ALLIANCE PLANNING AND COALITION WARFARE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES Edited with an Introduction by DR. HAROLD E. RAUGH, JR. Compiled by DR. M. CHRISTIAN ORTNER AND DR. DALIBOR DENDA Institute for Strategic Research Belgrade, 2019 Editorial Board: Editor in Chief: Lt Col (ret.) Dr. Harold E. Raugh, Jr. (USA) Brig. general Dr. Mario Christian Ortner (Austria) Col. Dr. Miljan Milkić (Serbia) Col. (ret.) Dr. Dimitre Minchev (Bulgaria) Lt . Col (ret) Dr. Tamas Nagy (Hungary) Secretary General: Lt. Col Dr. Dalibor Denda (Serbia) Reviews: Dr. Robert S. Rush (USA) Dr. Todor Petrov (Bulgaria) Dr. Milan Terzić (Serbia) Layout and Graphics: EtnoStil - Belgrade ISBN 978 - 86 - 81121 - 24 - 5 © Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, Wien, 2019 © Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd, 2019 UDK 94(100)"1939/1945" 355.48/.49 Logistical Problems of Joint Operations from the Point of View of An Ally, in Historical Perspectives: Eastern Front, 1941 by Viktor Andahazi Szeghy ABSTRACT: This paper highlights examples of the supply problems that the Royal Hungarian Army, as a subordinate military ally, faced during the 1941 Eastern Campaign and the specific reactions to those. The Alliance Hungary was the first nation to join the Japanese, German, and Italian Tripartite Pact, first formed in November 1940. The Axis ally evolved during military operations, including the attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941, and during the attack against the Soviet Union beginning in June 1941. 1. 20 November 1940. Vienna, Belvedere Palace (L-R: Hitler; Ciano, Foreign Minister of Italy; Saburo Kurusu, Ambassador of Japan; Paul Teleki, Prime Minister of Hungary). 72 After the signing of the Tripartite Act, The Axis powers of the Alliance on the Eastern Front (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Slovakia) fought under German command.1 To achieve military success, the fighting troops had to be supplied with food, weapons, ammunition, fuel, vehicles, and spare parts. The ability to move the troops was also essential. The difficulty of these tasks was that the allied army, which had its own logistical system in its own country, was obliged to operate in a foreign theatre as a subordinate element. The Army’s transportation capacity became restricted as operations advanced, and the throughput of the stretched supply lines decreased. In the food sector there were problems due to the different gastronomic cultures and standards. During the combined operations of the Second World War, the Hungarian Army primarily fought subordinate to the Germans. When one assesses the situation, one needs to consider that Hungary’s military doctrine and the reorganization of the Hungarian Army was influenced by its First World War experiences, and military innovations and theoretical discussions of the 1920s and 1930s.2 The Hungarian military leadership tried to secure optimal material and organizational conditions for the successful fighting of battles with the use of available resources. At the same time, as a result of revisionist ambitions, the Hungarian Army was prepared for deployment inside the CarpathianBasin, which radically differed from the subsequent demands of the Germany ally. 1 The dates of joining were 23November 1940, Romania; 24 November 1940, Slovakia; 1 March 1941, Bulgaria; and 15 June 1941, Croatia. Dénes Halmosy, Nemzetközi szerződések 1918-1945 (International Treaties 1918-1945.) (Budapest: Gondolat, 1966), 490-492. 2 Cf. Lóránd Dombrády, “Amagyar katonai gondolkodás néhány jellemzője a második világháború előtt” (Some features of the Hungarian military thinking before the WW II) in A magyar katonai gondolkodás története (The History of the Hungarian Military Thinking), ed.Ács Tibor (Budapest: Zrínyi, 1995), 126-145. 73 The Operation3 Map © 2014 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN Operation Barbarrosa, 1941 Hungary joined the attack against the Soviet Union after the bombardment of Kassa. The Hungarian government declared that bombardment was committed by Soviet airplanes. The attack of the Carpathian Group of theRoyal Hungarian Army included 8th Corps from Kassa, and the most modern 1st Mobile Corps. Cf. Viktor Andaházi Szeghy, A magyar királyi honvédség részvétele a Szovjetunió elleni támadásban (1941. június-december). (The Participation of the Royal Hungarian Army in the Attack against the Soviet Union, June-December 1941) (Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 2016), 212. 