then the NEC resigned paving the way to new
commissioners who were capable in facilitating the process.128 In October 2009, a new NEC came on
board and as APD recorded, ‘On 14 April 2010, in a ceremony organized for the signing of the political
parties’ Election Code of Conduct, the Chairman of the NEC unexpectedly announced that the election
would be held in mid-June 2010.’ 129
The previous leaders of the three national parties that participated in the 2003 election130 were
competing for the presidency in 2010 election. The incumbent President Dahir Rayale and Vice
President Ahmed Yusuf were standing for UDUB, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamud (Siilaano) and
Abdirahman Saylici were standing for Kulmiye as President and Vice President respectively and Faisal
Ali Warabe and Mohamed Rashid were standing for the UCID as a President and Vice President
respectively. On 1 July 2010, the NEC announced the results. According to the APD report on 2010
presidential elections:
‘Kulmiye secured a convincing victory with a margin of 88,000 votes over the incumbent team
and fractionally failed to secure a full 50% of the votes cast. The UCID candidates were
disappointed with their 18% share of the vote, but all parties accepted the result. The transition
from President Rayaale to Silaanyo took place within the timeframe specified in the Constitution,
127Ibid.
page 16
Ibid. p 17
129 APD, Vote for Peace II: A Report on the 2010 Somaliland Presidential Election Process, p 84
130 Kulmiye and UCID changed their vice president candidates
128
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and despite some disputes along the way, the handover itself was markedly positive, with the
formal ceremony attended by both the outgoing and incoming leadership teams.’131
2.3.2. The Second Local District Elections 2012
The local government elections were somewhat similar to the presidential elections; they were delayed
since 2007 which was the end of the first term of the elected councils. It was 28 November 2012 when
the people of Somaliland elected their second district and municipal councils. This election is ranked
the highest election in which 2,368 individuals contested 379 seats.132 The reason for the large number
of candidates is due to the decision of the parliament to make the council elections open rather than the
closed list of the previous district election.
This was a chance for the political associations (urur) to compete and become one of the three political
parties (xisbi) allowed by the Constitution. This election was therefore significant in two ways: a) this
election determined the district councilors and b) the election would also determine the top three
political associations which would become the national political parties for the next ten years period.
The total number of the political associations registered for this election was fifteen, but seven of them
failed to meet the requirements including the UDUB (the ruling party of Somaliland 2002 – 2010). The
six political associations which participated in the elections were, Kulmiye, UCID, WADANI, DALSAN,
XAQSOOR and RAYS.133 The parties with the highest number of votes, who would also be the three
national parties for the next 10 years, were Kulmiye, Wadani and UCID.134
2.4. Evaluation and Analysis of the Somaliland Democratization Process
As discussed previously, Somaliland underwent five ‘democratic’ elections and replaced clan-selected
officials with elected officials. It is, therefore, important to analyze the process and see if there was a
real transition or not. A glance at the early phases of Somaliland’s democratization and election
process will be useful in analyzing the entire process of democratization. The first phase of the
transition was during the 2002 district, 2003 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections with five
years term which was smooth in comparison to the second phase of the democratization process. As
Ahmed et al, said: ‘The second cycle of democratic elections for district councils and the presidency
became more difficult to realize, when presidential elections scheduled for April 2008 were repeatedly
Walls and Kibble, Lessons from Somaliland’s 2010 Presidential Elections: What Democratic Spaces, What
Opportunities? 2011, p 24 Soradi, Hargeisa accessed on Febbruary 2016 available at
http://soradi.org/attachments/article/70/REFLECTIONS%20AND%20LESSONS%20OF%20SOMALILAND%E2%80%99S.p
df
132 Walls & Kibble. Swerves on the road: Report by International Election Observers on the 2012 local elections in
Somaliland, Progressio: London, 2013, p 6
133 Aly V, et al, The Economics of Elections in Somaliland, The financing of political parties and candidates, 2015, p 6 Rift
Valley Institute, Nairobi 2015
134Walls & Kibble. Swerves on the road: Report by International Election Observers on the 2012 local elections in
Somaliland, Progressio: London, 2013, p 6
131
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postponed, due to a problematic voter registration process, an incompetent National Election
Commission (NEC), and intransigence among the political parties.’135
This clearly shows that the democratization had not yet finalized and as a matter of fact, the
Constitution failed to address the situation and propose solutions. It is important to note that neither the
new parliament nor the general public did anything about developing appropriate laws for the
democratization of their land. They were in fact unwilling to do so because all the efforts previously
made including the election was aimed only to please the international community and gain recognition.
