RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES
DMITRY V. EFREMENKO
RUSSIAN GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES
Collection of essays
MOSCOW
2019
ОТ АВТОРА
Ефременко Д.В. Российские геостратегические императивы: Сб. статей (на англ. яз.) / РАН. ИНИОН. Центр социал.
науч.-информ. исслед. Отд. полит. науки. – М., 2019. – 138 с.
В сборник включены статьи, анализирующие динамику трансформации современного мирового порядка и роль России в этих
процессах. Рассматриваются проблемы взаимосвязи внутренней и
внешней политики России. Особое внимание уделяется геополитической конкуренции ведущих мировых держав на постсоветском
пространстве.
Для специалистов в области политологии и международных
отношений, преподавателей вузов, аспирантов и студентов.
Efremenko D.V. Russian Geostrategic Imperatives: Collection of
essays / Russian Academy of Sciences. Institute of Scientific
Information for Social Sciences. – Moscow, 2019.
The collection of essays provides an analysis of the dynamic
changes of the contemporary world order and Russia’s role in these
transformations. The interplay of domestic and foreign policies is
considered. Special attention is paid to the geopolitical competition of
the great powers in the post-Soviet space.
ISBN 978-5-248-00905-3
© ИНИОН РАН, 2019
CONTENT
Preface.................................................................................................... 4
Forced or Desired Modernity? Russia’s Chances
in the Post-American World (2010).................................................... 5
After the Tandem: Russian Foreign Policy Guidelines.
Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of Turbulence (2011).................. 20
Waiting for a Storm. Russian Foreign Policy in the Era
of Change (2012) .............................................................................. 36
Life after Vilnius. A New Geopolitical Configuration
for Ukraine (2013) ............................................................................ 52
Crossing Red Lines. Russia Takes the Lead in Revising
the World Order (2014)..................................................................... 66
The Birth of a Greater Eurasia.
How the Post-Cold War Era Ends (2017) ......................................... 82
Politics of Memory, Kiev Style. Ukrainian Identity Strategies
in the Context of European Integration (in co-authorship
with A. Voronovich, 2017) ............................................................... 96
Annex 1. Trumpism, European Rightists and Russia
(Excerpts from the Valday Discussion Club Report “Global
‘Rightists Revolt’: Trumpism and Its Foundations”, 2017)............ 110
Annex 2. Perestroika and the “Dashing Nineties”:
At the Crossroads of History........................................................... 116
Annex 3. “Deoligarchisation” in Post-Soviet Russia:
Retrospective View (2018) ............................................................. 127
3
PREFACE
This collection comprises essays mainly published in 2010–2017
in the journal “Russia in Global Affairs”. The author express his sincere
gratitude to the journal’s editor-in-chief Fyodor Lukyanov for his kind
permission to publish these essays in the present collection. The texts
reflect the evolution of Russian foreign policy, starting with Vladimir
Putin’s Munich speech (2007) and culminating in the 2014 Ukraine
crisis; they attempt to grasp the fundamental geopolitical transformations
unfolding before our eyes. An attentive reader will certainly also notice
the evolution of the author’s own assessments, for instance with respect
to the extent of potential rapprochement and level of partnership between
Russia and China in the transformation of the post-bipolar world order.
Success in foreign policy is on not only determined by the art of
diplomacy. In the long term, foreign policy efficacy depends on internal
factors, foremost on social stability, interethnic accord, the degree of
development of political institutions, relations between elites and mass
groups. Thereby, articles on political and economic processes in Russia
at the turn of the 21st century are included in the collection as annexes.
Finally, as a separate annex, the book contains sections of the Report of
the Valdai Discussion Club “Global Rightists Revolt: Trumpism and Its
Foundations” (2017) written by the author.
4
FORCED OR DESIRED MODERNITY?
Russia’s Chances in the Post-American World1
(2010)
The past decade witnessed a spate of manifestoes by political
analysts who unanimously predicted an early decline of the American
Century. “The Post-American World”, by Fareed Zakaria2, was one of
the most significant ones in this respect. The author mercilessly exposes
the mistakes and failures of American leadership, which resulted in the
compression of the period of absolute U.S. dominance since the end of
the Cold War. Zakaria’s book was published in the first half of 2008,
before the first thunders of the global financial tornado could be heard.
The crisis also became a point of no return in the process of “postAmericanization.” It imparts a markedly new quality to international
relations which all the players will have to adapt to. Russia is no
exception, of course.
A multipolar, post-American world is something Russia has
sought at least since the memorable U-turn of Yevgeny Primakov’s
airliner over the Atlantic. But now that the long-cherished world order
is an ever starker political reality, time is ripe for asking oneself: Is
Russia prepared to enjoy the fruits of this new world order? Are its
leaders aware of not only the new opportunities the erosion of
American hegemony is opening up, but also of the daunting perils of
existence in a world of strength-based multi-centrism? After all, since
1
Source: Yefremenko D. Forced or Desired Modernity? Russia’s Chances in
Post-American World // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2010. – Vol. 8, N. 4. – P. 36–49.
2
Zakaria F. The Post-American World. – New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2008.
5
the Cold War was declared over, Russia has had to experience not only
the bitter taste of being treated as a second-rate state on the
international scene and the permanent threat of attempts to minimize its
influence in the post-Soviet space, but also the comforts and amenities
that go with the status of a major exporter of energy and fuels. True, the
very existence within the confines of that niche can be viewed as a sign
of economic degradation, but Putin has successfully used the “fat
years” for healing the social scars left by post-Communist
transformations, and for the buildup of resources, significant enough to
take the liberty of a “frank conversation” with Western partners in
Munich. Now, these “advantages of discrimination” are gradually
waning, while the implementation of new opportunities is still to be
fought for tooth and claw.
The Rise of China as a Risk
“The rise of the rest” as the driving force of postAmericanization spells the emergence of many players who lay claim
to a significant growth of their international status. But at the present
stage of the multipolar world’s formation everybody’s eyes seem to be
riveted on China. The global economic and financial crisis is largely the
reason why the Chinese model is increasingly often looked at as an
alternative to the Washington Consensus, and the growing rivalry
between China and the West appears as an inevitable clash of
civilizations or ideologies.
The Russian view of China will inevitably differ from the one the
West may ever have. Back in the 19th century Konstantin Leontyev
warned: “Russia’s death can come in either of the two ways – from the
East, by the sword of the awakened Chinese, or through voluntary
merger with a pan-European republican federation”1. The awakening of
China had been waited for and feared in this country for decades. It is
not accidental that despite all the zigzags of Russian (Soviet) domestic
1
Leontiev K.N. Vostok, Rossija i slavyanstvo. Philosophia i politicheskaya
publicistika. Dukhovnaya proza (1872–1891) = The East, Russia and the Slavdom.
Philosophy and Political Publicism. Spiritual Works (1872–1891)]. – Moscow:
Respublika, 1996. – P. 445.
6
and foreign policies, the desire for “normalization of relations,” and
then for strategic partnership remained a foreign policy constant since
Yuri Andropov. And it is undeniable that the current level of RussianChinese relations is a precious asset, which, however, still does not
save us from complications in the future.
Now that China is “wide awake,” speculations about the threat
can be more dangerous than the actual threat. The rise of China should
be seen not so much as a threat to Russia, as a risk, that is, a situation
where the chances of losing and winning are approximately the same.
One tactical win for the Russian political regime is already evident,
though. First of all, the comparison of historical experiences of the two
countries provides additional arguments in favor of modernization
under strict government control. China’s achievements are also
changing the scale of political values, since success and effectiveness
stop to be unequivocally associated with liberal democracy.
The need for Russia’s sustainable presence in the Asia-Pacific
region – a key part of the world in the 21st century – is beyond doubt.
The central problem today is avoiding Russia’s conversion into its
satellite. In other words, the actual weakness of our current positions in
the Asia-Pacific region should be compensated for by an active policy
of maximizing the diversification of economic and political
opportunities.
Among the reasons why Russia should prefer the option of a
stable, but somewhat remote partnership with China, one finds not only
in the huge difference in the demographic potentials on either side of
our common border. The threat of Chinese population of Siberia and
the Far East is rather a “paper tiger.” At least it will be so in the
medium term. A risk far more serious is the perpetuation of structural
imbalances in bilateral trade and a quick slide into the position of a raw
material appendage of the newly-emerged “world workshop.” But
getting out of the commodity export niche is the most fundamental
issue of modernizing the Russian economy as such, and not just of
trading relations between Moscow and Beijing. Perhaps the most
serious reason why Russia should avoid too close a connection to the
Chinese locomotive is its speed. It might seem that the double-digit (or
nearly double-digit) growth rates that have been maintained for more
than two decades are precisely what we have lacked for the success of
7
modernization. But the longer the Chinese economic miracle lasts, the
greater the economic, social and regional disparities get, and the more
dangerous consequences may ensue in case of an abrupt slowdown.
Accordingly, Russia will feel an ever-greater need for establishing
safety mechanisms, alternative options and new opportunities.
What are these options? First of all, it is important that Russia
maintain the position of openness towards deeper cooperation with
Japan in the economy, science and technical science, as well as in
matters of regional security. However, the unresolved territorial dispute
leaves no chance for considering Japan as a partner for cooperation
significant enough to balance the Chinese factor. Intensifying relations
with the follow-up echelon of regional actors – South Korea, Taiwan,
Vietnam, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries looks a more
promising direction. None of these actors alone can serve as an
alternative to mainland China, but together they can be considered as a
set of potential points of reliance along the edges of the Middle
Kingdom.
On the pan-Asian scale, India is a most valuable partner. The
absence of a potential for conflict and the tradition of friendly bilateral
relations dating back to the early days of India’s independence are the
solid foundation of strategic cooperation between Moscow and New
Delhi in the 21st century. However, there are difficulties, too, primarily
of a psychological nature. Many in Russia are still not accustomed to
the idea that India can no longer be regarded as a wingman, that by a
number of key parameters that country is an equitable partner, and in
the near future it may prove a more powerful center of the postAmerican world than Russia. But in any case, India is a top-tier partner
to discuss the growing might of China and any other serious problem of
Eurasia. It should be borne in mind that India, with its experience of the
military conflict of 1962, may be more cautious towards rising China
than Russia, which has settled its border disputes with China.
The Russian strategy of a “turn to the East” must fully match the
American influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Both the U.S. and
Russia are aware of that region’s key importance for their future in the
21st century, as well as the absence of any serious conflict of interest in
the region on either side. As far as the line-up of forces and regional
security trends are concerned, it should be recognized that the U.S.
8
military presence in Asia Pacific in no way contradicts Russia’s
interests. The situation there differs significantly from that on the
western and southern borders of Russia, where any strengthening of the
U.S. and NATO is at least a factor for discomfort. In any case, it hardly
makes sense for Russia to join the ranks of the Okinawa-without-theAmericans enthusiasts, a slogan Japan’s former Prime Minister Yukio
Hatoyama tried to translate into reality with little success.
This does not mean that Russia should hurry to team up with the
United States to form some new regional security patterns, which
would inevitably be seen by Beijing as aimed against its own interests.
Here, in fact, it is important to see the borderline between finding a
balance of forces optimal for Russia and the creation of real or virtual
anti-Chinese coalitions, something Russia should by all means avoid.
At the same time, tapping the potential of Russian-American
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region might furnish the basis for future
relations between Russia and the United States and for preserving and
following up the extremely fragile results of the ‘reset’ of their
relations.
Relations with Number One Power of the Post-American World
It sounds ironic and banal at the same time: number one power in
the post-American world is the United States. America’s might keeps
shrinking, but one should not think this process will go on indefinitely.
Firstly, the steady rise of the main competitor – China – is also not
something predestined. Secondly, even if another, even more powerful
impact of the crisis follows, one can expect that America will
eventually achieve some sort of a plateau, and the further (relative)
reduction of its global role will halt. On the other hand, the problems of
America as a waning superpower are truly global, for any of their likely
solutions will reverberate throughout the world. The crisis has shown
not only the dependence of the rest of the world on America as the
world center of financial might and the main source of destabilization
for the world economy, but also the huge social price that will have to
be paid by all sooner or later for streamlining that system.
9
It is quite natural that Russia’s interest is in NOT paying more than
necessary for the recovery of the U.S.-centered global economy. This
consideration alone is an incentive strong enough to Russia’s
constructive participation in all global institutions and mechanisms of
anti-crisis management. Russia is interested in facilitating Washington’s
“soft landing” onto the post-American globe and preventing attempts
(strategically hopeless, but risky for Russia) at regaining elusive global
hegemony. It is equally important for Russia to create in the foreseeable
future favorable conditions for a constructive and stable partnership with
the United States.
Apparently, the “reset” as an important foreign policy project of
the Obama administration is part and parcel of the comprehensive
reassessment of the United States’ global role in the context of the
world crisis. Obviously, the common understanding was Russia in the
21st century world will not be America’s worst problem. But what is
the real effect of the ‘reset’ then? In Russia, as soon as the first global
tremors rocked the world economy, many were quick to triumphantly
herald “the decline of America,” while in America many commentators
were rejoicing at “Russia’s fall from heaven on earth.” In a word, at
first the “reset” looked only slightly different from the U.S.-Russian
interactions of the post-Soviet era – and those were clashes of
resentment and arrogance. Meanwhile, the crisis made both countries
feel like losers, and precisely this circumstance was to become a
realistic basis for a dialogue proceeding from a balance of interests. But
there has surfaced another paradox. For example, Sergei Karaganov,
together with several colleagues from the Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy, has formulated a very radical program called the “Big
Deal”1 – a compromise balancing the interests of Russia and the U.S.
Apparently, it fell on attentive and friendly ears of the advocates of a
realistic approach close to the Obama administration, and the dynamics
of bilateral relations observed over the past year produced an
impression that the parties tacitly followed the basic parameters of the
“Big Deal.” Russia demonstrates a constructive approach to American
interests in various regions of Asia and restraint to the post-Soviet
1
Karaganov S., Bordachev T., Suslov D. Russia and the US: Reconfiguration,
Not Resetting // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2009. – N 3, September. – P. 108–122.
10
space, while the United States, in turn, refrains from further attempts to
weaken Russia’s positions in the CIS countries and from forming an
architecture of security in Europe still more discriminatory against
Russia. Just one word ‘tacitly’ says it all. At any official level, these
parameters cannot be even verbalized, let alone transferred into the
status of complex formal arrangements.
As a result, even after the signing of the New START Treaty in
Prague and Russia’s support for sanctions against Iran in the UN
Security Council, it all looks very much like a very selective
improvement of bilateral relations. After each single step (even the
tiniest one) taken in conformity with the “reset guidelines” there follow
statements or actions designed to mitigate their effect, to demonstrate
their local character, to prove that the U.S. still follows the course of
“democracy promotion” and rejects any claims to any “spheres of
influence,” whoever may be making them. Therefore, it is necessary to
remember that at the moment of the very first serious internal political
turn in the U.S. the benefits of “resetting” may be ditched for the sake
of electoral prospects of some major group of influence in the
American political elite.
Does this mean that the ideas of “resetting” or – still more so – of
the “Big Deal” do not work in principle? If applied selectively, the
policy of resetting can hardly be expected to succeed, but if it is
understood as scrupulous and painstaking work to lay a firm
groundwork of Russian-U.S. relations in the 21st century, then it may
have good chances. In this sense, the Asian focus in the search for a
mutual balance of interests can be crucial. However, that balance must
ultimately formalize changes that have occurred in the overall makeup
of the world, in which the U.S. is still the most powerful state of the
post-American world and Russia is one of the poles of the new world
order. The political consequences of such a balance of interests must be
verbalized at the level of political elites in the United States and Russia,
and then transformed into a combination of formal and informal
commitments.
How far can (and should) these commitments stretch? The main
context of Russian-American partnership is the rise of China and the
related emergence of a new area of close alignment of Russia’s and
America’s interests. Given the “low start” of bilateral relations, Russia
11
is interested in a level of partnership with the U.S. that in the
foreseeable future would be comparable to the current level of RussianChinese relations. But if one moves further in this direction, the
strengths will begin to be transformed into weaknesses at an increasing
speed, and Russia may eventually be drawn into a game in which at
best it will remain on the sidelines, and at worst, will have the plight of
a chess piece the players are free to sacrifice, if need be.
Apparently, in the second decade of the 21st century the debates
about Russia’s integration into NATO or any other form of militarypolitical alliance with the U.S. and the EU will only gain momentum. For
the time being such conversations are far from concrete, but they have
begun, and not by accident. The dynamics of this process can be judged
by the nature of discussions over the draft of a pan-European treaty on
collective security the president of Russia has proposed. Nobody has
dared dismiss the idea offhand as such, and it is for three years now that
Moscow has heard polite statements of the intention to “examine
carefully” and “fully consider” the Russian initiative. Pronouncements
about fundamental support for the proposed treaty and of solidarity with
its basic postulate of the indivisibility of European security can be heard
far more rarely. The examination and consideration of the project can last
indefinitely – until a certain point, though, where our partners in
Washington and Brussels may decide that essentially the agreement
provides for a single security system not only for Europe but for the
industrialized North in general, but at the same time excludes from this
system China and other countries in the booming South.
It looks like the Russian foreign policy’s nightmare – NATO’s
further expansion to the East – will not become a reality. In fact, this is
the main achievement of Vladimir Putin’s “Munich course,” although
NATO’s expansion to the post-Soviet space will ultimately lose its
relevance in the context of the general “post-Americanization” trends.
The draft of a European security treaty is also designed to block the
expansion of NATO, but if this happens, it will be just international
legal recognition of a fait accompli.
Consequently, it is no longer a prize to be sought at any political
cost. Of much greater importance is the very possibility of equal
participation in setting the rules of the game in European security
matters, and in regard to a wider range of relationships in Greater Europe.
12
The Quest for a Greater Europe
With Europe Russia associates some of its fundamental interests.
But the situation here is almost a stalemate. It seems that the more
Russia and the European Union interact, the greater their mutual
alienation grows. The very institutional design of the EU actually
blocks any significant rapprochement with Moscow. And expecting
some kind of a breakthrough in relations between Russia and EU
institutions (the eloquent declarations of partnership and long-term
action plans are not exactly what one may call breakthroughs, of
course) is hardly possible. The worst thing of all is that participation in
the EU inevitably limits the freedom of political maneuver for each of
its individual members, including the most powerful ones, with which
Russia seeks to develop privileged relations on a bilateral basis. In
these circumstances, it is of special importance for Russia to use to the
maximum extent the opportunities opening up with the shift of the
center of the global financial and industrial might to the Asia-Pacific
region. Only if and when it has established itself there as an active and
influential player, Russia will be able to conduct dialogue with other
European countries with more confidence. And, most importantly,
Russia’s territory lying east of the Urals should become a tapped
reserve of national development, and not a space of demographic and
industrial vacuum.
After all, nothing in the world lasts forever, including the
stagnation in Russia-EU relations. Russia, its political and intellectual
elite, should by no means turn its back on the EU machine. It should
maintain a dialogue with its functionaries, and with the European
public, in other words, with the force that just recently was associated
with so many hopes for “a second birth of Europe.” These hopes were
premature, but the European public sphere still plays a very important
role in determining the situation. Therefore, when a new situation is to
be determined, it would be in the interests of Russia to ensure the idea
the EU is not tantamount to Europe and that a different, greater
European architecture may be possible.
Even if Russia defines its own role as participation in “the rise of
the rest,” its openness to a broad dialogue with individual countries
of the EU and with the European Union as a whole must remain.
13
Of particular importance in this case will be the ability to generate
some extraordinary ideas and moves setting guidelines for the dialogue
to follow. In this sense, we can only welcome the idea of a “Alliance of
Europe” Sergei Karaganov1 intends to promote. Being very problematic
as an ultimate goal, it is very important in procedural terms, because it
can substantially expand the room for maneuver by Russia, the EU
member-states and other European or semi-European countries.
International Relations and Civilizational Choice
in the Modernity Interregnum Era
In discussing Russia’s prospects in a multipolar world one cannot
ignore arguments of a more general nature. Zygmunt Bauman2 in his
analysis of modernity’s dynamics in the early 21st century refers to the
term “interregnum,” which Antonio Gramsci used to describe the
situation of expectations of radical change caused by the social
upheavals of the Great Depression.
The process of post-Americanization also fits in this picture of
interregnum, but does not exhaust it. There is a whole lot more at stake.
Fareed Zakaria’s somewhat calmer term “the rise of the rest” actually
means that the five-century-long period of unipolarity in the Western
civilization is drawing to a close. At the same time with every passing
day there increases the number of facts that refute the idea the
European (Western) variety of modernity is singular and unique.
As is known, the theory of the plurality of modernities was put
forward by Shmuel Eisenstadt3, who stipulated that the structural
differentiation of non-European societies does not necessarily replicates
the European model. In his view, the European model fosters the
emergence of different institutional and ideological patterns outside
1
Karaganov S. Soyuz Evropy. Poslednij shans? = Alliance of Europe. The Last
Chance? – Mode of access: http://www.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Soyuz-Evropyposlednii-shans-14943
2
Bauman Z. Communism: A Postmortem? Two Decades On, Another
Anniversary // Thesis Eleven. – 2010. – Vol. 100, N 1, February. – P. 128–140.
3
Eisenstadt S.N. Multiple Modernities // Daedalus. – 2000. – Vol. 129, N 1. –
P. 1–29.
14
Europe. In the context of Eisenstadt’s theory the metaphor of
“interregnum” could mean that the Western version of modernity by
and large exhausts its mission of “reconfiguring” non-Western cultural
programs and enters a period of coexistence and competition with other
versions of modernity that have emerged out of these programs. This
coexistence implies the recognition of the pluralism of values,
institutions and models of political systems.
Just one look at the dynamic changes of the system of international
relations is enough to notice numerous manifestations of shifts. Suffice it to
point to the BRIC phenomenon and, in particular, the rapid transition of
Russian leaders from taking special pride in the nearly full-fledged
membership of G8 to the enthusiasm of a co-founder of a club of new
leaders of global economic growth. Russia’s activity in this capacity is not
welcomed by all, but by strange coincidence in the chorus of those who
question the value of Russia's presence in the BRIC most harshly the voices
of China, India or Brazil are barely heard, if at all. It is noteworthy that the
author of the term ‘soft power,’ Joseph S. Nye, who is very reserved in his
comments on the BRIC phenomenon as such1, fails to mention that this
construction, even while remaining largely a virtual association, is already
becoming a new source of soft power and beginning to produce and
consolidate regulatory authority. The BRIC’s normative message is not only
in defending the Westphalian principles of sovereignty and striving for
multipolarity, but also in the fundamental recognition of a plurality of values,
cultural programs and models of political systems. In fact, the normative
message from the BRIC is nothing but a translation of Eisenstadt’s theory of
multiple modernities into the language of global politics.
The development of a post-American world is an imperative to
adjust the prevailing conceptualizations of international relations. One
option of such adjustment is to separate the qualitative characteristics of the
international order from changes in the global role of the United States. For
example, G. John Ikenberry is prepared to consider only a “crisis of
success” of the Western project of modernity, and not a crisis of the very
1
Nye J.S. What's in a BRIC? // Project Syndicate. – 2010. – May 10. – Mode
of access: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/what-s-in-a-bric?barrier=
accesspaylog
15
idea of that project’s singularity1. If one follows this logic, the driving force
behind the common modernity project is the common interest of major
international actors in the reproduction of the liberal order, which, at least
in theory, brings benefits to everyone. It turns out that the needs and
interests of non-Western powers can be met only through the further
dissemination of the principles and practices of Western liberalism.
The international order is quite inert, and in the situation of an
“interregnum” it is hard to expect its rapid reformatting. Most likely,
many sustaining global interdependences in security, trade, finance and
the environment will evolve much more slowly than the changes in the
economic and political weight of leading global players. However, the
fundamental feature of the liberal international order is the
establishment of hierarchical relationships, which in the long run is
incompatible with the “rise of the rest.”
Not surprisingly, the reaction from the expert community to the
rise of non-Western powers is that of confusion and alarm, when those
powers are seen as menacing outsiders. At the same time, calls can be
heard in favor of looking at the booming non-Western countries as “our
likes” who need to be socialized and taught to respect the rules. As Tim
Dunne has noted, in the context of contemporary international politics
both strategies, in fact, postulate the absence of any alternatives to the
Western version of modernity, and this approach remains in great
demand even despite its progressing inadequacy2.
Does this mean that Russia, too, is “doomed” to adapt itself to
the post-American world and at the same time stay faithful to the
dogma of the singularity of modernity? Does it make sense in the era of
“interregnum” to accelerate the civilizational choice, or at least, to
agree to be bound by rigid foreign policy commitments for the sake of
demonstrating loyalty to the Western version of modernity?
Not that the civilizational choice in favor of the West is
impossible or unacceptable, or the seeds of liberal values, if planted in
Russian soil, germinate as some ugly weeds. One of the main reasons
for the mutual frustration of Russia and the West was the area where
1
Ikenberry G.J. Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of
Liberal World Order // Perspectives on Politics. – 2009. – N 7, April. – P. 71–87.
2
Dunne T. The Liberal Order and the Modern Project // Millennium: Journal of
International Studies. – 2010. – Vol. 38, N 3. – P. 615–640.
16
there values proved identical or close was very vast, while differences
looked eventually surmountable. But finally in Russia there developed
a firm belief that discussions about values are aimed at undermining
Russian interests, while many in the West traveled all the way from
unjustified illusions during Gorbachev’s perestroika and Yeltsin’s
reforms to the certainty Russia is “incorrigible.” In these circumstances
translating political discussions into the language of interests can be the
only constructive solution; debates about values are better left to the
scientific community and NGO activists.
Although the 20th anniversary of the Soviet Unions’s breakup is
round the corner, it is too early to say that in Russia there has emerged
a new political nation and the post-Communist transformations have
been completed. The very instance a course towards modernization has
been declared indicates at least partial failure of all post-Soviet socioeconomic policies and of their main vector, which has remained liberal
and westernizing even throughout the years of restoring the vertical
chain of command. Clearly, there must be a turn and a serious
correction of the course. Once it has been decided to call this turn
“modernization,” then it should be understood that modernization in the
era of modernism’s interregnum must be a purely pragmatic action. In a
sense, it is Deng Xiaoping’s cat, whose most important quality is
effectiveness in catching mice, and not conformity with the standards of
the Western breed of modernity.
The main thing is Russia has discovered it has a choice, and the
commandments “Thou shalt not drop out of Europe,” and “Thou shalt
stand by the West”1 do not imply waiving participation in the “rise of the
rest” or the formation of new institutions and mechanisms of a world
order that would herald the end of the era of modernity’s interregnum.
Indispensable Pole and the Freedom of Choice
The largest fragment of the former Soviet Union, Russia objectively
still has quite a few reasons to lay claim to being one of the poles in a
1
Surkov V. Nationalization of the Future: Paragraphs pro Sovereign Democracy //
Russian Studies in Philosophy. – 2009. – Vol. 47, N 4. – P. 8–21.
17
multi-polar world. However, the general trend over the past two decades in
Russia’s case was a descending one. As for the 1990s, there is only one
way of saying it – a slump. Even the stabilization and the oil and gas boom
during Vladimir Putin’s presidencies can be considered only as a
temporary slowdown of this steep downward spiral. In other words, that it
has remained one of the poles in world politics Russia owes to the force of
inertia, but in the future the Russian authorities will have to attract ever
more additional resources to retain this status.
It is likely that pretty soon we shall start hearing calls in favor of
another downgrade of Russia’s ranking in world affairs. The arguments
will be confined to the impermissibility of spending major resources for
the purpose of maintaining a high international status, and to claims
that entering the zone of attraction of some other pole would optimize
the risks of existence in a turbulent multipolar world. Rejecting this
position only because Russia must be great and strong and nothing else
would be at least shortsighted. Under certain circumstances, we may
have no other choice. But surely, any government in Russia should seek
to prevent such a situation.
For Russia, there are specific reasons for retaining the status of a
center in a multipolar world. Russia’s multi-vector and highly
maneuverable foreign policy in the current circumstances is an important
mechanism to compensate for the weaknesses stemming from the
economy structure, population dynamics, low-quality governance,
corruption and technological backwardness. However, besides solving
tactical tasks, maneuverability must also have a “super-task.” Although
absent from the top three centers of power in the post-American world,
Russia must be a pole significant enough for any of the main centers of
power to seek full-scale partnership with to enjoy indisputable and
decisive superiority.
It is worth saying it again: all of these benefits will be available
and lasting as long as Russia remains in the position of an independent
center of power in a multipolar world, having a freedom for maneuver
and staying open to the development of partnerships with various
global players. As soon as this status is exchanged for involvement in
some strict alliances or integration mechanisms involving more
powerful centers of power, these benefits will be gone in an instance.
It turns out that Russia should be everywhere and all by itself.
18
Ultimately, retaining the status of an independent global player,
even if it requires attracting significant additional resources, will be less
costly and risky for Russia than entering the zone of attraction of one of
the stronger centers. In the latter case, the resources to be spent and the
risks involved would depend on growing internal tensions resulting
from the need to maintain the country’s development along the lines set
from outside. The logic of advocates of this approach, eager to use
binding international commitments to accelerate belated internal
changes, is easy to understand.
Unfortunately, the risk of a totally different scenario looks far
more real. Internal changes, shaped according to imported templates,
may start a new wave of imitations of institutional legal practices and a
chain reaction of very real destabilizing shifts in the field of
international and federative relations.
