Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2010
REVIEW ARTICLE
Aristotle, the Action Researcher
MARIANNA PAPASTEPHANOU
The Ways of Aristotle: Aristotelian Phronesis, Aristotelian Philosophy of
Dialogue, and Action Research. Olav Eikeland. Bern, Peter Lang, 2008. Pp. 560.
Pbk. d54.00.
This article discusses Olav Eikeland’s The Ways of Aristotle, a book that
takes stock of a whole range of Aristotelian themes and communicates
various complex Aristotelian ideas to impressive effect. What is distinctive
about the book is, amongst other things, that it provides valuable
exegetical material for the kind of interpretation that makes Aristotle’s
significance for action research stand out most convincingly. The article
approaches the material of the book with an eye to those Aristotelian
ideas and connections that usually pass unacknowledged in dominant
accounts. Thus, the article aspires to show that it is possible, with the aid
of Eikeland’s book, to defend the relevance of Aristotle to present-day
educational concerns in hitherto unexplored but henceforth fresh and
fertile ways.
The Ways of Aristotle reconstructs Aristotle’s philosophy as political,
educational and learning-oriented (p. 450) and deploys its significance for
action research innovatively and insightfully. The intersection of the terms
‘political’, ‘educational’ and ‘learning-oriented’ makes Olav Eikeland’s
approach to his material valuable for philosophy of education. This is not
only because all three of them are central to the discipline, but also, and
more, because politics, education and learning are nowadays often
connected in a rather impoverished discourse about knowledge- and
learning-societies. Thus, a book that enriches this discourse in such a
reflective, methodical and masterful way is very welcome.
Eikeland’s reading of Aristotle is refreshing in many respects. It adds
the necessary complexity and intricacy that is often missing when the
Aristotelian influence on educational action research and educational
philosophy is limited to a handful of concepts whose meaning is usually
taken to be uniform or well-worn. It sets the record straight regarding
many points of Aristotelian philosophy that have been misinterpreted in
ways crucial for our understanding of educational notions and for the
polemics we establish around them. It shows that those approaches to
Aristotle that favour a dichotomous thinking do not do justice to the
richness of Aristotelian thought, which resists reductive polarisations. And
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it demonstrates how Aristotelianism may help us set education centrestage in an age of limited direct philosophical interest in education’s
liberating and emancipatory potentials.
A most straightforward connection of education and politics can be
inferred negatively. Lack of education (apaideusia) combined with
authority (exousia) (p. 444) produces a mindlessness of extremely
dangerous implications. But although a sense of lack is the point of
departure for any Aristotelian endeavour toward knowledge and virtue, it
surely is not its endpoint. Apart from countering the disabling
repercussions of ignorance, a more positive task of political education is
to cultivate the enabling possibilities that are inherent in the ethical
formation of the human character. Yet, such Aristotelian ideas often
appear tarnished either by a supposed moralism and conventionalism or by
a supposed detached rationalism. It is no wonder that, for some
contemporary thinkers, Aristotle’s thought seems to deserve little more
than historical attention or even to attract sweeping and dismissive
comments. Eikeland’s penetrating look into the role that Aristotelianism
has, historically-educationally, played, sets the parameters within which
the corresponding schooling has moved and makes the necessity for
revisiting our views on Aristotle stand out more clearly:
Western institutions, and their divisions of labour, are undoubtedly partly
a product of how Aristotle has been interpreted through the centuries. But
his emphasis on practical experience and dialogue, as the ‘way’ to all
basic principles and ends, has hardly been understood nor heeded. Hence,
schools have been insulated from practical settings and filled with
didactic, deductive teaching much more than with dialogical learning (p.
461).
Against such interpretations or supposed applications of Aristotle,
Eikeland’s book constitutes an excellent exposition of the Aristotelian
philosophical architectonic and a springboard for philosophers of
education who may wish to examine various discussions—of theory and
practice, particularism versus universalism, means-ends rationality and
other such problems—from another perspective, one that Eikeland
convincingly presents as not yet adequately mined and perhaps
inexhaustibly rich.