The Constitution was less important to the people and mattered little beyond Article 1 which stated that
Somaliland is a sovereign and independent state, but the political leaders however emphasized
recognition. Even President Egal told the people of Somaliland that ‘the transition to a multiparty
democracy with Somaliland’s desire to gain international recognition, arguing that the international
community would not recognize Somaliland’s independent status unless it adopted such a system.’136
Table 1: Somaliland People’s Perception on the Best Governance System in Somaliland
The best governance system for somaliland is
50
46.7
45
40
35
30
28.3
25
20
20
15
10
5
1.7
3.3
0
Both Democratic democratic multiparty
multiparty and
system
traditional clan politics
135
136
islamic sharia
Others
traditional clan politics
Abdi Ahmed, et al, Somaliland: facing challenges of free and fair elections, SORADI, 2010, p 13
ICG, Somaliland Democratization and its content, 2003, p 12
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Table 2: Why did Somaliland choose the multiparty democratic system over the traditional
system?
Somaliland peaple choose multiparty demecratic system to:
To satistfy westren countries
They want to show the international community that they
are different from the rest of somalia and then to be
recognized
Somaliland people believe that multi party system is the
best way to manage their affairs
simply clannish
others
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
The people of Somaliland are principally divided about the future outlook of Somaliland’s political
system. Some believe that clan politics is indispensable and rooted deeply in the Somali culture,
tradition and history, while others support modern forms of government. The supporters of clan politics
claim that it is a locally owned system of governance rooted in the grass roots and provides peace and
stability.137 However, three consecutive elections have been carried out peacefully but the
democratization of Somaliland, which was intended to progress from clan politics to multiparty
democracy, has not yet occurred (See table 2). Clan politics have a very strong influence on the district
and presidential elections wherein parliamentarians have been elected based on their clans not parties.
Although NEC produced a list of qualifications for the candidates like age, citizenship and education,
the parties were more interested in candidates who could bring more votes from their clans. Therefore,
the clan leadership played a significant role in selecting candidates and finance their campaigns. 138
WSP International, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities , Red Sea press Inc., Asmara, 2005, p 85–6
Abokor A, et al, Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections, Progressio: London,September
2006, p 9
137
138
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Table 3: Perception of the Somaliland people on the ownership of the political parties
Somaliland political parties belongs to:
Public people
20%
individuals
18%
Clans
62%
The multi-party political system was new to the political parties and there was no difference between
the parties except clan differences among the leaders. Hence, Somaliland’s multi-party political system
became increasingly based on the personality of the party leaders, not ideologies and policies. As Adan
et al, write, ‘Many of the ministers promoted their own candidates from within their own clans. One
minister is even alleged to have supported three candidates for the three parties from within his clan.’139
2.4.1. Systemic Challenges to democratization in Somaliland’s
The Somaliland governance system comprises both traditional and modern democratic systems, and
each system has its advantages and disadvantages. The former works well at times of instability and
conflict, especially when the government loses control over state affairs. The latter is necessary to
social development such as common education, national security and other social developments. The
two systems have always been competing for power and influence (Louise Wiuff 2011:146 cited Boege
et al. 2009b: 24).140 This is common in most sub-Saharan African states but one system usually
dominates the other. In the case of Somaliland, both systems have been functioning together since
1991 and the issue is in balancing the two systems. Between 1991 and 2001, the traditional authorities
were more powerful and facilitated the foundations of the state building and peace building processes.
Post 2001, though the conflict appears in many levels, the government authority controlled most state
affairs.141 Since the adoption Constitution, the politics of Somaliland was gradually growing and shifting
from traditional governance systems to modern state and multiparty democratization systems.