The range of opportunities opening up before Russia in the
process of the emergence of a post-American world should be used to
create favorable conditions for internal development, and not for
complicating them with involvement in strict alliances and hasty
selection of any of the available versions of modernism. At the same
time, Russian society is in need of genuine openness to the world, of a
broader dialogue with a variety of cultural programs, and readiness to
perceive and borrow from outside everything that can contribute to
practical solutions of internal problems. The freedom of choice is a
truly precious asset in the era of multipolarity. Not just the freedom to
choose strategic partners, but also the freedom to choose the ways and
methods of modernization, and even the image of the desired
modernity.
19
AFTER THE TANDEM:
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY GUIDELINES.
Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of Turbulence1
(2011)
A tragic death in the provincial Tunisian town of Sidi-Bouzid
brought world politics into the second decade of the 21st century. A
young trader set himself on fire after a local official insulted him. In
any other circumstances the incident would have incited talk at local
shops or cafes for just a few days, but this time it sparked a wave of
protest that swept across northern Africa and parts of the Middle East.
Although systemic problems were behind the ouster of Tunisian
President Ben Ali and Egyptian leader Mubarak, and subsequently the
civil war and NATO operation in Libya, it was the young man’s death
that set off fundamental changes in this key region.
Global Turbulence in 2011
The revolutionary upheavals in northern Africa have become the
subject of political analysis, with the supporters of one approach or
another rushing to find in these events either a confirmation of their
ideas or a reason to adjust them. Much depends on the way the
international situation is viewed – as a non-linear, multidirectional
1
Source: Yefremenko D. After the Tandem: Russian Foreign Policy Guidelines.
Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of Turbulence // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2011. –
Vol. 9, N 2. – P. 36–49.
20
process with no predetermined outcome – that is, in line with Francis
Fukuyama’s The End of History – or as a movement on the heels of the
civilized vanguard, which definitely knows where it is heading. It is
more appropriate to describe the events of the past few months and
those in the foreseeable future in terms of political turbulence, not
“waves of democratization.”
Small events generate a chain reaction of mass protests, which
well-organized political forces of all kinds – from political parties and
movements in Arab countries to foreign states, international
organizations and military and political blocs – have to follow, while
trying to guide them in the proper direction. Thus, there is far more
reason to interpret the ongoing upheavals as harbingers of the global
community’s ventures into the unknown, where it might face an even
stronger shake-up.
In international relations theory the idea of turbulence in world
politics was defined by James Rosenau, who published an insightful
book1 at the beginning of another period of powerful turbulence that
resulted in the collapse of the Berlin Wall and, soon after, the Soviet
Union. Rosenau, in taking an extremely radical approach to the theory
of mutual dependence, wrote about the world entering an era of “postinternational” politics, when global processes will be affected by the
multidirectional actions of a previously unthinkable multitude of
collective actors, each guided by different objectives and using the
newest technology. Subsequently, this results in prolonged chaos in
international relations, which continues unabated or even gains
momentum, despite stable political governance institutions. In this case
turbulence becomes an integral part of global development which
underscores not only the upheavals that accompany “scheduled”
changes in the key parameters of local or global processes, but also
changes that frustrate the established rules and models of development.
Two decades have passed since Rosenau’s paper was published,
but the world is still being carried along the same current; its force and
duration suggest that these are fundamental global changes. It is true
that over the past twenty years the world has seen periods of relative
1
Rosenau J.N. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and
Continuity. – Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
21
calm. However, these were transient periods and showed that the
sources of turbulence were far from exhausted (as many analysts had
expected with the end of the Cold War) and they continue to expand,
emerging in quite unexpected places.
It looks like a new kind of turbulence has begun that involves
two inter-related processes. Globalization is already commonplace,
while the other, post-Westernization, is just beginning to find a niche in
social-scientific discourse. The latter, however, should not be confused
with de-Westernization. Global civilization, supported by five centuries
of Western domination, is rethinking this legacy and is not going to
develop along Western lines; however the specific parameters of the
new phase of civilization’s development are not yet clear. What we are
witnessing today is an extended turbulent period – an “interregnum of
modernity” – which is an alarming threshold to a new era.
The main characteristics of 21st century turbulence (which,
incidentally, began in 1991, after the end of the “short 20th century,”
using a term coined by Erick Hobsbawm1) are associated not only with
the end of Western domination, but also with the global nature of world
trends. The matter at hand is not just increasing global interdependence
and transnationalization, but also a new quality where the world, as a
system working towards unification, finds itself locked in and devoid of
any outside periphery. This new quality implies that turbulence is
taking place within a confined system, with no opportunity to expand,
and consequently, reduce internal pressure.
There is no question that the confined global system has retained
quite a few internal partitions and barriers that are the surviving
vestiges of a divided world. One can still find a place for economic
activity, an outflow of “excessive” population, or for collecting
industrial waste. Preserving such vestiges of sovereignty and
particularity causes differences in internal pressure and, consequently,
turbulence flows. Much depends on the stability of these barriers
inherited from the Westphalian era; they are either a useless wreck or
an old-fashioned, yet relatively reliable, bulwark capable of providing
protection from average-force vortex flows. At any rate, when studying
1
Hobsbawm E. The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–
1991. – London: Abacus, 1994.
22
the causes of modern turbulence one should take a close look at the
asymmetry of sovereignty in the system of international relations and
an increasing variety of the existing types of statehood.
As previously, economic factors are crucial to ensuring stability,
or, visa versa, disrupting social systems and political regimes. In a
confined world the movement of capital flows, less than ever before,
conforms to the ideal of a “natural regulator” of economic processes.
Instantaneous overflows of capital, often caused by speculative
operations or momentary considerations, can push prosperous nations
to the brink of economic collapse and social explosion in a matter of
days. Shrinking opportunities for the territorial expansion of capital,
above all finance, is compensated for by a frenzied expansion in time,
i.e. various forms of living on credit, and creating bubbles in all
economic and financial sectors wherever possible – from raw materials
and real estate to the hi-tech sector.
The majority of these bubbles burst consecutively in the 2000s.
Today, the growing bubble of state debt is becoming the last resort for
the timely expansion of capital. In the case of the U.S., the world’s
largest economy and an issuer of world currency, it is fraught with
global collapse, whose magnitude might surpass that of the 2008–2009
financial crisis. However, economic normalization measures can also
cause turbulence, which will imply a considerable decrease in spending
in the U.S. state and private sectors. This may result in an overall
dramatic decline in consumer demand and a new global economic
recession.
In world politics, turbulence is linked, as never before, with what
can be called natural turbulence, i.e. the increasing vulnerability of
socio-technological systems to natural calamities. Some of these
disasters stem from the effect of man-made factors on climate and
ecological systems critical for balancing the global environment. There
has been ever more evidence lately that the global environment is
increasingly determining the behavior of individuals and social
communities through natural anomalies and catastrophes1. A direct
consequence of these processes is the increasing problem of food
1
Yanitsky O.N. “Turbulent Times”: What does it Mean? // Russian Sociology
in Turbulent Times / ed. by V.A. Mansurov. – Moscow: RSS, 2011. – P. 188–192.
23
supply, a growing inequality in access to freshwater reserves, an
increasing lack of control over migration flows, and the appearance of
hotspots of social tensions, even in countries which did not have a
history of such problems.
However, even in cases when there is no direct link between the
scale of natural disasters and man-made factors, we can see that a
natural catastrophe causing destruction and human casualties in one
country may have complex and long-term consequences across the
globe. One recent example is the devastating earthquake and tsunami in
Japan, which, in addition to killing thousands of people, sparked the
most serious nuclear accident in history since the Chernobyl disaster.
This will have long-term consequences for global energy policy, thus
reducing even further the already scarce opportunities to resolve the
energy problem.
Russia’s position in this setup is rather controversial. Although it
is integrated in global processes, its involvement is not complete; so it
has managed to avoid some of the waves of global turbulence. Nonethe-less it has been impacted. The 2008 financial crisis easily crushed
the hopes of the Russian authorities that Russia would be perceived as a
“safe haven.” Yet the old-fashioned bastions of sovereign state have
been coping quite successfully with smaller flows, while stronger winds
have only slightly impacted Russia so far.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the present-day generation of
Russians was slightly ahead of other leading nations in gaining experience
in weathering great upheavals, so Russia seems to have had a better ability
to adapt. Furthermore, Russia is in a unique position, where relations with
a majority of countries are good or satisfactory, largely because Russia is
able to deftly maneuver its foreign policy in a chaotic world.
Even in economic terms, Russia’s position as the largest fuel
supplier turned out to be more solid than the honorary position as leader
of the knowledge economy. This most likely is a transitory state, like
the calm within the “eye of a hurricane.” While Russia has been
successfully accommodating itself within this zone, it has been
extremely lucky, as political scientist Sergei Karaganov noted recently1.
1
Karaganov S. Lucky Russia // Rossyiskaya gazeta. – 2011. – 29 March. –
Mode of access: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Lucky-Russia-15154
24
The question is how long Russia will be able to keep this advantageous
position amid mounting turbulence.
There are at least two challenges here. The first is to continue
skillfully navigating Russian foreign policy through turbulent weather,
leaning on a world outlook that is adequate for modern global
processes. Second, and most important, Russia has to be careful not to
become a new powerful source of global instability. It is this last
circumstance that is crucial to the discussion about the possible
evolution of Russian foreign policy after the country’s upcoming
parliamentary elections in 2011 and presidential election in 2012.
Foreign Policy Conceptions and Group Interests:
The Russian Case
During the first three years of the power-sharing tandem of Putin
and Medvedev, Russian foreign policy was not a matter of dispute (real
or imaginary) between the two teams. The immediate goal of Putin’s
Munich speech, that of putting a brake on NATO expansion into the
post-Soviet space, was achieved in 2008. After that, Moscow, while
keeping its foreign policy reference points, needed to demonstrate a
decrease in the intensity of arguments, openness to dialogue and
readiness to build partnership relations with the West within the context
of global efforts to overcome the consequences of the global economic
crisis. President Medvedev was effectively fulfilling these tasks, which
were certainly part of his joint strategy with Putin.
The Putin-Medvedev rift over UN Resolution 1973 – which
paved the way for a military operation against Libya – was unexpected
against this background. Curiously, the controversy began after the
Kremlin made a decision (most likely mutually agreed on in principle)
not to veto the resolution. The Kremlin had obviously weighed the
advantages and disadvantages before deciding not to create obstacles to
Western involvement in a new war in the Islamic world. The difference
was that Putin, immediately after the initial bombing of Libyan
President Muammar Gaddafi’s military facilities, did not feel
constrained by any obligations before the new coalition and went ahead
25
with standard anti-Western statements, while Medvedev stood up to the
resolution, if not to the West’s attack.
In the ensuing flow of opinions and comments by experts eager
to find new signs of a split in the tandem, few paid attention to the fact
that the Russian leader had used the term “humanitarian intervention”
in his arguments. Earlier, a similar reason was cited during Russia’s
five-day war with Georgia in August 2008. However, humanitarian
intervention in general is not a popular idea for political discourse in
Russia. Before asking what the prospects are for such a discourse in
Russia, we might want to think about why, aside from political realism,
Russia obviously lacks stable foreign policy movements or schools of
thought comparable to liberal Wilsonianism or Jacksonian populism in
the U.S. After all, such ideas are voiced. Russian experts are quite
capable of offering them a la carte, or, at least, relaying them from
foreign sources. However, demand is needed in addition to supply.
What are the sources and mechanisms that create demand? This
or that line of foreign policy thought will only be viable if it is linked
with stable and influential interest groups and if these interests are
represented by the appropriate conceptions. Understandably, Russia
does not have any movements on the scale of Jacksonian populists or
Wilsonianists in the U.S., as historical succession was disrupted in the
20th century. Could such movements have appeared if these disruptions
had not taken place? They certainly could have. The 19th century
Russian historian Nikolai Karamzin, whose book “Memoir on Ancient
and Modern Russia”1 became a paradigmatic text for Russian
conservatism, projects the historical arguments in support of the
autocratic “power vertical” onto concrete conditions of European policy
after the Peace of Tilsit. However, if Karamzin’s ideas about the nature
of Russian government partially hold true for the internal political
situation at the beginning of the 21st century, his opinions about the
turbulent times of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars will at
least be instructive for those who are trying to find their bearings in the
turbulent world of post-Westernization.
1
Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia: A Translation and
Analysis. – Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005.
26
Projecting the foreign policy ideas of pre-Revolutionary liberals
onto the modern world will be more difficult. An analogy between the
imperial aspirations of the Kadets’ leader Pavel Milyukov and Boris
Chubais’s idea of “liberal empire” would look like a coincidence. The
latter caused brief, albeit lively, polemics at one point, but never
developed into a serious concept.
The stability of foreign policy ideas and demand for them depend
directly on the interests of influential forces and on voicing those
interests in public. In the post-Soviet period new groups of interests
emerged, which steadily gained support among the public (beginning
with the mass media) in the 1990s. Recreating the power vertical did
not imply eliminating interest groups; on the contrary, they continued to
consolidate. However, the forms of articulation and mechanisms to
coordinate various interests and resolve conflicts changed dramatically.
These forms were heavily dependent on the government during Putin’s
presidential term. Yuri Pivovarov, a historian and political scientist,
probably offers the best illustration of the specifics of this situation.
The political metaphor he uses – “the power plasma”1 – successfully
brings together the incompatible clusters of Russian elites through
specific regulation of the government-property relationship. This
amorphous substance is the medium where conflicts between the main
groups of interests are settled and new conflicts arise. The “power
plasma” is the breeding ground for structuring and differentiating
groups of interests, some of which already have quite definite
geoeconomic and geopolitical preferences (post-Soviet space, the
European Union, the U.S., China and Asian-Pacific countries).
However, these preferences have not been articulated clearly so far.
The political discussions during this pre-election year, which
began to involve Russian policy issues, show that the “power plasma,”
as a mechanism for political-economic governance and for settling
conflicts, is no longer satisfactory for many influential forces and large
groups. The very reconfiguration of government and the beginning of
the first long (six-year) presidential term means not only the end to the
interim period of “tandemocracy,” but also a possibility to unfetter key
1
Pivovarov Yu.S. Russkaya politicheskaya traditsia i sovremennost = Russian
Political Tradition and Modernity. – Moscow: INION RAN, 2006.
27
interest groups. If these groups emerge after the Putin-Medvedev
tandem and change the state of the “power plasma” to a full-fledged
existence in the public political arena, then they will most likely launch
the process of forming stable foreign policy doctrines. These doctrines
will rely on demand formed by stable structures that have a strong
foothold in society, rather than on the preferences of individual experts.
This process is based on overall macro-social changes related to
the strengthening of the Russian middle class and the shaping of its
identity. It also concerns the further restructuring of elites. The middle
class, like other large social groups, is unlikely to formulate a clear
demand for one foreign policy line or another anytime soon. The
middle class will remain vague and self-contradictory, bearing a slight
resemblance to the eclectic foreign policy aspirations of the broad strata
of the U.S. These are the people on whom President Barack Obama’s
opponents, including those in the Tea Party movement, rely at present.
In the U.S., however, elite groups are capable of articulating the
interests of a wide range of people and match them with those of the
business community, the military-industrial sector, various minorities,
etc. Immersed in the “power plasma,” the Russian elite are “stewing in
their own juices,” with little need (until recently) to interact with large
groups. Ultimately the matter at hand is the quality of the current
Russian elite, the extent of its rootedness in modern Russian society,
and the awareness of its responsibility before society.
The Russian urban middle class, or “the new angry ones,” as
journalist Alexei Chadayev1, a member of the Russian Public Council,
aptly called them, is already integrated in the globalized world – both
through information and technology. This does not imply, however,
that despite its severe criticism of the Russian government and elite, the
middle class will generate pro-Western and pro-modernization demand.
It is more likely that the middle class will expect Russia’s relations with
the outside world to finally begin to work for its benefit. The criticallyminded middle class will be the first to not support a policy, which,
despite all the declarations of openness to the West and a striving for
modernization, will only be in the interests of a few elite groups.
1
Chadayev A. “Dramaturgija 2011-go” = “Dramaturgy of 2011” // Vzglyad. –
2011. – 21 March. – Mode of access: https://vz.ru/opinions/2011/3/21/477289.html
28
Broad coalitions could appear in the mid-term in support of
stability or renewal that would reflect large-scale demand and the
interests of certain elite groups. Such coalitions could lay the
groundwork for reconfiguring the socio-political order and overcoming
the current “power plasma” pattern. One of the countless consequences
could be that various schools of foreign policy thought will gain a
stronger foothold among the Russian public. The question is whether
these changes will be expedited by the 2011–2012 election campaigns,
or whether they will be accompanied by other, possibly alarming,
events.
Elections and Turbulence
The new configuration of power after the 2011 and 2012
elections will not so much determine a radical change in Russian
foreign policy (which is unlikely), but indicate whether or not Russia
will become a new source of global turbulence. In the end it is the
election, not the winner, that matters, i.e. its ability or inability to secure
the legitimacy of the next president. Full-fledged legitimacy is
necessary because the “power plasma” model is losing its efficiency
and is no longer meeting the needs of a number of elites and social
requirements of large groups of the population.
This legitimacy should above all be proven to Russian citizens
(the criteria of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
or other supra-national bodies that comment on electoral procedures are
of secondary importance in this case). This legitimacy should not be
merely reduced to an election free of fraud; it is also a measure of how
the policy of the elected leader meets the expectations of the people. In
this sense, the legitimacy of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency rested not just
on his victory in fair elections on June 12, 1991, but essentially on the
tremendous potential of hope that various strata of the population
pinned on him. The 1996 election did not strengthen his legitimacy, but
the initial hope was strong enough to continue throughout the 1990s. In
Putin’s case it was not the competitive election that played the key role
in legitimizing his authority, but his conformity to changing demands in
29
society. The legitimacy of the Putin-Medvedev tandem was inert, a sort
of a follow-up to Putin’s presidency.
Securing new legitimacy is the main problem of the upcoming
elections, and an increasing number of representatives with a wide
range of political views agree that an election won in a truly fair fight is
the best way to attain this goal. As it stands now, any candidate with
administrative leverage can win an election, but this kind of victory will
not make the new president truly legitimate. At best, Vladimir Putin
might hope to exploit what is left of his earlier legitimacy by leaning on
the paternalistic-minded electorate and offering it a kind of a new social
contract in the style of renewed political conservatism or a modified
solidarity. If the use of all administrative levers brings victory to a
liberal candidate, one may expect, with a high degree of probability,
that the new president will not be legitimate (the consequences of this
can be seen in the final years of Gorbachev’s term) or there will be a
radical turn implying a departure from the principle “freedom is better
than non-freedom.”
Alternative free elections are not a panacea; using this instrument
amid conditions of “vegetarian authoritarianism,” as political scientist
Ivan Krastev1 termed it, is fraught with unpredictable consequences.
Russian politics today needs an objective evaluation of the real setup of
forces and interests, including foreign policy, instead of trying to lull
oneself with talk about “irreversible modernization,” or the everlasting
value of political stability. Granting political representation to varied
forces that exist in society, but which are absent in the official political
setup, is a means to prevent domestic turbulence.
Meanwhile, there were clear signs in late 2010 of a loss of
control and legitimization when it became apparent that a new nonsystemic force had surfaced on the public and political stage. Fans of
the Spartak football club clashed with the police in Manezhnaya Square
outside the Kremlin on December 11, 2010, an event that was a
symptom of mounting internal political turbulence. It demonstrated the
spontaneity and potential of public involvement, the quick mobilization
and defiance of legal political forces, as well as confusion among law
1
Krastev I. Paradoxes of the New Authoritarianism // Journal of Democracy. –
2011. – Vol. 22, N 2. – P. 5–16.
30
enforcement officials. The vector of the protests was a particularly
alarming indicator. Muscovites were not only witness to an upsurge in
xenophobia based on a primitive, “friend-stranger” division, but there
was a readiness to apply this division nationwide, fence themselves off
from others, or secede from part of Russia. “National isolationism” is
the term for this trend. With strong ideological support this is an
extremely dangerous utopia, and any attempt to implement it will
automatically turn Russia into one of the major zones of global
turbulence.
The protest that broke out late last year quickly exposed the
structural vulnerability of the current Russian state, although this was
not a surprise to anyone.
It was inevitable that the collapse of the Soviet Union would lead
to the emergence of dangerous cracks in the government structure of
the Russian Federation. Throughout the 1990s the Kremlin tried to
prevent these cracks from spreading to a critical level. It seemed that
the government had managed to make significant achievements in the
following decade: the cracks were stopped and plastered. Now the
plaster has begun to fall off and even a mid-sized shake-up could widen
these cracks. Under these circumstances, free and fair elections, as the
most effective method of legitimizing the authorities and ensuring that
the main interest groups are represented, could help strengthen
statehood and find a reasonable balance between stability,
modernization and strengthening Russia’s position in a turbulent world.
Foreign Policy Options after 2012
The inner vulnerability of the state structure and external
turbulence are the framework conditions for the next presidency. Any
efforts to develop a Russian foreign policy strategy in the second
decade of the 21st century will be futile, if the end of the PutinMedvedev tandem contributes to internal instability, tensions in ethnic
and federative relations, or makes Russia a new source of global
turbulence. How Russia overcomes the landmark year of 2012 will be
crucial from the point of view of the effectiveness of its foreign policy.
31
Obviously, the elected president (no matter who it is) must have
a new full-fledged mandate, without trying to clutch at the helm by
exploiting what is left of the previous legitimacy. Naturally, the key
foreign policy events of the initial period of the next presidency will
contribute to the strengthening of new legitimacy. If state power is
consolidated without causing social resentment and political tensions,
then the new president will certainly seek to have a complete array of
foreign policy instruments at his disposal.
In this sense it is hardly justifiable for someone to limit one’s
own political maneuverings and follow a standard doctrine. Global
turbulence will not disappear after the inauguration of the new
president. Rather, one should expect new upheavals mostly fueled by
the global economic situation, namely the consequences of the 2008–
2009 financial crisis that have still not been eliminated. Moreover,
post-Westernization is likely to generate several new problems.
A look at the basically tentative “interregnum of modernity” and
global turbulence as the Zeitdiagnose of the beginning of the 21st
century suggests that Russia’s foreign policy needs to resolve three
interrelated tasks:
• Prevent or minimize the destabilizing influence of global
turbulence on domestic politics;
• Use global turbulence in Russian interests as much as possible;
• Seek Russia’s full-fledged participation in determining the
future rules of the game – the new world order, which will replace the
“interregnum of modernity” sooner or later.
The first two tasks are an attempt to use the country’s luck and
the “eye of the hurricane” for as long as possible. In order to cope with
this, Russia will need a maximum degree of foreign policy
maneuvering, an openness to constructive interaction with other
influential world political actors, and the prudence to stay away from
hasty moves to fit into this or that rigid configuration of militarypolitical unions or integration mechanisms, where it will find itself
playing second fiddle.
The increasing rivalry between the U.S. and China for global
leadership will obviously become one of the key trends of this decade.
Objectively, Russia has a potential capable of securing strategic
superiority for one of the sides. But Moscow should learn lessons from
32
Beijing, which was in the same situation for two decades during the
Cold War. Mao Zedong’s tactics of the “monkey watching two tigers
fight” proved to be beneficial, with the triumphant monkey eventually
siding with neither. In the present circumstances, Russia may make the
most use of its advantage without joining any of the opponents, while
trying to build partnership relations with each.
At present, U.S.-Russian relations have not moved any closer to
the level of Moscow’s relations with Beijing, despite the significant
achievements of the “reset” policy. The main difficulty is the inability of
Moscow and Washington to agree on a basically new agenda for bilateral
relations that would meet present-day realities. As a result, by the end of
the (first?) presidential terms of Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev,
missile defense may become the key problem determining the further
agenda of bilateral relations. It could expose the limits of the U.S.Russian “reset” policy or dismantle it altogether. At the same time, the
rise of China will eventually make Moscow and Washington work out a
new format for bilateral relations, regardless of who the future U.S. and
Russian leaders will be and what political parties they will represent.
A dramatic change in U.S.-Russian relations also depends on
whether Russia will be able to secure full-fledged participation in
establishing the framework conditions and institutional mechanisms of
the new world order. However, this search cannot be the sole
prerogative of either Moscow or Washington. In the short and midterm, the key international actors might take joint actions to ensure
relative governability amid the growing conflict potential in a number
of important regions of the planet, turbulence on the commodity and
financial markets, new waves of migration, the growing activity of
various online communities, environmental degradation, man-made
disasters, etc. The search for a new model of global governance is a
multilateral and competitive process, and in this sense it may also
produce turbulence. In recent months, we have seen a frantic search for
effective crisis-resistant global governance mechanisms. We have also
seen attempts to revive the institutions of the Washington consensus,
efforts to form a more representative club of the leading players in
world politics (the G20), and new multiparty cooperation institutions,
such as BRICS. It is in Russia’s interests to take an active part in the
majority of possible configurations targeting the formation of a new
33
system of global governance. The exceptions would be political
configurations that may directly involve Russia in regional conflicts or
in a situation where one of the major aspirants is in competition for
world leadership.
Russia’s foreign policy is likely to remain multidirectional after
the 2012 presidential elections. Even if its foreign policy is strictly tied to
the objectives of modernization, largely associated with a sense of
“hardware,” it will still have to be ready to quickly react to turbulence,
situational coalitions, and various doctrines geared up to substantiate
moves justified by certain circumstances. Accordingly, Russia should
keep the ideas and rhetoric of humanitarian intervention in store in case it
needs to take action in the territory of the former Soviet Union, which is
something that cannot be ruled out. Of course, it would be strange if such
ideas became the cornerstone of the new president’s foreign policy.
Russia should be prepared to endure turbulence in the postSoviet space or in its immediate proximity during the first “long”
presidency. In the first place, the situation in Central Asia could
worsen, possibly fueled by large social protests, ethnic clashes or
natural changes in political leaders. This has already happened in
Turkmenistan and may take place in other countries of the region. Even
if the region is stable, Afghanistan will remain a constant source of
turbulence, as various scenarios could emerge after the death of Osama
bin Laden to considerably reduce or even put an end to the West’s
military presence in that region.
A new flare-up of the Karabakh and Transnistria conflicts would
be extremely dangerous for Russia. An open confrontation in these
regions would result in a large-scale disruption in the fragile balance that
is in place all over the former Soviet Union. It would also provoke direct
interference by some Western countries, the Western military or political
institutions in the affairs of former Soviet republics. Furthermore, Russia
could find itself directly involved in those conflicts.
The establishment of the Customs Union and the Common
Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan has been one of the
unquestionable political achievements of the Putin-Medvedev tandem.
However, the situation is still unstable for both economic and political
reasons, above all, due to the problem concerning the stability of
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime. Admittedly,
34
strengthening these achievements will be an important task during the
new presidency, along with attempts to stabilize the situation in the
Customs Union member-states and the CES.
Positive changes in Russian-Ukrainian relations after the election
of Victor Yanukovich as Ukrainian president were an important event
in 2010. This potential could be wasted if Moscow and Kiev stick to the
existing stereotypes of interstate relations in the post-Soviet space.
“The flight from Moscow” – the Alfa and Omega of the previous
Ukrainian administrations – proved to be a breakthrough to a
geopolitical dead end, not to Europe. Yet drastic moves in the opposite
direction do not promise large dividends for Kiev either, especially if
these moves follow the existing patterns of institutional cooperation
between post-Soviet states. Russia should help the incumbent Ukrainian
administration determine Ukraine’s special place in Greater Europe,
where it could play a truly active and unique role, which Moscow,
Brussels and Washington would treat with equal respect. In strategic
terms, the stability and prospects for developing the post-Soviet space
will directly depend on whether Moscow and Kiev are able to find a
new formula for Russian-Ukrainian partnership.
* * *
Avoiding internal instability in the next few years will be crucial
for Russia’s role in the “interregnum of modernity.” If things remain
stable, Moscow will play an increasingly active role in the international
arena regardless of who takes the presidential oath in the Grand
Kremlin Palace in 2012. At the same time, the evolution of domestic
policy will steadily stir demand for particular doctrines on the part of
interest groups. These doctrines will begin to affect Russian foreign
policy to a greater degree. In other words, Russia’s foreign policy in the
mid-term will no longer reflect the “power plasma” consensus over
relations with the outside world. It will begin to reflect the more
explicit interests of influential groups, both among the public and the
elite. Meanwhile, global turbulence and post-Westernization collisions
might significantly alter daily foreign policy and conceptual
interpretations of its key objectives.
35
WAITING FOR A STORM.
Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of Change1
(2012)
Whatever may be happening in the world these days, turbulence
is Mr. Analyst’s label of choice. This catchword largely owes its
popularity to the world financial and economic crisis, which now looks
as infinite as it did back in 2008. Uncertainty about the capacity to
exercise control of one’s own future, which Pierre Bourdieu2 discussed
in relation to the individual at the end of the 20th century, is now
enveloping states and their economic systems, as well as transnational
associations. Nothing is ruled out and nothing is predetermined – this is
what the uncertain system of coordinates, in which world leaders have
to make decisions, looks like now. Vladimir Putin, who has extended
his stay in office till 2018 (without any guarantees, though), can for a
good reason be considered one of the oldest old-timers. The world and
the country where he has taken presidency for a third time is markedly
different from what it was when Boris Yeltsin handed over the reigns of
power to him. That the changes have proved so significant is largely a
merit of Putin himself. But that by no means makes his future tasks
easier.
1
Source: Yefremenko D. Waiting for a Storm. Russian Foreign Policy in the
Era of Change // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2012. – Vol. 10, N 2. – P. 18–32.
2
Bourdieu P. La précarité est aujourd’hui partout [Precariousness is
Everywhere Nowadays] // Bourdieu P. Contre-feux. – Paris: Liber Raisons d’agir,
1998. – T. 1. – P. 96–102.
