April 2019
Sofia,
Bulgaria
DE RE MILITARI
JOURNAL
CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
ENGLISH ISSUE
DE RE MILITARI
De Re Militari is a Bulgaria-based group of analysts, which follows the development of
conflicts and political processes worldwide. Our purpose is to provide the broad audience
in Bulgaria with in depth understanding of the processes that are shaping the conflict
around the globe. All our work is freely available on the Internet and has been used by
students of political science worldwide in the conduct of their academic research, as well
as from specialists in the field, NGOs and government structures.
Published in Sofia, Bulgaria
Issue: 04.2019
Blog of the journal:
www.remilitari.wordpress.com
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https://www.facebook.com/deremilitari
https://twitter.com/remilitari
Contacts:
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ISSN 2367-9476
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
AUTHORS
RUSLAN TRAD
Freelance journalist, analyst and author with over ten years’ experience covering and
analysis of MENA, Balkans and Turkey regional issues; co-founder of De Re Militari
Journal; and author of the book “The Murder of a Revolution” (2017).
DR. ALEKSANDAR STOYANOV
Dr. Aleksandar Stoyanov is a co-founder of the De Re Militari journal. He has graduated
from the Leiden University with a PhD in History and is working in the field of Military
History for the past twelve years. Dr. Stoyanov has five published books and dozens of
articles in different scientific and popular journals.
VENTSISLAV BOZHEV
Political scientist and an expert in the field of international relations with extensive
experience in analysis of the European political processes as well as the dynamics of the
relations in the Middle East and the former Soviet Union. Author of many publications and
academic texts on the subject.
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Exclusive: interview with Mark Galeotti ........................................................................... 4
If you think Putin is a selfcentered warmonger, you havent payed much attention in your
Russian history class..................................................................................................... 10
Are ISIS coming back in Syria and Iraq? ....................................................................... 16
The advent of the digital mercenaries ........................................................................... 28
A glimpse beyond the Golan Heights ............................................................................ 33
Russia’s Youth Strategy for Syria .................................................................................. 40
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
EXCLUSIVE: INTERVIEW WITH MARK GALEOTTI
Mark Galeotti is a Senior Associate Fellow, Royal United
Services Institute, and analyst of the Russian politics
and global crime. He is an author of numerous books
and analyses. Founding editor of the journal Global
Crime, former European Editor of Low-Intensity Conflict
& Law Enforcement. He is also a member of the editorial
boards of Crime & Justice International and The Journal
of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, and a
Contributing Editor for IntelliNews Business New
Europe, and a regular columnist for Raam op Rusland.
Galeotti is also on the international advisory board of
the Andrei Sakharov Research Centre for Democratic
Development at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas,
and the Las Vegas Mob Museum. You can follow his blog1, Twitter2 or search for
his books3.
In your book “The Vory: Russia's Supermafia”4, you outline several
stages of relations between the authority and the underworld,
unraveling in Russia for the past 100 years. Is there a “trinity” between
the oligarchs, the avtoritety and the current administration that could
be perceived yet another stage of this complex relationship?
There is, although interestingly enough since the 1990s – when the world of
crime, politics and business all but merged – they have become distinctive
again. The government calls the shots, the oligarchs deal with the more
commercially-minded gangsters’ bosses, the avtoritety, but there is a clear
sense of separation. Furthermore, there is a fourth, increasingly unwelcome
component, the old-style gangsters. As the avtoritety increasingly blend into
the business class, in many cases they are looking to break their links with
their old partners in crime.
1
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/
https://twitter.com/MarkGaleotti
3
https://www.amazon.com/Mark-Galeotti/e/B001HCZ4AG/ref=dp_byline_cont_book_1
4
https://www.amazon.com/Vory-Russias-Super-Mafia/dp/0300186827
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
2
How do people like Igor Sechin and Yevgeny Prigozhin fit in this pattern
of oligarchs, avtoritety and administration?
Sechin has a personal relationship with Putin, who trusts him, and this is
arguably the most valuable resource in Russia today, and what got him his
current job running the Rosneft oil corporation. Prigozhin, by contrast, is a
perfect example of what I call the “adhocrats,” a figure who has no fixed role
in the system, just doing whatever the Kremlin wants done today. He has
catered for Putin’s parties, fed the Russian army, run one of the infamous
social media “troll factories,” and now manages the Wagner mercenary
organization. In every case, it is because this is what Putin and the state
needed him to do. At the very top level, after all, the distinctions between
oligarchs, bureaucrats and shadier figures fall away: this is Tsar Vladimir’s
court, and he has favorites like Sechin, allies like defense minister Sergei
Shoigu, and servants, like Prigozhin.
Russia has extended its economic, military and political influence
across Africa. Which is the driving force behind this process? Are
private economic interests leading or are they following on the political
agenda, carried out by the Kremlin?
The Kremlin is looking to assert Russia’s great power status, and to a
considerable extent this means building up international status and toe-holds
in areas that the West – especially the USA – might at some time find
important. At the same time, Russia lacks the money to buy allies like the
Chinese, let alone deploy substantial forces. Therefore, it has in some ways
privatized the process, encouraging private or state commercial interests to
get involved, making money for themselves and building influence for
Moscow in the process. This is a classic move by Putin’s Russia, harnessing
private and corporate interests for a wider government agenda, and doing
so on the cheap.
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
In the past few months, Russia has deployed troops and mercenaries
in several countries, most notably Sudan, CAR, Madagascar and
Venezuela. Is this an over extension or is it a calculated projection of
power?
These are all relatively small commitments, and often wholly or partially
financed through being granted local economic concessions. A few hundred
mercenaries or soldiers and cybersecurity specialists in Venezuela, for
example, is a small enough deployment, but very cost-effective. After all, if
the Maduro regime falls anyway, no one could really expect Moscow to have
prevented the USA from asserting its power in its neighborhood, but at least
it demonstrates that it does not abandon its allies. And if the regime survives
– regardless of how important the Russian forces were – then this can be
spun as a victory, that Moscow successfully challenged Washington in its
own backyard.
In your recent book “We need to talk about Putin”5, you emphasize
on the necessity to distinguish fact from fiction when analyzing the
actions of Russia's president and his supposed abilities and intellectual
capacity of a Machiavellian mastermind. Which are the main myths
regarding Putin, which need to be “busted” in order for the West to
perceive Russia in a correct way?
I run through a number in my book, but the most significant ways in which
we fall prey to both the Kremlin’s spin and our own fears, are to see Putin as
a strategic mastermind and a daring gambler. He clearly has no coherent
strategy, only a broad set of objectives, and his approach is essentially
opportunistic. As a good judoka, he strikes whenever he believes his enemy
is vulnerable. Sometimes this works, often this fails, but it is driven by
opportunity. Russia’s campaign against the West is also to a large extent not
run from the Kremlin but generated from below: all kinds of “political
entrepreneurs,” from oligarchs and intelligence agencies, to journalists and
diplomats, take initiatives when they think they have a chance to further the
5
https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117583/we-need-to-talk-about-putin/9781529103595.html
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
Kremlin’s agenda. If they fail, they fail; but if they succeed, the Kremlin
retrospectively blesses and rewards their actions. Thus, when we have
trouble spotting a grand strategy behind Russia’s varied and often
contradictory actions, it is because there isn’t one.
Likewise, despite the bare-chested macho image Putin projects, the
evidence suggests he is very risk averse in practice, often postponing
decisions until he is sure he knows the outcome. Of course, he gets things
wrong, especially because these days people tell him what they think he
wants to hear, rather than what he needs to hear. But many of his seeming
gambles, such as the 2014 intervention into the Donbas or the attempted
assassination of Sergei Skripal in the UK in 2018, reflected miscalculations
and bad intelligence: he thought they were safe bets.
Apart from its foreign political issues, Russia has met with several very
important problems at home. Which are the main issues that could
have a destabilizing effect on the Russian federation in the near future?
The economy is in decent, if not wonderful shape. People are unhappy, but
not violently so. There are no genuine serious threats to Russia’s security.
The real challenge is likely to surround Putin’s health or his likely attempts to
manage a political transition. For twenty years almost, he has been the sun
around which the rest of the political system has orbited, and it is unclear
how well it will cope with change, especially when issues such as corruption
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
continue to provide potential rallying points around which genuine political
protest could cohere.
Many opponents of Putin and his administration believe that the West
could simply outlast the current Russian government by continuing with
the economic pressure. Could a country in which a third of the GDP is
embezzled by the “gray sector” be intimidated by legal economic
sanctions?
The sanctions regime is irksome, but not disastrous, and even the wholly
legitimate parts of the economy are generally coping. Barring all-out
economic warfare designed to break the country – which would be
tremendously dangerous, not least as they would force Putin into some
violent escalation – then the sanctions regime is more about signaling protest
at Russia’s actions. The irony is that Moscow actually thinks time is on its
side, that the Western consensus on the sanctions regime will break before
it feels it has to compromise.
So far, Russia has gone through periods of ups and downs regarding
the proportion of power, concentrated in the hands of the state and the
mafia. There seems to be a continuing pattern though. So, what comes
next? What will the next “trinity„ look like?