Ibid. p 9 – 10
Louise Wiuff Moe, ‘Hybrid and ‘everyday’ political ordering: constructing and contesting legitimacy in Somaliland’, Journal
of Legal Pluralism, 2011, p 146
141 Markus Virgil Hoehne, ‘Limits of hybrid political orders: the case of Somaliland’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7:2,
2013, p 200
139
140
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The two systems co-existed for years in Somaliland with actual friction beginning right after the multiparty democratic system was adopted. The government has been highly committed to democratic
governance but the traditional systems hold the democratization back and delay elections as well.
Most politicians see the challenges but have little opportunity to overcome and solve the problem
because of high pressure from the traditional authorities. The five consecutive elections between 2002
and 2012 deepened the gap between the two systems and created a perception that the government
administration was limited only to the capital city of Hargeisa, where people could not commute to that
easily. In response to this perception, the local government elections aimed to decentralize government
authority into local municipal districts which supported the traditional system to gain power in the local
municipalities. In an interview with the ICG, a local council election candidate of 2012 said that his
position ‘is not owned by the government, but by the clan. There is no sense of loyalty to the state.”.142
Table 4 shows the difference between the selected and elected parliament of 1998 and 2005
respectively. As few eastern regions, eastern Sanaag and some parts of Sool region, did not vote in the
elections and their share of power decreased; the Isaaq clan gained more seats in the parliament and
other government posts as power-sharing shifted to the election dominating the rest. This hybrid
system did work well during the peace and state building period but Somaliland’s recent political
challenges, however, suggests that it has reached its natural limits.143
Table 4: Parliament Selection by Traditional Leaders (1998) Vs Parliament Election (2005)
Clan
1998 parliament
2005 parliament
difference
Isaaq
47
57
+10
Harti (Dhulbahante + Warsangeli ) 14
10
-4
Gedabuursi
11
13
+2
Ciise
5
1
-4
Minorities
5
1
-4
Total
82
82
Source: APD and Interpeace, A Vote for Peace: How Somaliland Successfully Hosted its First Parliamentary Elections in 35
Years, Hargeisa (Somaliland), 2006, p 44
This would be the right time for Somaliland to discuss their future prospects because the hybrid system
had not been working well with the two systems opposing each other. According to the ICG:
'Opposition and civil society have failed to press for greater reform and inclusion, contributing to
a “culture of silence”. The result is the hybrid system’s unhealthy stasis. Numerically significant
“minority” clans in urban areas and borderlands are losing political representation, especially
under majoritarian democratic politics. The tri-party system, based on the three parties with the
most votes in regional council elections and meant to prevent the emergence of single-(Isaaq
sub) clan-based parties in national elections, has largely reinforced overall Isaaq dominance.
While it requires cross clan coalitions, many smaller and non-Isaaq clans have seen their stake
diminish. Thus in the 2012 pre-election vetting process to select the official parties, small clan
142
143
ICG, ‘Somaliland: The Strains of Success’, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°113 Nairobi/Brussels, 5 October 2015, p 1–5
Ibid. p 1
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support for Xaqsoor lost out to large clan blocs; large Isaaq sub-clans now dominate both the
ruling party and opposition.’144
The Guurti and its challenges to democratization: Guurti, the House of Elders, is the upper
house of the Somaliland parliament and as per the Constitution they have a special legislative
responsibility relating to tradition and culture. They were the very foundation of traditional state
building in Somaliland and were selected by the clans. Guurti was institutionalized in 1993 at the
Borama Conference becoming the only organ that has a traditional selection process which was
never democratic since 1993. The Constitution which was adopted in 2001 says that the Guurti
should be elected one year after the election of the House of the Representatives, the lower house,
but that did not happen.145 As mentioned before, the Guurti’s role was mainly in the state and peace
building processes of Somaliland during the 1990s. However, in the following years, the roles of the
government contradicted the Guurti’s because the latter was everything to Somaliland’s society,
even performing government tasks for various reasons ranging from government incompetency to
the absence of the government institutions. The role of the Guurti in Somaliland’s society poses a
challenge to democratization in two ways: First is that the Guurti is the only organ which is never
elected which questions its accountability. Second, a majority of the real Guurti who were originally
selected by their clans in 1993 has died, and their posts have been inherited by their families.