36
About out Near-Revolution
The range of foreign political options, which the Russian
political leadership will be able to choose from in the near future, will
be determined by internal political opportunities to a far greater extent
than at the beginning of the past decade. In my previous publications I
dared speculate that in the election campaigns of late 2011 and early
2012 Russian foreign policy may become hostage to an uncontrolled
march of events as a result of the lack of the authorities’ legitimacy
won in elections devoid of genuine competition. Now that the dramatic
threshold is way behind, one should consider the possibility for Russia
falling victim to the latest changes and turning into a new trouble spot
of world turbulence. But first, a few words about what really happened
between December 4, 2011 and March 4, 2012.
‘Near-revolution’ seems to be the most appropriate word to
describe the events. The term was coined by some leaders of the student
unrest of 1968 to describe the scale of youth protests against the social
and political system in the countries of the West.
The dwindling electoral support for the ruling party United
Russia (even according to the official results from the State Duma
elections) and, above all, the protest demonstrations that followed the
December 4 voting have demonstrated that the political consensus of
the early 2000s is gone. The scope of the demonstrations in Moscow’s
Bolotnaya Square and in Sakharov Avenue indicated a cumulative
growth in the number of those having “stylistic disagreements” with the
authorities. Although a detailed sociological profile of the “people with
white ribbons” is still to be drawn, one can say with certainty that the
vertical chain of command has lost the support of a considerable
segment of the middle class in major Russian cities.
Apparently, the awareness of the new situation has thrown the
ruling Putin-Medvedev tandem into confusion. The protest sentiments
forced them to agree to partial political liberalization, which had begun
to be considered long before the December elections. Simultaneously,
the editorial policies of the government-controlled electronic mass
media showed certain change, similar in scale to the glasnost
breakthrough of the 1980s.
37
However, in January 2012, the Putin team revised its election
tactic to shift to confrontationist rhetoric towards the protesters and the
sympathetic external forces (the just-appointed U.S. Ambassador,
Michael McFaul fell victim to that campaign, too). In this way a new
basis of Putin’s electoral support was consolidated and preconditions
were created for a considerable shift in the balance of forces at the level
of the political elite. The presidential election proved surprisingly
competitive, but it was a competition between the authorities and a
patchy opposition not represented in the ballot papers. In February, the
pro-Putin forces achieved superiority in the scope of street
demonstrations. Eventually, Putin for the first time emerged winner in a
political standoff, and this fact will have major consequences for
Russia’s politics.
It looks like the scope of protest demonstrations was a no smaller
surprise for the leaders of the anti-Putin opposition than it was for the
authorities. Almost spontaneously a weird coalition emerged that united
supporters of liberal values, leftwing radicals and nationalists. In a
configuration like this the emergence of one coordinating center,
capable of formulating an integral list of political demands, proved
impossible. Seeking to gain massive support of demonstrators in street
protests, the oppositional leaders missed the chance of distancing
themselves from dubious personalities and organizations that had
joined the rallies in the first days. As a result, protest activity developed
a downtrend before the March 4 election. The scope and intensity of
grass roots support for the oppositional protests were not enough for
destabilizing the regime. But nothing is settled yet. The number of
opponents critical of Putin and of the system he represents has not
reduced, and it is hard to believe they will be calmly waiting for the end
of his third term.
From the very moment of his inauguration, Putin was confronted
with a stark dilemma – either to go ahead with strengthening the
authoritarian rule in every possible way, or to undertake fundamental
political reforms, including a constitutional one, which would at last
build the presidency into the system of power sharing, establish
guarantees of the independence of courts and the mass media, and make
genuinely free elections inevitable. Most probably Putin and his
entourage will at first try to consolidate power with regard to the new
38
political realities. The under-revolution of the winter of 2011–2012
highlighted the non-efficiency of the previous coalition of siloviki and
systemic liberals Putin had relied on since 2000. In the new conditions,
Putin will have to recruit a new generation of the managerial and
political elite to count on. In the long term, the “newcomers” will be
determining the country’s future to an ever larger degree.
In the near future the Russian authorities will be taking any
significant step with double caution, because the risk of another
outbreak of protests is still high. Putin’s political opponents will
continue to question the legitimacy of his third presidency and the
current composition of the State Duma. In the event of another tide of
the economic crisis Putin will have to establish a dialogue again with
various political forces, including the advocates of Western-type liberal
democracy and radical nationalists. The task of the political leadership
will be to integrate both groups in a legal political process by giving
them a chance of full-fledged participation in regional and municipal
elections, and then in federal election campaigns. The normalization of
political processes would be far easier to achieve should there be an
unambiguous signal that Putin and his entourage are prepared to
confine themselves to a six-year presidency and will not seek to
prolong it to 2024. In fact, time is ripe for Putin to start working on a
strategy of a civilized exit from the ruling officialdom within the
deadlines established by the Constitution.
The Russian near-revolution has demonstrated the Opposition’s
indifference to foreign policy issues. The oppositional activists’
response to Putin’s statements throughout the election campaign was
slack, none of them even tried to propose some policy benchmarks in
that sphere, at least in response to the Putin’s article in Moscow News.
It is very unlikely that there is a broad consensus of Putin’s supporters
and opponents as regards foreign policy issues. The Opposition
remained reluctant to get involved in the foreign policy discussion,
most probably because the alternative platform does not look attractive
enough for mobilizing the electorate and political activists. In fact, the
Opposition allowed Putin to retain monopoly on shaping and
interpreting Russia’s foreign policy agenda.
The social processes that have been unfolding in Russia since
late 2011 are undoubtedly consonant with the main trends of the global
39
political turbulence. But, if one considers the March 4, 2012 election as
an interim threshold, then one must admit that by the moment it was
reached Russia had avoided the plight of turning into another source of
global chaos. Russia’s foreign policy has not yet become hostage to the
internal political change, of which Russia’s independent stance on Syria
in early 2012 is evidence. Nevertheless, the likes and dislikes of
Russia’s main foreign partners regarding the actors of the political
process within the country have clearly manifested themselves. In the
future, especially in a situation of a growing internal political
turbulence, outside pressure in support of this or that force inside
Russia will increase. Accordingly, the Kremlin’s foreign policy choices
may be derivative of a “friend-or-foe” approach, with all other factors
of significance fading into the background.
Eurasian (Post-Soviet) Integration
The Putin-Medvedev duumvirate’s rule has seen a major change
in interstate cooperation in the post-Soviet space. In fact, there has
developed a change of trend for the first time ever since 1991. True, it
would be too bold to say that disintegration and nation-state building
has given way to a unification boom. But the creation of the Customs
Union and the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and
Kazakhstan is increasingly often seen as a project with greater-thanzero chances of success. It is also noteworthy that it was none other
than Vladimir Putin who played the most important role in launching
this initiative (although by and large he avoided disputing Dmitry
Medvedev’s foreign policy prerogatives).
Why did it become possible? It would be an exaggeration to say
that the economic integration of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
materialized in favorable external conditions, but the general background
was surely neutral. The world economic crisis noticeably reduced the
capabilities of the key world players in the post-Soviet space. Besides, as
one may speculate, the resetting of Russian-U.S. relations implied
bilateral tacit awareness that the U.S. activity in matters related to the
political and economic development of the CIS countries would be surely
less intensive than it was under George W. Bush. While refusing to
40
recognize Russia’s right to a zone of privileged interests, the United
States under Barack Obama apparently deemed it impossible to resist
Russia’s growing strength in the post-Soviet space too firmly. As for
the European Union, the Eastern Partnership program, formulated at the
initiative of Poland and Sweden, has failed to become an effective
instrument for exercising influence in the post-Soviet space. In a word,
by 2012 Russia had achieved considerable progress in advancing its
integration initiatives.
True, these initiatives still remain mostly a political project. The
idea of a Eurasian Union, which Putin breathed a new life into in the
autumn of 2011, is still feeding the political component of the
integration activity. However, this policy is fraught with certain risks,
such as the disruption of unification efforts. The establishment of a
trilateral Customs Union and the proposed formation of a Eurasian
Union on its basis is a project of three personalistic authoritarian
regimes, of which the Russian one is the softest, particularly so after the
turbulent political winter of 2011–2012. Therefore, it is logical to focus
efforts on minimizing the project’s costs so as to make the integration
trend irreversible and ensure stability of the union structures irrespective
of what may be happening “after Nazarbayev,” “after Lukashenko,” or
“after Putin.” Conversely, any steps towards expanding the Customs
Union and the Eurasian Union territorially, for instance, to Kyrgyzstan or
Tajikistan, would hardly contribute to making the economic basis of
integration stronger. Alongside greater economic pressures this would
be tantamount to the import of instability and conflicts. For instance, in
view of the strained relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan it
would be careless to agree to a radical rapprochement with Dushanbe,
thereby complicating the dialogue with Tashkent.
Creating a firm and sound (at least economically) core of
integration in the post-Soviet space is a major task that will take years,
if not decades, to accomplish. Beyond the scope of the “top three” –
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan – it would be correct to opt for a model
of multi-speed integration, making it possible to gradually create
economic and political prerequisites for closer relations among ever
more countries in the post-Soviet space. In relation to Ukraine, the
optimal scenario might be to put it in the follow-up integration echelon.
Ukraine’s hypothetical membership of the Customs Union, the
41
Common Economic Space and, eventually, of the Eurasian Union,
would considerably ease the integration impetus and, in case of another
change of power in Kiev, result in the deconstruction of the emerging
associations. One has the impression that Moscow seeks to use the
weaknesses of Ukraine’s current authorities to address issues
concerning the future of the gas pipeline system, as well as involve
Kiev in some sort of partnership that would prevent Ukraine’s ultimate
reorientation towards the European Union. However, the march of
events in the neighboring country after the “Orange Revolution” has
convincingly shown that any “final” solutions there are impossible. For
Moscow it would be reasonable to proceed precisely from this
understanding of Ukrainian specifics. If the idea of Greater Europe
“from Lisbon to Vladivostok” is to be considered in earnest, Kiev
might play a modest but independent part in such a European concert.
Russia should recognize this and even help Ukraine find a constructive
role of a link between the European Union and the Eurasian one.
The European Impasse
That the relations between Moscow and the European Union
have been in an impasse for years is on everybody’s tongue. Even those
who are still prepared to offer solutions are beginning to feel bored.
Russia can only wait and watch the EU trying to find a way out of the
debt and institutional crisis. Naturally, it can make its moderate
contribution to resolving the debt problems and to eventually take a
tactically beneficial position of a lender. On the EU scale Moscow’s
support will be hardly noticeable, but it would be tangible for
individual countries, for instance, Cyprus. Possibly, the current moment
is most convenient for laying hands on low-priced European assets, but
a massive buy-up of the heftiest chunks of property, for instance, in the
high-tech sector, will not happen.
In his last pre-election article1 Vladimir Putin made it clear that
he was an advocate of the version of anti-crisis reforms and institutional
1
Putin V. Rossija i menyajushiisa mir = Russia and the Changing World //
Moskovskie novosti, 2012. – 27 February.
42
transformation that Berlin and Paris were insisting on. To be more
precise, not of the version as such, but of the idea that its
implementation will help consolidate German-French domination in
united Europe. It is hoped that such transformation would have the
most favorable effect on Russia-EU relations. However, if this shift is
bound to occur, it will not happen in the near future.
Europe’s debt crisis has exposed things which everybody knew
all the way but which were painstakingly camouflaged: whereas before
the crisis Germany’s leadership was kept under the veil of a consensus
political decision-making (even with certain adjustments the Lisbon
Treaty had introduced), which diluted political responsibility, now
Berlin is forced to assume the role of a full-fledged leader. Germany’s
cautious Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is still trying to share the burden
of responsibility with France, but this does not make much difference.
Most probably, when the crisis is at its peak, the majority of EU
countries will accept Berlin’s terms of exit from the debt depression,
but the London-led camp of opponents will get stronger, too. As they
overcome the crisis, the number of countries, prepared to contest
Germany’s key role in solving various problems, will grow. A variety
of scenarios is possible here.
One scenario suggests that the mechanism of decision-making in
the EU will be rather quickly adjusted to the new economic realities,
and the “multi-speed Europe” principle will be institutionalized. This
would be most favorable for taking practical steps in favor of
implementing the idea of “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok.” The
European Union’s stratification into several integration tiers would help
bring about more zones of cooperation, serving as “bridges” from the
European Union (its core) to the Eurasian Union. Implementation of a
differentiated model of multi-speed integration would lay the basis for
new mega projects with points of support in Paris, Berlin, Warsaw,
Kiev and Moscow. For the time being this scenario looks purely
hypothetical, though.
Under another scenario the reformatting of the EU will last a
while, and Berlin will have to make concessions to partners on issues of
secondary importance again and again. Possibly, the policy towards
Russia and other countries in the post-Soviet space will be one of the
victims. On the Eastern track, the simulacrum of the European Union’s
43
common foreign policy has chances to last longer. Then the stagnation
in relations between Moscow and the European Union undergoing
internal transformation will last for years. Europe will be a priori
unable to discuss strategic partnership matters with Moscow, and
Russia will hardly like the idea of waiting in uncertainty in front of the
European home’s locked front door. Respectively, Moscow’s
partnership with Brussels will not become a tangible factor,
contributing to Russia’s positions in the Asia-Pacific region, which
Putin mentioned in the pre-election article “Russia and the Changing
World” as a goal to be sought. Most probably, it will turn the other way
round, and a resolute surge in Russia’s policy in Asia and the Pacific
will sooner or later force the EU countries to take a fresh look at the
prospects of relations with the largest country in Eurasia.
The third scenario may involve a sharp worsening of the
military-political situation in the Middle East, and also its long-term
geopolitical and geo-economic consequences. A clash of Israel and the
United States with Iran would make the problems of energy security
more acute. The effects of such a clash will produce serious long-term
challenges for all: the redrawing of borders in the Middle East, refugee
flows, Turkey’s struggle for asserting its ambitions of a regional
dominator in the Eastern Mediterranean, the South Caucasus and
Central Asia and the comeback of the specter of a Sunni Caliphate from
Mecca to Casablanca. Awareness of common threats is certainly one of
the strongest arguments for countries to unite.
Asia-Pacific Window of Opportunities
Remarkably, Russia’s chairmanship of this year’s Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum has coincided with the shift of the world
policy focus on that region. If the struggle for global leadership
between the United States and China is to become the key factor in the
transformation of the system of international relations, then the
expanses of East Asia and the Pacific are bound to serve as the
competition field. The more so since the center of gravity of world
industrial and financial activity is moving from the Euro-Atlantic area
to the Asia-Pacific region. A realignment of forces is afoot, and Russia
44
is not taking an active part in it yet, reluctant to get involved in any
political-economic configuration prematurely. However, despite the
growing tensions caused by this realignment, the Asia-Pacific region
still remains a fairly stable and economically safe part of the world, and
presence there is a basic condition for Russia’s successful development
in the 21st century. “An eastward turn” will entail major risks, but
staying idle will be far more risky, for the window of opportunity may
be shut to never open again.
A radical change in the agenda of Russian-U.S. relations will be
possible only if the sides succeed to jointly define a balance of interests
in the Asia-Pacific region and to consider it as the main contextformatting factor for the entire range of cooperation relations between
Moscow and Washington. Firstly, the balance of interests should involve
economic cooperation, including creation and development of regional
free trade areas. Secondly, it suggests support for Russia’s active
contribution to supplying energy resources to the Asia-Pacific region,
including wide diversification of routes of delivery and destinations. This
sort of mutual understanding in questions of energy supply to the AsiaPacific region means a departure from confrontational policies in the
field of European energy security, where the United States had until
recently acted as the main lobbyist for alternative oil and gas supply
routes that would ease Europe’s dependence on Russia. Thirdly, the new
balance of interests suggests the United States and the Asia-Pacific
countries leaning on it will enjoy vast opportunities opened up for the
development of Siberia and Russia’s Far East. At least, the same
opportunities as China enjoys. Fourthly, Russia should recognize that the
considerable military presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific
region does not endanger its security. Moreover, a further U.S. military
buildup in the region may be deemed acceptable on the condition it does
not undermine Russia’s own strategic security efforts. At the same time,
the United States will have to demonstrate its readiness to take into
account the interests of Russia’s security in the post-Soviet space, in
Europe, and in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, however, the chances for a positive “resetting of the
resetting” of the U.S.-Russia relations are slim, and they will remain so
for years to come. Relations with Russia have long ceased to be a
matter of bipartisan consensus in Washington. Quite probably,
45
fundamental efforts in favor of a U.S.-Russia rapprochement will for a
long time be blocked by an influential group of U.S. legislators
interested in the votes of anti-Russia minded migrants from Central and
Eastern Europe and their descendants. The rhetoric component of
Russian-U.S. interactions may even get stronger. For instance, a swap
of the vintage Jackson-Vanik amendment for the Magnitsky Act that
John McCain and a number of his colleagues have proposed will
exacerbate the distrust between the two countries, without resolving a
single practical problem. The publication of a conversation between
Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, caught by a live microphone in
Seoul, and the ensuing anti-Obama and anti-Russia campaign by Mitt
Romney and other Republicans were yet another illustration the
chances of shrugging off the power of stereotypes are scarce.
Instead of searching jointly for opportunities for cooperation in
the Asia-Pacific region as the basis of a new agenda of U.S.-Russian
relations we will see a further erosion of the modest achievements of
the resetting. The current agenda of bilateral relations, in which the
missile defense problem takes center stage, will be perpetuated till the
end of the current decade. And then, especially in case of another surge
of internal political tensions in Russia or of another aggravation of
relations with the West, Moscow may take a step towards still closer
relations with Beijing.
The current level of Russian-Chinese relations is optimal by and
large. A search for a balance of interests and new mechanisms of
cooperation by Russia and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region
might help achieve a better balance and avoid unilateral dependence on
China. For Moscow, it would be equally risky to get involved in antiChinese and anti-American alliances. At this point it would be
reasonable to lessen the disproportion in China’s favor by stepping up
cooperation with the United States. Such restoration of balance would
provide the most comfortable ground for the further advancement of
Russia’s interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
The opportunities for economic cooperation and the development
of trade are most significant in this context. Russia’s crucial task
following the access to the World Trade Organization is choosing
partners for the establishment of free trade regimes. Already now
discussions are underway on free trade by the Customs Union countries
46
with New Zealand, Vietnam and Mongolia (beyond the Asia-Pacific
region consultations are being held with the member-states of the
European Free Trade Association). The talks may serve as a model for
further wider dialogues over the establishment of relations with the
existing and emerging free trade areas or even over full-fledged
participation in one of these areas. In contrast to the European Union,
multilateral structures of economic cooperation and free trade in the
Asia-Pacific region keep cropping up. Besides accepting the conditions
for cooperation in the region established earlier by other actors, Russia
may also participate in setting the rules of the game.
The Asia-Pacific region still lacks a major project for multilateral
economic cooperation, but there is a variety of competing projects. In
the final count the choice will be confined to which project is preferable
– the one involving the United States or China. This situation will not
last indefinitely, but now Russia has a chance to consider various
options. The free trade regime is by no means a harmless thing,
particularly so for a one-sided economy like Russia’s. Nevertheless it
makes sense to analyze the existing options, above all the possibility of
closer relations with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The United
States will dominate this emerging economic group, so a probe into the
chances of close cooperation with the TPP will also put to test the
chances of “resetting the resetting” on the basis of a balance of interests
of Washington and Moscow in the Asia-Pacific region. One should not
brush aside offhand the possibility of taking part in some other
configuration, for instance, the ASEAN+6 format.
Russia should look for regional partners (in other words, sherpas,
if one is to use a word from the diplomatic vocabulary) that would be
prepared to provide assistance to Russia in turning eastwards. They
should not be stronger than Russia itself, or have some insurmountable
differences, like a territorial dispute. Clearly, Moscow should create
powerful incentives to persuade these countries to take into account its
interests in earnest. Such incentives may be varied – supplies of fuels
and energy, joint infrastructural projects, the opening of the Russian
labor market, creation of favorable conditions for economic activity,
assistance in resolving conflicts, etc.
Vietnam and South Korea may easily become such regional
players. With Vietnam Russia shares the political and economic
47
heritage of the Soviet era. Naturally, that heritage suffered serious
erosion, but, despite the years of mutual estrangement, a number of
successful economic cooperation projects have been preserved, and
many people in both countries are keenly interested in reviving
Russian-Vietnamese cooperation on a new basis. Vietnam largely
follows the Chinese model of modernization, and in terms of the
structure and quality of its workforce Vietnam looks very much like
China of 10–15 years ago, but the gap is narrowing. At the same time,
the Vietnamese economy is tiny compared to the Chinese one. Besides,
Russia and Vietnam do not have a common border, which lifts certain
concerns which invariably surface whenever plans for a massive
invitation of Chinese workforce into Russia are discussed. Lastly,
Vietnam is not just an ASEAN member, but a participant in the TPP,
and the specific features of Vietnam’s political regime are not an
obstacle to this.
The situation with the Republic of Korea is different, of course,
but even in that case Russia may discover some potentially favorable
opportunities. First and foremost, Moscow is sincerely interested in the
peace settlement of controversies over North Korea’s nuclear program.
Russia has every reason to demonstrate support for a constructive
dialogue between the two Korean states, because it is a necessary
condition for the implementation of projects for developing transport
and energy infrastructures in the Korean Peninsula. Peaceful unification
of the two Koreas would be consonant with Russia’s strategic interests.
Naturally, it would be preferable to see not some dramatic scenarios,
like the fall of the Berlin Wall, but gradual and steady progress in the
inter-Korean dialogue based on the principle “one country – two
systems.” Moscow has enough reasons to seek a situation in which stilldivided Korea would be its privileged partner in East Asia, similar to
what Germany is in Europe. Also, Korea may counterbalance the
influence of China and Japan somewhat.
However favorable the foreign economic opportunities might be,
Russia’s “turn eastwards” will require resolute internal political action.
The plans for creating a government corporation for the development of
the Russian Far East seem to point to the seriousness of such intentions.
However, it looks like they have already fallen behind the pace of
depletion of the region’s human potential and the scale of external
48
challenges. In the current situation moving the center of political power
to that region may turn the tide of negative trends. Dmitry Medvedev’s
initiative, voiced last year, for doubling the territory of Moscow and
moving political governance structures to a new site would resolve only
some of the Russian capital city’s problems. At the same time the
project will cause further growth in the disproportion between the
central region and the rest of Russia. A decision to move the capital to
the Asian part of the country, or at least to disperse the capital city’s
functions geographically will not only prove that Russia wishes to fit in
with the new configuration of political and military power, but also
herald the beginning of a new political era. Lastly, relocating Russia’s
government center eastwards would let the authorities distance
themselves from such a hotbed of political turbulence as the Moscow
megalopolis.
* * *
Turbulence is characteristic of a situation where long-term
forecasts are not worth a dime. Minor causes may trigger macroprocesses and scenarios that seemed exotic or utterly improbable just
recently, but today are a fact of life. Most global turbulence factors lie
outside Russia, and changing something radically is beyond its leaders’
ability. The economic system of global capitalism has accumulated a
tremendous potential of internal destruction and chaos, and over the
years of the economic crisis that potential has not only eased, but kept
growing. Globalization has put a cap on the territorial expansion of
world capitalism and encouraged it to start temporal expansion, to try to
maintain economic growth and well-being at the expense of the future.
What makes the current crisis particularly dangerous is that this
resource seems to have been exhausted, too. No one knows though
whether all bills will be presented for payment instantly, or several
generations will have to redeem them by installments.
The old U.S.-centered world order has been losing supports one
by one. Moscow may watch this happen with a mixed feeling of
satisfaction and alarm. The reasons for alarm are many, because even
the general outline is still unclear, and, consequently, the period of
49
turbulence will last. Russia is, of course, capable of making its
contribution to the gradual emergence of a new world order, hoping for
a worthy place in it. However, one should not rule out a synergy of
internal destabilization and external turbulence, witnessed many a time
in the past, for instance, in the second half of the 20th century. At this
point one can say with certainty only that no vector of historical
evolution is predetermined.
The above-described options of Russia’s action in the
international arena during Vladimir Putin’s third presidency are based
on the assumption of relatively inertial transformation of the world
order. They rest upon the assumption of moderate turbulence. At the
same time there are no guarantees that in 2012–2018 the world and
Russia will avoid getting into a real storm. The causes may be varied –
an escalation of currency wars, a chain of defaults that nation states
may declare on sovereign debts and, lastly, tensions in the Middle East
growing into a large-scale military conflict. The ineffectiveness of anticrisis measures may add to the temptation to try an unconventional exit
from the crisis through a military shakeup. Many have been writing
about this option and still keep doing so, but the important thing is that
such options have begun to be considered in earnest by the most
authoritative analysts, such as Paul Krugman.
In the years-long saga over Iran’s nuclear program the most
menacing factor is the pace at which tensions have been soaring. This
pace narrows the room for maneuver by politicians making decisions,
and increases the role of random factors which can result in the total
loss of control. This pace brings to mind the way tensions grew over the
Balkans in the period from the Bosnian crisis in 1908 up to the fatal
shot in Sarajevo. Fortunately, in contrast to the events of a hundred
years ago the current situation still gives enough reasons to believe that
Russia will be able to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. But it
will be unable to stay aloof altogether, either, because the economic
effects of the military cataclysm will be global. Consequently, the hope
for a relatively smooth and soft transformation of the world order will
be shattered.
The good news is that turbulence does not mean that this or that
scenario is predetermined. The combinations of factors increasing the
likelihood of a military scenario are transient. A minor push may
50
trigger a chain reaction of decisions and actions that will make a
conflict inevitable. But it is likewise possible that a “war-inducing”
combination of factors will begin to be eroded, too, while the trends
enabling one to edge back from the fatal line will be gaining strength.
However, those responsible for planning and political decisionmaking in a turbulent environment must take into account the
possibility of the worst-case scenario. There is not enough certainty that
political planning in Russia is done at the appropriate level. There is
still less certainty that the country will remain strong enough to stand
the gusts of the storm during Putin’s third presidency. The much
needed reforms of the political system, although creating extra
problems when being implemented, can contribute to greater
resistibility to external challenges in the long-term. Such reforms do not
guarantee Moscow’s success in foreign policy, but they will certainly
ease the risks stemming from internal political polarization.
51
LIFE AFTER VILNIUS.
A New Geopolitical Configuration for Ukraine1
(2013)
A political anniversary passed largely unnoticed on 12 September
2013: fifty years ago on that date Turkey and the European Economic
Community signed an association agreement. Although it might be a
good time to look back on what has been achieved since then and make
plans for the future, Turkish politicians have largely ignored the
anniversary. And for good reason! While the association agreement
resulted in tangible economic benefits for Turkey, in the political sense
it doomed that ambitious country to 50 years of humiliating uncertainty
in the antechamber of a unifying Europe. Today Ukraine, another large
country, is impatiently waiting to be let into that antechamber. But no
political analyst in his right mind will state that Ukraine will not have to
wait longer than Turkey for full-fledged European Union membership.
And still, the agreement of association between Ukraine and the
EU, scheduled to be signed on 28 November 2013 in Vilnius,
Lithuania, will be a landmark in the history of post-Soviet countries.
The agreement envisages the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The event as such will not bring
about instant economic or institutional transformation; on the contrary,
Ukrainians will either notice that everyday life has improved slightly or
has gotten worse. However, in the geopolitical sense, Ukraine will enter
1
Source: Yefremenko D. Life after Vilnius. A New Geopolitical Configuration
for Ukraine // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2013. – Vol. 11, N 3. – P. 47–61.
52
a new orbit and by zero sum game logic, to which Russia and the West
have in fact returned, this will be seen as a strategic loss for Russia.
What Should Russia Do?
The Vilnius agreement will likely have a greater impact on how
the Russian political elite and society view the world rather than on
Russia’s immediate interests. However, this is not the end of the world!
The emergence of a new, unfavorable geopolitical configuration will
force the Russian leadership to choose from a variety of options,
depending on strategic targets. In the most abstract terms, this choice
will be limited to returning Ukraine to the former geopolitical orbit or
fundamentally revise the rules of the game in relations between Russia
and the EU.
Will Ukraine turn towards Russia after Vilnius? Statements about
the “irreversible European choice” are better left for Ukraine’s
domestic political use. After all, the point at hand is the scale of
material, political, diplomatic, information, and other resources Russia
might be prepared to employ to influence Ukrainian elites and public
opinion. For the past few months a great deal has been said about
Ukraine’s annual economic benefits from joining the Customs Union,
which will range from $6-12 billion. These benefits could be achieved
through a drastic reduction in the price of Russian gas, the lifting of
export duties on petroleum products, and the creation of a preferential
regime for the supply of Ukrainian food products. Moreover, Ukraine
will be entitled to compensation with its transition to the Customs
Union’s unified customs tariff. Undoubtedly, the brunt of this burden
will be placed on the Russian taxpayer during the first phase of
Ukraine’s geopolitical membership in the Customs Union. Yet all of
this was not enough to persuade Ukraine not to sign the DCFTA or to
join the Customs Union. No doubt the stakes will increase after the
agreement on association and free trade takes effect between Ukraine
and the European Union. With a sluggish Russian economy, relatively
high oil prices, and renewed growth in Western economies, geopolitical
expectations will serve as an excuse for such a financial burden. Russia
has no guarantees that such a strategy will be successful, because
53
relations between Russia and a united Europe could become
confrontational within the framework of that scenario.