The desire and the demand for wisdom both theoretical (Sophia) and
practical (phronesis) and for happiness as well-functioning (eupraxia),
have all in many ways reappeared as a serious concern for supporting
sustainable, well-functioning, reflecting, and learning communities of
practice in professional work . . . and social life in general (p. 464).
Therefore, what renders the Ways of Aristotle so topical is that the issues
raised within this context, far from being outdated, re-emerge as focal
points of praxis-based epistemology and action research, communicative
ethics, eudaemonist contextualist liberalism, transcendental pragmatics
and even redemptive politics and emancipatory, critical pedagogy. Being
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exegetical in its aims, the book itself avoids spelling out such implications.
But it invites them, nevertheless: through its compelling and all-round
exposition of those Aristotelian ideas that crop up in most contemporary
debates— surrounding phronesis in action research, the epistemic status of
the reflective practitioner, the relevance of philosophy to contemporary
educators qua researchers and the impact of postmodernism on
educational research methodology.
In fact, Eikeland’s demanding yet accessible work on Aristotle’s ideas
goes beyond the merely exegetical by offering a powerful interpretation
that brings theory and practice closer. Away from conventional interpretations, we find in this book a reconstruction of the inherently ethico-political
content of theoretical philosophy (p. 24). That there is no dichotomy
between general knowledge and contextualism in Aristotle’s thought
regarding virtuous action (p. 176) is one of the main arguments of the
book—and one well-documented by references gleaned from the entire
Corpus Aristotelicum. Around it revolves a dynamic defence of the
Aristotelian coupling of reason and praxis and of the One and the Many.
For, much against the time-honoured depiction of the thinker as an isolated,
inactive, solitary and self-absorbed figure (consider, for instance, the
familiar reception of Rodin’s The Thinker), for Aristotle, ‘although able to
think alone, even the wisest individual will be better able to think with the
aid of others’ (p. 450). Likewise, against much current individualisation
and de-spiritualisation of happiness or against simplistic treatments of
ideas of the good life and collective wellbeing, the book rehabilitates the
neglected affective, supra-individual and ethico-political dimension of
thought. I will organise my brief commentary on how this is performed
around three dichotomies (and, indirectly, around their intersection): theory
versus practice, logos/knowledge versus experience, and discursive
procedures regarding justice versus conceptions of the good.
Eikeland argues against current approaches to action research (Stephen
Toulmin’s among others) so long as they assume rigid segregations of
episteme and phronesis (p. 41) and theory and practice, and so long as they
claim that the province of action research is practice rather than theory,
privileging the local over the general (p. 42). By contrast, what we gain
from the Aristotelian framework is that, within it, ‘action research cannot
be just phronesis. Nothing can be merely phronesis, since phronesis is the
ultimate, practical perfection of the other virtues—ethical and intellectual’
(p. 464). More broadly, it is shown that, compared to Aristotle’s refined
and complex philosophy, modern concepts of theory and practice appear
to be too simple and coarse (p. 71). For Eikeland, a more desirable and
acceptable relation of theory and practice is realised better by the common
cause of the intellectual and the ethical. To account for it, Eikeland
introduces a neologism, ‘theorethics’, which denotes the ‘ethical and
relational import of the theoretical practice and attitude’ (p. 345): ‘A truly
political life is actually concurrent with a life of theoretical and practical
wisdom, a life of theorethics’ (p. 417). It embodies the happy coordination of the logos and the alogon (outside reason) as indissoluble
parts of a unique life-history.