Hoehne noted that: ‘Initially, only men sat in the Guurti; recently, a few women came in who
“inherited” the seats of their deceased husbands’146. In addition, they disrupted the elections several
times and extended the terms of the President without consulting other stakeholders.
Clan- based political mobilization: As the Somali ‘‘Xeer’’ regulates the socio-economic, political and
civil relations of the society, the power and authority of traditional institutions are apparent in all levels
of the society. These traditional institutions are perceived to be the last and sole authority that sustains
peace and stability. This perception comes from the fact that the traditional authorities are the
producers of the current Somaliland state from the ashes between 1991 and 2001 and even solved
some other more difficult conflicts in Somaliland after 2001.
Ibid. p 8
Markus Virgil Hoehne, ‘Limits of hybrid political orders: the case of Somaliland’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7:2,
2013, p 202
146 Ibid. p 203
144
145
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Table 5: Current Conflict Resolution Mechanism in Somaliland
Somalilander's Trust of Authority
12%
Both
Elders using the somali
traditional mechanism
48%
40%
Government using its
constitutional power
Recently political parties and clan leaders mobilized people on the basis of clan affiliation which might
retard the democratization process and cause deep social divisions. It would also reduce trust between
the people and their formal institutions making them increasingly rely on clan systems. Clan systems do
not only challenge the democratization process and elections but also weaken the national unity of the
country.147 As Forero, et al pointed out ‘Individual Somalilanders usually do not perceive themselves as
citizens of a geographical town or region but as members of a social group, clan, or sub-clan. Thus,
clan allegiances are still the fundamental organizing principle in society.’148 However, eliminating clans
from Somaliland politics would be very difficult because people trust their clans more than any other
system and would then have a direct negative impact on the democratization process.
Table 6: Criteria for Party and Candidate Election in Somaliland
During elections criteria for electing candidates and party
choice:
60
58.4
50
40
30
18.3
20
8.3
10
8.3
5
0
CLAN AND
MONEY
CLANS
MONEY
PARTIES
PROGRAMS
PERSONAL
PROGRAMS
Owens J, et al, ‘Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya’, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs 2013, p 14 –5
148 Ibid. p 15
147
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2.4.2. Technical challenges of Somaliland democratization
Before 2001, Somaliland had very limited experience in democracy and elections, but the motivation for
a democratic state has been present since the 1980s. In order to turn such ambitions into practice,
Somaliland has conducted five consecutive elections which were aimed at transforming the politics of
the Somaliland from a clan- based to multi-party democracy. Compared to neighbouring states, the
elections in Somaliland were reported the most as they were free and fair and transitioned from the
ruling to opposition party peacefully. In the early years, remarkable achievements were made and three
elections were carried out within four years, but that didn’t last. The elections stopped and were on hold
with several delays and postponements. Among the challenges that caused the delays were and
continue to be:
Weak and incomplete electoral laws: After the adoption of the Constitution, the next step in
democratization is the development of electoral laws. The development of effective electoral laws which
meet international standards is very difficult without external support. Somaliland got little support from
the international community because of the lack of recognition. The development of electoral laws in
Somaliland started in 2001 and was based on the previous Somali Republic Laws which also reflects
the Somaliland Constitution. There were difficulties and they can be traced to the British rule in
Somaliland, such as the demarcation of the regions, allocation of parliamentary seats to specific
regions and increasing new districts in one region. This led to the development of different electoral
laws such as the Presidential and Local Elections Law 2001 (Law No. 20/2001), the House of
Representatives Election Law 2005 (Law No. 20—2/2005) and the Voter Registration Law 2007
amended in 2008 (Law No. 37/2007).149 In most cases all the laws were drafted and developed during
the elections while the polling arrangements were underway. This was a major issue that contributed to
the election delays in Somaliland. It is extremely difficult to hold elections without appropriate and
effective electoral laws.
