Филос. науки / Russ. J. Philos. Sci. 2019. 62(7)
I.Y. BULOV. Contemporary Concept Nativism: Some Methodological Remarks
Contemporary Concept Nativism:
Some Methodological Remarks
Современный нативизм идей:
некоторые методологические замечания
I.Y. Bulov
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, Russia
DOI:
Review article
Abstract
The innate knowledge problem is a classical problem in philosophy,
which has been known since the classical antiquity. Plato in his dialogues
Meno and Phaedo formulated the doctrine of innate ideas and proposed an
early version of the poverty of the stimulus argument, which is the most frequently used argument in innate knowledge debates. In the history of philosophy there was also an opposite view. This approach is often associated
with J. Locke’s philosophy. Locke thought that all our knowledge about the
world is a product of the universal learning mechanisms whose functioning
is based on perception. The question about the presence of innate ideas in
the human mind still remains relevant. New findings in cognitive science
and neurosciences and also some recent arguments from philosophers contribute to the contemporary discussion between the spokesmen of the rival
approaches to this problem. The paper presents the investigation of one of
the approaches to solving the problem of innate concepts, which is called a
“concept nativism.” It highlights the outstanding characteristics of the concept nativism: 1) domain specificity position, 2) belief that domain-specific
mechanisms of learning are innate and 3) belief that at least some concepts
are innate. The article also proposes an analysis of notions “innateness” and
“idea” which is important for understanding nativists’ approach to innate
ideas theory. And finally, it describes the most popular nativists’ arguments:
1) references to empirical studies using the preferential looking technique,
2) the poverty of the stimulus argument and 3) the argument from animals.
Keywords: ideas, innateness, nativism, domain specificity, poverty of
the stimulus, modularity, empiricism.
Ilya Y. Bulov – postgraduate student at the Institute of Philosophy,
Russian Academy of Sciences.
bulovilya@gmail.com
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7212-2395
For citation: Bulov I.Y. (2019) Contemporary Concept Nativism: Some
Methodological Remarks. Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences =
Filosofskie nauki. Vol. 62, no. 7, pp. DOI:
96
И.Ю. Булов
Институт философии РАН, Москва, Россия
DOI:
Научный обзор
Аннотация
Проблема врожденного знания – классическая философская проблема, известная еще с античности. Платон в своих диалогах «Менон» и «Федон» сформулировал концепцию врожденных идей и предложил раннюю версию аргумента от бедности стимула – наиболее
распространенного аргумента в спорах о врожденных идеях. Платон
считал, что усвоение идей происходит не за счет процессов обучения,
а является следствием припоминания уже имеющегося в нас знания. В
истории философии существовала и противоположная точка зрения,
известная нам, прежде всего, благодаря философии Дж. Локка. Локк
считал, что абсолютно все наше знание о мире является продуктом
универсальных механизмов обучения, работа которых обеспечивается перцептивными данными. Вопрос о существовании врожденных
идей и сегодня не теряет актуальности. Новые данные из когнитивной
науки и нейронаук, а также свежие аргументы философов, способствуют продолжению обстоятельной дискуссии между представителями конкурирующих подходов к данному вопросу. Статья посвящена
исследованию одного из подходов к решению проблемы врожденных
идей – современному нативизму идей. Отмечаются его характерные
особенности: 1) концепция местной специализированности, 2) вера во
врожденность местно-специализированных механизмов обучения и
3) вера в наличие как минимум нескольких врожденных идей. Также
проводится анализ понятий «врожденность» и «идея», проясняющий
смысл нативистского подхода к теории врожденных идей, и излагаются наиболее частые аргументы сторонников нативизма: 1) ссылки на
эмпирические исследования, использующие метод зрительных предпочтений, 2) аргумент от бедности стимула и 3) аргумент от животных.
Ключевые слова: идея, врожденное, нативизм, местная специализированность, бедность стимула, модулярность, эмпиризм.