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Yet what about the logos that is familiar to us from the attacks on
logocentrism? Eikeland’s aim is not to confront this charge head-on;
however, he indicates that such criticisms misfire when directed at
Aristotelian thought. Logos in Aristotelian philosophy is a rich concept
that cannot be reduced to ‘the modernistic, one-dimensional, formalrationalistic, and non-lingual concept of reason’ (p. 57). Just to give an
example: standards (horoi) are evidently a form of universality and
generality justified by means of reason. At first sight there seems to lurk
some absolutism and finalism in the idea of context-transcending givens to
which people are expected to aspire. But it is a more interesting point,
evident through deeper exploration, as Eikeland pertinently shows, that for
Aristotle the generality of standards is not always valid. It is rather true for
the most part (p. 74). This certainly leaves space for what we describe
today as fallibilism and proves how Aristotle’s philosophy is equidistant
from both, from the collapse of criteriology and from the finalism that
takes standards to be absolute and infallible. Moreover, it retains an
insight that is extremely useful for any research and for educational action
research in particular, namely, that ‘practical thinking cannot abandon or
dismiss truth any more than practice can abandon vision or perception in
general’ (p. 71). As for the modern, misleading association/identification
of logos with calculation or with the statistical element of modern science,
Eikeland points out that the implicit confusion here lies in the mistaken
translation of logismos as calculation (p. 69). For Aristotle, logismos is
something like bouleusis (deliberation), which does not carry the
connotations that calculation bears today. I would add, here, that modern
Greek retains the connection of logismos and deliberation, and the modern
Greek word for calculation is hypologismos, a term whose preposition
(hypo) might initiate an interesting philosophical discussion as it has
connotations that are unavailable in the international term ‘calculation’.
Then again, even if logos were immune to the charge of absolutism and
finalism, and not necessarily identical with calculation, could it still be
defended against the charges of isolated contemplation implicit in bios
theoretikos? Eikeland is well aware of this difficulty, and, to meet such an
objection, he introduces another important distinction. He concedes that
theory may take the form of a distant and disinterested gaze. And it may
lack practical import, although not all theory suffers from this sliding into
abstraction. The abstract kind of theory he calls—and dismisses as—
theôreˆsis, yet without abandoning the other kind (which he calls
theôrı´a)—that is, the kind that does not fall into the trap of abstraction.
The choice of terms here is very felicitous because, amongst other things,
the Greek word theôreˆsis does carry connotations of a distant and
disinterested viewpoint.
Unlike theôreˆsis, which relies on transcendentalism and applies from a
distance (pp. 72, 310), Eikeland’s Aristotelian theorethics promotes
theôrı´a along with dialogue, feelings and the cultivation of humanity. The
knowledge that accompanies it is not disengaged or disinterested (p. 360).
Another binary opposition, one that concerns deep down the opposition
between the private and the public, is thus dismantled here. Eikeland’s
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account of the distinction between the oikos qua private household and the
polis (see also pp. 392–5) can be expanded to turn it into an effective
critical tool for analysing contemporary emphases on anti-political and
apolitical (p. 467) modes of being-with-others privileging management
and securitisation. Against the modern disconnection of involvement and
interest in knowledge that demarcates the theorisation of reason as
drastically apart from practice and depoliticises learning, Aristotelian
empiricism presupposes that knowledge go hand-in-hand with trial and
error, with recurring testing and spirited controversy in real dialogue with
others. Instead of being a privatised acquisition or an amassed possession
in the sense of household provisions, knowledge is acquired, experienced
and tested publicly and politically. Experience in the Greek context is
involvement in a situation, and not disengaged perception (p. 170). The
corresponding Aristotelian (and, more generally, Greek) word for
experience, empeiria, signifies that which results from repeated practice
and accumulated, common knowledge. It must not be confused ‘with the
modern, empiricist-methodological reduction of experience to senseperception’ (pp. 144–5). Consequently, what Eikeland, following
Aristotle, theorises as gnosis appears to be a wider category of knowledge
than episteme, since gnosis comprises, amongst other things, also
perception (aesthesis), habituation (hexis) and even self-conscious human
living (p. 80).