There have been interesting signs of movement: arrests of some major
gangsters, a new law allowing criminal bosses to be imprisoned just for that,
without having to prove they committed any specific crimes. I suspect in the
next decade we will see a campaign against the tattooed “blue-collar
criminals” by the new blended business elite of “white-collar criminals” and
their allies in the state. This will be less to do with law and order and more
about taming an increasingly unreliable and inconvenient underworld in the
interests of those now looking to legitimize their money and power.
After all, when Putin eventually dies or surrenders power, I think the
dominant force will be the pragmatic kleptocrats, who will want to improve
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
relations with the West, but also protect their wealth at home. Ironically, it is
the more successful criminals, the ones who can afford to look legitimate,
who will lead the charge against their street-level counterparts.
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
IF YOU THINK PUTIN IS A SELFCENTERED WARMONGER, YOU HAVEN’T
PAYED MUCH ATTENTION IN YOUR RUSSIAN HISTORY CLASS
Dr. Aleksander Stoyanov
Ever since 2008, Western media has built upon the notion of Russia’s leader
Vladimir Putin as a warmonger and a Machiavellian mastermind, who aims
at exploiting any weakness, demonstrated by his opponents. While there are
certain trends which verify such an idea, the notion that Putin’s policy is a
novelty in Russia’s foreign political tradition is false.
While Putin’s authoritarianism has served as a role model and a benchmark
for many world leaders in recent decades, neither his foreign political
approach nor his schemes are unique, measured against the substantial
background of Russia’s previous entanglements abroad. For anyone who
has been living under a rock for the past 600 years, it’s worth noting that
Russia is a first-rank power, which has built upon a vast legacy of failures
and triumphs – both military and diplomatic. Thus, when considering Putin’s
foreign political moves, it’s always helpful to read through the thick historical
books in search of previous instances in which Russia’s paramount leaders
– grand princes, tsars, emperors and chairmen of the USSR’s political
machine, have reacted to similar challenges.
Regardless of the historical period, each great state’s foreign policy is
determined by a set of similar factors. Economic potential, military power,
geographic location and the qualities of the leading political and military
figures all predetermine the development of Great Powers throughout
history. The Russian federation is no exception. The only significant
difference comes from the fact that there are only a handful of states the
uninterrupted political tradition of which dates back as far as Russia’s. Take
for example the interactions with the Middle East. Russia is probably the first
foreign power to try to meddle in the region’s affairs as early as the 16th
century when Ivan III and his successors established relations with the
Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia and the multitude of states and tribes in the
Caucasus. For the next four centuries, Russia would gradually gain and store
knowledge and understanding for that region and would model its approach
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
according to this rich database. Compared to such background, the US, with
its 70 years of Middle Eastern policy, looks a bit like a newbie. The October
revolution of 1917 and the fall of USSR in 1991 certainly sent shockwaves,
which greatly disturbed the existing foreign political trends, but both
contemporary and Soviet-era diplomats and leaders were rather quick in
restoring and reasserting Russia’s political agenda in the contested regions.
The war in Georgia, occupation of Crimea and the intervention in East
Ukraine at first seem as rather uncertain political adventures. Many have
tried to portray these acts of aggression as ad hoc decisions, moves intended
to patch things up in the last minute. Such notions are very far from what is
happening in the hearts and minds of Kremlin’s leader and his close
advisers. What might seem as a last-minute response to growing foreign
pressure is in fact part of a long-term political program. Russia has built and
defined a set of boundaries and areas of influence that have changed little
in the past couple of centuries. The Caucasus has been viewed as a
backyard since at least mid-16-th century. Dominance in Central Asia has
been sought after since 1716. The Balkans were nurtured as a region of proRussian sentiments at least since 1765 and political and economic presence
in the Indian ocean has been a goal since 1722. Russia has made it clear
that economic and political developments in East and Central Europe were
in its sphere of interest since 1733 and even the Far East has been targeted
as yet another, even though remote, backyard since mid-18th century.
All those centuries of foreign political interest saw a constant interaction
between political, economic and military pursuit of mastery on Russia’s
behalf. To put it simple – if any area of the world has once been in Russia’s
sphere of influence or territorial control, it will remain so regardless of the
political model which governs the Kremlin at the present time. Western
historians have long pinpointed the fact that Stalin used the schemes of 19th
century Pan-Slavism in order to build his post-WWII Soviet empire.
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
TODAY, PUTIN IS SIMPLY REVIVING THE OLD TRENDS.
This time instead of communist internationalism, Russia’s leader is throwing
his lot on conservative nationalism…just as Russian leaders did in mid-19th
century. Or contrary to the now-popular meme – modern problems do not
necessary need modern solutions.
In this context military intervention has never been the last resort of tsars.
Rather, it’s usually either the first or the second. There is no simple answer
to the question why Russia prefers to handle its foreign opponents by force.
It’s probably due to the same reasons why, for example Habsburg Austria
has tried to handle them through diplomatic means. Possessing a vast
country with limitless natural resources, a huge population and a geography
which makes all important economic and political centers almost
untouchable probably contributes to bellicosity. Another explanation comes
from the fact that nothing strengthens authoritarian power as much as
frequent conflicts and states of emergency.
Russian powerholders have utilized war as means of concentrating power
and extracting loyalty and submission for centuries. The Soviet Union was
practically maintained based on supposed constant military threat from
abroad. Alexander II used the war with the Ottoman empire to divert public
attention away from the increasing terrorist activity of Russia’s anarchists,
and Peter I laid his entire reform program on the failure of the old boyar army
against Sweden in the initial stages of the Great Northern War (1700-1721).
Today, military success in Syria is used to promote foreign success parallel
to the introduction of ever stricter laws and freedom of speech limitations at
home. In a recent report to the annual military conference in Moscow, chief
of staff Valeri Gerasimov has noted that Russia is under constant threat from
the West and that it needs to utilize its military potential in order to thwart any
enemy initiative, aimed at the Federation. In Gerasimov’s words, this must
be achieved by submitting the army and the society to strict regulations,
which must protect the people from supposed ideological threats and covert
ops.
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
The projection of power into experts call the “far abroad” is also not a new
idea of Putin’s court. While today we see Russian troops and mercenaries in
Venezuela, Libya and Sudan, promoting Kremlin’s interests with rather small
investment of money and materials, this practice has been well tested before.
In 1896, Russia sent military advisors to Abyssinia to thwart Italy’s invasion.
It was a small mission of a few dozen officers and a cargo of several
thousand guns, but it proved enough to strengthen Orthodox brotherhood
between the two states. In 1923, the Soviet Union helped local communists
in Bulgari organized a failed rebellion. Two years later, two Soviet agents
and a few hundred guns were sent for an attempt at behedging Bulgaria’s
political elite in what became the bloodiest terrorist act in the country’s
history. Both investments were cheap and had no repercussions for the
USSR, but were later used as leverage on Moscow’s behalf, when the
Bulgarian communist party took over in 1944. To turn the clock a few
centuries back, in the first decades of 18th century, Russia provided a small
amount of money and guns to the Montenegrins in exchange for the
recognition of Petersburg as the “big brother” directing Cetinje’s foreign
political direction. Similarly, during Catherine’s wars against the Ottoman
empire, Russia provided limited military and financial support for the Greek
rebels in the Peloponnesus only to leave them hanging once the Hellenic
cause was no longer valuable for Petersburg’s war effort. As with their
contemporary engagements, these were all low-risk interventions, from
which Russia (USSR) could disengage with no or almost no damage to is
resources and reputation. Besides, part of the benefit of being Russia is that
people around the world generally expect the Kremlin to act in this matter
and thus there are no positive expectations that need to be met. If things turn
out fine, its only for Moscow’s benefit.
Finally, there is the political meddling in elections. The world was shocked
by the interference in the US vote in 2016 that brought Trump into power.
This has drawn attention away from similar moves played on a smaller scale
in the decades before. Still, fixing votes has been a common game for
Russia’s foreign policy for a long time. During the imperial period, Russia
constantly interfered in the political matters of Balkan countries. In Bulgaria,
for example, Russia was the game changer in elections in the late 1870s,
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
the 1880s and the 1890s.Governments rise and fell according to
Petersburg’s’ approval and even the first Bulgarian monarch – Alexander
Battenberg, had to abdicate due to Russia’s political pressure. The Soviet
Union similarly interfered in political processes in the Interwar period, and
later orchestrated elections across Eastern Europe after World War II. During
the Cold War, USSR’s political meddling abroad was only matched by that
of the United States. To go back deeper into the past, Russia was essential
for establishing the rulers of Eastern and Central Europe in the Age of the
Succession wars, and after the Congress of Vienna. In the upcoming years,
Russia will certainly interfere in the post-war reconstruction of many
countries in Africa and Asia and will also seek to promote its political interests
through local supporters in Eastern Europe.
***
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
Russia has long been a prime-time player on the global political chess board.