Булов Илья Юрьевич – аспирант Института философии РАН.
bulovilya@gmail.com
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7212-2395
97
Филос. науки / Russ. J. Philos. Sci. 2019. 62(7)
Философия сознания
Для цитирования: Булов И.Ю. (2019) Современный нативизм идей:
некоторые методологические замечания // Философские науки. 2019.
Т. 62. № 7. С. DOI:
Introduction
The innate knowledge problem is a classical problem in philosophy,
which has been known since Plato’s works. Plato in his dialogues Meno
and Phaedo formulated the innate concepts doctrine and proposed an
early version of the poverty of the stimulus argument, which is the
most frequently used argument in innate knowledge debates nowadays.
Nonetheless, the discussion around the question of innate concepts is
more strongly associated with the works of modern era philosophers,
such as Descartes, Locke, Hume or Leibniz.
From the Locke and Hume time and up to the middle of the 20th
century empiricism was the dominant approach (at least in science).
After that, the Chomsky’s early works started the so-called “nativist
turn,” which resulted in the revival of those old debates about concepts
making it crucial for contemporary metaphysics.
As a result, nativism [Carey 2009; Chomsky 1965; Fodor 1983;
Margolis & Laurence 2013] has become the most influential view in
science and philosophy. Nevertheless, in recent days we can observe
the resurrection of empiricism in the works of many scientists and
philosophers [Barsalou 1999; Barsalou 2018; Clark 1993; Cowie 1999;
Damasio 1989; Prinz 2002], criticizing the nativist approach. The new
empiricism movement is often called “neo-empiricism.”
But what was that convincing in the nativism of the 20th century, so
it put the end to the long empiricist rule (at least until recent times)? I
believe it is the union of the appealing theory and the sound arguments.
In the first part of the article, I have described the crucial features of
modern nativism. In the second part, I have clarified terms “concepts”
and “innateness.” In the third part, I have described the most popular
nativists’ arguments.
Contemporary theory
At first, one may think that modern concept nativism is about innate
concepts (1) (or innate cognitive structures) (2). It is partially true due
to historical nativism (Plato, Descartes). But most of the contemporary
scientists and philosophers can agree that today concept nativism is
something more than just a belief in the existence of innate concepts
[Cowie 1999, 3–25; Laurence & Margolis 2015]. The reason why it
98
I.Y. BULOV. Contemporary Concept Nativism: Some Methodological Remarks
should be more, as it was noticed by nativism theorists Laurence and
Margolis, is that modern empiricists may also assume the existence of
some innate concepts [Laurence & Margolis 2015, 118]. Quine once
noted that even a behaviorist “is knowingly and cheerfully up to his
neck in innate mechanisms” [Quine 1969, 95–96].
Hence, there must be something else to differentiate concept empiricism
and concept nativism from each other. And the best candidate for this role
is domain specificity, which was offered in 20th century by contemporary
nativists. So, the essential distinction between concept nativism and
concept empiricism is the idea of domain specificity.
The domain specificity hypothesis can be called the most noticeable
feature of modern nativism. It, on the one hand, differentiates the new
concept nativism versions from the historical ones (e.g. Cartesian
concept nativism) and, on the other hand, draws the tangible border
between modern concept nativism and neo-empiricism. The empiricist
approach assumes the universal learning mechanism as opposed
to nativists’ domain specificity [Prinz 2005]. Basically, the domain
specificity hypothesis states that the human mind has the different
learning and processing mechanisms for the different types of
information (more about domain specificity in [Baer 2016; Cowie 1999;
Gelman 200]). These mechanisms can also be called “modules,” if we
follow Fodor’s terminology [Fodor 1983].
Domain specificity helps nativists to solve the poverty of stimulus
problem, which was initially presented in modern science and
philosophy by Noam Chomsky (3) [Chomsky 1986]. Chomsky’s argues
that the process of language acquisition is so effective that it cannot
happen just through universal learning rules. Lacking of information
about the sophisticated syntax rules simply would not allow a child to
acquire his native language so fast if there were only universal rules.