This has important implications for the issue of different forms of
knowledge and ways of knowing, since, as Eikeland explains, forms of
knowledge, being various hexeis, are also forms of gnosis rather than
forms of episteme. Therefore, their presentation is a gnoseology, not an
epistemology (ibid.). As I see it, this would reinvigorate the ongoing
debate over scientific borders and the conflict of the faculties. Also, it
would make common cause with those theories (e.g. Habermas’s) which
have defended the embeddedness and reconnection of science with the
lifeworld against tendencies to over-formalise scientific knowledge and
detach, disconnect and dissociate it from everyday life structures. On the
one hand, the Aristotelian position facilitates a respectful treatment of the
limits that separate forms of knowledge, much against contemporary
tendencies to fuse discourses and promote a facile interdisciplinarity. On
the other hand, the Aristotelian position eases the passage to ethics and its
reconnection with knowledge and learning, thus facilitating the conception
of a unity of reason. To explain this, let us return to Eikeland’s text. As he
informs us, ‘the common genus (genos) of both ethical virtue (areˆte),
episteme, and the other intellectual virtues’ is habitus and disposition
(p. 80). Hence, although distinct, they are all hexeis and all share the
common ground of gnosis. To illustrate just indicatively, contra Socratic
and Platonic positions that assume a quick passage from knowledge of the
good to ethical action, for Aristotle, it is not only significant to know what
virtue is but also, perhaps even more importantly, to know what is
generative of virtue (p. 339). This gap is filled with the kind of forged
habit that becomes character, habitus (i.e. hexis) (p. 53) and second nature
through training (p. 182), teaching and dialogue.
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In fact, much unlike mentalist, modern readings of ancient philosophy,
Eikeland’s reading of Aristotle makes innovative connections between
forms of knowledge, noesis and dialogue that undo the older impression of
noetic disengagement of inquiry from hexis as habituating learning
through a critical and testing (peirastiki) approach to experience. One of
the most important tasks of dialogue is ‘the apprehension of the primary
principles of each discipline and each kind of activity. As a definable
activity distinguishable from others, dialogue is called the way (he hodos)
to arrive at basic principles in all inquiries’ (p. 217). Apart from showing
how appropriate the title of Eikeland’s book (The Ways of Aristotle,
emphasis added) is and apart from offering us the chance to single out the
kinetic dimensions of route and method (meta1hodos) that are often
missed in sedentary perspectives that sacrifice route on the altar of routine
(and routinisation of methodology), this conception of dialogue offers us
another possibility to theorise noesis. The tasks of dialogue are tasks of
‘the virtue of nous’ (p. 218). Nous is also a habitus, a hexis (p. 214), and
this, once again, accommodates the element of practice as indissoluble
rather than as oppositional to thought. To follow the implicit equation
through to its end, noesis as critical, reflective thinking (p. 222), as work
of nous, goes hand-in-hand with dialectics and dialogue. It breathes more
intellectuality in dialogue, and, although nous and dialogue are not
burdened with identical tasks (p. 222), noesis helps them meet,
nevertheless, in a reflectivity that does not leave the self unaffected and
over-protected. The noetic, the theoretical and the leisurely (skhole) join
forces in making dialogue something more than agonistics, beyond some
contemporary Arendtian, Lyotardian or poststructuralist (e.g. Laclau’s)
interpretations of ancient dialectics or theorisations of dissent. This is
especially important in the current context, where agonistics frequently
fascinates postmodern discourse and blocks more nuanced versions of
discursive formation and of learning (rather than points-scoring) through
dialogue. ‘Dialectics is not merely competitive, although certain aspects of
it could be’ (p. 218); nor is it negotiation—and, here, we may recall the
difference of the oikos and the polis and of the managerial and the
political. Negotiation, coming from the Latin negotium, means business—
in Greek askholia, i.e. a1skhole 5 no leisure—and a negotiator means a
businessman. By contrast, ‘dialogue is thinking and speaking freely. It
belongs to logos unbound by the necessity of speech to serve doing this or
that’ (p. 233). I believe that, if, when dealing with world problems and
global conflicts today, we wish to inculcate some vision, justice and
spirituality into the political discourses of resolution, reconciliation and
peace education, it is especially important to keep this in mind. I believe,
further, that the political element realisable in dialogue becomes apparent
also in yet another instance, that is, when we come to see that, for
Aristotle, dialogue critically examines not only doxai—i.e. opinions that
are relevant to a topic—and not only the immediate phenomena—i.e. what
appears ‘first-for-us’ and what things look like (dokounta) (p. 255)—but
also prevailing opinions (ta endoxa). We could mobilise another meaning
of endoxa (in modern Greek the word means ‘glorious’) and argue that
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dialogue should entail, amongst other things, a critical questioning of
prevalent opinion or of thinkers who are held in high esteem. And
dialogue should involve the reflective attention that is owed not just to
prominent ideas or influential figures but also to the undercurrents of
thought, to whoever or whatever society neglects, preoccupied, as society
usually is, with what it takes to be its higher achievements. We could
theorise this as another dimension of the politics of thought and as another
way of searching for the justice that can be done to thinking.