While its economic resources are limited, compared to its former
reincarnations, the Kremlin empire remains a pivotal power, that will continue
to rise not so much due to its own strengths, but by exploiting the
weaknesses and wrong decisions of its global and regional opponents. Putin
is not so much a Machiavellian mastermind, but rather an adaptive product
of the turbulent 1990s, who knows how to find and utilize the errors of his
opponents. In this context, the master of Kremlin can also rely on centuries
of experience by his predecessors, who usually followed the same general
agenda that now drives Russia through its journey ahead in history.
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
ARE ISIS COMING BACK IN SYRIA AND IRAQ?
Dr. Aleksander Stoyanov
On the 23rd of March, 2019 the coalition of Kurdish and Arab militias, known
as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), announced its victory over the final
ISIS stronghold in Syria in Baghouz Fawqani.6 The end of the battle also
marks the completion of the main phase of operation “Inherent resolve”,
which started on 15 June, 2014. There can be no trace of doubt in the fact
that the United States were the main driving force behind the fight against
ISIS in Iraq and Syria during the past 4 years. Any attempt by other countries
to claim primacy in this matter is only aimed at promoting foreign and
domestic interest in certain states and has no real dimensions whatsoever. 7
It was expected that a victory at Baghouz would spring a series of cheerful
comments and celebrations. The more experienced and well-prepared
analysts were quick to dismiss the overexcitement and pointed to the fact
that the real struggle against IS has just began – the struggle for the hearts
and minds of the people in Syria and Iraq. Specialist around the world has
long ago recognized the fact that only by strengthening the resolve of the
locals and by substantial improving their living conditions and education,
could the Coalition and its allies hope to prevent the return of the jihadists. It
was back in October 2016 when our team issued the first warnings that if the
Coalition fails to dismantle Daesh's local networks, the tumor will regrow
once more and spread.8 The months and years after that have confirmed our
thesis, supported by the works and reports of a number of well-established
analysts and specialists in Middle Eastern studies and politics.9 Our weekly
reports on the events in Syria and Iraq, as well as similar papers, provided
6 In the following text, the Islamic States, ISIS, IS and Daesh will be used to describe the same terrorist
organization.
7 A quick look at Twitter accounts of Russian and Iranian supporters might give you a hint of these claims and the
effect they are having on the general population of certain countries.
8 Ребусът „Даеш“, (The “Daesh” puzzle), De Re Militari, XXVI, p.3-11
DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
9 For example – H. Hassan, ‘Insurgents Again: The Islamic State’s Calculated Reversion to Attrition in the Syria-Iraq
Border Region and Beyond’ CTC Setntinel, vol. 10, issue 11, December 2017, p. 1-8
by NGOs and Governmental structures, demonstrated that ISIS was slowly
but steadily rebuilding their network, counting on a certain local level of
engagement, of which mention will be given further in the article.10
In the early weeks of 2019, all leading security experts and specialists
monitoring the Middle East have clearly stated that the Islamic State are on
the verge of resetting its network across Iraq and that the victory of SDF and
the Coalition in Syria is far from final and complete. The fight for Syria has
just entered another stage, the roots of which can be traced as far back as
the fall of Raqqah in 2017. Then, as we did an year earlier, De Re Militari
warned that the IS is rebranding its operational strategy in order to adapt to
the new conditions in the Middle East.11 In the following months this strategy
of adaptation was transferred to the other ISIS local structures in Libya,
Somalia and Afghanistan.
„THE NEW“ FACE OF ISIS
Immediately after the serios setbacks and defeats, sustained in the end of
2016 and trough 2017, the Islamic state took a series of measures to adapt
to the everchanging ecosystem of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. In the
months to come, many will claim that these changes are product of the 20182019 period, while infect these transformations are a constant feature of the
jihadists' development since 2006, when ISI emancipated from Al Qaeda.
The changes applied by the terrorists on their organization structure can be
divided in two general groups. The first one consists of the momentary
decisions, best described by the Latin term ad hoc. These are measures,
which are applied as a reaction to a process in the happening and are not a
product of a long-term strategy or concept. Decisions of the sort are mostly
related to local IS segments and the tactical decision making in the course
of offensives and defensive battles. The second group of transformations are
related to the long-term strategy of ISIS defined in 2013-2014 in a series of
10 For example reports by „Institute for the study of war” or „the Atlantic council”.
11 „Победени, но не и разгромени…или как Ислямска държава се опитва да се адаптира към новата
тактическа и стратегическа обстановка в Ирак и Сирия“
(https://remilitari.wordpress.com/2017/10/25/bentbutunbroken/ ) (Defeated but unbroken -or how ISIS is trying
to adapt to the new tactical and strategic reality in Iraq and Syria) DE RE MILITARI JOURNAL | CONFLICTS, MILITARY, ANALYSIS
papers, which are based on earlier concepts dating back to 2006. These
decisions are linked to the main components of IS's policy and to the way
the terrorist group functions in the broader context. These changes and
adaptations could be summed up under another Latin concept – modus
operandi.
The strategy of building local underground structures is set in papers as early
as 2007, when the jihadists of ISI (Islamic State in Iraq) are still held together
by a loose structure and their positions in Iraq are under the constant
pressure of Iraqi authorities and the US mission.12 After 2008, building upon
the objectives, listed in the document and the accumulated experience, ISIS
began to establish their system of local level structures. This was a complex
and long process, which developed in several stages. The procedure very
much resembles the establishment if underground networks at the end of the
Cold War, drawing experience and know-how from states like Columbia and
Mexico, as well as from the Russian mafia.13 This trend was also promoted
by the variety of nationalities which made up ISIS, bringing in their
experience from back home. Apart from the underground experience, IS
capitalized on the rich practical and ideological heritage provided from its
predecessor – Al Qaeda. AQ's experience on the other hand, has been
formed in a long process of fighting the USSR in Afghanistan and later
confronting the USA around the globe. Further back, the AQ database can
be linked to the ideas and practices of Cold war guerrilla warfare, going back
to WWII.
The first step in infiltrating a certain region by the jihadists is the
establishment of a fighting segment, which simultaneously begins gaining
power and establishing a network of “eyes and ears” in order to target and
monitor all key targets in the selected area – both in terms of infrastructure
and prominent social figures. The next step is the formation of more
complicated battle teams, in order to carry out aggressive operations. After
12 Тhe text can be found here - https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/after-the-battle-for-mosul-get-ready-for-theislamic-state-to-go-underground/.
13 For a well-written account on the underground networks in Latin America, see R. Savini “Zero zero zero”; For
the Russian mafia check M. Galeotti, The Vory: Russia’s Super mafia (Yale:
University
press,| 2018)
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that, the jihadists aim at absorbing or destroying existing underworld
networks in order to monopolize violence and create a powerhouse, able to
challenge the authorities. Along with the assimilation, the terrorists absorb
certain illegal means of gaining additional finance – extortion, trafficking,
smuggling, illicit trade and kidnaping. Parallel to their underwound
expansion, IS moves in to infiltrate existing religious structures, both bringing
in loyal clerics and eliminating possible opposition in the existing clergy. After
the initial stage is completed, the IS sends in higher ranking members to take
command and further expand the existing venture. The newly established
structure resambles a council of ministers, each with a head and several
branch leaders, responsible for war, finance, trade and logistics.14
Each of these components has a specific set of tasks, which are taken over
by selected segments of the local structure. The entire structure is monitored
by a regional body with basically the same main components. On the top of
the provincial hierarchy sits the council of the wilayah (province), which is
also structured along the well-established line. The provinces on their turn
are monitored by a central structure, the influence of which varies regarding
the distance and autonomy of the separate provinces. While it is a
centralized structure, provincial segments maintain a rather flexible and
broad autonomy in order to better react to last-minute situations. Thus, rather
than using a pyramid, the overall structure of ISIS could be better described
as a network of self-supporting components, linked to a main body that
dictates the modus operandi, but leaves the ad hoc decisions to the local
governing bodies. The same structure is applied by both mafia groups (in
Russia for example) and by Al Qaeda. The difference comes from the fact,
that while mafia and Al Qaeda tolerate the existence of branches and
supporting, but independent groups, ISIS incorporates all existing local
fighters into a single structure, not recognizing separate entities in its global
network.
The structure, described above, has been used in practice to develop,
maintain and expand ISIS's influence up to 2013. In the following years, IS
took the next step in its evolution – the establishment of direct territorial grip
14 CTC, document MNFT-2007-005313 – ‘Example of a Simple Structure for Managing the State Affairs‘
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over areas of Iraq and Syria. This was the moment, when Daesh finally broke
with its Al Qaeda heritage and began walking a path of its own devise. Hence
forth, ISIS developed a quasi-state structure, in which the underground
structures of the past developed into a full-grown administration, which in its
apex presided over 8 000 000 souls. 15 Local councils morphed into local
administration and internal security structures transformed into a security
apparatus, a secret police and religious policing forces.