The legislation process of the different electoral laws reveals how the parliament failed to make the
electoral laws into a cohesive legal document for all election. The judiciary too was perceived to be a
pro-government organ which failed to intervene and arbitrate conflicts arising during elections. A good
example was the district elections in 2012, when Marodijex Regional Court refused to hear a dispute,
between the NEC and a political party regarding the recount of a few votes. This allowed the traditional
clan leaders to resolve the case outside the formal institutions. Inefficient electoral laws may only hinder
the progress of the NEC and other institutions involved in the election process. Furthermore, if the laws
are perceived to be weak by the public, there will be uncertainty leading people to interpret it differently
and raise conflicting expectations, thus resulting in conflicts and clash. This situation continuously
149
Jama, Ibrahim, H., Handbook on Somaliland Electoral Laws 2009, (Somaliland law series), 2009, p 20 –7
40 | P a g e
challenges the development of democratization in Somaliland while increasing dependence on the
clan-based traditional authorities.150 In addition, the political parties are not ready to advance their
internal policies and procedures; they don’t even support the NEC in fulfilling their mandate. Kaltuun
observed that ‘Somaliland political parties do not respect the electoral laws and the code of conduct; if
one party has a majority votes in one region the other parties tries to mess it up and make such votes
null and void. They even advocate multiple voting and under age voting’.151
Invalid voter registration: The voter registration was scheduled for 2007 but that did not happen due
to technical problems in the Voter Registration Law. The political parties and NEC reached an
agreement to make a few amendments to the law but that delayed the presidential and local council
elections.152 Besides the lack of trained staff of the NEC and voter education, the NEC carried out the
registration with low competence. Clan leaders and political parties took advantage of their incapability
and prompted the local people to register themselves as much as they can. Hence, voters registered
multiple times because the registration officers were incompetent. They did not fingerprint the people; it
was revealed after the registration that only 47 per cent of the 1.3 million registered people were
fingerprinted. The delays and inefficiency cost the government too much and the voter registration
system was suspended by the parliament. A new NEC was formed which would conduct the
presidential election.153 Another reason for multiple registrations is because people want to vote more
to show that their clan had more power and influence over the government. As Haroon said
‘In the pastoral environment it is quite common for Somali herdsmen to inflate the size of their
sub-clan and livestock in order to signal their power and /or to scare off potential adversaries.
Similarly, in politics clan leaders exaggerate their numbers to justify their claim to a bigger share
of the national pie. The Somaliland voter registration fiasco in Oct 2008 is a good example of
this. At the time politicians and elders mobilized as many of their clan members as possible for
the registration in order to demonstrate their numerical supremacy and to enhance clan prestige.
Rivalry between the clans led to multiple and under-age registrations’.154
Clan affiliations are entrenched in Somali politics and they are a technical as well as structural
challenge to the democratization process in Somaliland. They have certainly delayed the presidential
elections of 2010 for several months and the local council elections for two years.
Weak Political Parties:
The political parties in Somaliland were weak and contributed to the delays in election and incomplete
democratization process in the country as well. The parties relied on clan support and did not develop a
Owens J, et al, ‘Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya’, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2013, p 09
151 Kaltuun Shiikh, Interviewed by Mustafe Osman, 2016 Somaliland National Election Commission.
152 Jama, I. H. Handbook on Somaliland Electoral Laws 2009, (Somaliland law series). 2009, p 119
153 Owens J, et al, ‘Elections and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 2013: Somaliland, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya’, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs 2013, p 11
154 Haroon, Y. Somaliland’s Political Culture: Challenges to democracy, (SORADI, Hargeisa), 2011, p 18
150
41 | P a g e
policy agenda which Somalilanders could engage, empathize or participate in. The clan mentality has
had a strong influence on the formative phases of the parties and the party leaders continued to seek
the support of their clans and inadvertently the traditional clan leaders. The political parties did not have
regular funding and financial freedom making them even more dependent on clan contributions. The
multifaceted dependence and financial support from their clans result in clan ownerships of the
parties.155 The most difficult problem is the weak internal organization of the political parties. They lack
internal policies and procedures and the internal management of all the three parties is not democratic.
As a result, internal conflicts are unresolved which could destroy the party like in the case of UDUB, or
splits the party into two like in the case of UCID. A party’s decision-making process is centralized
wherein the chairman has absolute authority over all members and any form of dissent would result in
expulsion from the party. Notably, there are also less than 10 women members in all the three
parties.156 Kaltuun157 describes this party politics in an interview, ‘All the parties are divided into clans
and there is a huge difference on what parties are supposed to be and how they are behaving
internally. If you look every party’s members the party’s chairman clan dominates all the other clans.