We can express the poverty of the stimulus problem this way.
In the process of development, the information of the type T in the
amount A was acquired.
As a result, the rule R was formed.
The rule R allows its carrier to process the information of the type T
promptly and efficiently.
However, it seems that the amount A of information is not enough
to form the rule R.
Let us presume it was formed through the basic (not specialized)
learning mechanisms and input systems.
How R was formed?
99
Филос. науки / Russ. J. Philos. Sci. 2019. 62(7)
Философия сознания
The domain specificity hypothesis, as nativists claim, let us solve
this puzzle [Simpson et al. 2005, 6–7]. It explains why children acquire
a certain set of rules (e.g., language grammar) so fast despite a lack
of learning. According to nativist approach, specialized mechanisms
and dedicated input systems are better suited for acquiring information
of various types. The main assumption is that the certain specialized
type of acquisition mechanism, which corresponds to a certain type of
information, provides better learning in a shorter period of time than
a mechanism governed by universal rules.
Nativists traditionally think that concepts can occur as a product of
domain-specific learning mechanisms despite the lack (or absence) of
learning. In other words, they accept the innate concepts hypothesis.
Laurence and Margolis notice that innate concepts hypothesis is a crucial
part of contemporary nativism [Laurence & Margolis 2015, 118].
We should also specify that these domain-specific mechanisms are
innate in the most concept nativists’ theories. That assertion allows us to
distinguish nativism and certain forms of concept empiricism that claim
that under certain conditions the domain specificity can emerge as a
product of the universal learning mechanism [Karmiloff-Smith 1992].
As is clear from the above, the theoretical basis of modern nativism
of ideas includes three inherent propositions.
1. The leading principle of the mind architecture is domain
specificity.
2. Domain-specific mechanisms of the mind are innate.
3. At least some concepts derived from domain-specific modules
are innate.
Concepts and innateness
It still remains unclear what exactly terms “concept” and “innate”
mean. That is why we should clarify them to further examine
contemporary nativism. Despite the fact that there are quite different
views on the structure of concepts [Prinz 2002], we can say that some
philosophers and cognitive scientists still have some basic conventional
characterization of concepts. Today hardly anyone will challenge
John Locke’s definition of concepts as the “materials of reason and
knowledge” [Locke1823, 60] or reject the contemporary empiricist
Jessy Prinz’s characterization of concepts as “constituents of thoughts”
[Prinz 2002, 2]. Many other researchers of this problem gave similar
descriptions. For example, Susan Carey calls concepts “units of thought”
[Carey 2009, 5], and K. Solomon, D. Medin and E. Lynch wrote that
100
I.Y. BULOV. Contemporary Concept Nativism: Some Methodological Remarks
concepts are “building blocks of thought” [Solomon, Medin, & Lynch
1999, 99], etc. (4).
The main advantage of this characterization is that it, on the one
hand, refers to a concrete phenomenon and, on the other hand, leaves
room for discussion [Prinz 2002, 2].
As for the term “innateness,” on the contrary, there is heated debate
around it. It is quite common and intuitive to put an equal sign between
innate and genetic. However, this reasoning sometimes turns out to
be counterproductive for innate concepts discussions. After all, the
chain of amino acids (that is, proteins) is the only object with which it
is possible to more or less correctly match genes. But comparing genes
with concepts and other phenomena of mind encounters a number of
methodological difficulties. As Peter Godfrey-Smith observes, genes
do not describe but prescribe (with varying degrees of probability)
whether a particular trait will appear or not [Godfrey-Smith 1999,
328]. Therefore, genes are incorrectly regarded as a blueprint of an
individual’s traits. Nonetheless, it is quite reasonable to present DNA
as a set of causes leading to emergence of a certain traits. But, as we
know, genes are not the only reason for the formation of a trait. For
instance, to form secondary sexual characteristics, besides certain
genes, an organism also has to get proper nutrition. Moreover, different
traits can be formed under the influence of the same genes. For
example, studies show [Pieau et al. 1994] that turtles Emys orbicularis
“choose” their sex depending on the temperature at which the egg
resides (for a review of similar examples see: [Gilbert 2003]). And
vice versa, different genes can contribute to the formation of the same
phenotype. In biology this phenomenon is called “genetic heterogeneity”
[Matthew & Michael 2013].