The defeats, sustained by Daesh, as well as the lost territories represented
a series of new challenges to the existence of the jihadists group. They were
met by following the long-established modus operandi. Faced with
insuperable resistance, the Islamic state chose to degrade its structure back
to the underground level which functioned prior to 2013. The length of
deconstruction of the existing administrative segments depended on the
amount of pressure, exercised over ISIS in the specific instance. Thus, in
areas with more successful ant-terrorist operations, IS degraded further back
to a n even earlier stage, while in zones with less pressure, the jihadists
maintain low profile, but retained their mid-level organization. The overall
meaning of this process is simple – survive, adapt, regrow.16
Once stabilized at a certain level of structuring, ISIS begins a slow and
steady process of restructuring and regrouping. Regarding the scale of
Coalition engagement in the past two years, ISIS has chosen to maintain a
low profile, operating on a cellar level in the separate provinces, often not
forming a regional or provincial structure in order to avert attention. The
process of restructuring often interacts with the development of underground
organizations, forming in the aftermath of the expulsion of the jihadists from
their territorial strongholds. Based on the absence of power in the newly
liberated areas and the overall uncertainty about the business, trade and
rebuilding, local gangs and criminal networks step in to take over trafficking,
smuggling and illicit trade. A substantial part of these networks has sought
15 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595
16 P. Rayan, P. Johnston – After Mosul, get ready for the Islamic state to go underground
(https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/after-the-battle-for-mosul-get-ready-for-the-islamic-state-to-gounderground/)
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protection and support by a variety of paramilitary groups, operating under
governmental supervision in both Syria and Iraq. Most of these are funded
and trained by Iran, either the PMU (People Mobilization Units) in Iraq, or the
number of militias in the so-called National Defense Forces (NDF) in Syria.
Many of these paramilitary forces and criminal gangs try to duplicate ISIS in
the manner of infiltrating and taking over local territories and dominating the
illegal trade in certain regions.
Thus, for example, the former rebel areas in the province of Dara'a in Syria
are now contested by five separate groups, struggling for control over drugs
and weapons trade – Hezbollah, the 4th division, 5th corps, the Tigers and the
militias loyal to the military intelligence service and the Airforce intelligence
service. The situation in Iraq is more or less the same and all in all, things in
the Middle East much resemble what is happening in Venezuela with its
Cartel of the Suns17 In the near future, ISIS will either fight these criminal
structures for control or will make deals with and probably incorporate part
of them. In the meantime, we can expect a series of short- and long-term
deals to be made between the jihadists, the criminals and the paramilitary
structures. It is quite possible that state actors will also be involved in the
process.
THE NETWORK
ISIS has already begun to show signs of revitalizing its network in both Syria
and Iraq. During the past year, IS has carried out a substantial number of
attacks against a multitude of targets in the said countries.18 For the past 15
months, there have been an average of 8 attacks per day with a different
scale of intensity. Such a statistic is in a sharp contrast with the notion of a
defeated and broken terrorist organization.
17 The Cartel of the Suns is an illegal structure, which involves both mafia leaders and political and military figures
in Venezuela. For a well written account, see - https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/drug-traffickingvenezuelan-regime-cartel-of-the-sun/
18 According to a BBC investigation, between January 2018 and March 2019, ISIS has carried out 1767 attacks in
Iraq and 1124 in Syria. According to the jihadists' media Nawa, between
JulyMILITARI
2018 and
March 2019,
IS has been
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responsible for 1395 attacks in Iraq and 966 in Syria.
A number of reports on Iraq have pointed that ever since the end of 2017,
ISIS began to reestablish their network in Iraq, building upon the pre-existing
structures, which were not adequately uprootedted by the authorities.What
is troubling is that the jihadists are using a copy of their previous version,
achieving the same level of succes without being contered by any meaningful
measures on the government's behalf.
The wide spread corruption and the lack of adequate authority are a further
bonus for the jihadists in their task of regrouping and re-growing. At present,
the IS have reinstalled their structures in the provinces of Anbar, Ninawa,
Salahuddin and Diyala, and have also infiltrated Kirkuk and the zones around
the Bagdad perimeter.19 Their network links a series of settlements, hidden
bases and caves and functions on the basis of a well-established practice,
tested between 2008 and 2014. In certain parts of the above-mentioned
provinces, ISIS have an actual grip on the hinterland of several settlements.
There is also a dramatic increase in the number of kidnappings and
assassinations of local leaders and strongmen – both secular and religious.
In the second half of 2018, the ISIS network began spreading south.
Jihadists began returning to key cities like Tikrit, Samara, Fallujah and
Ramadi. In 2019, their attacks began to spread further south to Makhmudia
and Madain. From a strategic standpoint, IS's leadership seeks to establish
a string of positions around the Iraqi capital – a clear sign that the
organization will try to repeat its campaign from 2014. In addition, similar
rings of strongholds are being established around Kirkuk and Mosul.
In Syria, ISIS maintains ist strong poresence in the desert areas of the
provinces of Deir ez Zor and Swayda in the Palmyra-Swayda-Deir ez Zor
triangle, sometimes referred as Badiya. In recent months, the jihadist were
able to transfer troops from Baghuz to Swayda, capitalizing on corupted
militia leaders and the government turning a blind eye in order to later use
the jihadist treat agains the local Druze population. A recent investigation
has shown that no less than 1 500 ISIS members, well armed and battle
19 http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-re-establishes-historical-sanctuary-iraq
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ready, have been transferred though government held areas.20 Further proof
of continuous jihadist presence is exacerbated in the form of constant attacks
against SDF and Assad forces along the Euphrates – from Baghouz to
Manbij. In two separate attacks, more than 20 Kurdish and government
soldiers have been massacred by mechanized machinegun squads, which,
strike out of nowhere and then disappear in to the wilderness.
In Syria, ISIS continues to rely on close ties with several Bedouin tribes and
clans, living along the Euphrates river in the provinces of Raqqah and Deir
ez Zor, as well as in Hassakah. Popular unrest against the harsh treatment
of Arabs by the new Kurd administration are quickly prompting pro-ISIS
sentiments, which the jihadist will certainly capitalize on. The same goes for
government held areas, where mismanagement, corruption and illegal
activities by pro-Assad militias, back by Iran and Russia will certainly
backfire, strengthening the Islamic state. Further aid is provided by the timely
restructuring of the provinces in Syria, which has been carried out in 2018.
The new structure is far more flexible, sacrificing centralization for autonomy
and adaptability. In addition, new practices and experience in rebuilding will
certainly be brought in from Iraq.
„THE SINEWS OF WAR ARE INFINITE MONEY“
As in any other venture, the establishment, maintenance and
reestablishment of the jihadist network demands funding. Between 2014 and
2016, ISIS was at the height of its financial power and was able to extract
such a quantity of funds, that its annual budget could match the military
spending of countries as big as Romania. Just from selling of petrol, IS was
able to make over $1 500 000 a day.21 In the following years, this income
has been reduced but not removed.22 Furthermore, the jihadist were able to
transfer their operations toward other parts of the world and establish a
global illicit network, the funding from which can be redistributed to support
20
Sarah Hunaidi – ISIS Has Not Been Defeated. It's Alive and Well in Southern Syria.
(https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/03/isis-has-not-been-defeated-its-alive-and-well-in-southern-syria/ )
21 https://www.ft.com/content/b8234932-719b-11e5-ad6d-f4ed76f0900a#axzz3rhwAkkfP
22
https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/10/oil-extortion-still-paying-off-for-isis.html
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the ongoing effort in Iraq and Syria. In this aspect, structural decentralization
has actually helped maintaining the center.
ISIS continues to earn millions from their participation in drug and people
trafficing, smuggling, weapons and antiques trade etc. Simultaenously, the
group has been able to slip a substantial amount of money from Iraq and
Syria and to transfer these funds to safe locations. Between July 2017 and
July 2018, IS was able to extracted over $400 000 000 out of Iraq and Syria.23
In the aftermath, the jihadists were able to reinvest a substantial part of these
funds back into the Iraqi economy – an estimated $250 000 000, laundered
through carwashes, pharmacies, fast food diners, currency exchange offices
and car repair facilities. The people managing these ventures were either
part of the informal ISIS network or were in business relations with the
jihadists.24 After being laundered, the funds earn profit and go back to the
pockets of ISIS investors, in return funding the purchase of guns, munitions
and explosives.
In Syria, where the territorial fragmentation is much more obvious than in
Iraq, local powerholders have been unable to establish a strong and working
control over trade, movement of goods and people and the transfer of
money. While legal business is not as profitable as in Iraq, ISIS is capitalizing
on more brutal forms of extraction – kidnappings, smuggling, traffic of goods,
weapons, drugs, people and antiquities. Turkey has also proven to be a good
option for the terrorists' business activities, regardless of several
counterterrorist ops, carried out by the authorities. Through Turkey, ISIS can
tap in the European illicit market, using a complex system of intermediaries.
23 R. Mansur – „ISIS Inc.“ (https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/isis-inc-islamic-state-iraq-syria/)
24 Ibid.
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Regarding operational spending, the reshaping of ISIS from a quasi-state
status into an open insurgency, is easing the financial pressure on ISIS. The
group now has far less expenditure than two years ago, while its income has
mostly remained unchanged since 2018, and has probably even grown
govern the IS expansion in other parts of the world. The fact that ISIS has
completed its transformation into a global jihadi-mafia cartel has further
strengthened this trend.25 In reality, as is happening in Latin America, the
boundaries between terrorism and organized crime are beginning to fade.