3 74 The tasks of the Group were until 9 July 1941 to track the Russian troops withdrawn from the Hungarian border and to seize the crossing points on the river Dniester. The 1st Mobile Corps was detached from the Carpathian Group on 9 July 1941 and subordinated to the German Army Group South. The Carpathian Group itself remained under Hungarian command. The tasks of the Group were to establish the military administration, restart the economy, and subdue the enemy in the hinterland. The additional tasks of the 1st Mobile Corps were to logistically sustain the advance of Operation Barbarossa and to cut the withdrawal of the Soviet Armies and help surround them. The Carpathian Group and the 1st Mobile Corps were relieved in October-November 1941, during the attack against Moscow (Operation Typhoon). Logistical Framework Continuous transport was needed to provide food, weapons, fuel, and spare parts to the Royal Hungarian Army, because of the manoeuvring attack. Sustainment required time to procure, store, and transport the goods to the combatant troops. 3. Distributing fuel from a German train, in the Eastern Front, 1941 75 The operational supply level of the Hungarian troops was based on a kind of special dualism regarding the Eastern Front:4 Based on the agreement between Hungary and Germany, cash, food, horse fodder, fuel, and German-made ammunition were the responsibility of the German supply service. The take over was provided by the German logistical services on their own bases. The Hungarian logistical services provided the Hungarian cultural foods (bacon, spices), uniforms, and Hungarianmanufactured weapons and ammunition. Transport to the combat troops was provided by the railway – until the last station behind the frontline. Supply at the tactical level was provided by so-called exchange points. The goods were transported to the brigades and were distributed to the troops by their own unit-level supply organizations. Troops were also allowed to satisfy their needs from local sources. Wholesale requisition was the responsibility of the unit. Rail and road networks were the backbone of the sustainment of this logistical system. The supply of the fighting troops during combat operations occasionally encountered obstacles. Problems I Geographical 4. Local requisition somewhere in Ukraine Sándor Nagy, et al., A magyar katonai ellátó (hadtáp) szolgálat története (The History of the Hungarian Supply Service)(Budapest: Zrínyi, 1984), 470, 494. 4 76 During the 1941 Eastern Front operations of 1941, neither geographic nor climatic conditions were favorable for the attacking forces. The poor rail and road network, which was mostly demolished by the retreating Soviets, made movement and transportation very difficult.5 The weather also made conditions for the attacking alliance difficult. Due to the heavy summer rains, the gravel roads became inaccessible and the flooded rivers difficult to cross. Early autumn rains caused a Schlammperiod (“mud period”) which was followed by frosts in October. Winter also arrived earlier than was expected. 5. A typical road in October Traffic Organizing the traffic control system was the responsibility of the Wehrmacht Transport Commandature. The weak Russian railway system was overloaded by the German transports to the frontline, causing Hungarian transports to be delayed regularly. The long distance 5 The average railway system in the Soviet Union at that time was 400 m/100 km2. Sp, Katonai földrajz, VII, fejezet Oroszország. (Military Geography, Chapter VII -- Russia (Kassa: n.p., 1943), 6. 17. 77 of the unloading stations from the frontline made the situation more difficult for resupply operations. Repairing the transportation routes demolished by the Soviet forces was the primary task of the Carpathian Group. The secondary task was to transport and secure the main supply routes (Rollbahn Süd and Rollbahn Mitte) to the frontline. The railways troops reset the rails from the wide Russian gauge into the European standard when repairing damaged rail lines. First class, solid motorways connected the important cities only. There were only 2nd and 3rd class routes in the direction of attack of the 1st Mobile Corps.6 Those one-lane dirt roads – so-called “Stalin-concrete” – were solid during the summer, but even a short rain made them very slippery. Problems II Logistical Cooperation Problems associated with the improperly regulated dual (German-Hungarian) logistical system emerged during the first month of the attack. The transport of the German provided materials was strictly administrated. A major problem was that the German fuel depots were some 100-300 km behind the lines, and they could not give barrels for transportation closer to the frontlines. Tires for the vehicles, provided from German and Hungarian warehouses, was another concern. The Hungarian military forces wanted the Germans to provide these replacement tires. The Ist Mobile Corps required 10,000 tires until October, but the Hungarian support element provided only 150 tires, 6 In that time there were only six 1st class solid motorways (at least 4 m wide, solid way, suitable for two directions); 2ndclass routes (at least 3 m wide, suitable for two directions with by-pass, with 6-8 t capacity bridges); and 3rd class routes (1.6 m wide dirt road, with gravel basement, with maximum 2 t capacity bridges)between the Black and Baltic Seas. Ibid., 23-24. 