Therefore, the assumption of the strict causal correspondence
between gene(s) and trait seems too simplified, and referring to the
corresponding group of genes seems to be insufficient reason to call
a certain concept innate.
The lack of a unified definition of “innate” has given rise to many
opinions about which features should be called innate. Some authors
even argue that usage of the term “innate” is just a manifestation of
naive biological essentialism. Hence, “innate” should be regarded as
a term from folk biology [Griffiths 2002].
Despite the fact that there are many interpretations of “innate,”
concept nativists most often use the lack of learning approach as well
as the ostensive approach to the definition of this term.
101
Филос. науки / Russ. J. Philos. Sci. 2019. 62(7)
Философия сознания
The lack of learning approach described by Khalidi [Khalidi 2002;
Khalidi 2007] implies that we call a trait innate if that trait was
formed despite the insufficient (poor) environmental impact required
for the formation of this trait. In other words, according to the lack of
learning approach, if a trait emerged despite the insufficient learning
or a lack of learning, we assume it is innate. Innate traits with this
approach are most often considered as evolutionary adaptations to the
environment.
One of the most famous supporters of this approach is Noam
Chomsky (“The speed and precision of vocabulary acquisition leaves
no real alternative to the conclusion that the child somehow has the
concepts available before experience with language” [Chomsky 1988,
28]). Another one is cognitive scientist Susan Carey (“As I use the term,
innateness is interdefined with learning: innate representations are
those that are not the output of learning processes” [Carey 2009, 11]).
Proponents of the ostensive approach believe it is enough to use
the term “innate” if we simply pointed out where and when it takes
place. The full description of “innate” will be elaborated in further
investigations. T. Simpson, P. Carruthers, S. Laurence and S. Stich can
be ranked: “Just as we can investigate the phenomena of locomotion,
memory, chemical interaction, or planetary movement without fully
explicit characterizations of the kinds involved, so too with innateness”
[Simpson et al. 2005, 5].
Nativists’ arguments
Since concept nativists make statements about the structure of
cognitive reality, the most basic and obvious argumentation strategy
for them is to refer to empirical results from cognitive science. Today
this argumentation type is especially easy to use, since nowadays
there are plenty of studies testing hypothesis of innateness of such
concepts as physical qualities of an object (e.g. object continuity
[Aguiar & Baillargeon 1999; Kellman & Spelke 1983; Spelke
1990; Spelke et al. 1995] or knowledge about the qualities of solid,
soft and fluid objects [Rips & Hespos 2015]), number and count
[Brannon 2002; Brannon, Abbott, & Lutz 2004; Dehaene 1990; Lipton
& Spelke 2003; Lipton & Spelke 2004; McCrink & Wynn 2004;
Wood & Spelke 2005; Xu & Spelke 2000; Xu & Spelke 2005], agency
[Hamlin 2015; Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey 2005; Tomasello et al. 2005],
causality [Cohen & Oakes 1993; Michotte 1963; Muentner & Carey
2010; Saxe & Carey 2006], grammar [Chomsky 1986; Crain & Pie-
102
I.Y. BULOV. Contemporary Concept Nativism: Some Methodological Remarks
troski 2001; Crain & Thorton 1998; Pinker 1994], etc. [Margolis &
Laurence 2013, 694]. The vast majority of these studies are based on
the preferential looking method, which was suggested by Robert L.