The alternative looks very hypothetical at this point. It concerns
fundamental changes in relations between Russia and the European
Union, and Ukraine’s integration into this system of relations as a fullfledged participant. The key to this strategy should be based on
recognizing Ukraine as a key factor in Russian-European interaction
and devising an inclusive approach to Kiev. Clearly, this condition
alone will be very hard for the Russian leaders to accept. However, the
political and institutional incompatibility of modern Russia and EU
countries is a much harder obstacle to overcome on the road towards a
strategy of mutual benefit. Harmonizing the diverse interests of
countries with similar political regimes is one thing, but doing the same
in relation to countries whose political institutions, norms, and practices
are moving in the opposite directions is something very different. Over
the past eighteen months this discrepancy has acquired a new quality
and has considerably narrowed the maneuvering room in Russian
foreign policy towards the West. Even Russia’s recent diplomatic
success on the Syrian issue merely emphasizes this. It looks like the
European Union and the U.S. will take extra efforts to ensure that
Russia’s triumph in Geneva is counterbalanced by a geopolitical
knockdown in Vilnius.
Political transformations are not a guarantee that Russia,
Ukraine, and the European Union will achieve a strategic partnership.
What is of decisive importance for Russia’s future is a real division of
power and reconciling the institution of the presidency with the system.
Additionally, the Russian government needs to separate the state from
property, ensure genuine free and fair elections, promote a new
generation of political leaders, and replace the old political and
economic elites with new people. These changes, however, will at least
create the possibility of conducting a dialogue in a common language
and enable all participants to understand that a policy that guarantees
joint gains is far more preferable. Apparently, none of these strategies
can be implemented in full within months or years after the agreement
is signed in Vilnius. Under one scenario, the economy will be the
stumbling block; under another, the logic by which the Russian political
regime operates will cause problems. Nevertheless, even if Russia does
54
not take any harsh, emotional steps in retaliation for Ukraine’s joining
of the DCFTA, a number of quality changes in Russian policy towards
Ukraine will manifest themselves before long. Firstly, Russia will have
to take protective measures when trade barriers between Ukraine and
the European Union are removed. It is important that these measures
agree with the principle of reasonable sufficiency and not look like
simple revenge. After the Vilnius conference, there will be no reason to
preserve the preferred trading and economic relations that Ukraine
enjoys, which Russia introduced with a view to that country’s future
full-fledged participation in Russia-centered integration projects. At the
same time, a wrong decision could follow that would curtail programs
for inter-regional cooperation, which would hit primarily the residents
of the Crimea and Ukraine’s eastern and southern regions, many of
which are still pressing for a special relationship with Russia. It would
make more sense to expand such programs.
Russia will make a serious mistake if it closes its labor market to
Ukrainian workers. Soaring social tensions over the problems of labor
migration are certainly not caused by Ukrainian guest workers looking
for jobs in Russia. On the contrary, job qualifications, knowledge of the
Russian language, and cultural similarities should, in theory, make
Ukrainian migrants welcome guests in Russia. The economic problems
Ukraine will face after it signs the association agreement with the EU
might fuel an influx of labor migrants to Russia. If that happens, those
workers should not be sent back to Ukraine.
The launch of a major student grant program to attract thousands
of students from southern and eastern regions in Ukraine to Russian
universities could be one of the asymmetric responses to Ukraine’s
geopolitical reorientation. The size of the grants should be competitive
with those under similar EU programs. This student program might
help form a youth cohort of campaigners who want to prioritize
developing relations with Russia. Also, it might spell tangible benefits
for participating universities in Russia. It is reasonable to offer
university graduates involved in this program a wide variety of
opportunities, envisaging not only their return to Ukraine, but also
various options of further employment in Russia.
Of special note is Ukraine’s hypothetical presence in two free
trade zones after the DCFTA becomes effective; that of the CIS and the
55
European Union. Although not unique in the global economy, this
situation is unprecedented in post-Soviet space. All the effects of
Ukraine serving as a link between the two free trade zones are hardly
possible to assess at this point, although Russian officials prefer to
focus on the negative aspects. It cannot be ruled out that the worst
damage will stem not from the transit flow of European goods across
Ukraine to the Russian market, but from preventive measures Russia
might take and retaliatory measures by Ukraine and the European
Union. In any case, this kind of situation will not last long. Ukraine
may try to derive political gains from its special position and to propose
some trilateral mechanism to regulate trading relations, which, once
operational, might change into a discussion to consider the idea of
creating a free trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Brussels will
hardly dismiss this idea offhand, because (1) European exporters will
benefit the most from the liberalization of mutual trade, and (2)
Russia’s participation in trilateral negotiations would be tantamount to
actual recognition of the geopolitical transformation that is about to
take place. Russia will likely face a dilemma. If the trilateral dialogue
concept implies only a discussion of free trade zone issues, then the
Russian leadership will most probably prefer to avoid such talks.
If Russia is eager and able to propose a wider agenda, then it is
precisely this format that will help steer Russian-EU relations out of
profound stagnation.
Events could also develop quite differently. Refusing to hold a
trilateral dialogue and escalating protective trading measures will in
fact push Ukraine out of the CIS free trade zone. This process will not
be smooth and in all likelihood will end the CIS era. Strictly speaking,
the whole process was triggered nearly a decade ago with the series of
‘color revolutions’ in a number of post-Soviet countries. The possibility
that some CIS countries may conclude association agreements with the
EU played the role of a catalyst, for Russia followed in the EU’s
footsteps to make those countries face a clear ‘either-or’ choice.
Armenia’s difficult decision to give up the idea of rapprochement with
the European Union and its declared intention to join the Customs
Union is a clear indication that the geopolitical polarization of postSoviet space is becoming more intensive. If Russia decides to push
Ukraine out of the CIS free trade zone after that country signs the
56
association agreement, then, as a result, practically all of the postSoviet space will be split into two unequal sectors, except for
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. One of them will be economically tied
to the European Union, and the other to the Customs Union of Russia,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
This polarization of post-Soviet space will result in divisive
consequences for the Customs Union, which may see a steady extensive
growth trend for two or three years in the future. The risks of the
Customs Union’s hasty expansion have been grossly underestimated so
far. The Customs Union’s quick start raised the hope initially that it
would be the first successful integration project in the post-Soviet era.
However, initial positive effects from the emergence of the Common
Economic Space and the common customs territory of Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan gave way to what is sometimes called ‘the growth
crisis’ and of gradually increasing internal tensions between the
association’s members. A growth crisis is a natural phenomenon, but in
the Customs Union’s case, the specifics of the personality-dependent
regimes of the member-states and related excesses, like the
‘Baumgertner affair,’ turned out to be an additional burden.
Nevertheless, joint efforts to resolve disagreements and to unify
domestic legislation strengthen the Custom Union’s institutional base.
Also, coordinating strategic goals could give a fresh impetus to the
process of integration. A shift in focus to co-opting several new
countries would considerably complicate efforts to achieve the main
target of the upcoming months – getting the Eurasian Economic Union
up and running by the beginning of 2015. In particular, the efficiency of
the Eurasian Economic Commission, whose decisions are consensusbased, may decrease considerably with the admission of new memberstates into the Customs Union. Some kind of intermediate participation
format might work as a pragmatic alternative to the Custom Union’s
rapid expansion; for instance, agreements of association or privileged
partnership. However, in the context of growing geopolitical
competition, the most likely choice will be in favor of expanding the
list of full-fledged Custom Union members, which will hurt its
effectiveness.
57
The European Abduction of Ukraine
Among the series of events leading up to the Vilnius summit, 8
November 2011 is a key date. On that day the Nord Stream pipeline
started transporting gas to Western Europe to dramatically ease
Russia’s dependence on Ukraine as the main transit country for Russian
fuel. It might seem that the Putin-Schroeder policy of establishing an
exclusive energy partnership between Russia and Germany triumphed
in spite of all the obstacles, which would give the two countries an even
greater political edge in post-Soviet space and in the European Union
respectively. In addition to Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and other
countries transiting Russian gas have also lost previous political and
economic advantages. Yet on the very same day German foreign
minister Guido Westerwelle and his Polish counterpart Radoslaw
Sikorski (the latter had compared the Nord Stream project to the
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact shortly before that) stated that Germany and
Poland had agreed on a joint policy towards Russia. It turned out that
the statement was not just a token compensation addressed to Poland.
The Westerwelle-Sikorski message heralded a new distribution of the
‘spheres of responsibility’ between Germany and Poland. In fact,
Poland hinted that it was prepared to recognize Germany’s leadership
in the further reforming of the European Union. For its part, Germany
agreed with Poland’s critical attitude towards Russian foreign and
domestic policies. While remaining focused on EU institutional and
economic problems, avoiding excessive involvement in post-Soviet
affairs, and reconciling itself with the gradual stagnation of GermanRussian relations, Germany gave Poland and its backers in the Baltics
and the Visegrad Group of countries a greater say in formulating the
EU’s eastern policies.
The European Union’s eastern policies have begun to look
increasingly Jagiellonian. Leaving aside the specifics of purely intraPolish political and ideological rifts from many centuries ago, the term
Jagiellonian can be applied to coordinated efforts by the elites of
Central European and Eastern European countries based on resistance
to a foreign presence, i.e. Russia. Historically, those countries were
once either part of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania (later the Polish Rzeczpospolita), or at least were adjacent to
58
the vast area between the Baltic Sea and Black Sea. In the modern
context, the Jagiellonian policy boils down to an attempt to pull several
countries out of the ‘grey geopolitical zone,’ where they have been
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The policy is targeted at
cementing those countries’ political and economic attachments to the
European Union, as well as preventing their participation in integration
projects that may constitute alternatives to the EU.
The latest phase of Jagiellonian policies towards Ukraine began
in an adverse environment. Amid the global financial crisis, the
European Union and the U.S. paid less attention to the CIS, while the
Russian foothold in the post-Soviet space grew much stronger. In
Ukraine, the leaders of the Orange Revolution suffered an election
defeat and either disappeared into political oblivion or they were
imprisoned. The very possibility of a dialogue with the new Ukrainian
authorities, which launched the prosecution of former Prime Minister
Yulia Timoshenko and her associates looked very doubtful to many in
the European Union. Nevertheless, the proponents of Jagiellonian
policies continued to build a relationship with President Victor
Yanukovich and his team, for which purpose they skillfully used
mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine. At first, Yanukovich
regarded the unfreezing of dialogue with the European Union as an
opportunity that gave him a better bargaining position in tough
negotiations with Gazprom and Vladimir Putin. However, in the longterm Jagiellonian diplomacy persuaded him that seeking an agreement
of association with the European Union might be an alternative for him
and his inner circle.
With the European integration project in crisis, EU institutions
are in dire need of fresh evidence of their own attractiveness and
political success. This is one of the major reasons why the EU’s eastern
policies have turned Jagiellonian. Dragging Ukraine into the EU realm
of economic and political influence may prove successful and receive a
great deal of publicity, but at the same time will not require European
taxpayers to bear any considerable additional costs. Moreover, the
opening of Ukraine’s vast market will surely benefit the export-oriented
economies of the EU, especially the German economy. At the same
time, the association format means that Ukraine will not receive
59
financial subsidies from Brussels, which are only available to full EU
members.
Ever since Russia and the U.S. failed to reset relations following
Putin’s return to the Kremlin, Jagiellonian policies towards Ukraine
have relied on growing support from the U.S. At the same time,
negotiations between the U.S. and the EU to create a trans-Atlantic free
trade and investment area may explain to a great extent the U.S.’s
interest in Ukraine. If this global project is successful, Ukraine will be a
free bonus complementing the unification of the two largest global
economies.
What are the chances that the EU’s eastern policy will follow the
Jagiellonian course after the Vilnius summit? Much will depend on
changes the European integration model will undergo in the course of
its internal restructuring and, as a result, the creation of a free trade
zone with the U.S. It is most likely that key EU countries will return to
the Jagiellonian policy. Indeed, Belarus and Transnistria have good
chances to come into the focus of Jagiellonian policies after Ukraine. In
both cases the conflict potential may turn out to be blown out of
proportion. In all likelihood the costs of such Jagiellonian policies in
post-Soviet space will look unreasonably high to leading EU countries.
If this happens, Germany and France will find it far more convenient to
return to a dialogue with a geopolitically weakened Russia than to try to
drive it into a corner. At the same time, Jagiellonian connotations in the
EU’s eastern policies will not likely disappear altogether.
The Morning After…
Nothing special will happen the morning after the association
agreement is signed between Ukraine and the European Union. A large
share of Ukraine’s political establishment will celebrate Europe’s
triumph and get ready for a new round of Ukraine’s traditional internal
political struggle that pits everyone against each other. The Western
press will not miss a chance to declare a geopolitical defeat of Putin’s
Russia. The Russian media will report on Ukraine’s loss of real
sovereignty and the gloomy prospects for the Ukrainian economy.
However, several serious problems will surface before the ratification
60
of the Vilnius agreement. Russia will most likely reduce its direct
investment in Ukraine, and Russian financial institutions will curtail
their lending programs to the Ukrainian economy. Possible exceptions
will include programs that are the most sensitive for major Russian
economic players who cooperate closely with Ukrainian industries.
In a situation like this, the risks will soar for a Ukrainian
economic default. A possible default could be prevented through a
politically motivated easing of terms for Ukrainian access to IMF loans.
At the same time, it is very unlikely that the European Union will rush
to grant direct subsidies to the Ukrainian economy even after the
DCFTA comes into force. The first months and years of the DCFTA’s
operation will see Ukrainian goods phased out of the domestic market by
lower-priced goods of better quality from EU countries. These tendencies
will increase with the transition to EU technical standards, a key DCFTA
requirement. The simultaneous introduction of protectionist measures
in Customs Union countries will bring many Ukrainian enterprises, and
even whole industries, to the brink of collapse. The crisis may peak in
2015 and coincide with the Ukrainian presidential election.
There is a sense that Victor Yanukovich and his citadel in
parliament – the Party of Regions – are about to launch a very risky
game, if not commit political suicide, by betting on the agreement of
association. The current political consensus for closer relations with the
EU will disappear the moment the ink is dry on the Vilnius Agreement.
Subsequently, the entire responsibility for the economic turmoil will be
placed squarely on Yanukovich and his team. The electorate, on which
Yanukovich and his Party of Regions currently rely, will be split.
The Yanukovich case is extremely important to understanding
the behavior and further evolution of post-Soviet political elites.
Earlier, Moldova’s former president, Vladimir Voronin, followed the
same path. Pro-Russian slogans propelled him to power, but when he was
half a step away from the Moscow-proposed Transdniestrian conflict
settlement plan, he made a U-turn under Western pressure. After he was
elected president in February 2010, Yanukovich took some resolute steps
to mend relations with Moscow. He and then Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev concluded the Kharkov accord to extend the presence of
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for 25 years and introduce a
thirty-percent discount on the price of Russian gas. However, both the
61
Kharkov Accords and the Ukrainian parliament’s adoption of a special
law on Ukraine’s non-bloc status indicated that the Yanukovich team
was eager to get back to the traditional Ukrainian policy of balancing
between Russia and the West. At that moment Russia must have
misjudged the motives of the new Ukrainian authorities and the
opportunities to put pressure on them. At first, the Russian negotiators
employed all the tactical and strategic arguments available while
negotiating the future of the Ukrainian pipeline system; later they relied
on a wider range of issues in Russian-Ukrainian relations. The most
influential oligarchic groups, one of which is represented by
Yanukovich, interpreted such pressures as a major threat to their longterm business interests. Although in domestic policies the Ukrainian
authorities used the tactics of their Russian counterparts quite
successfully in fighting their political opponents, in foreign policy
Ukraine started drifting towards Brussels again.
Ukraine’s entry into a new geopolitical orbit will certainly propel
Yanukovich into a position with which Western political quarters will
be prepared to negotiate. Yet that does not mean the West will give him
a free hand in building up his potential inside of the country using the
very same methods he has resorted to so far. The reverse is more likely:
not a single major abuse of administrative resources will remain
unnoticed in European capitals. Brussels will demand that Yanukovich
hold free elections and nobody will be upset if he loses.
Will Yanukovich lose the votes of those Ukrainians who still view
Russia favorably? Most likely, the euphoria over the EU agreement will
disappear soon, resulting in a great deal of disillusionment over the Eurointegrationist rhetoric, especially in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Moreover, a split could also occur in the Party of Regions, where certain
tensions are already intensifying after the presidential team deviated from
the eastern integration vector. However, this does not mean that some
new political force will appear before the 2015 presidential election and
new leaders will gain power capable of uniting those Ukrainians unhappy
with the country’s geopolitical reorientation. Victor Medvedchuk and his
movement Ukrainian Choice are not convincing contenders for this role.
As for the Communists, they will have somewhat better election
prospects, but will still be unable to bring about any qualitative
restructuring of Ukrainian politics. Apparently, after the Vilnius
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agreement is signed, Yanukovich will make several conciliatory
statements regarding Russia. They will be addressed not so much to Putin
or the Russian public, but to his own voters. Russia will not react
positively. Yet these statements may prove to have something more than
trivial political maneuvering behind them. There have been certain signs
of an emerging new political and ideological phenomenon, which could
be called ‘East Ukrainian Europeanism.’ In contrast to Ukrainian ethnic
nationalism, of which western Ukraine is the stronghold, East Ukrainian
Europeanism wants to create a political nation that unites all citizens
irrespective of language, religion, or ethnic affiliation on the platform of
sovereignty and with the strategic goal of Ukrainian admission to the EU
in combination with exclusive relations with Russia. In that formula the
European vector means: (1) receiving foreign guarantees of state
independence; (2) a determination to enhance the positions of
Ukrainian financial and industrial groups in relations with partners in
the East; and (3) consent to institutional transformations in accordance
with EU recommendations. At the same time, an exclusive relationship
with Russia must be a mandatory part of that formula, because only this
sort of relationship may give Ukraine extra political arguments in all
interactions with Brussels. Ukraine will never get additional arguments
if it is used as part of an anti-Russian ‘sanitary cordon’ after the EU
agreement.
Under the Jagiellonian scenario, Ukraine will likely act as a
policy instrument in the hands of its neighbors in the West. In other
words, the super-task of East Ukrainian Europeanism should be the
creation of a triple-tier model of strategic partnership, in which Ukraine
will act as the main link between Russia and the EU.
Russia still has too few politicians who are prepared to regard the
advocates of East Ukrainian Europeanism as reliable partners. As long
as Yanukovich is the main speaker for East Ukrainian Europeanism, the
level of trust towards these ideas and related initiatives will remain
minimal. If calls to join the Customs Union increase in eastern Ukraine,
those in Russia will gain strength who want to take a harder line
towards the current Ukrainian authorities. They would prefer to see
Yanukovich lose, even if he is defeated not by proponents of
integration with Russia, but by representatives of nationalist or antiRussian forces.
63
* * *
Neither a miracle nor a tragedy will take place in Vilnius, but the
effects will be serious. Ukraine will experiment on itself and all the
other countries in the post-Soviet space are looking forward to
watching how it ends. Whether the ensuing economic or institutional
changes over rapprochement with the EU appear tangible and positive
will determine Russia’s own conduct and the conduct of countries that
still rely on it.
Association with the European Union will provide Ukraine with
no guarantees of being plugged into this major international project,
which still has to prove its viability in the context of the turbulent
twenty-first century world. Naturally, the Ukrainian authorities will be
quick to declare their intention to acquire full-fledged membership in
the EU and, possibly, some confirmation of the seriousness of these
intentions may still come to light under Yanukovich. But then Ukraine
will approach a threshold where, for the sake of a “bright European
future,” it will have to take action to change the very nature and mode
of operation of its state machinery and social institutions. It is not
certain that the post-Soviet Ukrainian elite will be able and eager to
step across that border.
The most important task for the Ukrainian authorities is to
preserve the country’s importance and its existence as a political entity.
In future, Ukrainian leaders will be confronted with powerful pressures
from internal and external forces that would like to see Ukraine
abandon its neutral status and join Jagiellonian policies. Along with
this, the advocates of Ukraine’s non-bloc status will bolster their unity.
In the context of this confrontation, East Ukrainian Europeanism may
be the political course that at least will ease the heated internal debates
and force external players to take Ukraine’s special opinion into
consideration.
The struggle for Ukraine’s geopolitical choice unfolded in strict
conformity with zero sum game logic. For the current Russian political
regime, this logic is organic. It serves as a natural extension of the
golden rule of totalitarian domination: “For my friends, everything; for
everyone else, the law.” But the European Union, which in fact
inherited the Jagiellonian vision of the Russian Federation as a
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half-ruined, revenge-driven empire, also follows zero sum game logic
and acts in an imperial way. Even though many Europeans, Ukrainians,
and Russians are prepared to see the EU as a collective ‘good empire,’
this will not change the very essence of imperial rivalry and related
long-term consequences for Europe and Eurasia.
The European Union, Ukraine, and Russia could pool efforts
after the Vilnius summit in an attempt to devise a fundamentally new
format of trilateral cooperation based on the logic of mutual benefit, but
the chances for this are very slim. Probably, EU leaders will try to
avoid further escalation of geopolitical rivalry in the post-Soviet space,
but that does not mean any of them will be prepared to exert great
efforts to harmonize relations with Russia before the future of the
European integration project has been clarified. In all probability,
everything will come down to closer monitoring of what Russia’s
strategic response to the Vilnius summit will be and how this
geopolitical weakening will influence internal political processes in
Russia.
The Russian leadership is facing a limited number of choices,
and the options still available depend on costs and risks. As for Russian
society, the EU agreement may serve as a bitter lesson that brings
Russians closer to realizing that the political system and economic
policy must undergo fundamental reform. After Vilnius, life will go on,
including in Russia, but it will be life in anticipation of change.
65
CROSSING RED LINES.
Russia Takes the Lead in Revising the World Order1
(2014)
Minor causes may have major consequences. A hundred years
ago a terrorist act masterminded by a small group of Serbian
nationalists set in motion a chain reaction that eventually led to a world
war and the collapse of several empires. In our days, a short Facebook
message calling on likeminded people to gather in Kiev’s central square
led to a crisis that shook Europe and dramatically expedited changes in
the existing world order. The Ukrainian crisis is at its apex and is likely
to cause much more trouble. The national democratic revolution and the
breakout of an armed conflict in the east of Ukraine can hardly be
classified as anything else but a tragedy of the country that was brought
into independent existence by the emergence and subsequent
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Russia’s active role in this crisis
also stems from our common past, but not only the past. A future where
Russia and Ukraine stand apart and participate in different integration
projects and military-political alliances appeared to be unacceptable to
too many people in Moscow. The crisis prodded the Kremlin into
taking steps that can be regarded as a desperate attempt to defend its
crucial geopolitical position and as a determination to break out of the
world order’s “red lines” within which Russia is doomed to constantly
be a Cold War loser.
1
Source: Yefremenko D. Crossing Red Lines. Russia Takes Lead in Revising
the World Order // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2014. – Vol. 12, N 3, – P. 34–47.
66
The Putin Factor
The Ukrainian crisis certainly has objective causes which
include, among others, the lingering inertia after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, ticking time bombs in relations among post-Soviet
countries, planted back in Soviet times, and post-bipolar world realities.
But the personality factor has also become extremely important.
Russian President Vladimir Putin played a crucial role at some points
during the crisis. Back in 2004, he regarded the “orange revolution” in
Ukraine as a geopolitical challenge and a model for destabilizing the
political regime, which, under certain conditions, if they were allowed
to form, could be transferred to Russia as well. The subsequent events –
the Russian-Ukrainian “gas wars,” the rifts among the Maidan leaders,
their political fiasco, Victor Yanukovich’s fatal policy of trying to
balance between the European and Eurasian integration projects, and
finally the second Maidan – clearly showed that Ukraine was to be one
of the most crucial political battles Putin had to fight. Ukraine had
never been as important for any other external actors concerned. This
was why the Russian president’s decision to move from the drawn-out
trench war to active steps came as a surprise. And yet, Putin’s policy
with respect to Ukraine should be regarded as nothing else but an active
counterplay and his readiness to reverse the negative trend by
employing all available resources and taking unexpected moves.
At the same time, one should exercise great caution when
hearing that the Russian president’s actions are predetermined and stem
from the underlying logic of his efforts to get a firmer authoritarian grip
or live up to the demands of a large number of great-power-minded
people stupefied by the aggressive anti-Western propaganda. On closer
scrutiny, Putin’s political moves taken during his third presidential term
reveal a much more sophisticated picture showing not only his
determination to defend more firmly Russia’s geopolitical interests, as
they are understood by the Kremlin, but also to resume a constructive
dialogue with the West. At any rate, this is borne out by the release of
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and, even more so, by the efforts to create a
positive image of Russia as the host of the 22nd Olympic Winter
Games which were so important for Putin. This is why the change of
power in Kiev brought about a very painful reaction. For one thing, the
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triumph of the major sport event was overshadowed by the
Euromaidan’s triumph; for another thing, the Russian leadership’s
hands were tightly tied. It seemed that after the brilliant Olympic
Games closing ceremony the Kremlin had no choice but to recognize
the new authorities in Ukraine. At least, this is what the Russian
leadership was prompted to do by the United States and the European
Union which, however, made no promises that Ukraine would take into
account Russia’s interests. During those days the reformatted majority
in the Verkhovna Rada and the interim government in Kiev were
working in frenzy, making one decision after another which called into
question Ukrainian statehood as such. These decisions included an
attempt to cancel the Kolesnikov-Kivalov language law and the
disbandment of the Berkut special police force. They could have been
followed by a revision of Ukraine’s non-bloc status and the Kharkov
Agreement.
Putin’s decision in favor of reunification with Crimea was
undoubtedly provoked by the coup in Kiev and expectations of its
dreadful geopolitical consequences. But it would be superficial to
assess this decision as spontaneous. On the contrary, all the previous
years of Putin’s presidency can be regarded as preparations for crossing
the Crimean Rubicon. At least, the time between his two most
prominent foreign policy statements – the speech at the Munich
Security Conference on February 10, 2007 and his almost confessional
Crimean speech on March 18, 2014 – was a period of final
disappointment at the impossibility to build equal partnerships with the
United States and the European Union. As this disappointment
deepened, he grew more and more convinced of an impending crisis in
relations with the West, with Ukraine being its most probable center.
However, open confrontation was expected not earlier than 2015 when
the next presidential elections were to be held in Ukraine. Obviously,
not only the Kremlin but also the West, the previous Ukrainian
authorities and their opponents were preparing for this event as a
crucial battle. But Kiev-based journalist Mustafa Nayyem’s post on
social networks, in which he urged the supporters of Ukraine’s proEuropean choice to come to the Maidan, messed everything up.
The subsequent uncontrolled developments in Ukraine looked
like a torrent that no one could divert. Putin dared do it by countering
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the Euromaidan’s will with the will of those who advocated Russian
irredentism. By so doing he took an irreversible step not only in
relations with Ukraine and the United States but also in relations
between the authorities and society inside Russia.
Until recently, the voice of the Russian public in discussions on
relations with Ukraine was not very strong. Calls for maximum
integration between the two countries were broadly supported but their
cooperation was not among issues considered vital by society. The
discussion before the crisis went livelier in the expert community, but
ties between experts and agencies that shaped policies were waning. By
that time, an ultimate degree of centralization had been achieved in
making political decisions on Ukraine and the success of Crimea’s
reunification with Russia was largely owed to such hyper-centralization
and direct control by the head of state.
The reestablishment of Russia’s sovereignty over the Crimean
Peninsula predictably received broad popular support and raised the
president’s popularity rating to an unprecedented height. What until
March used to be Putin’s sole business became a common cause and
responsibility shared by the authorities and society. The rise of
irredentism gave the full legitimacy to Putin’s third term, closing the
chapter of Russia’s modern history associated with political protests in
Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue. The authorities received a
free hand in using the mobilization model of development although
there is no confidence that Russian society, when faced with the
hardships of the “Russian world” mission, will stay as monolithic as it
was during the Crimean euphoria. At the same time, there formed a
strong public demand for all-round support to millions of ethnic
Russians and Russian-speaking people outside the country, about which
Putin spoke in his Crimean speech. The need to live up to this demand
is becoming a factor that may not yet be determining the Russian
foreign policy but that is certainly outlining the limits for compromises
with Ukraine. This demand for solidarity with the “Russian world” may
give rise to new forces and figures that can change the Russian political
landscape in the future.
At the same time, for some political and economic elites in Russia
the return of Crimea became some sort of “white elephant” and they had
nothing else to do but join the “Crimea is ours” jubilation, while carefully
69
hiding their confusion and concerns about their own future. As the March
celebrations marking the reunification with Crimea and Sevastopol
subsided and as the West started imposing sanctions, hidden pressure
from these elites increased and evidently affected the Kremlin’s readiness
to provide direct support to the militia in Donbas.
Putin’s crucial role in the Ukrainian events and the related
disintegration of the world order clearly added an edge to personal
competition among world leaders. This appears to be especially
intriguing in the case of U.S. President Barack Obama who is not
particularly inclined toward excessive personification in state affairs
and world politics. But this should rather be “credited” to the
president’s conservative opponents in America who kept talking about
“a strong Putin” and “a weak Obama”. The understanding by Western
partners of the specifics of the political decision-making process in
Russia is even more significant. Putin’s vertical of power, which he was
preparing for confrontation with the West over the past several years
(the so-called nationalization of elites) proved quite efficient during the
Crimean phase of the Ukrainian crisis. But the Russian personalized
regime has its structural weaknesses which however are made up for by
tight control exercised by the leader. The weakening of his positions
would jeopardize the system of power as a whole. In this context, the
Western sanctions directed against Putin’s closest aides are not as
symbolic as they may seem to be.
There is no doubt that in the foreseeable future Putin will have
the final say in shaping up Russia’s Ukraine policy. But now he will
have to take into account not only the Western pressure and
controversial signals from the Russian elites but also the growing
irredentist attitudes.