Furthermore, criminals and jihadist become more and more entangled in joint
networks of illicit trade, trafficking and smuggling operations. A global system
is forming in which cocaine from Columbia is being exchanged for heroin
from Afghanistan in North Africa by drug cartels buying guns from terrorists
and separatists who also happen to be intermediaries in the transfer of drugs
across the Middle East.
25 „Ислямска държава ООД“, (ISIS Inc.) (https://remilitari.wordpress.com/2018/01/29/isis-inc/
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Apart from its material form of illicit trade, criminal capitalism is expanded
through a system of informal banking, which has developed in the Middle
Ages, based on the Islamic ummah. The term describing this system is
hawala and it has been known to scholars for a long. 26 The core of this
system is based on money transfer via intermediaries, without money
traveling any real distance. A man in Damascus (Mr. A), for example, decides
to send money to an associate, operating in Kabul (Mr. B). Mr. A finds a
trustworthy intermediary in Damascus, requests a transfer of $1 000 000 to
Kabul and gives him a slightly higher sum (the intermediary keeping a “fee”).
The Intermediary sends word to a friend of his own in Kabul, saying that one
Mr. B will come asking for $1 000 000 and that these funds must be given to
him. The intermediary in Kabul, trusting his friend back in Syria, will lend Mr.
B the money, no questions asked. The debt between the two intermediaries
will be settled later, without attracting unnecessary attention from the
authorities. Since these are contacts between illegal structures, the hawala
will include more than one set of intermediaries, so that the path of the funds
become almost untraceable. In the end, since no physical transfer of money
is made, and no accountability is provided from the intermediaries
(hawaladar), the money can hardly be followed. Prestige and trust are the
most valuable assets in these operations. Losing trust means cutting all ties
and losing all clients.
Based on the untraceable hawala funds and the infiltration of the local
economy (both legal and illicit), the Islamic state is establishing a lucrative
transnational network, which can finance all the operations and attacks,
carried out by the jihadists across the globe. Money buy guns, munition,
explosives and provisions. They also buy mercenaries and military
instructors such as Malhama Tactical – a Jihadi-orientated private military
company, offering training to insurgents, terrorists and the sort.27 In addition
to military cooperation, funds also buy the services of a network of hackers,
26 Р. Трад – „Как радикални групи използват древна банкова система, за да се финансират“ (R. Trad – How
radical groups use an ancient banking system to finance themselves) (https://www.vesti.bg/sviat/radikalni-grupiizpolzvat-drevna-bankova-sistema-6079184)
27
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/10/the-world-first-jihadi-private-military-contractor-syria-russia-malhamatactical/
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Internet provocateurs and “trolls”, which use a wide variety of techniques in
order to promote “the caliphate” – from attacking servers to designing
elaborate infographics in order to cow enemies and inspire followers.
The issue of whether the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has been eliminated,
received a firm answer from both independent experts and the US
authorities. The jihadists, even if beaten badly, are neither broken nor extinct.
Their tumor-like network continues to spread across the Middle East in the
fertile soil of corruption, state irresponsibility and sectarian tensions. Existing
local and regional conflicts add additional strain to the existing social order,
opening the hearts and minds of the population to ISIS propaganda. While
experts have a clear sense of why the resurgence of ISIS is happening, so
far no one has provided an adequate answer of how to prevent it and uproot
jihadism from these troubled lands. As for the question posed in the title of
this article – whether ISIS are coming back to Syria and Iraq, the answer is
simple – they never left.
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THE ADVENT OF THE DIGITAL MERCENARIES
Dr. Kiril Avramov is a post-doctoral
fellow at the Intelligence Studies
Project at the University of Texas at
Austin. He is an Assistant
Professor of Political Science at the
Department of Political Science
and former Vice-Rector of the New
Bulgarian University in Sofia and a
former Senior Fulbright Visiting
Researcher at CREEES, UT Austin, Texas.
The topic28 of use and role of private military contractors in modern warfare
periodically gains the intensive focus of public attention and scholarly
scrutiny. It happens so, due either to highly publicized lobbying efforts of the
proponents of private military and security companies’ (PMSC) wider
implementation in long-running conflicts, such as the recent “Prince plan” for
Afghanistan, or highly publicized operations of increasingly assertive nonWestern PMSC’s, such as the likes of the Russian “Wagner”.
The scrutiny focus and intensity are justified and rightfully so, as the
expanding role of the private military contractors represents a key feature of
the rapidly evolving nature of modern warfare. However, while the public
attention tends to captured mainly by the kinetic operations performed by the
modern day “condottieri”, a new type of modern “soldiers of fortune” emerges
center stage. Namely, the ascent of a new breed, one that could be best
described as “digital mercenaries”. The advent of these new professionals is
of no less importance than their “traditional” counterparts who provide
muscle and boots on the ground in distant and difficult environments.
Provided the current state of accelerated technological development,
28
Republish with the author`s special permission. The original version https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/advent-digital-mercenaries
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relentless international race for artificial intelligence dominance coupled with
profound global uncertainty marked by increasing “gray zone” cyber activities
intensity renders their rise to prominence, as an inevitable.
In fact, these new “cyber soldiers and spies” for hire and their respective
operations in benefit of their clients will probably become the permanent new
norm, rather than a series of occasional and fairly rare episodes of obscure
nature. They will also certainly make a profound mark in the field of traditional
nation-state intelligence performance and cooperation, as well. The existing
global structural preconditions certainly provide a fertile environment for such
privatized actors to proliferate and gain even further importance. The
process of their expansion, however, raises virtually similar ethical, political,
economic and regulatory issues and concerns comparable to their
“traditional” PMSC’s counterparts.
HACKERS FOR HIRE
These problems are best illustrated by the recent revelations stemming from
the excellent Reuters investigation regarding the so-called “Project Raven”
in support of the expanding UAE signals intelligence efforts via employment
of American ex-NSA personnel. It could be argued that this particular case
of hiring of the new type of “digital mercenaries” is an industry inflection point.
It also exhibits all of the spectrum of issues of concern, while serving as a
precursor of the upcoming trends in the cyber contracting trade. While the
transfer of cutting-edge “defensive” cyber and surveillance technology and
hardware to well-resourced nation-states in process of defense and
intelligence capacity building is not a new phenomenon, the transfer of skills
and personnel definitely is. Especially, when it comes to provision of
intelligence training and actual application of personnel skills and technology
in benefit of foreign intelligence services.
And yet, this is precisely what the initial “Project Raven” and subsequent
“DarkMatter” projects were all about, where U.S. personnel was allegedly
tasked with helping their Emirati colleagues and managers in their efforts of
surveillance of governments, militants and dissidents deemed dangerous by
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the UAE ruling class. After at least five years of cooperation between an
American based company and UAE’s National Electronic Security Authority,
the whistle was blown after an American employee of the contractor raised
her concerns about the practice of targeting of U.S. persons designated by
the Emirati project management. In essence, the “thin, red line” was crossed,
when the American ex-government intelligence employees were troubled to
discover that the ever-expanding list of targets supplied by the Emirati
management was not limited to foreign governments and terrorist-related
individuals and groups only.
It allegedly also included a separate “white category” designated for
American citizens, besides the already existing country “color” categories,
such as Iran and Yemen. Apparently, the target list has featured the
designation of other Westerners, in addition to prominent Emirati human
rights activists.
VENTURING INTO THE DARKMATTER
It should be noted, this particular case is not isolated in terms of highlyintrusive surveillance and targeting technology transfer and implementation
from the West to other governments worldwide, as the recent research of
University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab demonstrates, where the Israeli NSO
company’s Pegasus flagship product was tracked in use by multiple
governments with less-then-stellar human rights records with quite
significant geographical reach. Similar was the story of the FinFisher toolset
sold by the British-German Gamma International, as well as the one of their
Italian rivals of “Hacking team” with their Remote Control System spyware.
Despite these companies’ denials regarding the intent of use of their
respective products and services, namely defensive purposes, the evidence
points out that they are overwhelmingly used in offensive operations that
routinely target civil society among various other targets. These stories are
a vivid illustration of the fact, that in the field of contemporary cyber warfare
it becomes increasingly hard to clearly distinguish between offensive and
purely defensive operations, as they frequently overlap in similar to
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traditional PMSC’s operations fashion. They also illustrate the potential
political problems that the use of regular and cyber contractors creates in
regard with respective national foreign policy objectives different
governments pursue.
While the general overlap of Western and client governments’ objectives,
such as tracking and neutralizing terror groups for instance, renders the
contractors of both kinds as beneficial assets, the diverging internal policy
agenda of authoritarian regimes turns the foreign hires into liabilities for their
home governments. While the general overlap exists, when the number of
suppliers increase and diversifies, there is no iron-clad guarantee that at
certain point the service providers will not cross knowingly or involuntarily the
policies of their home governments, as they cannot exercise control over the
agenda of their hosts, as visible in the case of “Project Raven”. In similar
vein, it also offers ample international criticism “munition” to all kinds of
different state and non-state actors and groups motivated to scrutinize and
object the Western foreign and security policies agenda.