Fantz [Fantz 1958; Fantz 1961; Fantz 1963; Fantz 1964; Fantz, Ordy,
& Udelf 1962]. In the series of experiments, Fantz demonstrated that
in general children look longer at more heterogeneous surfaces or at
objects with more complex patterns and look less at homogeneous
surfaces or at objects with simple patterns. Researches usually combine
this method with the habituation technique (5). In a later study, Fantz
added habituation to a preferential looking experiment. This allowed
him to identify a subject’s visual preferences in cases where the time
of observation of objects was initially the same due to the novelty of
the objects.
Hunter and Ames later summarized these results and concluded
that children (taking into account their age, IQ, etc.) after habituation
tend to look longer at an object or a situation if it seems complex or
unusual to them [Hunter & Ames 1988].
Thus, if situation after habituation seems unusual to a child, then it
is not something he already knows. From that nativists conclude that
some physical law or a logical operation occurring in the experimental
situation is not innate. And vice versa, if a child seems to be familiar
with the property/law/operation then this property/law/operation is
likely to be classified as innate.
Of course, the preferential looking method, like all scientific,
methods has its limitations. For instance, we cannot know for sure
why children stare longer at some situation or object. It may turn out
that they find it generally more interesting (even after habituation)
than the other ones and not because they think it is odder [Prinz 2005].
Reproducibility of some experiments is also very low. For the
review of all limitations of the preferential looking technique see:
[Munakata 2000].
Another nativists’ argument is the argument from the poverty of
the stimulus. It is undoubtedly the most popular argument among
nativists. The structure of the poverty of the stimulus argument is
such that we take the poverty of the stimulus problem discussed above
and show that the best solution of this problem is domain specificity
(i.e. modular structure of the mind). N. Chomsky proposed the most
revealing versions of this argument in his famous paper criticizing the
B. Skinner’s theory of language acquisition [Chomsky 1959]. Chomsky’s
argument can be represented as follows.
103
Филос. науки / Russ. J. Philos. Sci. 2019. 62(7)
Философия сознания
1. There is a set of different possible grammars, which can be
hypothesized by a child from the primary linguistic data (6).
2. There is no guarantee that the grammar learned by the child would
be simpler and more natural than the possible alternatives.
3. Usually there is a lack of evidences that the grammar learned by
the child is the one she should pick from the possible alternatives.
4. Hence, if children used universal learning principle (hypothesis
testing), they would never acquire the correct grammar of their
language.
5. The overwhelming majority of children do acquire the correct
grammar of their language.
Conclusion:
6. Therefore, children do not use universal learning principles when
they acquire language. And if so, a child’s mind must be equipped
with some specialized learning mechanism or principle helping him to
acquire the correct grammar of the language (adapted from [Laurence
& Margolis 2001, 22]).
As, we can see, the main reason of this argument is to show that
the process of language acquisition is so effective because it cannot
happen without some specialized inner machinery. This specialized
inner machinery (or “language acquisition device” in Chomsky’s
terminology) hypothesis, as Chomsky suppose, is the best explanation
of how we learn so sophisticated rules of grammar in so short period
in our childhood with a lack of proper instructions and deficiency of
negative evidences (parents usually do not correct their children’s
ungrammatical sentences frequently enough). Some later studies of
linguistic universals came to the same conclusions [Crain & Pietroski
2001; Crain & Thorton 2000].
The third argument that nativists use is the argument from animals.
The argument from animals is more basic. But it is usually combined
with empirical evidence. The argument can be represented in the
following form.
A. All animals are equipped with specialized learning mechanisms.
B. Human is an animal.
Conclusion:
С. Human is equipped with specialized learning mechanisms.
To strengthen (A), one appeals to the studies showing that different
types of animals have different mechanisms for the formation of
associations for different modalities, and that implies the domainspecific structure of their learning mechanisms [Margolis & Laurence
104
I.Y. BULOV. Contemporary Concept Nativism: Some Methodological Remarks
2013, 703–704]. Rats, for example, associate food poisoning primarily
with the taste of food and not with its color or smell. At the same time,
rats being exposed to electricity associated this effect with visual and
auditory stimuli [Garcia & Koelling 1966].