Venus and Mars Team Up in Ukraine
Robert Kagan’s well-known metaphor which likened the
belligerent United States to Mars and effeminate Europe to Venus1 is
1
Kagan R. Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World
Order. – New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
70
well applicable to the Ukrainian crisis. The European Union and its
Eastern Partnership policy made a major contribution to the escalation
of the crisis by having embarked for the first time on the hitherto
unexplored path of geopolitical competition. But no European strategy
for the post-Soviet region, which would combine the interests of EU
countries, had essentially been stated. Instead, the European
bureaucracy chose to tread the well-beaten path, preferring to entrust
the task of charting the political course to a group of countries that
claimed to have special experience and knowledge of the region. This
move was justified when the leading role in determining the European
policy for the southern and eastern Mediterranean was played by
France with its colonial experience and broad ties with countries in the
region, with no other powerful geopolitical player standing behind
them. On the contrary, the Eastern Partnership policy, conceived by its
major advocates as a way to force Russia’s influence out of the western
part of the post-Soviet area, inevitably drew the European Union into
geopolitical competition. As a result, no alternative version proposing
long-term economic integration of the EU, Russia and other post-Soviet
countries from the Baltics to the Black Sea, rejecting the zero-sum
game logic and shifting the focus to a mutually beneficial strategy was
seriously considered even by experts.
Raised stakes in the geopolitical standoff often caused confusion
in the EU structures responsible for a common foreign policy. With
Victor Yanukovich refusing to sign the Association and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area Agreement with the EU, with the compromise reached
on February 21 with the mediation of the foreign ministers of Germany,
France and Poland not holding even a day amid the revolution and with
the United States insisting on sectoral sanctions against Russia, the
effectiveness of a common European foreign policy dropped to a level
that was close to paralysis. In those circumstances, self-assured Mars
hurried to disconcerted Venus’ rescue.
With the start of the second Maidan, the United States became
the main opponent of Russia, as it saw the Ukrainian crisis not only as a
threat to European stability but also as an opportunity to breathe a new
life into its own withering global leadership. Up until Russia’s
incorporation of Crimea, the United States was solving mainly regional
tasks, making up for European diplomacy’s weaknesses over and above
71
(its figurative assessment by Robert Kagan’s wife and Assistant
Secretary of State Victoria Nuland made quite an uproar1). The
reestablishment of Russia’s control over Crimea immediately added a
global dimension to the crisis as Moscow’s move indicated a transition
from the erosion of the post-bipolar world to its purposeful revision.
Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea is of exceptional value as a
precedent signifying its refusal to adhere to the world order where rules
are set by the United States. Although the Crimean challenge is not big in
scale and poses no threat to America’s positions in the world, the very
possibility of unauthorized territorial changes is a factor that gauges
Washington’s ability to maintain the order where it has the final say.
From this point of view, active U.S. moves to mobilize allies for
deterring Putin’s Russia appear to be quite predictable. What is
important in this case is not deterrence as such but mobilization which
lends a new meaning to the U.S.-led military-political alliances. The
European Union has to agree to further American military presence in
Europe and, above all, to the creation of significant military
infrastructure in countries that once were members of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization. The division of Europe into “old” and “new”
proposed by then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld a decade
ago came to its logical conclusion during the Ukrainian crisis: with the
active U.S. support “a new” Europe’s positions on energy and military
security issues have become so strong that “the old” Europe’s major
powers have to follow it, at least declaratorily. As regards Russia, “the
new” Europe is turning into a cordon sanitaire that can be reinforced
with Ukraine (at least its central and western regions) and Moldova
(except for Transnistria and presumably Gagauzia). However, the
configuration of “the new” Europe can differ substantially from the one
that existed ten years ago. Poland, the Baltic countries and Romania are
ready to join the cordon sanitaire, but Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and
the Czech Republic are showing much less enthusiasm for different
reasons. Nevertheless, in tandem with “the new” Europe, Washington
can effectively control both security policy in the whole of the
European Union and its efforts to resume dialogue with Russia.
1
Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call // BBC. – 2014. –
February 7. – Mode of access: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
72
It seems that the Obama administration will try to use tensions
around Ukraine in order to solve a more ambitious task of coming as
soon as possible to agreement with the EU on the creation of a transAtlantic trade and investment partnership. The emergence of such a
large economic bloc will signify the creation of a new pillar to shore up
the shaken U.S.-centered world order. The United States is also
stepping up the creation of a similar grouping in the Asia-Pacific region
as a competitor of the “Chinese dragon”.
The purpose of regional and global stratagems used in the
context of the Ukrainian crisis is far from building a decent future for
people in different regions of Ukraine. This country just has had bad
luck to be an arena of the first in a series of battles for the future world
order. And the Ukrainians will be on the losing end of it regardless of
the outcome.
Inevitable Turn to the East
Having decided to lead the way in revising the world order,
Russia has taken the main blows from the United States and its allies.
Such revision can potentially benefit a large number of global and
regional actors that have been watching with sincere interest the
standoff between Russia and the West, with China being the major
beneficiary among them on the way to open confrontation with the
United States in the fight for global leadership. The Ukrainian crisis
will give China a break (possibly for several years) and allow it to
retain its potential for pushing America off the podium as the number
one economy, while avoiding direct confrontation with it. But there is
more to this for Beijing than that.
A new round of Russian-Chinese integration was expected by
many experts since the day when Vladimir Putin made the decision to
return to the Kremlin as president for a third term. Many analysts
warned that overly zealous attempts “to catch the Chinese wind” in the
Russian sails would seriously complicate relations with the United
States and the European Union. A strong lean toward China limits
Russia’s ability to maneuver among key global actors. However,
Putin’s Crimean choice made the use of the previous model of
73
partnership with the United States and the European Union impossible
and necessitated new steps toward China.
With the Ukrainian crisis at its peak, Moscow undoubtedly hoped
to get China’s strong support. And its expectations came true. While
refraining from expressing solidarity with Russia’s actions, Beijing
nonetheless helped to avert its international isolation and largely
alleviated the effects of Western sanctions. The signing of a $400
billion gas contract showed that the Chinese leaders were considering
relations with Russia from a long-term strategic perspective. Beijing
had secured preferential terms of gas supplies but did not “put the
squeeze” on embattled Moscow and gave it a trump card to conduct a
firm energy dialogue with the European Union. As a result, RussianChinese cooperation is entering a phase where, while remaining
neighbors and strategic partners de jure, they are beginning to gravitate
toward the logic of allied relations de facto. And yet this cooperation is
not quite equal as it is and it’s likely to stay that way in the future.
The sanctions imposed by the West upon Russia create good
conditions for cumulative growth of Chinese investments in the Russian
economy. It seems that Moscow will have to lift most of the restrictions
on Chinese investors’ access to Russian assets, which were put in place
for security reasons or for equalizing bilateral economic relations.
If this happens, prospects for the Eurasian Economic Union to be
created from January 1, 2015 will also look differently. This Russia-led
integration project may as well be combined with the New Silk Road
initiative put forth by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Such synergy will
facilitate ambitious infrastructure projects that can substantially simplify
Chinese producers’ access to markets not only in the Eurasian Union but
also in Europe. In a more distant future, sectoral alliances based on
China’s enormous economic potential can be created in North Eurasia.
This would become an impressive antithesis to the idealistic notion of
common economic space “from Lisbon to Vladivostok”, the discussion
of which never developed into anything substantive before the Ukrainian
crisis and the subsequent acute geopolitical confrontation.
In its new paradigm of cooperation Russia will have to prove that
it can provide a reliable rear for China and thus prevent U.S.-oriented
countries from closing in on it. It seems that Russia will even have to
change some of the emphases when assessing the mounting tensions in
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the South China Sea: while last year Moscow showed cautious cordiality
for Hanoi, now it will most likely have to demonstrate its complete
impartiality or understanding for China’s arguments. Likewise, it will be
extremely difficult to keep the balance within the Moscow-TokyoBeijing triangle even despite the demonstrative reluctance with which the
Shinzo Abe government joined in the anti-Russian sanctions initiated by
Barack Obama.
On a global scale, the new quality of Russian-Chinese
cooperation is likely to lead to systematic, albeit cautious, bilateral
steps to dampen the global domination of Washington Consensus
institutions and practices. The gradual replacement of the U.S. dollar in
trade among SCO and BRICS countries, the development and mutual
recognition of their national payment systems, the establishment by the
BRICS countries of their own Development Bank, and the creation by
Russia and China of an international rating agency as a counterbalance
to the big three – Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s – can become
the first signs of global economic restructuring, and Russia may have to
bear the brunt of initial costs incurred by this transition. But one should
not entertain any illusions: there can be an alternative to the
Washington Consensus, but it will be a Beijing Consensus. And yet, in
the long term Russia and other countries that decide to go ahead with
these changes will benefit from the very idea of competition between
the centers of economic power, international financial institutions and
macroeconomic models.
Russia’s post-Crimean turn to China may have a rather
unexpected result with equally significant consequences, namely,
“nationalization” of the Internet. Apart from the similarity of the two
countries’ positions on the role of ICANN and the management of the
Internet, Russia’s determination to create its own analogue of the Great
Firewall can be a kind of revenge of the Westphalian order in the World
Wide Web. The well-known principle cuius regio eius religio (“Whose
realm, his religion”) may be restated in the second decade of the 21st
century as “Whose server, his Internet.”
The Ukrainian crisis made Russia’s turn toward China
unavoidable. But did it make it irreversible? Charles Krauthammer,
who said that Putin had repeated the famous Nixon-Kissinger maneuver
in Shanghai and that a similar geopolitical combination was now
75
directed against the United States1, might as well have been right.
According to Krauthammer, enhanced partnership between Russia and
China “marks the first emergence of a global coalition against
American hegemony since the fall of the Berlin wall”. Obviously, this
coalition will exist until it fulfills at least some of its missions.
Apparently, only the understanding that the loss of dominant positions
is inevitable can make a future American administration take effort
toward restoring relations with Moscow by recognizing, in whatever
form, Russia’s interests in both Ukraine and the whole of the postSoviet area. The problem is that this may happen too late when Russia
becomes heavily dependent on the economic power of China. Besides,
as the policy of reset showed, it’s hard for the U.S. leaders to make
truly attractive offers to Moscow even if this is necessitated by
American interests. Nevertheless, the determination to stay in the
vanguard of efforts for revisiting the world order, while leaning on
nearly allied relations with China, should not mean that Russia will
inevitably give up the search for a new model to keep the balance of
power both globally and in the Asia-Pacific region in particular.
Ukrainian Prospects: Finland? Bosnia? Transnistria?
Although the general outlines of a settlement that could have
resolved the geopolitical confrontation or at least reduced its degree to a
level acceptable to the majority of the parties involved became obvious
nearly on the following day after Yanukovich’s flight, none of the key
actors in the Ukrainian drama has so far dared state his readiness to
make such a compromise. This compromise can well be described by
the term “Finlandization”, which Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed as the
best solution shortly after the start of the crisis2 and Henry Kissinger
1
Krauthammer C. Who Made the Pivot to Asia? Putin // The Washington Post. –
2014. – May 22. – Mode of access: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charleskrauthammer-who-made-the-pivot-to-asia-putin/2014/05/22/091a48ee-e1e3-11e3-9743bb9b59cde7b9_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.71bde7808cc0
2
Brzezinski Z. Russia Needs a “Finland Option” for Ukraine // The Financial
Times. – 2014. –February 23. – Mode of access: https://www.ft.com/content/e855408c9bf6-11e3-afe3-00144feab7de
76
prior to Crimea’s accession to Russia1. “Finlandization”, as they
interpreted it, would have meant respectful good-neighborly relations,
Ukraine’s non-participation in military alliances and active
development of economic cooperation with both the European Union
and Russia. Russia was supposed to recognize the changes and give up
all claims on any part of Ukraine’s territory and attempts to destabilize
the new government in Kiev. As an additional bonus to Moscow they
proposed large-scale cooperation with the EU.
In principle, “Finlandization” of Ukraine is what could have
happened if the European leaders had not insisted on unconditional
signing by Ukraine of the Association and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area Agreement in Vilnius but would have heeded Moscow’s call to
find a mutually acceptable solution in trilateral talks. In this case Russia
would not have felt isolated due to the neighboring country’s joining an
alternative integration project, and Ukraine, making full use of the
benefits offered by exclusive relations with Russia, would have kept
drifting toward the European Union but slower. One way or another,
“Finlandization” means that Ukraine will gradually break away from
the “Russian World”.
Immediately after the triumph of the Euromaidan, “Finlandization”
appeared to be a less attractive option for both Yanukovich’s opponents
who had come to power and for the Kremlin. For the former, the very
possibility of recognizing Moscow’s certain special interest in Ukraine,
even partially, was unacceptable and contrary to the revolutionary
mandate. For the Kremlin, “Finlandization” would have meant that it had
to admit another fait accompli and accept not only the need to work with a
new unfriendly government but also the forcible change of the extremely
corrupt, although legitimate, regime.
Russia’s solution to the crisis in Ukraine provided for the latter’s
non-bloc status, federalization and constitutional guarantees for the use
of the Russian language. Objectively, federalization does not run
counter to the liberal and democratic development of Ukraine (i.e. the
ideals declared by the Euromaidan). Moreover, it facilitates it through
1
Kissinger H. To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End // The Washington
Post. – 2014. – March 5. – Mode of access: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a49611e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html?utm_term=.a0d69b164f70
77
interaction between the central authorities and regions. However,
federalization raises a barrier against ethnic nationalism by encouraging
constitutional guarantees for the rights and balanced interests of
different territorial communities, ethnic and language groups. And this
is clearly at odds with the radical nationalistic principles that dominated
the Euromaidan program before the dismantlement of the Yanukovich
regime.
The transformation of Ukraine into a federative state where
regions can influence decisions on accession to economic associations
or military-political alliances could provide an additional constitutional
guarantee of its non-bloc status. Such radical redistribution of powers
between Kiev and Ukrainian regions is essentially compatible with
“Finlandization” but means that external actors would be able to realize
their interests not only by working with the central authorities but also
by influencing regional political and economic elites.
Crimea’s accession to Russia and the adamant refusal by Kiev
and the West to recognize the legitimacy of this move led Ukraine to a
situation similar to that Georgia has been in since 2008 as a country
with an unresolved territorial dispute with its neighbor. Membership in
NATO becomes a hypothetical possibility for such a country. And in
this respect, constitutional guarantees of its non-bloc status would turn
into an architectural extravagance, into some sort of superstructure
above the harsh reality of the state where a revolutionary coup has
created a vacuum of legitimate power and the risk of losing territorial
integrity. But at the same time, such a formally non-bloc country, if it
stays as a unitary state, will be able to consolidate itself through radical
rejection of all things associated with Moscow. While in the first
23 years of its independent existence the country was falteringly
developing under the “Ukraine is not Russia” motto, now its slogan will
change to “Ukraine is anti-Russia”. If anti-Russianness becomes a
nation-building idea, even federalization will most likely be unable to
make much change there. It may at best enfeeble or slow it down.
The inevitability of long-term Russian-Ukrainian resentment and
the real risk of secession of several south-eastern regions from Ukraine
necessitate the search for a new formula of compromises modeled not
on Cold War-era Finland but on the Bosnia and Herzegovina
experience after the Dayton Agreement of 1995. Like Bosnia, Ukraine
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could use the mechanism of confederation in order to extinguish the
conflict by minimizing the powers of the central authorities and giving
broad autonomy to regions, including in relations with the neighboring
states. However, under the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s entities may not secede from it even though they are
connected much more loosely with each other than one of them is with
Serbia and the other with Croatia. The advantage of the Dayton model
for Moscow could be that by giving a special status to Donbas and
legalizing its pro-Russian positioning (this may apply to other regions
in the south-east of Ukraine as well), it will dramatically limit a
“Bosnianized” Ukraine’s legal capacity as an international actor.
Practically all efforts of the Ukrainian state, stabilized by the Dayton
model, will be directed toward maintaining internal balance between its
regions. At the same time, the use of the Dayton formula in Ukraine
may not only give it relevant internal stability but in the medium term
can also create better conditions for economic growth than a
unidirectional commitment to the European Union.
However, one should not forget that the Dayton peace deal was
made by the parties to the Bosnian conflict under unprecedented
pressure from the United States which, together with its NATO allies,
used such an argument, among others, as bombings (Operation
Deliberate Force). At the time when this article was being written,
Russia had not used such arguments. It is also obvious that Moscow
alone will not be able to convince Kiev to accept the Dayton model
without cooperation from the United States and the European Union. It
would be much easier for the weak Kiev authorities (which still remain
weak after the election of Petro Poroshenko as president) to continue
the ineffective army operation against the rebels in Donbas than to
recognize their representatives as a full-fledged party to the talks. If the
talks proceed in the absence of one of the sides and if compromises are
based on behind-the-scene agreements between the great powers, the
consensus reached there may be revisited at the first opportunity.
However the sustainability of the Dayton Agreement was based on
thorough preparation of all of its terms and conditions, which left
almost no room for free interpretation (the undecided status of the
strategic District of Brčko was for a long time the only serious
exception).
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Today the Dayton deal seems to be the best solution. However,
Moscow can hardly succeed in persuading Kiev and the West to accept
it under the present circumstances. As a minimum, the positions of the
self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk Republics should be just as
strong as were the positions of the Bosnian Serbs before the Dayton
talks. Unfortunately, the Dayton option can hardly be implemented
without resolving the Transnistrian issue first. But that is a matter of the
price Moscow can and is prepared to pay for the “Transnistrianization”
of Donbas, including the price of new sanctions. However, what makes
President Putin’s upcoming choice so dramatic is that a rejection of the
Transnistrian scenario will also have a significant political, economic
and symbolic price.
* * *
This article was contributed to Russia in Global Affairs during a
brief relaxation of tensions following the inauguration of the new
president of Ukraine and the talks between the key parties to the
conflict which were held during the celebrations in Normandy. The
intensification of international contacts and specifically the meeting
between Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko suggest that the crisis is
becoming too heavy a burden for everyone. The election of oligarch
Poroshenko as the new president of Ukraine three months after the
revolution, which was not only nationalistic but also anti-oligarchic in
nature, indicates that most people are tired of both the revolution and
the confrontation that is tearing their country apart. However, this does
not mean that Poroshenko has been given a mandate for a settlement
that would be acceptable to both Russia and the Donbas rebels.
Poroshenko’s power is not cemented; he has no strong support in the
present Verkhovna Rada and no constitutional powers to appoint key
members of the government. So the former “chocolate king” will focus
on strengthening his positions in the political arena by holding early
parliamentary elections. And yet, there is a long way to go before the
DPR and LPR forces can be declared defeated. However, any serious
compromise between the new president of Ukraine and the separatist
movements in Donbas would pave the way to a third Maidan and a new
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round of destabilization. The crisis has not yet run out of steam and its
temporary lessening may once again be followed by new flare-ups.
The Ukrainian crisis has already had a strong impact on Russia’s
internal policy. The refreshed (Crimean) legitimacy of Vladimir Putin’s
third term can be used for implementing a mobilization scenario, which
will be prompted by the Western sanctions that have already been
imposed and those that are still under discussion. The revival of the
American attempts to push Russia away will not only force the Kremlin
to change its methods of economic management but will also accelerate
the renovation of Russian elites and lead to further curtailment of civil
society freedoms. Modernization in partnership with the West has lost
its relevance for many years to come, leaving mobilization in
partnership with China as the only viable option.
Restoration of Russia’s cooperation with the West and primarily
with EU countries would depend on stabilization, at least partial, in
Ukraine. But the nature of relations will change dramatically anyway.
The EU policy with regard to Moscow, which was based on the
expectations that sooner or later Russia would follow Central and
Eastern European countries along the road of democratic transition, has
come to a dead-end. A new policy should be based on a new perception
similar to Europe’s perception of China. Such a turn would help to
pragmatize and instrumentalize relations between Russia and the
European Union. Discussions on values and civilizational closeness
should be suspended for a while. Instead, priority could be given to the
creation of an effective multilateral mechanism for preventing and
settling crises in Europe and North Eurasia. Such a mechanism will
prove very useful as the post-bipolar world order continues to be
revisited. The Ukrainian crisis is just ushering in a series of conflicts
amid which a polycentric system of international relations will form.
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THE BIRTH OF A GREATER EURASIA.
How the Post-Cold War Era Ends1
(2017)
Nearly twenty-five years separate two symbolic coincidences,
each of which caused tectonic shifts in world politics. On December 8,
1991, a treaty signed in Belovezhye, Belarus, put an end to the Soviet
Union; the following day the leaders of twelve Western European
countries approved the Maastricht Treaty. On June 23, 2016, a majority
of voters in the United Kingdom chose to leave the European Union.
Around the same time India and Pakistan signed memorandums in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to join the conventions of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, thus bringing its membership to almost a
half of the world’s population.
But one must not simplify things. Brexit does not mean Europe’s
decline. And yet it would be wrong to underestimate the importance of
the changes presaging the rise of a Greater Eurasia.
Greater Eurasia: Long-Term Strategies and Self-Organization
When I speak about Greater Eurasia, I mean the fundamental
process of geopolitical and geoeconomic changes in Eurasia and the
adjacent regions of Africa (or maybe even Africa as a whole). This
article does not consider Greater Eurasia solely as a synonym to the
1
Source: Yefremenko D. The Birth of a Greater Eurasia. How the Post-Cold
War Era Ends // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2017. – Vol. 15, N 1. – P. 150–164.
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Russian-Chinese strategic partnership, which attracts or may attract
other countries. Greater Eurasia cannot be reduced to the notion of a
heartland and the spatial factor cannot be the only determinant in
ongoing changes. Certainly space is important, but in order to grasp the
essence of current events one should consider history, multiple ways of
global development, and alternatives to the processes, of which until
recently there seemed to be none. Today some tendencies that surfaced
in the 1990s and 2000s are gaining momentum, while certain aspects of
globalization associated with the triumph of the post-bipolar world
order are withering away.
One of the key conditions for the emergence of a Greater Eurasia
is the strengthening of semi-peripheral and peripheral countries that
have been sailing with the fair wind of globalization and catching up
with developed countries. Within a short period of time in modern
history when globalization seemed to be offering benefits to all, a
number of non-Western states sought international legal personality
(independence of action on the international stage) – from countries
producing raw materials to those claiming to have taken a leap into a
post-industrial era. But as we all know, this Belle Époque ended
abruptly in 2008.
The crisis of 2008 clearly showed that globalization –
understood as the global triumph of the liberal politico-economic
model – was faltering. All of a sudden it turned out that in order to
retain its dominance, the West needed to reverse many of the
processes it had launched previously. In fact, China was very
successful in dealing with the hardships of the crisis; not only did it
consolidate its status as the world’s number two economy, but it also
announced its global ambitions. China did so after it had extracted
everything it could from its export-oriented growth strategy. The shift
in economic policy coincided with the ascent of a new generation of
leaders like Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. Their names are now
associated with reorienting the Chinese economy to domestic demand,
structural reforms, correcting disproportions, and stimulating
innovative activities.
Xi’s strategic initiative “One Belt, One Road” is unparalleled in
scale and outreach. For the first time since the voyages of Vasco da
Gama, a country is trying to build economic ties from East to West.
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China’s attempts to project its economic power and create a dense
network of communication, economic, and trade ties between major
Eurasian markets is often construed as a sign of self-interest aimed at
tapping the potential of both neighboring and distant countries for the
sake of its own development. Naturally China will not take steps that
could harm its interests, but the Chinese culture of political
administration committed to long-term strategic planning goes further
and seeks to create favorable conditions for the prosperity of the
country. The stability and wellbeing of the countries willing to service
Chinese interests are requisite for that.
The “One Belt, One Road” initiative will usher in a new kind of
competition between countries contending for Chinese investments and
loans, and those that want to host transport infrastructure to secure the
unity of a Greater Eurasia. But what is even more important is that the
process China has launched is acquiring its own inner logic, and other
countries are doubling their efforts to build their own logistic chains.
A clear example is accelerated work to create a North-South
transport corridor that will link Russia with Iran, and eventually with
India via Azerbaijan. The project has engendered a trilateral strategic
partnership between Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. In fact, PanEurasian transport projects increase competition among corporate
players. For example, investors from the German Initiative
consortium offer financial support for the construction of a high-speed
railway from Moscow to Kazan (a section of the future
transcontinental railroad between the capitals of China and Russia) as
an alternative to Chinese funding. Desiring to keep China from
seizing the initiative completely, the Japanese government has come
forward with a new approach to the territorial dispute with Russia,
offering broader cooperation to develop energy and transport
infrastructure in the Russian Far East.
The development of Greater Eurasia is beginning to look like a
process of self-organization. Premises for such development emerged a
long time ago, but there were no proper conditions until now. However,
some factors have had a negative or destabilizing effect, preventing
Greater Eurasia from becoming an independent key subsystem in the
emerging new world order.
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Greater Eurasia vs. Oceania?
One such factor is the U.S. policy of containment along the
gigantic external perimeter of China and Russia. Whether intentionally
or not, by pushing NATO towards Russia’s western border and
reinforcing military alliances in the Pacific, the U.S. is bringing Russia
and China closer together in how they see U.S. strategic goals; thus
encouraging closer military-political coordination between them.
However, many countries along the lines of confrontation find
themselves in a difficult situation because a more active role in building
Greater Eurasia could serve their national interests much better. Yet
they have to match, and more and more often subordinate, their
aspirations to U.S. military-strategic interests.
One example is South Korea, which has agreed to host a
THAAD antimissile system. According to official statements made by
the U.S. and South Korea, the system will be deployed as a response to
the nuclear threat from North Korea. However, South Korea will have
no control over the system’s infrastructure and U.S. commanders will
make all the decisions. The deployment of such a system on the Korean
Peninsula will make it possible for the U.S. to degrade the effectiveness
of nuclear missile capabilities in China and, to a much lesser extent, in
Russia. It is not surprising that initial reactions from Russia and China
were quite painful. South Korea has become engaged in the strategy of
containment with regard to China and Russia, even though its long-term
interests could best be served by making maximum use of the
opportunities Greater Eurasia can offer. South Korea will have to
embark on a long search for a median line between preserving its
security alliance with the U.S. and tapping the potential of
transcontinental cooperation and division of labor.
If the U.S. continues its confrontation with China and Russia
under Trump, there will most likely be new attempts to crank up social
and ethnic tensions in countries that are important to Russia or China.
The biggest bet will once again be placed on global trade and U.S.
attempts to retain its dominance after the failure of the globalization
model in 2008. The trend towards liberalization in global trade has
given way to a new generation of trade and economic groupings, the
creation of which is necessitated not only by market sensibility, but also
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by geostrategic interests. NATO and different U.S.-led formats of
military-political interaction in the Asia-Pacific region can be viewed as
some sort of power “bonds” in the zone of American economic
dominance. If U.S. strategy is fully realized, George Orwell’s Oceania
will become a reality, at least in terms of control over vast territories
from one center.
But one must not oversimplify the situation. Presenting the future
system of international relations as a binary opposition between
heartland and rimland, as a space of democracy and a space of
autocracy, would be no more than an artificial framework used to solve
specific tasks. Yet such a system would hardly be capable of factoring
in all the complexity and diversity of relations between different actors
in the changing world order. A truncated perception like this would
only intensify centripetal tendencies and strengthen the forces that
benefit from new dividing lines and exaggerated contradictions. The
danger lies not only in distortion per se, but also in the fact that, as the
Thomas theorem suggests, the perception of such a picture of the world
as real will have real consequences.
Confrontation between the U.S., one the one hand, and China and
Russia, on the other, is already a fact of life, but hard power and
economic power will gradually lose their relevance, and the two largest
Eurasian powers will try to avoid forming a military-political alliance.
However, competition in interpreting reality, defining meanings, and
translating values will play an increasingly growing role. While only
recently the West’s dominance in these fields looked absolute, now it
has become clear that in discussions on meanings and values the roles
of the teacher and the student, the leader and the straggler, are no longer
definitely assigned to certain nations and socio-political models.
Eurasia’s Western Peninsula
Discussions on the mixture of changes facilitating the emergence
and development of Greater Eurasia inevitably raise questions about
Europe’s role in this new reality. If Greater Eurasia is considered within
the geostrategic context of Chinese leaders, then it is easy to see that
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the “One Belt, One Road” initiative is designed to build multiple links
with Europe.
Brexit has made it obvious to everyone (even European
integration enthusiasts) that the European Union and Europe are not the
same thing. One may assume that even before its official exit from the
European Union, Great Britain will participate in multilateral talks on
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership as a party in its own
right. Great Britain may gain more maneuvering room for some time
and diversify its policy, finding space for Greater Eurasia as well. As it
leaves united Europe, Great Britain will try to secure the most
advantageous position for itself in the world economy.
Once Great Britain is out, the EU will quickly limit its
enlargement. Overstrain will erect hurdles on the way of enlargement
into the post-Soviet space. There is no guarantee that other countries
will not want to follow the British example.
Although Germany will dominate Europe after Brexit, this does
not mean that the European leader can impose its own scenario of
deeper integration on the other 26 member states. It is more likely that
the EU will regroup and reevaluate integration processes to return to the
Europe of nation states. The level of foreign-policy coordination will
change and a new space will emerge for differentiated interaction
between countries and external actors. The EU will become more
porous and more flexible in establishing numerous and multilevel
contacts and ties with state and non-state actors in a Greater Eurasia.
For example, one can imagine the European Union, the U.S., Canada,
and Great Britain establishing a common free trade regime (TTIP) and
sharing military-political obligations (NATO), but at the same time
becoming increasingly engaged in different forms of interaction with
Greater Eurasia at the micro- and meso-levels.