In addition, in the case of the “digital spies” for hire, inevitably the host
institution or government will be inclined to tap into the hired personnel’s
specific knowledge, professional networks and familiarity with classified
information in their previous line of government duty. In worst case scenario,
the hosts will seek to gain leverage over the hired personnel for own
respective purpose. As the pace of digital innovation frantically speeds up, it
becomes rather obvious that the suppliers’ market overcrowds and not every
vendor will be able to sell its digital products and services only to its own
respective government. Ample evidence in this regard is supplied by the
issues surrounding the exports by some of the industry leaders, such as the
leading companies from the Israeli cyber sector.
The relentless pursuit of profit coupled with the inability to overcome home
market monopsony leads scores of these companies to sell their products
and services directly or via intermediaries to governments and agencies
previously designated, as off-limits. Open question remains if and when the
beneficial end-users decide to use the technology supplied for purposes
different than anti-terror, in pursuit of commercial competitive advantage for
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home-grown champions or industrial espionage against their competitors for
instance. Finally, come the regulatory concerns regarding the licensing and
effective control execution by the U.S. and other Western governments
dealing with such “digital mercenary” operations that are not confined to
technology transfer alone, but also involve employment of former national
intelligence personnel overseas.
Again, as the situational complexity surrounding this novel trend of
employing foreign hired intelligence personnel is rather high. Despite the
existence of well-developed American legal corpus dealing with export and
transfer of military goods and services abroad, the incidents involving
licensing of cyber know-how and capabilities in benefit of foreign intelligence
service suggest that there might be gaps or at least a room for improvement
in the existing legal base. Same seems to apply for the other respective
Western governments that deal with such cyber outfits that operate in foreign
environments. Indeed, the complexity and context vary widely, as the
burgeoning private sector demand for specific skills and services pertaining
to intrusion and influence operations is clearly on a rise. Such conclusion
could be inferred by the cases of the now-defunct third party intelligence
operators, such as Cambridge Analytica and PSY Group that have employed
certain amount of cyber and traditional tradecraft in benefit to their private
clients with significant amount of loud public controversy.
Finally, in parallel to the myriad of issues and problems in the past twentyfive years that have surrounded the emergence and subsequent maturity of
the private military industry worldwide, the advent of the new kind of private
digital warriors and spies closely mirrors these traditional concerns. For
governments and regulators concerned, it would probably be best, if the
lessons learned in the process of standardization of the PMSC industry be
applied and thus some of the worst failures avoided in timely fashion.
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A GLIMPSE BEYOND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS
Ventsislav Bozhev
Without any doubts, the rapid development of the social networks for the last
10 years, have made huge impact over the political processes globally. More
and more politicians use platforms like Facebook, Instagram or Tweeter to
communicate more easily with their voters, partners or opponents. One of
the politicians who take great advantage of these opportunities is the
American president Donald Trump. He needed only one sentence to
successfully change the long-standing American policy of his predecessors
on a delicate issue such as the status of the strategically important Golan
heights. Less than 240 characters were more than enough for Trump to
announce that “After 52 years it is time for the United States to fully recognize
Israel’s Sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which is of critical strategic
importance to the State of Israel and Regional Stability!”29 The recognition
itself happened just a few days later through an official proclamation signed
in the presence of the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had
come in Washington specially for the occasion.
Of course, this decision wasn’t based on emotions, but it was a well-thought
move, which came at a crucial moment just two weeks before the
parliamentary elections in Israel where Mr. Netanyahu had to lead a hard
fight to maintain his position for another four years.
THE CASE
The Golan Heights is an area spanning about 1800 square km. along the
borders of Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. After the Six-Day war of 1967
the Israeli army occupied roughly 2/3 of its territory imposing full control over
it. The Heights have great importance, because of their direct link with the
Sea of Galilee and the nearby water sources vital to Israel’s water supply.
They are also significant from a military point of view giving full strategic
President Trump: It’s time to ‘fully recognize’ Israeli sovereignty over Golan, 21.03.2019,
https://jewishnews.timesofisrael.com/president-trump-its-time-to-fully-recognise-israeli-sovereignty-over-golan/
29
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control over the border. Before 1967 the Syrian army often used the comfort
of the high ground to shell settlements deep inside Israel. Nowadays, IDF
uses the heights in a similar manner to observe Southwestern Syria all the
way to Damascus 60 km. from there.
In 1981 the conservative government of then prime minister Menachem
Begin formally annexed the disputed territory by a special law, which legally
applied Israeli jurisdiction and sovereignty over it. The international
community firmly rejected the act and determined as null and void by United
Nations Security Council Resolution 497. 30 Of course this was not an
obstacle for the Israeli state, which still treats the annexed land as an
administrative part of the Northern District.
However, the case has been a subject of direct and indirect negotiations
between Israel and Syria several times. The main idea behind the talks was
the so called “land for peace” principle promoted by the UN which stipulates
return of occupied territory in exchange for a peace treaty and recognition of
the Israeli state. Ultimately, the negotiation process proved to be
unsuccessful, and since the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011, the whole
case remains frozen.
THE ELECTIONS
Of course, it was more than obvious, that the main purpose of Mr. Trump’s
decision was to give support to his ally during the election campaign. In a
very delicate moment just a few weeks after the Attorney General Avichai
Mandelblit announced his intention to indict Netanyahu in three different
corruption cases for bribery, breach of thrust and fraud. And even though the
final decision on indictment will only take place after a hearing three months
after the elections, the whole story casted a shadow over the campaigning
and even the political future of Netanyahu.
Moreover, Netanyahu’s name was involved in another scandal related to
multi-million arms deals with Germany about the sale of submarines and
30
Resolution 497 (1981), https://undocs.org/S/RES/497(1981)
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naval vessel in which Egypt takes part as well. The scandal itself formed
large part of the campaigning against Netanyahu from his main political
opponents namely Benny Gantz, Moshe Ya’alon and Yair Lapid. According
to the leaked information, the prime minister had been behind a massive
graft scheme involving high ranking Israeli officials, that benefitted personally
from three deals about the purchase of four Dolphyn-class submarines and
four Sa’ar 6-class corvettes from German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp.
A separate fourth deal about two submarines and two anti-submarine
warships was completed between Egypt and ThyssenKrupp. The problem
here is that Netanyahu has had shares in American company that sold steel
and technologies to ThyssenKrup, which afterwards were used for the
completion of the submarines for Egypt. In this relation Netanyahu benefitted
by green-lighting Germany for the deal without any consultations with then
Chief of the General Staff of IDF Benny Gantz and the Defense Minister
Moshe Ya’alon.31
It will hardly be clear soon whether all these accusations against Netanyahu
are true or not. In any case, however, it is certain that his name wasn’t
involved in a scandal for the first time and his contradictory image once again
threatened his political career. And at this very moment the cavalry arrived.
President Trump’s decision reaffirmed the political consensus in Israel,
which is united behind the notion that Golan Heights must remain Israeli soil
at all costs. Especially in the context of the Iranian advancement in Syria and
the resulting direct security threads for Israel. Netanyahu himself has always
stood firmly behind this line as well as Benny Gantz and all the other
opposition parties. But here comes the tricky part. Only the incumbent prime
minister can possibly derive political benefits from the American recognition.
And so, he did. Netanyahu successfully promoted it as his personal
achievement and the result of his strong ties with Donald Trump. A diplomatic
breakthrough, that brought him some bonus points for the elections.
31
Though Germany does not need Israeli permission to sell arms, based on their special relations and together
with the USA and other ally countries, it has shown that courtesy in order to maintain Jerusalem’s qualitative edge
in the region.
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THE BIG PICTURE
Without any doubt Mr. Trump has achieved some positive outcomes in the
short-term helping his strategic ally to stay in power. After all, Netanyahu is
the man with whom the Americans have been negotiating the possible gamechanging deal regarding the Middle East Peace Process.
But the picture might not look so positive from another perspective. Above
all, it should be noted that the unilateral American recognition doesn’t entail
any changes in the international law. The UN, the international community
or even the closest American partners from EU and NATO rejected the
decision of President Trump. In other words, at least for now, the Golan
Heights will continue to be considered as an occupied territory.
A very important part of the whole puzzle is the position of the Arab countries.
In the weeks or months following the Israeli elections, the team of Jared
Kushner is expected to announce the long-prepared plan about the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and the Middle East Peace Process. A plan that needs
the approval and the support of the Arab countries in order to be legitimate.
And decisions such as this for the Golan Heights make this support very
questionable. Simply because from the Arab point of view the Americans just
give away Arab land without any dialogue.
Of course, there is a possible hypothesis that the recognition of the
annexation and the last year’s recognition of Jerusalem as an Israeli capital,
might have been used as a bargain chip in the process of negotiating the
peace plan. The United States support these two strands in exchange for
more concessions from the Israeli site regarding the Palestinians. This can’t
be confirmed yet or at least not before the plan is revealed. A plan that Mr.
Trump would expect to be his major achievement as a president – “the deal
of the century”.