The first statement in this argumentation seems quite weak. And
despite the fact that Laurence and Margolis in their paper gave lots
of evidence, it is still perceived as doubtful. Mainly because there
is a lack of studies dedicated to specialized learning mechanisms of
non-human apes, which are much closer to us then rats or squirrels.
Moreover, this argument only works if we assume in (A) that all animals
have specialized learning mechanisms. It seems that such a strong
assumption can hardly be supported by equally strong evidence.
Only the most universal and frequent arguments of the nativists
were mentioned above. There are many other arguments. However, all
of them are strongly tied to a theory of a particular researcher. That is
why their presentation requires a description of these theories which
goes far beyond the scope of the present work.
Conclusion
Thus, modern nativism can be defined as a hypothesis that our mind
has many innate specialized learning mechanisms, the presence of
which contributes to the formation of specific concepts. The concepts
here are understood as “constituents of thought.” Nativists usually
say that a certain concept is innate if it was formed despite the lack of
learning, or sometimes they simply define it ostensively.
In defense of their position, nativists most often use the
following arguments: 1) references to empirical studies using
the preferential looking technique, 2) the argument from the poverty
of the stimulus and 3) the argument from animals.
The four leading versions of modern nativism of ideas are fertile
ground for further research: linguistic nativism of Chomsky, Fodor’s
radical concept nativism, moderate nativism of Carey and syncretic
nativism of Laurence and Margolis.
NOTES
(1) The terms “cognitive structure” and “concepts” can be used here
interchangeably. Further I give the characterization that satisfies both
terms.
(2) Historical nativism is sometimes called “rationalism.” Nevertheless,
there is a risk of confounding two different entities. The term “rationalism”
is also used for the rationalist position in the modern era debates about
105
Филос. науки / Russ. J. Philos. Sci. 2019. 62(7)
Философия сознания
the justification of knowledge. Hence, I ignore this term to avoid any
confusions.
(3) The very first mention of this problem was in Plato’s dialogue Meno.
That fact was highlighted by Chomsky when he called the poverty of the
stimulus problem “Plato’s problem” [Chomsky 1986, 7].
(4) Outstanding in this series is the concept eliminativism of E. Machery,
who considers concepts as fruitless and meaningless term [Machery 2009].
(5) The habituation technique involves a preliminary demonstration
of the object to the subject. This allows researchers to reduce the time of
observation of the demonstrated object, that is, the level of its novelty for
the subject.
(6) The term “primary language data” here means information about the
grammar of the language received by the child in the learning process. Those
who use argument from the poverty of the stimulus usually indicate that
such information is not enough for the child to build the correct hypothesis
about the grammar of a child’s native language.
REFERENCES
Aguiar A. & Baillargeon R. (1999) 2.5-Month-Old Infants Reasoning
about When Objects Should and Should Not Be Occluded. Cognitive Psychology. Vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 116–157.
Baer J. (2016) Domain specificity of creativity. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Barsalou L.W. (1999) Perceptual Symbol Systems. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences. Vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 577–609.
Barsalou L. W. (2017) Cognitively Plausible Theories of Concept Composition. In: Hampton J. & Winter Y (Eds.) Compositionality and Concepts
in Linguistics and Psychology. Language, Cognition, and Mind (vol 3,
pp. 9–30). Cham: Springer.
Brannon E.M. (2002) The Development of Ordinal Numerical Knowledge in Infancy. Cognition. Vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 223–240.
Brannon E.M., Abbott S. & Lutz D. (2004) Number Bias for the Discrimination of Large Visual Sets in Infancy. Cognition. Vol. 93, no. 2,
pp. B59–B68.
Carey S. (2011) The Origin of Concepts. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Chomsky N. (1957) Review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior. Language.
Vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 26–58.
Chomsky N. (1986) Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and
Use. New York: Praeger.