The Reverse Side of Eurasia
The most dissimilar factors have begun to act synergistically,
strengthening mutual transcontinental bonds, even though in many
instances this can have a negative effect and produce high risks and
political turbulence.
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We can see processes intensifying that thousands of years ago
made people in European centers of civilization realize that their
prosperous towns and provinces were no more than the fringes of a
gigantic oecumene and that outlanders could come pouring in at any
moment. In today’s Europe problems related to migration and
co-existence of the local population and migrants from Asia and Africa
date back to colonial times and are rooted in a decades-long liberal
immigration policy. It was a truly dramatic moment when it became
clear that migrants from Muslim-majority countries do not fully
integrate into the new society, but form enclaves with an alien culture
instead of a cohesive community. Migrant communities in European
countries keep their own religious and cultural identity, and in some
instances their ties with the home countries are much stronger than
those with the host ones. The information and communications
revolution has made many migrant communities more resistant to
attempts to integrate them into the new environment and makes it
possible for them not only to communicate with their faraway relatives
and friends, but also remain tightly attached to their sociocultural
realities. When such enclaves grow into a dense network of no-go
zones to the native population (there are about 800 such areas in France
alone), multiculturalism becomes impossible.
The failure of multiculturalism and ethno-demographic dynamics
in EU countries irreversibly tie Europe to the Muslim part of Greater
Eurasia. However Western political elites have succeeded quite well in
unleashing the destabilizing potential that has accumulated in Middle
Eastern countries. All obstacles to the growth of radical Islamism were
consistently removed – from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein to
support for the Arab Spring – sending a large region adjacent to Europe
into chaos. Terrorist acts in Europe and the biggest migration crisis
since World War II clearly showed that the turbulence in the Arab
world was beginning to spread into prosperous Europe, changing its
understanding of domestic security and messing up its customary
electoral patterns. These were followed by events that accelerated the
transformation of geopolitical reality in the Eastern Mediterranean and
Eastern Europe.
In 2015–2016, two of the three countries situated both in Asia
and Europe took steps that confused the West. For all the difference in
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their goals, both Russia and Turkey sought to show that they held the
key to the Syrian conflict, or at least could regulate instability caused
by the destruction of statehood in Syria and Iraq. In fact, the
participation of Russia and Turkey in the Syrian conflict prompted EU
countries to become immersed in the Eurasian context.
By becoming involved in the Syrian conflict on the side of
Bashar al-Assad, Russia showed that it could not only act effectively on
several theaters at the same time, but could also tie together all conflicts
that European countries considered isolated. Although the Kremlin’s
Syrian gambit did not lead to a primitive “Levant for Donbass” swap
(which was never the point), it helped erode the anti-Russian orthodoxy
and revealed the real price of the sanctions. Now the West has to accept
Russia as a key partner in dealing with the threats posed by Islamic
fundamentalism and the destabilization of Middle Eastern countries.
The objective reason for Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian
conflict is security problems, Kurdish separatism, and threats to vital
national interests. But these factors were magnified immensely by
President Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. The situation was further
compounded by the internal political confrontation, which culminated
in a coup attempt in July 2016. The Turkish leader’s maneuvering
during the Syrian conflict was especially risky. Erdogan readily raised
the stakes, but only to achieve temporary success, after which Turkey’s
position became even worse. At a critical moment during the migration
crisis, Erdogan essentially tried to dictate his conditions to Brussels and
Berlin, taking advantage of a position that allowed Turkey to regulate
the intensity and scale of refugee flows. Baffled European bureaucrats
and EU leaders made a deal with Turkey, which Amnesty International
described as “a dark day for the Refugee Convention, a dark day for
Europe and a dark day for humanity.” Turkey had obviously overdone
it, and its apparent rapport with Brussels quickly turned into mutual
frustration and estrangement. And that meant almost total political
isolation, given the tense Turkish-U.S. relations, a breakup with Israel,
rivalry with Iran, and confrontation with Russia.
Relations between Russia and Turkey remained in deep crisis
when the Turkish Air Force shot down a Russian Su-24 aircraft. The
two countries were about to plunge into a long-term confrontation that
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could have weakened both of them. The realization of this threat helped
the two countries find ways to overcome their antagonism.
The revived partnership between Russia and Turkey can
substantially influence the development of a Greater Eurasia and adjust
ongoing geopolitical transformations. But there are certain restricting
factors to take into account as well. These include remaining
differences over Syria, Erdogan’s growing personal power, and the
overall internal tension caused by the rearrangement of the political
landscape in Turkey after the failed coup attempt.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an Incubator
The SCO would be the best choice as an international
organization capable of streamlining the emergence and development
of Greater Eurasia. The admission of India and Pakistan to the SCO
will most likely lead to qualitative changes in the Organization’s
mission and regional agenda. Rivalry between these two countries can
block some initiatives and adversely affect decisions adopted by
consensus. There is a risk that the current institutional format will not
be able to cope with the strain of speedy enlargement and the creation
of a new structure for larger membership and future tasks may drag on.
Trying to implement less ambitious but more realistic scenarios could
be a solution.
The SCO needs greater flexibility to increase its role as a
platform for dialogue and regular interaction between states, the
number of which keeps growing. But while doing so it will have to
avoid the temptation of prematurely drafting universal documents, like
the Helsinki Final Act of 1975; nor should the SCO turn into a forum
for rhetorical exercises on transcontinental cooperation. While
preserving the achievements made over its 15 years of existence, the
SCO could act as an incubator for a wide range of agreements and
initiatives, covering such issues as security, trade, environmental
problems, and cultural, scientific and technical cooperation. It should
move forward gradually. As it does so, the SCO will see a network of
formalized ties, partners, and institutions emerging at the regional,
interregional, and trans-regional levels, and eventually across Greater
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Eurasia as whole. Only after all of these interim steps have been
completed would it be reasonable to begin a substantive discussion
about the formation of a community of Greater Eurasia.
A Minor Eurasia within a Greater Eurasia
Once a very promising integration project in the post-Soviet
space, the development of the Eurasian Economic Union has not always
been progressive. One reason is Russia’s natural dominance, resulting
in a high degree of dependence by other EEU members on the state of
the Russian economy. The crisis of Russia’s economic model coupled
with Western sanctions and falling oil prices has caused its EEU
partners to sustain serious economic losses. Attempts by Belarus and
Kazakhstan to minimize those costs (or, whenever possible, reap
benefits from U.S. and EU restrictions against Russia and its
countermeasures) are as much egoistic as they are rational.
The idea of connecting the Eurasian economic integration
process with China’s Silk Road Economic Belt initiative was partly
defensive and designed to ease the tension that would otherwise have
developed inevitably amid unregulated competition between further
efforts to develop the EEU and Chinese activity in the post-Soviet
space. Having recognized China’s role and declared the possibility of
their coordinated participation in its projects, the EEU member states
strengthened the positions of their association.
The EEU’s further evolution has become increasingly influenced by
the multidirectional policy of such countries as Kazakhstan and Belarus.
The former is facing a period of uncertainty due to the unavoidable change
of its leader and possible instability during the handover of power in the
country. The terrorist attack in Aktobe in June 2016 badly damaged
Kazakhstan’s image as a haven of stability and order in Central Asia.
Regardless of whether those events were a result of the struggle between
elites or Islamic extremist activities, it is clear that the ongoing processes in
Kazakhstan are a long-term problem which Russia will have to face.
Both the ruling circles and opponents of President Nazarbayev
criticize Kazakh membership in the EEU and, in particular, its
economic troubles (not all of them are related to Eurasian integration).
Nazarbayev, however, does not use this criticism of Eurasian
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integration institutions and mechanisms to weaken them, but rather to
strengthen Kazakhstan’s positions both in the EEU and outside it.
Apparently, Nazarbayev’s vision of a Greater Eurasia is not fully
identical to that of Russia. He emphasizes securing the best possible
positions for Kazakhstan in a new configuration that may be formed by
China, the European Union, Russia, and the Islamic world as its key
players. Nazarbayev’s proposal put forth at the St. Petersburg
Economic Forum to integrate the European and Eurasian Unions clearly
bears this out. At first glance, the proposal takes the idea of a Greater
Eurasia to its logical conclusion. But it is Kazakhstan that can benefit
the most from the institutionalization of the dialogue between the EU
and the EEU, without actually expecting the two projects to be really
integrated. In fact, in the current situation (even after Brexit) one can
hardly hope for anything more than Brussels’ invitation to the EEU
countries to accept EU norms and rules without being able to play any
part in their development. The “integration of integration” scenario is
no more than wishful thinking, premature implementation of such a
plan may have dangerous consequences.
The Kazakh leadership’s call for dovetailing the stalled Eurasian
integration to European standards may be an attempt to overcome the
discomfort of being in the EEU. But one cannot rule out that the
Kazakh leadership may be hesitating between “improving” the EEU
(for example, by pressing for a reduction in the list of exemptions from
the free trade regime) and steps that may erode the project. The latter
include Kazakhstan’s decision to accept the WTO tariff policy, which
differs from the common customs tariffs approved by all EEU states.
Kazakhstan has achieved many impressive results through
economic cooperation with China as part of the Silk Road Economic Belt
initiative. As of the beginning of 2016, Kazakhstan was ahead of Russia
in terms of cooperation with China and was carrying out more than 50
joint industrial and logistic projects worth over $24 billion. However,
some of those projects will be futile without Russian participation, such
as the Western Europe-Western China road, which ends precisely on the
Russian-Kazakh border. But Kazakhstan is involved in the construction
of routes bypassing Russia via the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus.
Kazakhstan is seeking to turn the country into a major transport and
logistic hub, and this is where the interests of Russia and Kazakhstan
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diverge. Nevertheless, if transport infrastructure is developed further,
cooperation between China, Russia, and Kazakhstan appears to be very
promising and may only strengthen the positions of the latter two if they
pursue a policy coordinated within the EEU.
The EEU’s institutional weaknesses have been discussed many
times. The main mechanism for counterbalancing Russia’s economic
dominance in the EEU is the right to veto and the principle of equality in
the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). But this principle does not
apply to the financial contributions member states make to this
institution, the costs of which have increased exponentially over the past
several years. The EEC has very limited possibilities as a supranational
body and may not even make proposals for further development of
cooperation within the EEU. It is not surprising, therefore, that the EEC
plays an increasingly small role compared to national institutions even in
Russia. The consensus trap seems to have closed, and the admission of
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan to the EEU highlighted institutional efficiency
problems. Changes in the decision-making mechanism (which will have
to be made sooner or later) may cause a serious crisis in relations
between EEU countries. To avoid that, the EEU should redefine its
mission and the purpose of its institutions, turning them into a collective
mechanism allowing member states to fit into the emerging network of
ties within a Greater Eurasia in the best possible way.
A new mission of EEU institutions could develop a common
position for all member states on issues concerning various integration
initiatives, and trade and economic cooperation formats both in Eurasia
and worldwide. The Silk Road Economic Belt initiative is a serious
challenge to EEU countries. But if Russia succeeds in convincing its
EEU partners to work out a common position on China’s economic
development strategy for Eurasia, then this will be a fundamental
achievement. The stakes are so high that a revision of the EEU
institutional model will be justified.
Some Conclusions Regarding Russia
China is sending a strong signal for the need to accelerate changes
in Greater Eurasia. Russia has to respond to these transformations and
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can influence them significantly. The problem is that regional and global
contradictions are also growing and becoming increasingly complex,
affecting not only security, economic, trade and financial spheres, but
also information flows and virtual space. Russia may be one of those
who will benefit from building a Greater Eurasia. At the same time, there
is a danger of turning into the main magnet for risks and threats in this
process.
Strategic partnership with China is becoming a key factor for
Russia. Bilateral cooperation should not develop into an official
military-political alliance directed against the U.S. or any other country,
but China and Russia should act jointly to dismantle the U.S.-centric
world order and build a fairer and safer system of international relations
in Eurasia and the world. Russia will not be able to avoid recognizing
China’s leadership, but it can preserve equality and the freedom to
maneuver in building strategic partnerships with third countries.
By developing strategic partnership or constructive dialogue with
India, Vietnam, Iran, Israel, and Egypt, as well as (under certain
conditions) with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea, Russia
will help make Greater Eurasia a more balanced system with several
centers of power. Russia should not only seek to build a balance of
power that will serve its own purposes, but it should also try to expand
the circle of countries with which it can jointly solve tasks on the basis
of trust and mutual interests.
Russia will also have to prepare its own institutions of influence
in the post-Soviet space for integration into Greater Eurasia and, acting
together with other allied states, make the EEU and the CSTO much
more efficient and flexible. That is not an easy task. A lack of
experience, insufficient expert support, and the inertia of previous
relations will be a major hindrance. But there is no alternative to
integrating the post-Soviet space into Greater Eurasia, and it is better to
lead this process rather than fight it. If these efforts proceed in unison
with development processes ensuring faster and better economic
growth in third countries, then the risks will turn into mutual gains.
Naturally, Russia will remain a country of European culture. But
there is no need to carve out a new window to Europe. Just recently,
leading European countries scornfully dismissed the idea of a Greater
Europe “from Lisbon to Vladivostok.” Now Russia will have to join in
94
the efforts to open up the shortest way to Europe for Asian economic
giants, but acting solely as a transit country will hardly be sufficient.
Russia can come up with its own, quite impressive, proposals including
not only routes and logistic centers, raw materials, food, military and
industrial products, and space technology, but also security. This is
necessary as a protection against the sources of instability that are
threatening not only old Europe, but also Asian centers of global
economic growth. Russia’s contributions to the fight against Islamic
terrorist networks and the liberation of parts of Syria and Iraq can be
regarded as a kind of test for the role of sheriff in a Greater Eurasia. It
would be reckless, of course, to claim such a role for itself alone. But if
this burden is shared with other influential players in Greater Eurasia,
the export of security can be quite profitable, both economically and
politically.
As far as the European Union is concerned, Russia cannot do
much more than show Europeans that some of the persistent problems
that trouble Brussels can be solved within a Greater Eurasia. There is
no need to try and reach universal agreements to regulate the entire
range of relations between the EU and the majority of post-Soviet
countries (EEU), let alone other parts of Greater Eurasia. The EU is at a
crossroads and needs time to choose the right direction for its own
transformation.
Russia has the necessary experience and possibilities to deal with
the risks arising during the emergence and development of a Greater
Eurasia. One of the keys to success is the optimum division of labor as
part of the strategic partnership with China and other Asian and African
countries, and eventually with leading European states. Another key is
sustainable economic growth, political stability, modernization of
public administration, and the effective operation of public institutions.
The experience of China and other Asian countries will be very useful
as a working model for economic development, but ultimately it is the
joint efforts of the government and society that will secure a worthy
place for Russia in Greater Eurasia and the world.
95
POLITICS OF MEMORY, KIEV STYLE.
Ukrainian Identity Strategies
in the Context of European Integration1
(in co-authorship with A. Voronovich, 2017)
French philosopher and historian of religion Ernest Renan in his
speech at the Sorbonne in 1882 defined a nation as follows: “A nation
is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one,
constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the
present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories;
the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to
perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an
undivided form.”2
Undoubtedly, two components of a nation are closely
interconnected, and the political management of the rich legacy of
memory provides an important stimulus for life. Nowadays, such
management is increasingly often described by the term ‘politics of
memory.’ It can be considered as a functioning system of interactions
and communications between different actors with regard to political
uses of the past. In other words, the politics of memory is one of the
key instruments for shaping macro-political identity of a community.
A complex system of interactions and communications occurring
as part of the politics of memory cannot be reduced to a linear process
1
Source: Voronovich A., Yefremenko D. The Birth of a Greater Eurasia. How
the Post-Cold War Era Ends // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2017. – Vol. 15, N 4. –
P. 184–197.
2
Renan E. Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ? = What is a Nation? – Paris: Mille et une
nuits, 1997. – P. 7.
96
of nation-building, using different practices of commemoration, the
teaching of history or the presentation of historical events in the media.
Things are much more complex as the parties involved often have
opposite aspirations and may be driven not only by the idea of national
consolidation but also by much more mundane objectives of
strengthening a concrete sociopolitical order or, on the contrary,
undermining it. External factors also play a role through a positive or
negative attitude towards the macro-political identity of a community.
It must be said that the main driving force in a country’s politics
of memory is the interests, aspirations and actions of internal agents
seeking to advance a certain interpretation of history. But at some point
external actors may start playing a greater role if they can significantly
influence the politics of memory in that country. More and more often
politics of memory becomes the subject of interstate interaction, and
supranational bodies (in the European Union in the first place) are
beginning to work out their own policy on these issues.
Diverging Paths of European Politics of Memory
Issues concerning the politics of memory have often been
discussed in the Russia in Global Affairs journal, particularly in the
articles contributed by Alexei Miller and Olga Malinova1. This
discussion is likely to go on since the politics of memory in certain
communities can be a factor of internal and international conflicts. The
politics of memory can be used to incite conflicts or plan post-conflict
settlement. Strictly speaking, in post-war Western Europe the politics of
memory played a major role in assessing the tragic experience of World
War II and Nazi crimes, and building a consolidating historical
narrative on that basis.
German scholar Aleida Assmann showed convincingly that the
Holocaust became the basic element of the European politics of
1
Miller A. Memory Control // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2016. – Vol. 14, N 3. –
P. 146–163; Malinova O.A Workable Past // Russia in Global Affairs. – 2017. – Vol. 15,
N 3. – P. 162–180.
97
memory1. It is based on the understanding of the Holocaust as the main
European tragedy of the 20th century and on the recognition of all
European nations’ collective guilt and responsibility for that tragedy.
The collective responsibility of Europeans stemmed from the
understanding that the Holocaust was carried out by Nazi Germany and
its collaborators but that it also involved the population of the occupied
countries. The Holocaust became the binding thread for the European
historical narrative in the twentieth century. The key role of the
Holocaust in Europe’s politics of memory was institutionalized in such
bodies as the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, the
World Holocaust Forum, and others. The Holocaust was gradually
turning into a key element of the politics of memory in Western Europe
in the 1970s-1980s and became an inalienable part of European
commemorative practices in the early 2000s.
The recognition of the Holocaust as a central element of the
European politics of memory coincided in time with the admission of
many former socialist Central and Eastern European countries to the
European Union. The commemoration of the Holocaust essentially
became one of the main requirements for the new EU members to meet
in order to prove that they belong to the “European family” and adhere
to the “European values.” However, this politics of memory vexed the
political elites of Central and Eastern European countries. One of the
reasons was that local actors, who had been linked to Nazi Germany
and involved in the Holocaust, spearheaded anti-Soviet resistance after
the war and are now loudly acclaimed as national heroes, especially in
the Baltic States. Having become full members of the EU, these
countries only superficially accepted the European policy of memory
agenda focused on the Holocaust.
They started advancing their own politics of memory, which
presented them as victims of Communism and, to a lesser extent, of
Nazism. Aided and supported by some leading Western European
politicians and intellectuals, the new members of united Europe have
made great progress in this respect. By drifting away from the central
1
Assmann A. Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit – Erinnerungskultur und
Geschichtspolitik = The Long Shadow of the Past – Remembrance Culture and
Historical Politics. – Munich: C.H. Beck Publishers, 2006.
98
meaning of the European responsibility for the genocide of Jews and by
emphasizing self-victimization and shifting responsibility to external
totalitarian forces, they laid the foundation for new conflicts and even
“memory wars.”
Declarations adopted by the European Parliament and the
Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in 2009 can be interpreted as a
victory of the new edition of the politics of memory1. Both resolutions
mentioned the unique nature of the Holocaust and did not
conspicuously equate Communism to Nazism, but a change of
emphasis was already obvious.
We can speak of more long-term effects of this shift in the
European politics of memory. The enlargement of the European Union
in 2004 essentially ruined all hopes that a consensus on the past could
become a factor facilitating its further consolidation. As Alexei Miller
has rightfully observed, “the politics of memory, or in broader terms the
culture of memory, is not the glue but the dissolvent which is eroding
the EU’s unity.2” The disuniting role of the politics of memory could be
ignored only until the European Union itself was regarded as a unique
example of a successful integration project, but no more. Brexit has
made a major realignment of forces in the EU inevitable, with “a
Europe of different speeds” being the most likely scenario even though
Jean-Claude Junker and other European officials claim otherwise. This
is where the politics of memory may become an effective instrument of
divergence.
1
European Parliament Resolution of 2 April 2009 on European Conscience and
Totalitarianism // Official Journal of the European Union. – 2009. – 27.05. – Mode of
access: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:137E:0025:
027:EN:PDF;
Resolution on Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil
Liberties in the OSCE Region in the 21st Century // Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Eighteenth Annual Session. –
Vilnius, 2009. – 29 June – 3 July. – Mode of access: https://www.oscepa.org/
ocuments/all-documents/annual-sessions/2009-vilnius/declaration-6/261-2009-vilniusdeclaration-eng/file
2
Miller A. Politika pamyati v postkommunisticheskoj Evrope i ee vozdeistvie
na evropeiskuyu kulturu pamyati = Politics of Memory in Post-Communist Europe and
its Influence on European Memory Culture // Politeia. – 2016. – N 1. – P. 111–121.
99
But there is more to it. When extended to post-Soviet countries,
all Central and Eastern European mechanisms of collective memory,
which have taken over the European politics of memory, generate
tension by conflicting with both the macro-political identity Russia is
building and the identities dating back to Soviet times. The Ukraine
crisis, especially the separation of Crimea and the proclamation of
“people’s republics” in the east of Ukraine, cannot be understood
without taking into account this clash of identities. The scenarios of
further developments in the territories controlled by Kiev should also
be considered in the context of this conflict of identities, which only
seems to have been quashed.
Ukrainian Historical Narratives
There are two main historical narratives competing with each
other in independent Ukraine. Academically, both are based on the
interpretation of Ukraine’s history proposed by Mikhail Grushevsky
and his followers. But modern interpretations are reversive, tend to
adapt historical facts to the realities of post-Soviet Ukraine
(“Ukrainization” of Kievan Rus’ history is only one of the examples),
and emphasize Ukraine’s uniqueness even when it was part of the
Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.
A more radical narrative can be described as nationalistic. It
reflects the teleological movement of the Ukrainian people to its own
statehood and is based on the glorification of persons who fought for its
independence and development. It also emphasizes the status of the
Ukrainian people as a victim of external forces, especially Russia and
the Soviet Union. Naturally, this approach vilifies the Soviet period in
the history of Ukraine and praises those who resisted it, with the glory
of heroes bestowed upon OUN-UPA nationalists as anti-Soviet fighters
for the Ukrainian state. However, their role in the Holocaust and antiPolish campaigns is largely hushed up or even denied. It should be
noted that this approach is actively supported by the Ukrainian diaspora
which plays a significant role in Ukraine’s political history.
Its opponents also appeal to numerous elements of the national
narrative, especially when it comes to the history of the country in the
100
20th century. They do not assess the Soviet period as negatively as their
vis-à-vis do. For example, the Holodomor occupies an important place
in their interpretation, but it is not portrayed as the genocide of the
Ukrainian people. They also oppose radical nationalism and appeal to
the nostalgia for the Soviet past among part of the population. Former
President Leonid Kuchma’s book with the eloquent title Ukraine is not
Russia1 conveys the quintessence of their approach.
Differences in the culture of memory undoubtedly have a
regional dimension which remained even after 2014. But a simplified
division into the west and the east should be replaced with a more
nuanced political, geographical and sociocultural landscape.
“Ukraine is Europe” as the Leitmotif of the Politics of Memory
Different versions of Ukraine’s politics of memory have always
made, in different proportions and forms, attempts to distance the
country from Russia and set it on the historically “destined” European
path (even though the radical nationalistic version tends to mistrust the
European West). The Ukrainian politics of memory received a truly
powerful impetus towards “Europeanization” after the Orange
Revolution when the policy of European integration became one of
Kiev’s priority objectives. Subsequently, even political forces or
leaders who came to power with pro-Russian slogans or who were
generally viewed as loyal to Moscow continued to steer the country
towards Europe.
The European Union, in turn, tried to support as much as
possible European aspirations in Ukraine, Moldova, and other postSoviet countries. In 2009, Brussels launched the Eastern Partnership
program designed to establish closer cooperation with the member
states and gradually harmonize their norms and values with European
ones. The program was expected to step up institutional reforms started
in those countries in order to adapt them to European standards of
democracy, political management and market economy. The signing of
1
Kuchma L. Ukraina – ne Rossija = Ukraine is not Russia. – Moscow: Vremya,
2003.
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association agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and the
introduction of visa-free travel regimes was a sort of interim
culmination of this policy. The question is whether Brussels’ decisions
were prompted by the real successes of those countries or by their
geopolitical confrontation with Russia. Ukraine’s and Moldova’s
achievements in promoting democracy, building a free market
economy, implementing social programs, and developing infrastructure
draw strong criticism. However, European integration was not reduced
entirely to the implementation (and often imitation) of political and
economic reforms. One of Brussels’ unspoken requirements for postSoviet aspirants was the adoption of the European politics of memory.
Compliance with these requirements gave an admission pass to the
“European family.”
The governments that replaced one another after the Orange
Revolution had to play by the rules accepted in the European politics of
memory. But they could also use the European politics of memory for
their own purposes. The gradual emergence of two opposing trends in
the European politics of memory gave Ukraine room for maneuver.
Both the authorities and the opposition tried to use the key tenets of the
European politics of memory for fighting their political opponents.
During Victor Yushchenko’s presidency, Ukraine’s politics of
memory was clearly underlain by the nationalist narrative, with the
Ukrainian diaspora playing a much greater role than before. Key
elements of Yushchenko’s policy were glorification of OUN-UPA
nationalists, with a focus on the sacrificial narrative of Ukrainian
history in Soviet times and on the Holodomor as the genocide of the
Ukrainian people. The European politics of memory, which at that time
was underpinned by the notion of pan-European responsibility, created
certain problems for Yushchenko’s agenda.
Yushchenko’s attempts to glorify OUN-UPA fighters and his
large-scale national and international campaign to recognize the
Holodomor as genocide met with a controversial reaction in the world.
Both aspects of his policy ran counter to the European precept of panEuropean responsibility. Attempts to recognize the Holodomor as
genocide, with the number of casualties exceeding those of the
Holocaust, called into question the unique nature of the latter in
European history and concurred with the search by many other Eastern
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European countries for their own “genocide.” The glorification of
OUN-UPA fighters, notoriously known for their role in the Holocaust,
denied the responsibility of the local population for the tragedy.
Paradoxically, key elements of the politics of memory pursued by
pro-Western President Yushchenko contradicted the European politics
of memory at that time. This aroused resentment in Europe as a whole
and in individual countries in particular. No wonder, Ukraine’s
relations with Israel became quite strained.
Yushchenko did not ignore the Holocaust. On the contrary, he
used it quite actively to advance his own policy. In 2006, when the
international community marked the 65th anniversary of the Babi Yar
massacre, during which the Nazi and their local collaborators had
executed more than 30,000 Jews, Kiev hosted a Holocaust
remembrance forum where Yushchenko stressed the importance of that
tragedy not only for the Jews but also for all ethnic groups living in
Ukraine. He omitted the participation of Ukrainians in the Holocaust,
mentioning only the role of his compatriots who had helped save the
Jews. This approach was also quite manifest in the subsequent
Holocaust commemorative events attended by Yushchenko and other
representatives of official Kiev. A year later, when the next anniversary
of the Babi Yar tragedy was marked, Yushchenko laid flowers at the
monument to OUN fighters who had been killed there too. He also
made numerous attempts to portray the Holodomor as the “Ukrainian
Holocaust.” In declarations and regulatory documents concerning the
Holodomor, these two tragedies were often mentioned together. The
Holocaust was used as an example and an argument for recognizing the
Holodomor as an act of genocide and imposing criminal penalties for
refusal to do so. Yushchenko tried to use the symbolic significance of
the Holocaust to justify and fortify his own policy. He used the
commemoration of the Holocaust for utilitarian purposes both in order
to reinforce his argument about the “genocidal” nature of the
Holodomor and to placate his Western partners angered by some of his
decisions concerning the politics of memory. Yushchenko denied the
very fact of OUN-UPA fighters’ participation in the anti-Jewish
violence, which, however, could hardly convince his opponents both
inside and outside the country.
103
On the whole, his policy fitted into the concept, quite popular in
Eastern Europe, which equated the victims of the two totalitarian
regimes – Nazism and Communism – and relieved his own nation of all
responsibility for those crimes. Such radical policy mobilized those
sections of society which did not share his views. To some extent,
Yushchenko’s politics of memory helped his opponents win the
following presidential election.
Victor Yanukovich’s victory in 2010 was viewed by many
observers as the triumph of pro-Russian forces and the related narrative
of Ukrainian history. In fact, the new Ukrainian leadership was much
more open to cooperation with Russia in various areas, including those
concerning the politics of memory. For example, in 2010, Presidents
Medvedev and Yanukovich together laid flowers at the monument to
the victims of the Holodomor. Two years prior, Medvedev had refused
to go to Kiev to attend a similar event at the invitation of then President
Yushchenko. Nevertheless, Ukraine continued to drift towards Europe
until November 2013 when Kiev unexpectedly decided to suspend the
negotiations on an association agreement with the EU, which
precipitated mass riots now known as the Euromaidan.
Contrary to Yushchenko’s policy, the new Ukrainian authorities
sought to promote the culture of memory that offered a more positive
look at the Soviet period and Russian-Ukrainian relations over several
centuries of common history. At the same time, they showed a negative
attitude towards radical Ukrainian nationalism in the twentieth century.