The ironic here is that there is hardly even one Arab leader (except Bashar
Assad) who is opposing the Israeli annexation. At least for now the presence
of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria is much more dangerous for them than the
Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. After all this territory has never been
considered as part of the Palestinian cause and it will never be anything more
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than territorial conflict between Israel and Syria. However, no Arab leader
would ever admit such statement. Or at least not publicly.
And that’s why at the Arab League summit in Tunis all of them slammed the
US decision in a final declaration that said it “affirmed that the Golan is
occupied Syrian territory according to international law, the decisions of the
United Nations and the Security Council”. 32 But apart from this relatively
angry declaration, there weren’t any other significant consequences
following the Arab summit.
The controversial decision of President Trump will also in no way help the
improvement of relations with Turkey, which considers the Syrian territorial
integrity as a particularly delicate issue. Especially in the context of the
Astana process. Against the backdrop of Washington’s support for the Syrian
Kurds, the American refusal to extradite the cleric Fethullah Gülen, the
relocation of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem as well as the
recent presence of Secretary Mike Pompeo at a conference between Israel,
Greece and Cyprus (considered in Ankara as anti-Turkish), the Trump
administration’s recognition of the annexation will become yet another issue
in the already tense relations between the two NATO allies.
In a typical style, the Turkish President Erdogan has already used the
Trump’s decision to derive political dividends for himself both domestically
and internationally. Domestically just a few days prior to the local elections
and internationally in the context of his ambitions to emerge as a leader of
the Islamic world.
32
Arab League rejects US recognition of Israeli control over Golan Heights, 31.03.2019,
https://www.france24.com/en/20190331-arab-summit-expected-reject-usa-decision-golan-heights-israel
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WHAT ABOUT RUSSIA?
Finally, we have Russia. All American mistakes in the Middle East over the
last decade combined with the mismanagement of conflicts, have given
enough space to Russia to raise as a major regional factor, that can hardly
be sidestepped. And this case is also an example.
The reaction in Moscow, as expected, was negative and according to the
official position of the Russian Foreign Ministry the actions of the American
administration are “another manifestation of Washington’s disregard for
international law, UN Security Council resolutions, the principle of land for
peace, developed during the Madrid Peace Conference co-sponsored by
Russia and the United States, and the Arab Peace Initiative.” 33
Disregard of international law, said from a state, that brutally occupied and
annexed sovereign Ukrainian territory, sounds cynically to say at least. And
in this sense, the Russian ability to take advantage of such precedents
should not be underestimated. In a similar way Moscow used Kosovo to
justify its intervention in Georgia and the following separation of Abkhazia
and North Osetia. And when the time comes President Putin will hardly
hesitate to use the Golan Heights as an argument supporting the annexation
of Crimea.
The Golan Heights case weakens the position of those opposing the
Crimean annexation and will certainly give more space for Moscow to
maneuver when it comes to debating with the EU regarding sanctions. A
common question without any doubt will be “If the world decided to impose
sanctions on Russia over Crimea, then why nobody is sanctioning Israel or
the United States?”
As for Syria, Trump administration’s actions might give Iran and Hezbollah
enough legitimacy of their claims in Syria. It would be easy for them to
promote their military presence close to the Israeli border as the only existing
Комментарий Департамента информации и печати МИД России в связи с намерением США признать
суверенитет Израиля над Голанскими высотами, 22.03.2019, http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3583239
33
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resistance against “the Jewish occupiers”. Something that is not a desire in
Moscow. After all, the Russians invested a lot of effort to reduce the tension
in Southwestern Syria, helping the UN peacekeepers to restore the patrols
along the 1973 ceasefire line.
CONCLUSION
The recognition of the Golan Heights annexation neither alters the status of
the territory in international law nor does it change dramatically the situation
on ground. A symbolic act simply confirming the reality, which everybody has
already accepted. But the Trump’s decision is also a provocation, that in the
long term has a potential to erode the US leading role in the Syrian peace
process and its position as a major player in the Middle East. Such actions
provide Vladimir Putin with opportunities to make himself look like fairer,
more consistent and respecting the international law mediator.
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Russia’s Youth Strategy for Syria 34
Kiril Avramov, Ruslan Trad
When discussing Moscow’s role in the Syrian conflict, much of the
public and scholarly attention is squarely focused on the multiple
dimensions of Russian “hard power” and exercise of brute force and
rightfully so. Thus, relatively under scrutinized remains the quest for
strategic influence through “soft power” exploits that aims to cement
Moscow’s role in Damascus and adjacent Middle Eastern capitals for
extended period. Russian “heavy metal” diplomacy might be the
preeminent tool when it comes to Syria, however we would argue that
the skillful use of other “softer” instrumentation in pursuit of strong clout
and leverage is equally important.
This specific instrumentation that leaves a serious imprint on the
development of the bilateral ties between Russia and Syria, includes the
exploitation of increasingly pro-active Russian charities, non-governmental
organizations and committees focused on broader Middle East and Syria in
particular. Among the many commonalities shared between these “soft
power” instruments, in terms of structure, personnel, ideology and modus
operandi, that include the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, “RUSSAR”
Charitable Fund, “Combat Brotherhood” nation-wide veteran organization
and the Committee for Solidarity with Libyan and Syrian Peoples, one
particularly stands out and deserves a special attention.
Namely, all these structures zero in and focus part of their foreign activities
on the next generation of young Syrians. The younger generation becomes
prime propaganda target, as this vulnerable segment of the Syrian
population could be heavily influenced and successfully co-opted in the vast
wider Russian strategic influence architecture in the Middle East.
34
An edited version was published in EA World View https://eaworldview.com/2019/02/russia-youth-strategysyria/
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WORKING IN CONCERT TO PROMOTE GLOBAL “ORDERISM”
As mentioned above, all the Russian charities and non-governmental
organizations engaged in activities in Syria do share multiple commonalities,
as they have similar ideological load, comparable structure and overlapping
memberships of their key personnel. They also do have very close ties to
Russian military and intelligence structures and aim for increasingly
expanding international influence and exposure. All their key senior people
hail similar biographies shaped mainly by their experiences in the ranks of
Soviet nomenklatura, diplomatic corps, foreign intelligence or the military.
All of them export post-Soviet state-backed propaganda abroad, heavily
influenced by the ideas of Russian political and religious messianic global
mission, as well as what could be best described as “orderism” -i.e. new state
quasi-ideology that values sovereignty, stability and preservation of
“patriotism, traditional gender roles, Orthodox Christianity and military
strength…” When it comes to Syria, all of them seem to work in concert and
in close coordination in disseminating humanitarian aid, but also information
via academic lectures, high-profile conferences, art expositions and
academic and school delegation exchanges. In addition, they support
Russian language education, implementation of school programs, as well as
Assad regime’s veterans and veteran’s family support.
Their respective activities cover a wide spectrum ranging from religious to
language education and patriotic indoctrination that overlap with
contemporary different facets Russian foreign policy. Thus, these
organizations are linked directly with Kremlin via multiple structural and
personal channels and enjoy its full support, as they function as a virtual
extension of Russian diplomacy. They also act as the Russian state’s quasiofficial ideological arm when dealing with Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese
youth, students and intellectuals, as they are multifunctional platforms that
allow for simultaneous interaction in Syria and its neighbors and in Russia
both, where ideas are disseminated among local and Syrian, Palestinian and
Lebanese ex-pats and exchange students.
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These platforms allow for the cooptation and absorption of older Syrian and
other Middle Eastern ex-pat networks and mixed marriage families in Russia
and Syria that were built in the seventies of the past century, when scores of
Middle Eastern students were dispatched to study in the U.S.S.R.
Another very important functionality of such platforms is the ability for
representatives of circles close to Assad, such as the Khoury brothers, to be
coopted within the ranks of the contemporary Russian elite and receive
additional legitimacy and an opportunity for close networking. Something
quite important, especially when such people are targeted by international
sanctions and their ability to execute financial transactions and travel freely
in Europe is severely limited.
As a bonus, platforms, such as the “RUSSAR” Charitable Fund allow for
execution of parallel “unofficial” diplomacy that aids the official Russian
efforts in Syria and the broader Middle East, as in the case of the blitz-visits
of the head of “RUSSAR” in Tehran or endorsement and promotion of
Hezbollah’s profile and role in Syria.
A SPECIAL INSTRUMENT FOR SYNERGY
As the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society is Kremlin’s main device for
religious diplomacy and is a “heavy duty” instrument, current runner-up that
gains most attention with its energetic activity and cooperative approach is
“RUSSAR”. A charity, that was set up in response of 2014 “tragic events”
and named in abbreviation of Russia and Syrian Arab Republic was
established by Russian and dual Syrian citizens with varied professional
profiles, ranging from career ex-diplomats to financial entrepreneurs.
Headed by Oleg Fomin, a seasoned former diplomat who has been the
director of the Soviet cultural center in Syria from 1969 to 1975 and
representative of the Russian center for international scientific and cultural
liaisons at the government of the Russian Federation in Tunisia and Egypt
from 1994 to 2006, who also is co-chairing the Committee for Solidarity with
Libyan and Syrian Peoples and high-profile member of the Imperial Orthodox
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Palestine Society, the charity is tightly connected to certain segments of the
Russian political establishment via its board’s member the former deputy
chairman of the Duma, Sergey Baburin.