Chomsky N. (1988) Language and Problems of Knowledge: The Managua Lectures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cohen L.B. & Oakes L.M. (1993) How Infants Perceive a Simple Causal
Event. Developmental Psychology. Vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 421–433.
106
I.Y. BULOV. Contemporary Concept Nativism: Some Methodological Remarks
Cowie F. (1999) What’s Within: Nativism Reconsidered. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Crain S. & Pietroski P. (2001) Nature, Nurture, and Universal Grammar.
Linguistic and Philosophy. Vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 139–186.
Crain S. & Thornton R. (2000) Investigations in Universal Grammar:
A Guide to Experiments on the Acquisition of Syntax and Semantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dehaene S. (1997)The Number Sense. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Fantz R. (1958) Pattern Vision in Young Infants. Psychological Record.
Vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 43–47.
Fantz R. (1961) The Origin of Form Perception. Scientific American.
Vol. 204, no. 5, pp. 66–72.
Fantz R. (1963) Pattern Vision in Newborn Infants. Science. Vol. 140,
no. 3564, pp. 296–297.
Fantz R. (1964) Visual Experience in Infants: Decreased Attention to
Familiar Patterns Relative to Novel Ones. Science. Vol. 146, no. 3644,
pp. 668–670.
Fantz R., Ordy J., & Udelf M. (1962) Maturation of pattern vision in infants during the first six months. Journal of Comparative and Physiological
Psychology. Vol. 55(6),pp. 907–917.
Fodor J. (1983) The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Garcia J., Koelling R. (1966) The Relation of Cue to Consequence in
Avoidance Learning. Psychonomic Science. Vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 123–124.
Gelman R. (2000) Domain Specificity and Variability in Cognitive Development. Child Developmant. Vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 854–856.
Gilbert S. (2010) Sex Determination. In: Gilbert S. (Ed.) Developmental
Biology (10th ed.) (pp. 511–540). Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.
Godfrey-Smith P. (1999) Genes and Codes: Lessons from the Philosophy
of Mind? In: Hardcastle V. (Ed.) Biology Meets Psychology: Constraints,
Conjectures, Connections (pp. 305–331). Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
Griffiths P. E. (2002) What is Innateness? The Monist. Vol. 85, no. 1,
pp. 70–85.
Hamlin J. (2015) Does the Infant Possess a Moral Concept? In: Margolis
E. & Laurence S. (Eds.) The Conceptual Mind: New Directions in the Study
of Concepts (pp. 477–518). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hunter M. & Ames E. (1988) A Multifactor Model of Infant Preferences
for Novel and Familiar Stimuli. In: Rovee-Collier C. & Lipsitt L.P. (Eds.)
Advances in infancy research (vol. 5, pp. 69–95). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Karmiloff-Smith A. (1992) Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kellman P. & Spelke E. (1983) Perception of Partly Occluded Objects in
Infancy. Cognitive Psycology. Vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 483–524.
107
Филос. науки / Russ. J. Philos. Sci. 2019. 62(7)
Философия сознания
Khalidi M.A. (2002) Nature and Nurture in Cognition. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 53, no. 2, pp.251–272.
Khalidi M. (2007) Innate Cognitive Capacities. Mind & Language.
Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 92–115.
Laurence S. & Margolis E. (2001) The Poverty of the Stimulus Argument. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 52, no. 206,
pp. 217–276.
Laurence S. & Margolis E. (2015) Concept Nativism and Neural Plasticity. In: Laurence S. & Margolis E. (Eds.) The Conceptual Mind: New Directions in the Study of Concepts (pp. 117–147). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lipton J. & Spelke E. (2003) Origins of Number Sense: Large Number
Discrimination in Human Infants. Psychological Science. Vol. 15, no. 5,
pp. 396–401.
Lipton J. & Spelke E. (2004) Discrimination of Large and Small Numerosities by Human Infants. Infancy. Vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 271–290.