And yet, the concept of national history prevailed in politics and
education. Being predominantly a technocrat, Yanukovich had no
clearly defined politics of memory, which was largely confined to the
revision of some of his predecessor’s decisions and abolition of some of
the regulatory acts that glorified nationalist leaders Shukhevich and
Bandera.
Speaking of the influence of the European politics of memory at
that time, two aspects are worth mentioning. The first one concerns the
introduction of new textbooks in schools by Minister of Education
Dmitry Tabachnik, whose appointment and activities drew a lot of
public attention. Tabachnik is known in Ukraine for his pro-Russian
views. In a major article published in 2010, he suggested that the work
on new textbooks should focus on “the humanitarian, anthropocentric
104
approach to history.” The only significant reference to the “European
tradition” materialized in the decision to exclude the last decade in the
history of the country from textbooks.
Another important step was the establishment of Holocaust
Remembrance Day in 2011 by the Ukrainian parliament’s resolution
passed on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Babi Yar tragedy.
However, it suggested marking the Day on January 27, that is, when
International Holocaust Remembrance Day is observed, a date not in
any way related to the Babi Yar massacre. But the explanatory notes to
the draft resolution did not even mention January 27 although it clearly
had an international connotation. Interestingly, the draft was proposed
by a lawmaker from the Communist Party. Apparently, it was an
attempt by political forces opposing the rehabilitation of the OUN-UPA
to establish a commemorative day which they could use against their
ideological opponents.
After Euromaidan: Separation of Memory and Responsibility
Anti-communist motives in Ukraine’s politics of memory have
become relevant again in the present-day political landscape, which has
changed drastically. Following the Euromaidan, Yanukovich’s flight,
and events in Crimea and Donbass, the new Ukrainian leadership
thought it could reap some benefit from reformatting the symbolic
space and fanning the flames of the “memory war.” In April 2015 the
Ukrainian parliament hurriedly passed a package of four laws: “On the
Denunciation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi)
Totalitarian Regimes,” “On the Commemoration of the Victory over
Nazism in World War II,” “On the Legal Status and the Honoring of
the Fighters for the Freedom of Ukraine in the 20th Century,” and “On
Access to the Archives of the Repressive Bodies of the Communist
Totalitarian Regime.” These documents launched the official process of
“decommunization” in Ukrainian society. Some supporters of the new
regime explained the adoption of the laws by security needs, because
the Soviet past was regarded as a national security issue. Obviously,
this interpretation stemmed from the ideological confrontation with
Russia and those Ukrainians who were skeptical about Kiev’s new
105
policy. But there is no doubt that these laws reflect the dramatic rise of
nationalist ideas and their increased influence on the Ukrainian ruling
circles after the Euromaidan.
Ukraine’s Institute of National Memory played a key role in the
development of these laws. The institute, modeled on similar bodies in
other post-socialist countries, has in recent years adopted a number of
controversial decisions and declarations. The institute is headed by
Vladimir Vyatrovich, known, among other things, for denying the
OUN-UPA’s role in the Holocaust. In one of his books he claimed that
the OUN-UPA had actually saved Jews from the Nazi, not helped to
exterminate them1.
The first of the abovementioned laws, “On the Denunciation of
the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes,”
was fully in line with the policy of self-victimization. Its preamble
linked the law to six decisions of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and
the European Parliament in a bid to legitimize it as part of the panEuropean trend. The Ukrainian parliament’s move has far-reaching
goals and envisages a wide range of measures from banning
“totalitarian symbols” to dismantling monuments to Soviet leaders and
renaming cities, towns and settlements. Nazism mentioned in the law is
no more than just a suitable backdrop and an argument for
criminalizing Communism by equating two types of totalitarianism.
Clearly, this is a strategy designed to suppress an alternative historical
memory. The latest European tendencies in the politics of memory
provided a convenient basis for justifying such methods of solving
domestic political problems. In addition, the dramatic deterioration of
Russian-European relations after 2014 gave Eastern European countries
more room for maneuver in their politics of memory. The European
Union closes its eyes to campaigns and decisions which previously
were viewed as detrimental to relations with Russia.
The Law “On the Commemoration of the Victory over Nazism in
World War II” places emphasis on the term ‘World War II’ and
excludes the “Great Patriotic War” wording used before. By so doing
1
Vyatrovich V.M. Stavlennya OUN do evreiv: formuvannya pozitsii na tli
katastrofi = Attitude of the OUN to Jews: the Formation of a Position against the
Background of a Catastrophe. – Lviv, 2006.
106
the Ukrainian parliament tried to obliterate the culture of memory
connected with the “Great Patriotic War” narrative which bound
Ukraine with other former Soviet republics, primarily Russia, through
joint struggle against Nazism, starting from 1941 but omitting prior
events. Instead, the parliament proposed alternative wording, “World
War II,” in which Ukraine is portrayed as a victim of the two
totalitarian regimes starting from 1939. The law ignores the fact that
Ukrainian territories were consolidated into one republic, firstly, as a
result of the events of 1941-1945, and secondly, due to the decisions
adopted by one of the “totalitarian regimes.” An important novelty in
the law, which reflects a collision between two interpretations of that
period, is that it establishes Remembrance and Reconciliation Day on
May 8 and at the same time proclaims May 9 as Victory Day over
Nazism in World War II (Victory Day). The decision to mark May 8 as
Remembrance and Reconciliation Day was not accidental. On this day
many European countries mark the end of World War II even though
the UN resolutions cited in the Ukrainian law mention both dates, May
8 and May 9, as suitable for commemorative events. However, Ukraine
is trying to get rid of the previous pattern in commemorating the end of
the war under the pretext of following “European moral and cultural
values.”
And yet, this is largely a half-measure. Ukrainian leaders
apparently were aware of how strong the tradition was and did not dare
ban Victory Day completely and replace it with the “European”
alternative. They are trying to put a different meaning into this date as
one can see from its full official name. Some were clearly dissatisfied
with the changes as insufficient. In 2017, the Institute of National
Memory proposed a new version of the law on state holidays and
commemorative days. Transferring a day-off from May 9 to May 8 was
one of the major changes. Vyatrovich said this decision should stress
“the European tradition of concluding World War II.” However, in this
particular case, observance of the “European tradition” underscores the
division of Ukrainian society as borne out by constant clashes between
different groups of people occurring these days.
And yet, one cannot say that the “Great Patriotic War” narrative
is a taboo among Ukrainian leaders. They often refer to its elements as
part of the ideological struggle over the armed conflict in the east of
107
Ukraine, trying to fill them with a new meaning and use their symbolic
power. Sometimes events are presented as a new stage in the “heroic
fight of the Ukrainian people” against invaders, including the World
War II period, using well recognizable constructs and symbols such as
“our Stalingrad.” The leaders of the breakaway republics also actively
use the “Great Patriotic War” narrative for commemorating the armed
conflict. For example, they carry the photographs of killed separatist
military commanders during the Immortal Regiment march on May 9
as part of this trend.
Going back to the European politics of memory, it is necessary
to say that its other element focused on the Holocaust continues to
influence Ukraine’s politics of memory after the Euromaidan. On
the whole, its influence has decreased, but the commemoration of the
Holocaust remains part of the repertoire obligatory for members of
the “European family.” This allows Eastern European regimes to use
the Holocaust as an “inexpensive” (compared to structural reforms)
way to improve their image in the eyes of their Western partners. The
commemoration of the Holocaust becomes largely a ritual when the
Ukrainian authorities make public declarations, organize events
marking Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27, unveil new
monuments, and inaugurate new museums. However, as a rule, none of
these activities requires the recognition of their own people’s guilt for
the Holocaust as a central element of the pan-European responsibility in
the politics of memory. The Ukrainian Law “On the Legal Status and
the Honoring of the Fighters for the Freedom of Ukraine in the 20th
Century” has essentially excluded many local actors from the list of
possible perpetrators of the anti-Jewish violence. So although the
Ukrainian authorities have been actively exploiting the Holocaust
theme lately, primarily for foreign policy purposes, they have not
suffered any significant political losses on the domestic front, which
they would if the role of local residents in the genocide of Jews would
be assessed comprehensively and unbiasedly. Responsibility for the
Holocaust is placed entirely on external forces, the Nazi, and
sometimes even the Soviet Union.
This narrative dilutes the Jewish tragedy in the overall tragedy of
the country as a victim of external “totalitarian” forces.
108
* * *
The post-Maidan version of Ukraine’s politics of memory,
coupled with other steps undertaken by official Kiev in the field of
education, and language and information policies, will have long-term
consequences for the future of Ukraine and its relations with the
European Union, Russia, and other countries. In terms of importance,
they will be comparable with any of the possible scenarios of the
conflict in the east of the country (or, hopefully, its resolution). But one
cannot be separated from the other. The conflict itself, its events and
participants are already becoming the object of the politics of memory
both in the territories controlled by Kiev and in the breakaway
“people’s republics” in Donbass.
It is necessary to understand that macro-political identity
emerging on this basis will inevitably be ethnocentric, with the
dominant historical narrative promoting the complex of a victimized
ethnos and the ban on topics that may imply the recognition of one’s
own guilt and responsibility for the past and present tragedies. The
nationalist narrative in the politics of memory amid constantly stoked
tension over the “Russian threat” makes ressentiment the main motive
of Kiev’s policy with regard to Moscow.
In the political turmoil of recent years, the Ukrainian authorities
have been harshly cracking down on the alternative historical memory
kept by millions of people in the country. However, even after the loss of
Crimea and part of Donbass Ukraine cannot be considered a consolidated
nation with one identity and a common view on history as borne out by
numerous public opinion polls. Regional differences remain, and
attempts to erase them quickly may produce the opposite result.
Depending on how aggressively the Ukrainian political elite cultivates
ethnocentric identity and how drastically the central authorities overhaul
their language and regional policies, a combination of these factors may
exacerbate social, ethnic and political tension. In the long term, Ukraine
may end up as a “problem country” not only for Russia but also for other
neighboring countries and the European Union.
109
ANNEX 1.
Trumpism, European Rightists and Russia
(Excerpts from the Valday Discussion Club Report
“Global ‘Rightists Revolt’: Trumpism and Its Foundations”, 2017)1
Trumpism as an ideology and a system of values is much broader
than the political figure of Trump and is not directly tied to his current
political activities. This being said, the question of whether Donald
Trump will be able to stem the onslaught of the old Washington
establishment, rather than walking away from his election platform, is
not that important for the given discourse. Much more important is the
fact that a global political wave caused by Trump’s electoral success
formed a fundamentally new ideology and even a system of values
which could conventionally be described as ‘Trumpist’ (once again,
without any tight conjunction with the future evolution of Donald
Trump himself). … Trumpism is definitely a new phenomenon, but it is
rather deeply rooted in the American political history. As was rightly
noted by Walter Russel Mead, Trump and Trumpism demonstrate good
compliance with the Jacksonian paradigm, i.e. American nationalist
populism2. Jacksonianism implies a vision of America and its role in
the world that substantially differs from the vision of the Founding
Fathers, for whom the top priority was nation-building based on the
1
Source: Global ‘Rightist Revolt’: Trumpism and Its Foundations: Valday
Discussion Club Report / Barabanov O., Efremenko D., Kagarlitsky B., Koltashov V.,
Telin K. – Moscow, 2017. – September. – P. 5, 6, 8, 21–22, 24.
2
Mead W.R. The Jacksonian Revolt. American Populism and the Liberal Order //
Foreign Affairs. – 2017. – March / April. – Mode of access: https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-01-20/jacksonian-revolt
110
totality of political principles. Jacksonian nationalism, on the contrary,
is based on the vision of America as the Promised Land conquered,
seasoned and sanctified with sweat and blood. Sovereignty is one of the
most important categories for Jacksonians. In case of Andrew Jackson
protecting or spreading the American sovereignty was not only about
the territory, but also about restoration of the federal government’s
sovereign control over the financial system. In this sense, the
Jacksonian “I killed the Bank” is tantamount to Trump’s escapades
against supranational financial structures stripping Americans of
control over their own national economy. Jacksonianism in America
has gone through ups and downs, but it never died. In the evolution of
American conservatism, the Jacksonian paradigm was obviously on the
rise during the two recent decades until it led to the temporary
consolidation of forces determined to topple the order symbolized by
Clintons and Obama. American conservatism is a heterogeneous
phenomenon, to be sure, uniting polar movements – from libertarians to
paleoconservatists. Trumpism became a reality by virtue of the high
demand for a figure capable of consolidating protest sentiments and
expressing the hopes of numerous electorally significant interests. Yet,
the success of the rightist populism personified by Trump does not boil
down to the figure of an establishment-rejecting rebel. The electorate
and stakeholder groups who brought Trump to the White House voice a
broader demand for transformation of the American political system,
the model of social mobility and access to resources. The fact that this
model was turning increasingly closed for millions of Americans,
generated Trumpism.
At any rate, given Brexit and the rise of Trump, which signify
profound upheavals for the western world on both sides of the Atlantic,
there are weighty grounds to talk about an antisystemic ‘rightist revolt’.
Who has revolted against whom or what? And what are the possible
consequences? How should we respond? In general terms we are
witnessing a change of eras and a related change in ways and styles of
political thinking. Not in vain did Zygmunt Bauman, analyzing the
civilizational dynamics of the early XXI century, applied the term
Interregnum used by Antonio Gramsci in his ‘Prison Notebooks’ to
describe the anticipation of radical reforms caused by social disruptions
of the Great Depression. Gramsci meant upcoming simultaneous and
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profound changes of the sociopolitical and legal order. Today, as at the
time of Gramsci’s imprisonment in Torino, many global concepts,
institutes and mechanisms demonstrate progressive dysfunctionality,
with no fulfil edged replacement of these pillars heaving in sight for
now. Under these conditions the political scene on various levels, from
local to global, is being entered by forces interested to speed up the
demolition of the ineffective order where too many actors and groups
turned out to be outsiders. Yet, formulating an intelligible alternative is
a lot more daunting challenge which can nevertheless be observed in
competitive political systems, where electoral procedures enable the
mainstream opponents to make a statement and offer the electorate a
programme, which can be described as creative destruction. It can be
situational, focused on one or two problems, which are crucial or
considered as such under the current circumstances. The revolt against
the neoliberal political-ideological mainstream of national and
supranational elites is compound, strangely blending seemingly
incompatible aspirations and interests. Above all, we see a protest
against globalization, for the first time in history supported by
significant electoral groups in both the United States and Europe.
It suddenly dawned upon these groups that the current thrust of
globalization processes marginalizes them. The migration threat and
fears of cultural identity being undermined just open a list of
globalization effects quite unexpected for a western man in the street.
The erosion of national sovereignty is increasingly often interpreted by
many western voters as the loss of control over one’s own destiny. The
revolt against the neoliberal mainstream is largely turned against its
political, ideological, discoursive and sometimes even aesthetic
components related to postmodernism. At least the ‘rightist revolt’ is an
organic reprobation of eclecticism, construing any truth as relative and
conventional, relegation of the common good principle to something of
secondary importance, etc. This is also a revolt against political
correctness as a deeply layered system of double standards, tabooing
and self-censorship. As regards the ‘rightist revolt’ in EU the main
difference of the U.S. situation from the European one is that internal
split is not a surprise. The bipartisan consensus is a thing of the past –
at least starting in mid-1990s, when Newt Gingrich (a close friend of
Donald Trump) led the Contract with America resulted in deeper
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polarization within the American elite. In EU countries (at least in ‘old
Europe’ as referred to Donald Rumsfeld) the situation was different.
1990s and 2000s were characterized by gravitation towards the political
center and even partial ideological convergence of political mainstream
parties. But now the polarization trend and the demand of voters for a
sharply defi ned stance has reached the ‘old Europe’. Under greatest
pressure are traditional conservatives increasingly affected by rightist
conservative populism with its radical ideas gradually transforming the
respectable conservative philosophy. In the meantime, mainstream
conservatives try to keep away from ‘non-handshakable’ populists,
while poaching some of their slogans, tactics and thus increasingly
distorting the classical ideological matrix of political conservatism. In
Europe the rightist populism is now equivalent to Euroscepticism, even
though Euroscepticism is not tantamount to rightist populism.
Nevertheless, the very existence of the European Union and its
institutes is like a gift of heaven for rightist populists in Europe,
because this gives them a universal basis for bashing the political
mainstream as the key instrument for stripping European nations of
their sovereign power, stressing that supranational authorities have no
legitimacy within the framework of the national state. The problem of
political sovereignty, incidentally serving as a political basis for the
rapprochement of Eurosceptic activists with modern-day U.S.
Jacksonians, is coming to the fore. Ralf Dahrendorf succinctly
formulated the gist of the problem almost a quarter of a century ago:
“Constitutions institutionalize the rights, which are legal guarantees,
rather than just empty promises and nice words… The rights necessitate
instruments of coercion or enforcement bodies. All three classical
branches of power find their place here. But these authorities can
function only in a perfect form of the nation state. The ones rejecting
the nation state also lose effective guarantees of their main rights.
Those who consider the nation state superfluous also announce the civil
rights superfluous, even if unintentionally.”1 In the modern political
context this logic provides a strong posture for those willing to embrace
it, and gathers further momentum, when aversion to Eurocratic elite is
1
Dahrendorf R. Die Sache mit der Nation / Jeismann M., Ritter H. (Hrsg.) //
Grenzfälle: über neuen und alten Nationalismus. – Leipzig, 1993. – P. 109.
113
supplemented by disillusionment in the national pro-European elites.
The latter are not only willing to assign sovereign rights to Brussels, but
also pursue a common migration policy (i.e. beyond the pale of the
nation state), a common policy towards minorities, making a case for
special norms and values essentially based on self-censorship and actual
renunciation of the cultural-historical foundations behind the national
identity. If it is accompanied by the aggravation of socioeconomic
problems, the electorate changes its perception of globalization turning
its ugly face on the European voter. What more general conclusions can
be drawn? As for the outlook of conservatism and its transformation
under the impact of populism, one should be more cautious here. The
‘rightist revolt’ in the United States and Europe is global in terms of its
political repercussions. Trump is a very American story; Marine Le Pen
is a French story. For now, the national context retains primacy, so the
development of events will vary in different nations. Somewhere we will
see traditional conservatives crashing and being replaced with rightist
populists, but in other countries conservatives will borrow the populist
rhetoric, evolving in this direction, incurring painful losses, but
nevertheless retaining stable positions.
Britain is quite an indicative case in this respect. It is obvious
that the post-Brexit conservatives will be different from the preBrexit
ones. The Party of Independence played its part, but it is the Tory who
have to implement the new agenda. It is next to impossible for the
British Tory to become pro-European once again. But while
implementing the exit program, they still try to steer clear of Nigel
Farage and his followers. On the whole, the red lines will move further
away and populist forces will not only grab more seats in European
parliaments, but will also get involved in government coalitions in
some places. And then the liberal West will still become different from
what it was a quarter of a century ago, at the dawn of the post-history
era that was never ushered.
What should Russia’s attitude towards the ‘rightist revolt’ be?
The temptation of simple decisions is difficult to resist: Russia is
interested to revise the post-bipolar world order, which is perceived as
unfair; it criticizes the current globalization model while capitalizing on
the opening opportunities to the best of its ability; many in Russia reject
the postmodernist value matrix. Consequently, those who contribute to
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the erosion of the world order, weather it is deliberately or not, criticize
globalization and question the values prevalent in the West can be
viewed as our allies. But we should be careful not to go too far. The
western media did their best to place Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump
within one symbolic field. This is not to say that the Russian leadership
should thus position their nation. Rather it is necessary to be always
open and ready for dialogue with everybody. In fact, any force or
politician trying to get western nations back from postmodernist heaven
to the earth of national interests, i.e. to the frame of reference where an
intelligible dialogue is possible, could be a potential partner for Russia.
In the meantime, we should be aware of potential risks: the language of
national interests can be better understood, but the interests can be
antagonistic. The conflicts of national interests can be a lot more
intensive and dangerous, than conflicts around values. If Moscow
suddenly decided that it should align with the rightist populism, this
would mean the narrowing of political opportunities. Moreover, Russia
would not only share the success of these forces, but also their failures
(which are inevitable). Therefore, it is important to stake on a certain
frame of reference for the dialogue, acceptable to Moscow, Europe and
our overseas partners, rather than on certain political-ideological forces
or movements.
115
ANNEX 2.
Perestroika and the “Dashing Nineties”:
At the Crossroads of History1
In this article, an attempt is made to study issues of sociopolitical
transformations in the Soviet Union and post-communist Russia in the
late 1980s to the early 2000s. Particular attention is paid to those
junctures that brought about the catastrophe of the Soviet state and the
subsequent emergence of neopatrimonialism in post-Soviet Russia. The
regime transformation at the turn of the 1990s – 2000s is regarded as
the completion of the critical phase of post-Soviet development and the
onset of a long stage of stabilization, which means achieving a relative
balance between hierarchy and networks, formal and informal
institutions, agency and structure.
Some lessons of the collapse of the USSR
Vladimir Putin’s famous statement that the collapse of the Soviet
Union became “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”
1
This essay is based on two sources first published in Russian: 1. Efremenko
D.V. Posttravmaticheskaya Rossja: Sozialno-politicheskie transformatsii v usloviakh
neravnovesnoj dinamiki mezhduarodnikh otnoshenij = Post-Traumatic Russia: Social
and Political Transformations under Conditions of Turbulent Dynamics of International
Relations. – Moscow; Sankt-Petersburg: Zentr humanirnikh iniziativ, 2015. – P. 7–8,
16–17, 45–54; 2. Efremenko D.V., Dolgov A.Y., Evseeva Y.V. Rossija mezhdu
sistemnymi katastrophami i evoluzionnymi transformatsiami: Politiko-ontologicheskie
aspekty = Russia Between System Catastrophes and Evolutionary Transformations:
Aspects of Political Onthology // Polis. – 2017. – N 5. – P. 29–35.
116
is often interpreted in the West as a direct indication of the Russian
leader’s revanchist aspirations and revisionism regarding the existing
world order. However, in fact, such interpretations only disorient those
trying to understand the priorities of Russia’s domestic and foreign
policy. The attribute “greatest” certainly contained evaluation, addressing
millions of residents of post-Soviet states, who feel nostalgic when they
hear the abbreviation “USSR”. The term “catastrophe” is descriptive. An
attempt to analyze the collapse of the Soviet state and the communist
regime as a systemic catastrophe can, indeed, yield results worthy of
notice.
The Soviet Union can be viewed as a complex system that
included ideological, symbolic, organizational, material, and technical
components. As Charles Perrow shows, in complex technical or
organizational systems, catastrophic failures leading to the destruction
of the system are inevitable and at the same time unpredictable1.
Dysfunctions or failures at the level of discrete elements of the system,
which do not individually pose a serious danger to it, at some moment
enter a resonant interaction, capable of destabilizing the system as a
whole. At this moment, what can become decisive is the factor of the
operator, who, even without making gross mistakes (within the logic of
the regular functioning of the system) or successfully coping with
familiar technical issues, proves unable to respond adequately to such
systemic failures. In other words, the possibility of catastrophic selfdestruction is initially attributed to any complex system, which,
however, does not mean that this possibility will necessarily be realized
during the projected period of its functioning. However, it is impossible
to predict a catastrophic systemic failure based on traditional methods
of risk assessment.
If we literally project Charles Perrow’s logic onto the Soviet
communist system, then we can say that the possibility of selfdestruction was inherent to it in exactly the same way as it is inherent to
any other complex system. This did not meant at all that the collapse of
the system was to occur precisely at the turn of the 1980s – 1990s.
There is no doubt that in the early 1980s the Soviet system was
1
Perrow C. Normal Accidents. Living with High-Risk Technologies. – New
York: Basic Books, 1984.
117
undergoing stagnation, but, as a matter of fact, this state could continue
indefinitely. In the very process of formation, some internal flaws were
part of the system; seemingly insignificant, under certain historical
circumstances they could launch processes leading to the destruction of
the system1. Such historical circumstances had begun to take shape by
1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became head of the USSR. Starting
with 1985, the Soviet Union over a short period passed through several
historic forks and did that in such a way that the onset of a devastating
systemic failure became irreversible.
For the period of perestroika, the historic fork at the turn of
1986–1987 can be considered the key one. By that moment, it had
become obvious that the regular strategy of transformation was, indeed,
stalled. The initial impulse was practically exhausted, and the mass
expectations of indefinite positive changes were about to transform into
deep disappointment with the new leader and his rhetoric. Realizing the
need to correct the course, Gorbachev and his closest associates
apparently underestimated the seriousness of the economic situation. In
fact, in early 1987, the last opportunity to shift the reforms to the
Chinese way was missed. Of course, differences in the social structure,
levels of industrial development and urbanisation, labor qualification
and costs did not allow Deng Xiaoping’s reforms to be copied in detail
in the USSR2. Still, their general principle, i.e. transition to a market
economy, while maintaining strict political control by the ruling
Communist Party, could well have been realized in the concrete
historical conditions of the beginning of 1987.
As we know, Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates made
political reforms their priority. Gorbachev actually blamed the failures
of the first stage of perestroika on the Soviet party nomenklatura. A
shake-up of personnel at all levels of the nomenklatura hierarchy and
the introduction of alternatives in the election of candidates for party
and Soviet bodies began to be regarded not only as steps towards
political change, but also as tools for solving economic problems.
1
Sakwa R. Soviet Politics in Perspective. – London: Routledge, 1998. – P. 285.
Lai H. Contrasts in China and Soviet Reform: Sub-National and National
Causes // Asian Journal of Political Science. – 2005. – Vol. 13, N 1. – P. 1–21; Lynch A.
Deng’s and Gorbachev’s Reform Strategies Compared // Russia in Global Affairs. –
2012. – N 2. – P. 84–100.
2
118
However, trying to recruit new people into the ruling corporation and
thus increase its internal mobility, Gorbachev eventually destabilized
the supporting frame of the system as a whole. The decisions made led
to the reduction of the unity of the nomenklatura, its differentiation, and
the formation of inner-party trends.
Further radicalization of these processes became possible due to
the policy of glasnost. Today, thinking back to the events of the era,
one cannot but admit that the freedom of intellectual search and
expression attained owing to Gorbachev’s glasnost is the greatest
achievement. But for the old Soviet system, it was glasnost as a trigger
of ‘collective culture shock’ that made the catastrophic dynamics
irreversible1. In this sense, one can agree with the thesis by historian
Mikhail Geller that the Gorbachev era was “a victory of glasnost and a
defeat of perestroika”2.
Having made a choice in favor of the primacy of political
reforms, Gorbachev not only pushed economic reforms into the
background. After 1987, every new step towards a market economy
was complicated by the need to “fit” into the rapidly changing political
context, and the political effect expected from the planned economic
measures at first prompted Gorbachev and his entourage to choose from
possible solutions those that seemed less risky. As a result, economic
activities were merely a set of palliative measures, carried out
selectively and without any clear sequence3. In this fashion, such
measures were leading to further widening of economic and social
disparities, to further deepening of the overall crisis of the system. The
replacement of directive planning with indicative planning, expansion
of economic autonomization of the Union republics, transfer of
enterprises to self-financing, election of their directors, lifting of
restrictions on wage and salary growth were a set of actions that
1
Feichtinger C., Fink G. The Collective Culture Shock in Transition Countries –
Theoretical and Empirical Implications // Leadership & Organization Development
Journal. – 1998. – Vol. 19, N 6. – P. 302–308; Kramer M. The Collapse of the Soviet
Union (Part II) // Journal of Cold War Studies. – 2003. – Vol. 5, N 2. – P. 3–42.
2
Geller M. Gorbachev. Pobeda glasnosti i porazheniye perestroyki =
Gorbachev. The Victory of Glasnost and Defeat of Perestroika // Sovetskoye
obshchestvo. Vozniknoveniye, razvitiye, istoricheskiy final / Afanasyev Y. (Ed.). –
Moscow: Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyy gumanitarnyy universitet, 1997. – Vol. 2. – P. 558.
3
Goldman M. What Went Wrong with Perestroika. – New York: Norton, 1992.
119
undermined the foundations of the administrative command economy,
but did not result in the launch of a new economic model, let alone
macroeconomic stability.
The years 1987 and 1988 can be considered decisive for the fate
of the USSR in the sense that at that time, several powerful mechanisms
leading to its destruction were simultaneously activated, i.e. elimination
of ideological monopoly and censorship, weakening of the internal
unity of the CPSU as well as emergence of opportunities for the coming
into power structures of people positioning themselves as opponents of
the regime, erosion of the planned economy, rise of separatism in a
number of Union republics and the use by its activists of legal methods
of struggle for national self-determination and independence. Those
destructive processes were mutually reinforcing other; the load on the
system was increasing with each month. At the same time, the number
of people, social strata and elitist groups still linking their fate to the old
regime began to decline rapidly. On the contrary, there was an
increasing number of those who, due to various reasons (moral,
ideological, career, nationalistic or material), were leaning towards the
collapse of the system. However, the absolute majority of people were
disoriented; they were vaguely aware of the threat of the downfall of
the communist state and the habitual way of life associated with it, but
could no longer stand up for their protection.
Without touching upon other historic forks that preceded the
collapse of the USSR, it should be emphasized that the social and
political dynamics of the perestroika era generally correspond to the
logic leading to the onset of a “critical moment”. The weakening of the
rigid hierarchical structure (the Soviet party vertical edifice) created
conditions for new actors (individual and collective) to enter the
political arena, and the scope of their actions was rapidly expanding.
But it is not enough to merely state that.