Parties select their members based on clan affiliation rather than merit’.
APD, Pillars of peace, Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and
the Way Forward, 2015, p 37
156 Kaltuun Shiikh, Interviewed by Mustafe Osman, 2016 Somaliland National Election Commission
157 Somaliland National Electoral Commissionaire
155
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3. Conclusion
When the two territories of Somali and Somaliland united in 1960, the resulting union was a unique
nation in African. It had a homogeneous population sharing a common language and religion and even
had a clan-based political system. The differences in Somali politics appeared from 1991, which many
researchers linked to external factors such as radical Islamic ideologies and self-interest motivations of
neighbouring states. This thesis, however, attempted to analyze these differences from within as well
as outside the Somali social and political structures. The land of the Somalis attracted three different
European colonialists and Ethiopia who were controlling the Somalis and their land for decades. The
colonial powers left legacies which influenced the traditional Somali systems from a decentralized
pastoralist political system to a centralized government. They also created territorial borders between
the Somali people without respecting their clan systems158. The Somali political system is different than
the European state model which may provide an explanation for the prevalence of peace, stability and
democracy in Somaliland but not in the south.
The territory of Somaliland was under British administration from 1884 until 1960, except in 1941 when
the British administration moved to Aden in Yemen during the Second World War, and the Italian fascist
forces occupied Somaliland. On 26 June 1960, Somaliland gained independence from the British and
four days later united with the Italian Somali territory in the south.159 Within the first four days, a number
of 35160 states recognized Somaliland to be a state.161 As a result, they formed a single government
with one President, Prime Minister, national flag and the capital which was Mogadishu in southern
Somalia.162
Soon after the unification process, the people of Somaliland realized that the union was futile because
of imbalance in power sharing between the two united territories. All major positions in the united
government such as the President, Prime Minister, commanders of the national army, the majority in
the parliament and even the capital city were from and based in the south Italian Somali territory.
Between 1960 and 1967, the political suspicions between the two territories widened and nepotism
reached the highest levels. A flicker of hope for the Somalilanders came when Mohamed H Ibrahim
Egal was elected Prime Minister, the only and the last Prime Minister from the north British Somaliland,
Mark, Somaliland Country Report 1997, p 13
There were some conditions but was not legally agreed upon. There was an Act of Union drafted and signed by the
leaders of Somaliland; whereas, the Italian Somali trusteeship in the south did not sign. The Somali President, however
proposed another Act of Union to the parliament which most parliamentarians of Somaliland voted against it.
160 According to a former U.S. Ambassador David Shinn, 35 governments recognized Somaliland including the U.S. See
David Shinn, “The Horn of Africa: Where Does Somaliland Fit?” paper presented at a discussion seminar on Somaliland in
Umea, Sweden, 8 March 2003.