Locke J. (1823) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (24th ed.).
London: D. Cartwright.
Machery E. (2009) Doing Without Concepts. New York: Oxford University Press.
Margolis E. & Laurence S. (2013) In Defense of Nativism. Philosophical
Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition.
Vol. 165, no. 2, pp. 693–718.
Matthew J. & Michael M. (2013) Heterozygote Testing and Carrier Screening. In: Rimoin D., Pyeritz R., & Korf B. (Eds.) Emery and Rimoin’s Principles and Practice of Medical Genetics (pp. 80–81). London: Elsevier.
McClelland J. & Rumelhart D. (1986) Parallel Distributed Processing.
Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 2: Psychological
and Biological Models. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
McCrink K. & Wynn K. (2004) Large-Number addition and subtraction
by 9-month old infants. Psychological Science. Vol. 15, no. 11, pp. 776–
781.
Michotte A. (1963) The Perception of Causality. New York: Basic
Books.
Muentner P. & Carey S. (2010) Infants’ Causal Representations of State
Change Events. Cognitive Psychology. Vol. 61, no. 2, pp.63–86.
Pieau C., Girondot N., Richard-Mercier G., Desvages M., Dorizzi P., &
Zaborski P. (1994) Temperature Sensitivity of Sexual Differentiation of
Gonads in the European Pond Turtle. Journal of Experimental Zoology.
Vol. 270, no. 1, pp. 86–94.
Pinker S. (1994) The Language Instinct: The New Science of Language
and Mind. London: Penguin.
Prinz J. (2002) Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
108
I.Y. BULOV. Contemporary Concept Nativism: Some Methodological Remarks
Prinz J. (2005) The Return of Concept Empiricism. In: Cohen H. &
Leferbvre C. (Eds.) Handbook of Categorization and Cognitive Science
(pp.679–695). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Quine W.V.O (1969) Linguistics and Philosophy. In: Hook S. (Ed.) Language and Philosophy: A Symposium (pp. 95–98). New York: NYU Press.
Rips L. & Hespos S. (2015) Divisions of the Physical World: Concepts
of Objects and Substances. Psychological Bulletin. Vol. 141, no. 4, pp. 786–
811.
Saxe R. & Carey S. (2006) The Perception of Causality in Infancy. Acta
Psychologica. Vol. 123, no. 1–2, pp.144–165.
Saxe R., Tenenbaum J., & Carey S. (2005) Secret Agents: 10 and
12-Month-Olds Infer an Unseen Cause of the Motion of an Inanimate Object. Psychological Science. Vol. 16, no. 12, pp. 995–1001.
Simpson T., Carruthers P., Laurence S., & Stich S. (2005) Nativism Past
and Present. In: Carruthers P., Laurence S., & Stich S. (Eds.) The Innate
Mind: Structure and Contents (pp. 3–19). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Solomon K., Medin D., & Lynch E. (1999) Concepts Do More than Categorize. Trends in Cognitive Science. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 99–105.
Spelke E. (1990) Principles of Object Perception. Cognitive Science.
Vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 29–56.
Spelke E., Kestenbaum R., Simons D., & Wein D. (1995) Spatiotemporal
Continuity, Smoothness of Motion and Object Identity in Infancy. The British Journal of Developmental Psychology. Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 113–142.
Tomasello M., Carpenter M., Call J., Behne T., & Moll H. (2005) Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition. Behavioral & Brain Sciences. Vol 28, no. 5, pp. 675–735.
Wood J. & Spelke E. (2005) Infants’ Enumeration of Actions: Numerical
Discrimination and Its Signature Limits. Developmental Science. Vol. 8, no. 2,
pp. 173–181.
Xu F. & Spelke E. (2000) Large Number Discrimination in 6-Month Old
Infants. Cognition. Vol. 74, no. 1, pp. B1–B11.
Xu F., Spelke E., & Goddard S. (2005) Number Sense in Human Infants.
Developmental Science. Vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 88–101.
109