The Soviet party hierarchy was the framework of the regime, but
the system as a whole was not reduced to it. The Soviet system was
imbued with a multitude of informal network interactions that ensured
the circulation and redistribution of resources. Those interactions
eventually transformed the essence of the system adapting official
ideological attitudes and repressive practices to the vital realities of late
120
Sovietism1. The discrepancy between the official, ideologically
sanctioned power hierarchy and the formation of structures of network
interactions manifested itself in a variety of areas, from double morality
to shadow economic activity. In the situation of the imminent collapse
of the Soviet party hierarchy, some of these networks were only
growing stronger; the rapid development of cooperatives against the
background of the simultaneously degrading public sector may serve as
an example of the process in question.
The law “On Cooperation”, adopted in 1988, is usually referred to
as one of the most decisive steps towards a market economy in the entire
perestroika period. But the framework conditions for the development of
this form of entrepreneurship were determined not only and even not so
much by this law as by the decision previously made regarding
progressive taxation of cooperatives. The statistical data on the growth of
the cooperative movement in the last years of perestroika cannot but
impress: as of January 1, 1988, there were 13,900 cooperatives in the
USSR, and as of January 1, 1990, 193,000. The volume of annual
production (in the prices of those years) increased from 350 million to
R 40.4 billion. In the volume of GNP, the share of cooperatives was less
than 1% in 1988, whereas in 1989, as high as 4.4%2. But it is necessary
to take into account that 80% of the cooperatives were created in state
enterprises and in fact served as a legal channel for the withdrawal of
resources of those enterprises.
The expansion of cooperatives, like no other economic measure
of Gorbachev’s leadership, contributed to the disintegration of the
planned model of economy. In this sense, the data regarding the
growing output of the cooperatives correlate with those showing a
production decline in the public sector – of course, with an adjustment
for the schemes of “optimising” the tax burden by concealing the
profits of the cooperatives. Tax evasion, access to scarce supply funds,
selling products of state-owned enterprises through cooperatives
1 Afanasyev M.N. Kliyentelizm i rossiyskaya gosudarstvennost = Clientelism
and Russian Statehood. – Moscow: Moskovskiy obshchestvennyy nauchnyy fond,
2000; Ledeneva A. Russia’s Economy of Favours. Blat, Networking and Informal
Exchanges. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
2
Trudnyy povorot k rynku = Difficult Turn to the Market / Abalrin L.I. (Ed.). –
Moscow: Ekonomika, 1990. – P. 184.
121
became possible due to the formation of a corruption symbiosis
between cooperators, management of state enterprises, local party-state
nomenklatura, officials of sectoral ministries, representatives of law
enforcement agencies, and criminal structures. In fact, in the nonmarket system, plenty of quasi-market actors appeared who began to
use multitudes of its gaps, including legislative gaps, to again
maximum profit. Networks of those actors were thriving on the
disintegration of the old, hierarchically organized command
administrative system, but for the creation of a new, market system,
they were giving little – at best, a startup capital, specific experience
and connections needed to profit from the disintegration of the Soviet
public sector and to cream it off. The downfall of the CPSU hierarchy
removed of a major instrument for intra-elite conflict regulation. In this
situation, the most reckless could attain wealth and power in a very
short time1.
The issue of the institutional legacy of the “critical period” that
crowned Mikhail Gorbachev’s political and economic reforms is utterly
important and interesting. To the formal institutions that post-Soviet
Russia inherited from the USSR of the later period belong the revived
multi-party system and alternative elections. But no less important were
informal institutions, nurtured by network interactions. Douglas North
points out the possibility of a favorable combination of formal and
informal institutions providing optimal conditions for evolutionary
changes2. Unfortunately, the end of perestroika as a critical juncture did
not contribute to the formation of such an ideal constellation of formal
and informal institutions. The inconsistency and general lag in
institutional infrastructure led to the fact that after the collapse of the
communist regime and the disintegration of the USSR, informal
institutions primarily became tools for correcting the functioning of
formal institutions.
1
Zon H. van. Russia’s Development Problem – the Cult of Power. – London:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008. – P. 18.
2
North D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. –
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
122
The “Dashing Nineties”: A Thorny Path to a New “Old Order”
The catastrophe of the Soviet system by no means ended in
Belovezhskaya Pushcha or on the frosty night of December 25, 1991,
when the red flag was taken down from the Kremlin flagpole. The
Gaidar reforms also cannot be regarded as transformations started from
scratch. In addition to the reformers’ explicit and implicit intentions,
one ought to see in them the dynamics of the final stages of the collapse
of Sovietism, and even an attempt to institutionalise the by-products of
systemic decay1.
For Russia and most of the post-Soviet countries, the historical
meaning of the 1990s era consisted primarily not in the construction of
a new statehood, a market-democratic transit, the formation of civil
society, but in the exhaustion of the dynamics of decay and in rendering
habitable the ruins of the Soviet system. Rich in events, the first stage
of post-Soviet history turned out to be rather poor in terms of original
internal content. The strategic intent of the transformations of the
1990s, which the reformers themselves characterized as “an exchange
of power for property” and “the buyout of Russia from the
nomenklatura”2, can hardly be considered something fundamentally
new in comparison with the objective orientation of the economic
policy of the Gorbachev leadership of the 1988–1991 period. It was
actually not an exchange, but a market-style modification of the
dualistic unity of “power / property” and the social order derived from
it. Even the changes in the makeup of the elite give reason to speak of a
continuum or evolutionary transformations rather than a revolutionary
change of the ruling stratum.
The liberal reformers certainly intended to radically transform
society itself, but they sought to do it with the help of the “invisible
hand of the market”. In order to achieve that, the state was to “leave”
economy and to reduce as much as possible its “sphere of
responsibility” for social security. Consequently, Russian society
remained without traditional state guardianship for most of the 1990s.
1
Kotkin S. Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000. – Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
2
Gaidar E.T. Gosudarstvo i evolyutsiya = State and Evolution. – Moscow:
Eurasia, 1995. – P. 103.
123
The task of targeted institutional formation was never translated into
practice; it was assumed that the new institutional environment would
be formed as a result of measures to denationalize the economy. At the
same time, despite the externally innovative forms of the “withdrawal”
of the state from the economy (voucherisation and, a little later,
mortgage auctions), in fact this process was carried out using traditional
machinery that provided redistribution of command positions within the
“power-property” system. To some extent Gorbachev’s mistakes1 were
repeated by Gaidar and other liberals by using the old machinery of
government to reform.
Over two years separating the revolution of August 19–21, 1991,
and the adoption of the Constitution of the new Russia on December 12,
1993, undoubtedly became the time of the decisive transformation of
the political order and determination of the vector of its subsequent
development. During the same period, Russian society experienced a
severe traumatic shock2, accompanied by a loss of life guidelines for
dozens of millions of people. While the struggle for power, between
Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev in the last months of the nominal
existence of the Soviet Union, then between Yeltsin and the Supreme
Soviet, made the social trauma even more painful. The nature of that
struggle was determined by the decisions and actions of the main
political actors, whereas the structural limitations proved insufficient to
prevent the violent outcome of October 3–4, 1993.
The forcible resolution of the political crisis of the autumn of
1993 meant the closure of the “window of opportunity” for the
establishment of a new constitutional order on the basis of a political
compromise. The versions of constitution that could be agreed upon in
the course of the dialogue between the parties to the conflict provided
for a greater or lesser degree of balance between the executive, judicial
and legislative powers. A conciliation process similar to the 1989
Polish Round Table Talks or the negotiations of the Spanish political
forces that culminated in the signing of the Moncloa Pact (1977) would
most likely have become an obstacle to the adoption of the politico1
Galeotti M. Gorbachev and his Revolution. – New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1997. – P. 66.
2
Sztompka P. Cultural Trauma. The Other Face of Social Change // European
Journal of Social Theory. – 2000. – Vol. 3, N 4. – P. 449–466.
124
legal model that places the presidency institute above the system of
separation of powers. But the chance of reaching a political
compromise was missed. The Constitution of the Russian Federation,
approved at the referendum of December 12, 1993, actually codified
the political order established after the forcible dispersal of the
Supreme Soviet. Following the principle “Winner takes it all”, Yeltsin
clearly determined to secure political stability through a propresidential constitution coupled with a rigid amendment procedure1.
The adoption of the Constitution was supposed to promote the
consolidation of formal institutions. However, institutional and
structural stability was not achieved immediately. In fact, something
different was taking place. Both during the acute political confrontation
of the first post-Soviet years and in subsequent years, political actors
increasingly realized that the use of informal institutions was often
more effective in minimizing transaction costs, achieving short-term
and medium-term goals. The environment that ensured maximum
effectiveness of informal institutions had already taken shape by the
end of perestroika: first of all, those were symbiotic network structures,
which included representatives of the party / Komsomol nomenklatura,
former black marketeers, and the most successful cooperators. The
reformist government, nevertheless, actively influenced further
structuring of that environment, using such tools as concessional loans,
export and import subsidies, voucher privatization, and later, mortgage
auctions.
In the 1990s, Russia made a breakthrough to capitalism, but did
it just as it could, reproducing the familiar combination of power and
property under qualitatively new circumstances. A specific version of
neopatrimonial capitalism arose in Russia as a result of that.
Reproduction of the patrimonial model in a new guise provides rich
material for further discussions about Russia’s historical path. It all
looks as if in the early 1990s, Russia almost got out of the deep track of
its dependence on the past and by the end of the same decade, gladly
returned to it. It is quite difficult to explain such a trajectory of
1
Sharlet R. Russian Constitutional Change: An Opportunity Missed //
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. – 1999. – Vol. 7, N 3. –
P. 438.
125
development only by the effect of cultural codes and the power of
tradition. The history of Russia in the XX century is a story of most
brutal forcible breaking of traditional culture. However, to break a
tradition does not mean to destroy it. Modern Russia is not a country
without traditions, but rather a country with scraps of tradition. In any
case, there is no reason to assert that such formal institutions as
alternative elections of representatives of state power or an independent
court contradict the traditional values of an average Russian.
The institutional constellation at the time of the catastrophe of
the Soviet system was characterized by the discreteness and instability
of formal institutions. Simultaneously, the importance of informal
institutions increased; an appeal to them could reduce uncertainty for
individuals and social groups. Those were informal institutions that
contributed to the further reproduction of certain culturally conditioned
reactions and patterns of behavior. However, not everything was
reproduced, but only those elements that helped with post-catastrophe
adaptation and more or less successful habitation of the debris of the
collapsed system. Not cultural factors as such, but the atomization of
society, a sharp increase in the level of mutual distrust and fear,
awareness of the precariousness and unpredictability of everyday life
particularly hampered a successful development of formal institutions.
A social involution was taking place in Russia, i.e. consolidation of
private and small group space at the expense of public space1, a direct
consequence of this being the dominance of particular solidarities to the
detriment of civic solidarity.
The reincarnation of patrimonialism occurred as a result of the
aspirations of the key political players to find an optimal way to
achieve their goals in the given conditions as well as owing to the
implementation at the level of mass social groups of strategies for
avoiding uncertainty and minimizing risks. On that path, during the
1990s, important forks in the road were passed. In the second half of
the 1990s, there already emerged a prospect of the mutation of the
“power-property” formula and its replacement with the formula
“property-power-property”.
1
Burawoy M., Krotov P., Lytkina T. Involution and Destitution in Capitalist
Russia // Ethnography. – 2000. – Vol. 1, N 1. – P. 43–65.
126
ANNEX 3.
“Deoligarchisation” in Post-Soviet Russia: Retrospective View1
(2018)
The history of Russia of the past two decades was marked by
several significant turns, and the way of meeting them, and the vector of
further movement have considerably influenced the transformation of the
political regime and the role of Russia in the system of international
relations. Among these turns was a struggle against the attempts to
political domination of several oligarchic groups, which unfolded in the
period of Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term (2000 – 2004).
The term “oligarchy” in the Russian historical context is
associated with the 1990s. But the sources of this phenomenon go down
to Gorbachev’s perestroika, when a new social group of entrepreneurs
almost without experience of organizing production and business in the
conditions of open market competition came to the fore. Their road
was different, they were able to achieve success not contrary, but
thanks to the disintegration of the Soviet economic system, and their
method of doing business included, among other things, the ability “to
solve problems” at different levels - from local criminal groupings to
the federal government. Due to such interactions it was possible to
ensure reproduction in the qualitatively new conditions of the “power /
property” tie, freeing it from the political and ideological restrictions of
the Soviet epoch.
1
Source: Efremenko D.V. “Deoligarchisation” in Post-Soviet Russia:
Retrospective View // Russia and the Moslem World. – 2018. – N 3. – P. 6–18.
127
During the 1990s a specific version of neopatrimonial capitalism
emerged in Russia. Max Weber characterized relations between power
and property in Russia in the 16th – 19th centuries as a specific version
of patrimonialism – czarist patrimonialism1. In the latter half of the 20th
century Richard Pipes made a considerable contribution to the
elaboration of the concept of patrimonialism in Russia, regarding the
absence or vagueness of the dividing line between property and
political sovereignty as a factor determining specific features of
Russian history during the prerevolutionary period2. Shmuel Eisenstadt,
adapting Weber’s concept to the problem of modernization used the
term neopatrmonialism3. Neopatrimonialism can be regarded as a
combination of two types of political domination – rational bureaucratic
and patrimonial. The functioning of power in the conditions of
neopatrimonialism is subordinated to formally legal standards only
outwardly, whereas the real practice is informal and is determined by
patronage and clientelism. Neopatrimonialism is characterized by the
authoritarian organization of socio-political relations and the rentseeking model of economic behavior4. In the specific circumstances of
Russia in the mid-1990s the main agents of political transformation
staked more willingly on informal institutions, right up to actual
transfer to “outsourcing” of the economic groups of interests of a
number of functions of state governance. Such order of doing business
compensated the weakness of the state and at the same time created
additional insuring mechanisms for the political actors who were not
sure of their political longevity, relying only on formal institutions. The
culmination of neopatrimonial socio-political transformation was the
1
Weber M. Wirtschaft und Geselschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie.
[Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology]. – Tübingen: Mohr,
1976. – S. 621–623.
2
Pipes R. Russia Under the Old Regime. – New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1974.
3
Eisenstadt S.N. Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism. –
London; Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1973.
4
Erdmann G., Engel U. Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch-All
Concept. – Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2006. – (Working
Papers; 16). – Mode of access: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?
journalCode=ceas20&page=instructions
128
presidential elections of 1996, the period of “seven-bankers-rule,”
“loans for shares” auctions, and finally the Default on August 17, 1998.
Evidently, the economic reforms of the 1990s were either nonoriented to overcoming the patrimonial system, or at the very first
contacts of the reformers with the Russian reality, a tacit substitution of
the aims of transformation. There is no need to talk at length about facts
of real corruption or specific ways of life of certain members of
Gaidar’s team, for whom their stay in the government was only a transit
point on the way from academic institutions to the Russian “Forbes
list”. Realizing the inevitability of the reemergence of the “powerproperty” model in the new conditions the reformers of the 1990-s tried
to make it serve them and their customers. In this sense reforms may be
regarded as a kind of “social engineering.”
In Russia of the mid-1990-s, the political power formed a new
stratum of big owners, who, taking advantage of the weakness of the
state proclaimed their privileges in establishing control over the power
which has created them. Informal institutions were substituted for
formal ones and, as a consequence, political power was privatized by
economic groups of interests after the Default of 1998, which
concentrated about one-third of the Russian GDP under their control1.
However the very essence of the economic crisis, which started on
August 17, 1998 with the announcement of technical default and ended
with the transfer of presidential powers from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir
Putin on December 31, 1999, boiled down to the recreation of an
ultimate patrimonial model of state power more acceptable to the
majority of political and economic actors as well as mass social groups,
with state power playing the main role.
Even for a considerable part of influential interest groups, each of
which represented a powerful network unit, the need for the function of
state arbitration was quite evident. But more important was the fact that
the state as the supreme arbiter had to ensure the preservation of a new
structure of large property which did not have enough legitimacy in the
eyes of a big part of the Russian population. For most Russian citizens
privatization became an inalienable part of individual and collective
1
Rutland P. Putin’s Economic Record. Is the Oil Boom Sustainable? // EuropeAsia Studies. – 2008. – Vol. 60, N 6. – P. 1051–1072.
129
painful experience, a symbol of crying social injustice and monstrous
corruption. No wonder that about one-third of respondents even at the
beginning of the 2000-s spoke in favor of the renationalization of big
companies, and behind the “stable and widespread negative attitude
toward the results of privatization one could feel and see irritation and
revengeful expectation of “game change”. Paradoxically, this was
combined with almost complete absence of any hopes for the restoration
of “social justice.”1 Insufficient legitimacy of the structure of big
property remains a time bomb to this day, which can explode at the
moment of destabilization of the social system, which is conditioned by a
combination of external and internal pressure.
At the beginning of the 21st century the demand for “return of the
state” was a mass phenomenon and it was largely connected with the
further expansion of informal institutions and relations, which could
turn into a source of new social risks. On the contrary, the ability of a
political leader heading the hierarchy of power to control ambiguity and
risks, even if this control was effected on the basis of the combination
of using formal and informal institutions, proved highly in demand. In
this sense the desire for “return of the state” meant that public
expectations began to merge on one point, just as the interests of a
considerable part of political actors, as well as apprehensions of
influential interest groups. In essence, it was a demand for systemic
stabilization, establishment of understandable and acceptable “rules
of the game” in a compromise variant, excluding the repartition of
property and “privatization” of the state by interest groups. Solution
of this task became one of the key directions of Putin’s policy during
his first presidential term. It is precisely in this context that Putin’s
struggle with such figures as Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky and
Mikhail Khodorkovsky should be viewed.
Putin-proclaimed “equidistance” of oligarchs meant that in the
“power / property” combination it was power that played the dominant
role. Putin’s resolute actions aimed at curbing the influence of big
business and its certain representatives on power bodies were at first
1
Zorkaya N.A. Privatizatsiya i chastnaya sobstvennost' v obshchestvennom
mnenii v 1990-2000-ye gody = Privatization and Private Property in Public Opinion in
1990-2000 // Otechestvennyye zapiski. – 2005. – N 1. – P. 94.
130
carried on with the use of less political resources. The first of
“equidistant” oligarchs was Vladimir Gusinsky who made the
erroneous stake on the success of the Luzhkov-Primakov tandem at the
parliamentary elections of 1999, and Boris Berezovsky who repeatedly
hinted on his own resolute contribution to Putin’s electoral success.
Both of them were the living symbols of an epoch rapidly receding to
the past. Their banishment from Russia should have vividly
demonstrated the oncoming of a new epoch. The main result of the first
round of the fight against the oligarchs was the return of the key mediaassets under the control of the Kremlin; these media-assets were used
by Berezovsky and Gusinsky as the most powerful instrument of
strengthening their influence and expanding the business-empires
controlled by them.
Although the forced change of the editorial policy of the NTV
Channel and other mass media in Vladimir Gusinsky’s holding have
evoked serious fears for the fate of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press in Russia, the departure of the country’s new leader from the
influence of oligarchic groupings was completely in line with public
aspirations. Meanwhile, the authorities did not demonstrate any
intentions to revise the results of privatization, moreover, in case of
adoption by business of new rules of the game the powers that be
became the main guarantor of the preservation of that form of property
which was formed by the end of the 1990s. After the departure of Boris
Berezovsky from Russia this silent pact was adopted by almost all
business-structures. The only exception was the YUKOS Company of
Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
Khodorkovsky’s challenge was of a systemic character and
therefore it was regarded by Putin and his inner circle as a much more
serious threat than Berezovsky’s and Gusinsky’ claims to political
influence. The scope and direction of the challenge to fundamental
political and economic changes were not disputed or denied by
convinced supporters of Mikhail Khodorkovsky:
“The efforts of the “YUKOS shareholders at the beginning of
2003 could be joined in a certain general picture: they turn against
corruption, take the biggest oil company from state control, finance the
opposition, breed a new generation of freedom-loving citizens, develop
humanities, moreover they have a certain business-plan for Russia. In a
131
little time Russia will be able to extricate itself from the personal
control of President Putin and will become a full-fledged western
country. In a sense, it was a sort of a virtual plot aimed at changing the
social order. It was foolish to think that the persons in the Kremlin did
not notice that plot.”1
Apparently, the decisive motive of the authorities’ decision to
dismantle Khodorkovsky’s business-empire was the fact that following
the deal of a merger of YUKOS with Roman Abramovich’s giant
SIBNEFT (April 2003) negotiations began on the sale of the blocking
equity participation of the joined company with ChevronTexaco and
ExxonMobil. The successful negotiations meant the transfer of
Khodorkovsky’s business-empire to the high league of transnational
corporations, and its owner himself, having entered the Areopagus of
the global entrepreneur elite could become practically invulnerable and
untouchable for the Russian authorities. The loss of political and legal
control of the Kremlin over the crucially important asset of the Russian
oil industry could bring about not only a sharp growth of the alternative
center of influence on the country’s economy and policy, but also a
revision of the very formula of neopatrimonial capitalism. The success
of Khodorkovsky’s project should have opened the gates to convert
property into political power, and the latter – into new property. There
is not enough grounds to believe that this spectacular deal was planned
by Khodorkovsky in order to do away once and for all with patrimonial
relations, corruption and the specific instruments of Russian business in
the 1990s.
By the fall of 2003, when the confrontation between the Kremlin
and YUKOS ended with the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and
Platon Lebedev, it was found out that the authorities had exhausted all
sound legal instruments to complete this struggle. The YUKOS
Company has been able to put up serious resistance to the Russian
government pressure, which is shown by the multi-billion claims
presented to Russia by its shareholders. The obvious political
background if the sentence on Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon
1
Panyushkin V. Uznik tishiny. Istoriya pro to, kak cheloveku v Rossii stat
svobodnym i chto emu za eto budet = Prisoner of Silence: Story about How Man Can
Become Free in Russia and What He Will Have to Pay for It. – Moscow: Sekret firmy,
2006. – P. 21.
132
Lebedev explained the attitude to it of Russian citizens depending on
their political preferences. In many cases the criminal component of the
“YUKOS case” turned out to be beyond the framework within which
the supporters of some or other political positions were ready to regard
the Putin-Khodorkovsky confrontation.
According to a widespread view, the “YUKOS case” was a
major event in the first two terms of Putin’s power. In many ways it
could well be regarded the main dividing line. For one, the
consequences of Khodorkovsky’s arrest, YUKOS bankruptcy, and the
use of the virtual “Baikalfinancegroup” for the redistribution of the
basic YUKOS assets were of great importance for the relations of
Russia and the West. Naturally, the main reason for the tension that
arose between Russia and the West was not the arrest of the leader who
allegedly offered the Russian people a democratic alternative. Having
crushed Khodorkovsky’s business-empire Putin has clearly outlined the
bounds of the penetration of transnational and American capital in the
key sector of the Russian economy. The demonstration of the fact that
the master of property in Russia is the Russian power also meant that in
its foreign relations Moscow would resolutely claim equal partnership.
Besides, the “YUKOS case” coincided with the first diplomatic
opposition of Moscow to American invasion of Iraq. From that time on,
a possibility of possible integration of Russia in the American system of
global management, which was examined seriously enough during the
first two years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist act ceased to be
considered by leading world actors as a real option.
The Khodorkovsky-Lebedev affair has become a serious political
event for the Russian liberally-minded public. Back in 1999 the
electoral bloc “Union of Right Forces” which took the baton of liberal
ideology from the “Democratic Choice of Russia” undertook active and
relatively successful efforts in order to join the future Putin’s coalition
of winners. Approving the resumption of military hostilities in
Chechnya, the leaders of the Alliance hoped to see a new Pinochet in
Putin, who would not only suppress separatism, but also break internal
opposition to the neoliberal economic course. As a result, the “Union of
Right Forces” (URF) overcame the 5-percent barrier and formed its
own faction at the State Duma (the lower house of Parliament).
However, the presence of liberally-minded figures in the government,
133
who were ready and willing to continue the course of the Gaidar’
reforms were in no way connected with the electoral success of the
URF. In the 2003 elections it was not enough to support the actions of
the authorities, but it was also necessary to formulate one’s own
attitude to all major aspects of policy, including the campaign against
the YUKOS Company. It was necessary to dissociate from
Khodorkovsky and support Putin, although with certain reservations,
or, on the contrary, to make the overthrown oligarch their banner and
resolutely break up with the existing ruling regime. The URF leadership
was not bold enough to do either one or the other, although under the
pressure of the opposition information mainstream it was forced to
denounce the actions of the authorities against the YUKOS
management.
The image of regime victim, the courageous behavior of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky at the trial and in prison camp and his talent of a
political analyst have largely contributed to the growing respect of this
man on the part of liberal-minded people. However, these positive
feelings proved rather controversial. Respect for Khodorkovsky as a
courageous fighter against the ruling regime made it possible to put
forward several different interpretations of the past activities of the
disgraced oligarch. In one case, one could speak of the insight of the
new management of the YUKOS Company, who decided to renounce
once and for all the old methods of the accumulation of wealth and
sacrifice their assets and freedom for the sake of establishing
democratic institutions, rule of law and free market based on honest
competition in Russia. In another case, it was necessary to present
Khodorkovsky’s business as a miraculous exception among business
ventures of other oligarchs. Finally, the third strategy presupposed
apologetics of the Russian financial oligarchy as one of the excesses of
the historically inevitable stage of the primitive accumulation of capital.
All these strategies were based on a whole number of reservations and
defaults and thus they proved vulnerable to both the supporters of the
existing authorities and to those who did not recognize legitimate the
redistribution of property undertaken in the 1990-s despite the sad
plight of Khodorkovsky.
After his arrest, the so-called systemic liberals have found
themselves in a rather delicate situation. Although this term emerged
134
only at the end of the first decade of this century, the arrival of systemic
liberals in the Russian political arena can be synchronized with the
coming to power of Vladimir Putin. Throughout the 1990-s the
neoliberal reformers had the opportunity to exert considerable, if not
decisive, influence on choosing strategic development direction for
Russia. Under Putin, they continued to use this influence, however, it
was already the influence of executors or supervisors within the
framework of any system or subsystem controlled by other forces.
Sometimes things were going as far as to their readiness to fulfill the role
offered by the authorities, which could hardly have been tackled by any
ideologically motivated state-oriented political figure. A case in point
was the participation of one of the main organizers of “loans for shares”
scheme Alfred Koch in establishing government control over the NTV
television channel owned by Vladimir Gusinsky. For real democratic
reformers with the perestroika spirit, like, say, Yuri Afanasyev, such
“systemic liberalism” was tantamount to collaborationism1. Along with
unfolding the YUKOS case, accusations levelled against systemic
liberals of collaborationism from the radical enemies of the regime
became ever more resolute. It was more difficult to find convincing
arguments to approve the active participation of systemic liberals in the
vertical of power.
The traditional self-defense of systemic liberals boiled down to
the contention that participation in bodies of power or cooperation with
them makes it possible to minimize damage from “a turn to
authoritarianism,” preserve the basic gains of the 1990-s, and prevent
the total domination of representatives of law-enforcement agencies in
the key sectors of the economy and the abolition of the autonomy of
civil society. Along with this, appeal was preserved to the Pinochet
model, allowing to make socio-economic transformations under the
protection of the security and military services - something which the
liberal forces were unable to achieve through free elections. Finally,
the thesis was put forward from time to time that the very existence of
systemic liberals would contribute to a softening and further on a
1
Afanasyev Y. Vozmozhna li segodnya v Rossii liberalnaya missiya? =
Is Liberal Mission Possible in Russia Today? // Kontinent. – 2011. – N 148. – Mode of
access: http://magazines.russ.ru/continent/2011/148/a51.html
135
change of the regime. The “YUKOS case,” as well as the forced
resignation of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov in February 2004 gave
enough grounds to speak of the degeneration of liberals themselves
continuing to stay in the ruling bodies. In essence, at the beginning of
the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin the pact between the
elites was revised and in accordance with the new version systemic
liberals were not only given, on the outsourcing basis, some major
spheres of economic, social and scientific and educational policies, but
they were duty bound to be drawn in the system of relations between
branches of power. At the same time, having stopped to occupy key
positions in the high echelons of state power, they did not turn into a
screen to cover the consolidation of the autocratic ruling regime. The
systemic liberals rather play the role of some balance beams or cut-outs
allowing the authorities to avoid the overstrengthening of other interest
groups or keep their confrontation within an acceptable framework.
* * *
In 2018 the Putin’s “deoligarchisation” turned fifteen-years-old.
No doubt, without it, and the struggle accompanying it, the
development trajectory of Russia would have been considerably
different. The outcome of the struggle, above all, meant that the
removal of a serious threat to the vertical of power and the latter
remains on the present dominating position. In a way it can be regarded
a return to the Russian “historical rut,” or a system of relations
formulated by Emperor Paul I in the latter half of the 18th century: “Il
n’y a de grand chez moi celui je parle et pendant que je lui parle.” (He
spoke in French) [“There is no important person in Russia apart from
one to whom I talk and while I talk to one”]. Anyway, at the beginning
of the 21st century possession of a really big property in Russia is
possible only on the actual permission of the political power and only
until this permission is valid. A possibility of conversion of property
into political influence, if not completely abolished, is reliably
restricted. It can be said that these restrictions have been established
quite in time: the first of the so-called color revolutions in the postSoviet area – the “rose revolution” in Georgia – broke out one month
136
later after the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Meanwhile, one of the
most important mechanisms of developing political crises called “color
revolutions” is the readiness of some or other groups of the economic
elite of a given country to render a sizable resource support to the
forces striving to seize power. In the absence of this crucial factor
outside pressure aimed at destabilization or change of the ruling regime
proves ineffective. This is why the weakening of oligarchs’ influence
should be a must for strengthening the sovereignty of Russia as one of
the most important international actors.
137
DMITRY V. EFREMENKO
RUSSIAN GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES
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