A person accustomed to searching for justice—which is relational for
Aristotle (p. 55)—needs first descriptively to analyse and understand
(synesis) the situation that invites justice and then to deliberate about
(phronesis) the necessary action for the realisation of justice in that
specific context (pp. 112–3). Deliberation is ‘reasoning in order to choose
and realize some specific action’ (p. 211). For this kind of choice even
pure theory may prove valuable, as it comprises ethico-political aspects.
Instead of the right being at odds with happiness, it could be said that in
certain ways it is intrinsically directed at contributing practically to the
good life (p. 75). As to the general impression that Aristotle’s position on
the issue of eudaemonia is one that sees it as one highest good for general
compliance, Eikeland’s response achieves the complexity that is necessary
in order to prove that Aristotle neither developed a liberal-like formalism
of the good as merely external and devoid of content nor a communitarianlike specific and substantive ethical homogeneity (p. 300). A most salient,
contemporary objection—which, given the notorious Aristotelian position
on slavery and exclusivist conception of citizenship, comes up when one
discusses Aristotle’s ideas of happiness, the common good and justice—is,
however: what or whose justice?
Eikeland is well aware of this, but, instead of addressing the whole issue
in perfunctory detail, he opts for a very nicely-judged turning of
Aristotelianism against itself. He argues cogently that Aristotle’s
philosophy itself cannot sustain Aristotle’s prejudices or concessions to
the ‘realism’ of the times. In Eikeland’s own words, Aristotle’s ‘attempts
at keeping ‘‘natural slaves’’, manual workers, and women outside full
membership in the primary and best political constitution of he hodos, is
impossible to defend even within the limits of his own system of thought’
(p. 493). For, despite his ideas about slavery and limited political
participation, his philosophy ‘lends itself quite easily to emancipatory
thinking’ (p. 452). That this is truly the case, and not just the wishful
thinking of a proponent of Aristotelianism, is proven by the whole book—
that is, by this lengthy and thorough study of Aristotle in which all claims
of Aristotle’s enduring significance are not simply stated but argued point
for point.
Before I conclude this overview, I would like to draw attention to some
side issues to which, although they merit mention on grounds of their
relevance to and bearing on philosophical-educational debates, full justice
cannot be done within the confines of a review essay. These issues can be
seen as touching upon the following question: would this reinterpreted
Aristotelianism entail a new dichotomous logic, now separating the
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thinking and acting subject from desire and fulfilment? Eikeland’s implicit
answer is negative. The theorethical does not force lived experience and
life-planning into a false dilemma between the pleasure-seeking life, on
the one hand, and the life of active citizenship and insight (p. 417), on the
other. The following issues indicate that Eikeland’s answer opens
plausible, new connections with established debates.
A necessary presupposition for the deployment of phronesis for truth,
felicitous action as well as fulfilment is free time. Eikeland’s discussion of
it can be expanded to further a critique of current educational or societal
considerations of time. The Aristotelian idea of skhole (leisure) can be
contrasted to the contemporary exploitation of leisure by the culture
industry and the false, drastic choice between the supposedly pleasurable
waste of time and the rather ascetic and dry dedication of time to phronetic
purposes. From another perspective, Aristotle’s argument that phronesis
takes time (p. 152) can be used for criticising the emphasis on saving time
that underlies much concern about performativity for the sake of
productivity and at the expense of dedicating time to lived, rich experience.
An exceptionally helpful clarification that Eikeland offers us is that for
Aristotle both theory and practice need theoria and skhole. Theoria is the
studying and learning that people need in order to gain general competence
and insight, not just so that they can fix something. Skhole is the free space
and time that relieves people from immediate action requirements.