The charity’s board include the Russian ex-ambassador to Syria Alexander
Zotov, as well as the humanitarian projects coordinator of the “Combat
Brotherhood” Nelly Kuskova. It is also financially backed by the dual citizens
of Russia and Syria, brothers Mudallal and Imad Khoury, who were minority
owners of the US sanctioned Tempbank that was executing financial
transactions on behalf of Assad regime and in connection with gas and oil
trade with Iran.
The charity is a primer for a special purpose “soft power” influence instrument
that offers platform for synergy between all of the major stakeholders of
Russian foreign policy, such as the siloviki, the Orthodox and the old-school
Soviet diplomats and spies, that incorporates key topics of “orderism”
designated for global export from Donbass to Damascus, and allows for
client regimes’ representatives inclusion and utilization.
It also has a special focus on projects involving young people and
intellectuals, as it aims to shape the future Syrian civilian and military elite.
Thus, it stays close to important sources of local information that augments
the intelligence gathering efforts and allows its experienced operatives to
keep their fingers on the pulse of local events, while detecting and capturing
evolving public moods. In other words, “RUSSAR” is seeking returns on a
long-term investment strategy under the veil of humanitarian aid provision,
veterans’ families assistance and defense of Christian heritage in Syria.
CURATING A MYTH
Somewhere around 2012–13, when the Syrian protest wave was already
taking on the fearsome and ugly face of a civil war, the sympathizers of the
Syrian regime began to share an image of Bashar Assad as a defender of
the Syrian nation. In the image shared, Assad is in armor, confronting the
enemies who are conspiring against his government, enemies that include
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the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and scores of others. Using the
motives of St George’s story, Assad’s armored image was used by the
regime’s propaganda and circulated mainly by young people, to suggest that
without Assad heading of the country, the Christian population not only in
Syria, but also in the whole Middle East would be threatened.
Such tactics were meant to state not only to the Syrian people, but also to
the world that Assad was needed, and the opposition was discredited. From
Bulgaria through Western Europe and Russia, the Syrian communities were
gradually splitting, and the pro-Assad groups were created to claim, recycle
and repeat from the television screens and websites virtually the same.
Namely, the myth that the lone defender of the weak and the Sacred lands
is Bashar Assad.
That obviously had its effect, as it could be seen from the pictures in
Damascus taken at the traditional Christmas procession in 2018, where
along with the crosses and icons, the “armored Knight” image could be
spotted. The myth continued a life on its own, but this story got serious
impetus thanks to one of the Allies of the Syrian regime — Moscow. The
spread and careful maintenance and propagation of the myth was due to the
myriad activities executed by wide network of news outlets, charities and
foundations, such as “RUSSAR” and the “Combat Brotherhood”.
Another signature method associated with these charities to indoctrinate and
spread myths, is the de novo establishment and “ historical recycling” of socalled “youth camps” for “patriotic education” based on the rich Soviet
tradition and thriving on the process of ever growing militarization of children
and youth in Putin’s Russia.
These camps also provide the perfect opportunity to indoctrinate, shape and
mold the future “defenders of the Russkii mir”, while bonding them with their
peers from “Novorossiya”, Belarus, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Syria.
These camps serve the purpose of indoctrinating the next generation of
Putin’s version of “orderism” loyalists, in a peculiar program of winning hearts
and minds at a fairly early age. This program is a just a partial reflection of
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the fact that Russia does not have short-term interest in Syria and the Middle
East only.
Quite on the contrary, as Moscow’s serious efforts are related to establishing
a lasting presence and expanding the so- called “Russian World”, which so
far covers Eastern Europe and parts of Central Asia only. Like other cases,
where he took an example from the Russian Empire, Putin sees the Middle
East as a natural extension of Russian interests. And while the use of hard
military power, mercenaries, such as the infamous “Wagner group” and the
maintenance of local paramilitary structures are important strategic
elements, probably the most important element from strategic long-term
influence perspective is the maintenance of a tight grip over the youth, who
represent the next generation of elites in their respective countries, Syria
including.
OUR MAIN CONCERN — IT IS THE PEOPLE
Thus, in July 2015, the Crimea Peninsula will become once again important,
but for a reason that will not receive broad coverage unlike its occupation by
the Kremlin. In the area close to Donuzlav — once the deepest Crimean lake
turned into a bay by the Soviet authorities in 1961, a regular youth summer
camp was organized by the Russian combat veteran’s national organization
“Combat brotherhood”. So far nothing novel, if we discount the symbolism of
the camp’s chosen location, namely the one used in 2006 and 2007 proRussian nationalists and local communists’ protests against the disrupted
NATO annual “Sea Breeze” exercises in Ukraine.
And we discount another fact, namely that the camp has been organized with
organized with Russian state’s taxpayer’s money in accordance with
Presidential order 25.07.2014 N 243 under the official slogan of “For Russia!
For Victory! For Our Great Homeland!”. Also, if we ignore the membership of
the colorful organization committee, ranging from Russian Federation
Council’s Security and Defense committee notables, well-known
representatives of the separatist Donetsk and Lugansk’s “People’s
Republics”, their supporting propaganda outlets, such as the “News Front”,
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activists and instructors from “Anti-Maidan” movement, all the way to military
veterans of Afghan and Chechen wars and a world champion of mixed
martial arts and the infamous biker-gang “Night Wolves”.
So, if we ignore all the listed features, the only “real” novelty was the
participation of the twenty-six-member group of children of Syrian regime
loyalist veteran families for the first time in such “patriotic consciousness
awakening and education enhancement” camp in Crimea. Their participation
was materialized by “RUSSAR” and “Combat Brotherhood’s” joint efforts and
aided by the Syrian embassy in Moscow.
As evident from the event’s pictures, young boys and girls, dressed in military
fatigues under the red-star sickle and hammer flags, adorned with ribbons of
St. George are engaged in scores of different activities, ranging from
listening “geo-political orientation” lectures to shooting, swimming and
running. They also display show prevailing mood of merriment and
carelessness, as it most probably was, because the idea of this types of
camps is to unite the young people under the motto “Friendship of the
Peoples” — the motto that is deeply familiar to the natives of former Eastern
European communist countries, proudly displayed at the entrance of the
same camp.
What is not immediately evident from the official photos, however, is the
content of the course load taught at the camp that includes orientation, use
and manipulation of social media, explanation of the causes of “color
revolutions” and methods to counter their spread, as well as basics of handto-hand combat and techniques of spotting “provocateurs” in large
gatherings of people. As a testament to the nature of the “patriotic education”
at the camp, the final resolution of the participants leaves no room for doubt.
It five concise points it reinforces participant’s full support for Russian
Federations’ government policies of “consolidation” of people of “Great
Russia” and the quest of all separatist entities for unification with the
Federation, condemns the US, the EU and member-countries of NATO in
their promotion of “color revolutions” in post-Soviet space and radically
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protests the US and their allies-sponsored aggression against the Syrian
people and their legitimate Assad government.
Finally, they sincerely thank the “Combat Brotherhood” for their organizing
the smooth running of the camp. In sum, such patriotic youth camps have
existed for quite some time in Putin’s Russia being modeled after their Soviet
predecessors, however the war in Syria has presented a new opportunity for
direct inclusion of Syrian children at a whole new level — something that did
not happen even during Soviet times, despite the good bilateral relations
between Hafez Assad’s government and Kremlin.
MARCHING TO THE FUTURE
If the inclusion of Syrian children in the youth patriotic camp back in 2015
was a novel experiment, then certain subsequent developments in Syria and
on the home front in Russia, have allowed the idea to offer military training
to Syrian youth to enter “standardization phase”. Thus, as of last year Russia
offers military training to cadets, in augmentation of the traditional military
academy education for Syrian officers offered since the fifties of XX century.
As the first group of Syrian children has arrived in Saint Petersburg to begin
their studies in September of 2018, the contours of a larger idea emerge into
the public limelight. One, best verbalized by the Russian senator Olga
Kovitidi, who clearly expressed Russian long-term plans for full vertical
integration of future military elites and their compatibility with their respective
Russian peers, namely “…We expect that in 10–15 years Syrian borders will
be guarded by serviceman, that along with Russian serviceman, have
received high professional training at the same school”.
The senator’s message should be taken seriously, as she is actively involved
in supporting youth patriotic camps and their auxiliary activities, as is the
Syrian embassy in Moscow. In order to strengthen the process of vertical
integration, Russia continues to offer camps and activities to younger Syrian
children, especially for selected kids from Orthodox orphanages and children
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of Assad regime’s loyalist serviceman families who have died in combat, as
it has done for over ten years.
This future military and civilian Syrian elite pre-selection at young age,
cannot fully function without the potent “soft power” influence instrumentation
of Russian charities, funds and networks on the ground, as they represent
an updated and slightly improved version of their Soviet predecessors wellfamiliar in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
They often act, as local talent “spotters” and a “parallel transmission belt”
between Moscow and Damascus in executing foreign policy and economic
functions, while gathering strategic intelligence, strengthening and
refurbishing the old influence networks with fresh batches of new recruits.
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