78 and the Germans allocated 7,000 tires from their warehouse in Berditschev – 500 kms behind the frontline. The Operational Tempo The attack against the Soviet Union was delayed reportedly because of the German intervention on the Balkan Peninsula. That was why the German High Command increased the pace of the attack to the East. Because of the slow advance of the German-Romanian flank of the Army Group South, the Royal Hungarian Ist Mobile Corps was tasked to support encirclement maneuver of the 1st Tank Group. That was why Army Group South was unwilling to order an operational pause for the resupply of its forces and repair of its vehicles and equipment. The delay of an operational pause caused a decrease of combat readiness. The first pause of the Mobile Corps was between 19-29 August, after forty-five movement and combat days. By the end of the Battle of Nikolayev in mid-August 1941, the supplies of the fighting troops had been totally consumed. There was no possibility to resupply the soldiers and repair of worn-out vehicles and weapons, because of the length of logistical lines. The failure to resupply and permit the exhausted troops to rest also caused problems later. The Ist Mobile Corpse could execute on the next day an order to attack on 9 October, given by the German 17th Army, because they had fought more than thirty-five days until 5 October along the river Dnieper. The logistical tasks of the occupation troops, also operating under German command behind the attacking troops, certainly were strongly related to those of the frontline forces. Transportation and the repairing of transportation routes were their primary tasks. In addition, as a special logistical task, especially during the first months of the occupation, they also participated in requisitioning various military and 79 economic goods as war booty. They were especial hard-worked in that field. By the German-Hungarian agreement the Oberkommando des Heeres possessed the occupied area’s stocks.7 Although the Royal Hungarian Army was permitted to supply only its own needs, the Carpathian Group tried to gather and transport everything from the occupied Ukraine into the hinterland. The German Governor of Reichskomissariate Ukraine had protested against that activity.8 Lessons Due to conflicting interests within the international alliance, it proved to be a challenging logistical and military-diplomatic task for the responsible leaders to ensure the operation of the forces fighting in subordination far away from home. The supplying and moving of the relatively small Royal Hungarian units; the logistical difficulties of the air and land forces; and the handling of situations that often surpassed the capabilities of the Hungarian Armed Forces were problems that any military alliance can face, regardless of historical period or ideology. The improperly regulated subordinate logistical system continuously challenged sustainment operations. The wide diversity and lack of standardization of the weapons and vehicles in one Alliance made ammunition and spare parts resupply difficult. At the operational level, problems can be handled with good personal contacts of the liaison officers, and on the tactical level by comradeship. See the agreement in József Bálint, A Szovjetunió gadasági kifosztása dokumentumokban elbeszélve, 1941-1944 (The Economical Plunder of the Soviet Union in Documents, 1941-1944) (Budapest, Russica Pannonicana, 2001), 254-256. 8 Hadtörténelmi Levéltár VKF 1. osztály, napi helyzetjelentések, mikrofilm, General Staff 1st Department, daily situation reports 1941), box B/243, sheet 2326, 422. 7 80 Photos credits 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Lajos Izsák, et al., Magyar miniszterelnökök, 1848–2002 (Hungarian Prime Ministers, 1948-2002) (Budapest: Kossuth, 2003), 91. Victor Kamenir, ”The Bloody Triangle” https:// warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-eastern-frontsbloody-triangle/ Accessed 12 September 2018. Budesarchiv, 1011-180-0166-02A, https://www. pinterest.co.uk/ pin/ 322922235770594536/ Accessed 12 September 2018. Photoarchive 42835-94,MoD of Hungary Institute and Museum of Military History (MoDHIMMH). Photoarchive 42835-137, MoDHIMMH. Photoarchive 30309,MoDHIMMH. Photoarchive 42.835/Fk. 89, MoDHIMMH. 81