Embedded in practical contexts theoria and skhole are constitutive for
action research rather than being its polar opposites (p. 47).
Free time spent with others enhances sociality beyond mere socialisation. According to Aristotle, ‘living in the company of good people is like
training for virtue (askesis tis tes areˆtes), becoming constantly better by
activating their friendship and correcting each other (diorthountes
allelous)’ (p. 375). It seems to be the kind of friendship that draws you
into something better in the sense that we know from Stanley Cavell and
other contemporary philosophers, a friendship that functions, in Eikeland’s parlance, as a reflective mirror (p. 351). Colleagues who research in
the idea of friendship (especially those who work from a Derridean
perspective) may find many instances where the book provides valuable
Aristotelian exegesis (pp. 344, 391) and background knowledge. Now,
sociality comprises various other relational concepts such as equity and
forgiveness. Regarding equity, and in a move that is exceptionally
significant for contemporary philosophy and its dilemmas over formal and
social justice (and the corresponding problem of the appropriateness of a
moral principle to a specific context), Eikeland explains that Aristotle’s
equity (epieikeia) does not operate outside justice or as a degeneration of
justice but rather as its corrective. Equity ‘produces a higher justice.
Equity is more just since it is needed in order to ad-just more precisely to
the nature and particulars of the concrete cases at hand’ (p. 178).
Regarding forgiveness, Eikeland discusses how it falls into place in the
Aristotelian architectonic, offering ample textual evidence (pp. 179, 380,
406–7) that can be used to counter contemporary claims that antiquity
supposedly lacked the idea of forgiveness.
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Dialogue is equally, on the one hand, framed within this overall
emphasis on relationality and, on the other, defended as both educational
(p. 269) and erotic (p. 448). Deliberation is not an isolated activity, devoid
of passion and other-orientedness. Even deliberation over standards of
practice is connected with eros, since standards operate as attractive
powers, which Eikeland demonstrates in an interesting and highly original
manner (p. 67). This may provide a useful backdrop for discussing both
the fact that we often forget the motivational, psychological significance
of order and the fact of its degeneration into obsessive and pathological
commitment to rules, practices and laws. The account of the relational
element is also supported by the fact that, as I have already mentioned
above, Eikeland provides some very important distinctions in the light of
which it becomes clear that politically significant dialogue is not
exhausted in the agonistic mode but also takes place for the sake of
inquiry, the quest for truth (p. 239) and con-sensus (agreeing and feelingwith the other). And, even when the inescapable horizon of dialogue as
educational experience is tradition—theorised neither in liberal nor in
purely communitarian terms (p. 425)—the latter does not carry inherent
authority beyond critique (p. 321), dialogical reconsideration, reform
(p. 323) or even revolution (p. 322).
Nor are relational concepts and sociality themselves beyond critique.
Even care and consideration are not independent from the context within
which they are enacted: in the despotic oikos of unequal membership they
are condescending; within the context of the polis—that is, within a
context of free deliberation and discursive public shaping of the course of
life—they acquire their true ethico-political significance and role (p. 472).
Finally, the aspirations of such a critique transcend any specific locality: in
discussing the perfect city that extends beyond the limits of one’s
immediate concern, Eikeland uses the neologism koinopolis (pp. 370–1),
which he finds far more accurate for describing Aristotle’s view than the
Stoic cosmopolis—and which surely is a possible alternative for theorists
interested in the possibility of a non-toxic universalism of cosmopolitan
significance.
The whole book, on my reading, seems premised on the idea that ‘the
main task of ethics and politics is educational’ (p. 280). The Ways of
Aristotle presents the philosophy of an Aristotle as hodopoios (i.e. a
thinker introducing new methods, sensibilities and ways of thinking) as
not only indispensable to action research, but also thoroughly ‘political,
learning oriented and educational. Ultimately, it is all about paideia, the
personal and practical formation of character (ethos) and the individual
and collective mastering of life and work’ (p. 33).
Correspondence: Marianna Papastephanou, University of Cyprus, Department of Education, PO Box 20537, Nicosia, 1678, Cyprus.
E-mail: edmari@ucy.ac.cy
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