161 I. C. G, Somaliland: Democratization and Its Discontents, ICG Africa Report N°66 Nairobi/Brussels. 2003, p 4
162 WSP International, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities, Red Sea press Inc., Asmara, 2005, p 6–7
158
159
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but that did not last long and the Somali Republic entered another 30 years of military rule (1969 –
1991).163
Colonization and post-colonial Somali governments left their legacies on the Somali traditional political
systems. The colonial powers in Somalia, i.e., the Italian and the British, used different tactics which
produced different results in their respective territories. For example, on the one hand, the British used
indirect rule and allowed traditional systems of government for the natives. The Italians, on the other
hand, used direct rule and minimized traditional systems. The post-colonial administration, however,
adopted a Western style of governance in which people would elect their leaders democratically
minimizing the role of Somali traditional systems in their political affairs. The military rule from 1969 to
1991 banned all traditional systems and adopted a revolutionary socialist government. The Somali
traditional leaders continued to mediate and manage clan affairs in the peripheral areas, particularly in
the north in Somaliland. When war broke out between the SNM and Barre’s military rule, the traditional
leaders in Somaliland regained their power and mobilized people to fight against the regime.164
The Somali government finally fell and the state of Somalia collapsed after a long drawn civil war. As
WSP International noted, ‘A decade of conflict, antagonism, discord, hostility and suffering issued,
while other progresses towards development, peace and reconstruction of all social infrastructure were
deteriorating and eroding a day-after-a day Somalia entered the 21st century as “a black hole.’165
Therefore, the year 1991 was meant to bring hope to the people with a new form of governance
establishing the State of Somaliland. The people of Somaliland adopted different reconciliation efforts
and attempted to restore peace and stability with post-conflict reconstruction of social infrastructures.166
Several reconciliation conferences which were backed by the international community had failed to
restore peace and stability in southern Somalia. They were all based on the notion of Somalis being
homogenous and therefore unique, ignoring the realities of clan differences as well as traditional
methods of conflict resolution. In the north, at Somaliland, a number of locally funded peace and
reconciliation conferences were initiated. They were successful in bringing peace to Somaliland and
resolved all inter and intra-clan conflicts. According to the Somali culture, the responsibility of resolving
conflicts has always been of the clan elders like Guurti.167
Ibid. p 4
Markus V. ‘Limits of hybrid political orders: the case of Somaliland’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Volume 7, Issue
2, 2013, p 202
165 Ibid, p 5
166 Ibid, p 5
167 Ismail I Ahmed & Reginald Herbold Green, The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local-level
effects, external interventions and reconstruction, Third World Quarterly, Vol 20, No 1, 1999 p 123
163
164
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However, from 1991 until the present, there have been numerous political and social developments in
Somaliland but its independence remains unrecognized in the Horn of Africa despite practicing
democratic principles. Somaliland had five national elections from local municipalities, parliamentarians
and presidential elections where people directly voted without violence.
Democracy and its electoral systems need a large amount of patience and effort with compromise and
consensus from the communities, especially if it is a new democracy. This has been very difficult in
Somaliland; whenever elections approach, tensions are seen in the social fabric and the fragility of the
system becomes very apparent . Although the democratic transformation of Somaliland was successful
in various ways, the corruption and manipulation of neutral institutions such as the electoral
commission were very high.168 In 2009,the International Crises Group predicted that the ‘2010 electoral
process has plunged Somaliland into a series political crises that presents yet another risk of
destabilization for the region’.169
The hybrid political system of Somaliland (modern governance and traditional clan-systems) had
worked well for two decades. Frictions and challenges from one system to another have been
witnessed in Somaliland politics. The growth and advancing democratization is challenged by traditional
systems and clan influences. The traditional system had set the foundation for Somaliland’s statehood
and contributed largely to the peace building, state building and reconciliation of inter and intra-clan
conflicts after the collapse of the Somali government. They even formed the first two governments in
Somaliland which were based on clan-based consensus. In the recent political scenario of Somaliland,
democracy and democratic elections have occurred since 2002, but the influence of traditional systems
obstructs Somaliland’s democratization process. As Fadal wrote, ‘the national elected institutions are
being invariably challenged by clan allegiances which sometimes shake the foundations of the fragile
constitutional system.’170
The challenges of democratization in Somaliland are numerous and among them is the conflict
between democratic principles and traditional clan systems.. As the APD had observed, ‘Somaliland’s
democratic success story is nevertheless challenged by numerous problems, such as weak institutions,
ICG, ‘Somaliland: A way out of the electoral crises’, Policy Briefing No 67, Nairobi/Brussels. 2009, p 1-2, Accessed on
February 20016Available online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-ofafrica/somalia/B067%20Somaliland%20A%20Way%20out%20of%20the%20Electoral%20Crisis.pdf
169 Ibid. p 1
170 Fadal, M. Reflections and lessons of Somaliland’s: Two decades of Sustained Peace, State Building and
Democratization, SORADI 2011, p 1
168
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gaps in the regulatory framework, the absence of a political vision beyond elections.’171 This thesis has
explored the challenges of democratization in Somaliland but further research is required to understand
the compatibility of the hybrid system in order to devise political options that would benefit Somaliland
in the long term.
APD, Confronting the Future of Somaliland’s Democracy: Lessons from a Decade of Multi-Partyism and the Way
Forward”, 2015, p 98
171
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