Book Review Book Review Action Research 8(4) 444–448 ! The Author(s) 2010 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1476750310390973 arj.sagepub.com Olav Eikeland, The Ways of Aristotle: Aristotelian Phronesis, Aristotelian Philosophy of Dialogue, and Action Research (Studies in Vocational and Continuing Education, Vol. 5). Peter Lang: Berlin, 2008, 560 pp.: 9783039114719. This is a large and challenging book. In it Olav Eikeland examines Aristotle’s major works in great detail in order to make sense of the philosopher’s ideas of ‘phronesis’ and ‘dialogue’, and considers the implications of his interpretations for social science more generally and action research in particular. There are many unique aspects of Eikeland’s work, but his interrogation of so much of Aristotle’s canon, including the three ‘ethics’ treatises: Ethica Nicomachea, Ethica Eudemia and Magna Moralia as well as many others such as Topica, Politica, De Anima, Poetica, and Rhetorica represents an ‘exegesis’ (p. 457) of a unique kind. Such an undertaking, Eikeland admits, reveals many contradictions and inconsistencies in Aristotle’s thinking, but he suggests that even these difficulties make studying Aristotle’s work worthwhile because ‘(it)is unrealistic and contradictory in such excellent ways’ (p. 37). At the heart of this project is a desire to present the fullest possible account of ‘phronesis’. Phronesis is a concept which is closely aligned with Aristotle’s rendering of virtue ethics. The term is generally translated into something along the lines of ‘prudence’, or ‘practical wisdom’, gleaned from the ability to reflect on practice (thus its relevance to action research). However, Eikeland’s excursion demonstrates why phronesis is so much more than the ability to reflect on and learn from practice. This is accomplished both by problematizing taken-for-granted ideas such as ‘reflection’ and ‘learning’ but also through a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s approach to epistemology (more accurately described as a ‘gnoseology’, p. 80) and deconstruction of notions such as ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. Very early on Eikeland makes the point that contemporary renderings of these terms over-simplify the meaning they held for Aristotle. In particular Eikeland proposes, ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ were never meant to be as distinctive as they have become for us. Aristotle would have seen them as much more intertwined and interactive – each penetrating the other in ways that it is hard for contemporary minds to quite comprehend. One of the reasons Eikeland’s book is so challenging is that he attempts to convey some of the subtle distinctions he is able to discern from his familiarity with Aristotle’s mind. In truth I think it is very difficult to give language to some of the nuances in Aristotle’s thought which Eikeland attempts to describe (which may account for the somewhat repetitive and spiralling nature of the text). The book is organized into three main parts. In the first, ‘Aristotle, Social Research and Action Research’, which comprises two chapters, Eikeland broadly Downloaded from arj.sagepub.com at Oslo and Akershus University College of applied sciences on April 14, 2015 Book Review 445 outlines the case for Aristotle’s philosophy being of relevance to social scientists and action researchers in particular. He considers the nature of theory within the social sciences, lingering over issues of ‘standards’ and how Aristotle’s philosophy has important insights into how the quality of action research might be judged. The second, ‘Reading Aristotle – Limits and Possibilities for Phronesis’, constitutes the largest section of the book and is divided into five substantial chapters. Each provides a detailed account of a particular aspect of Aristotle’s thought which is relevant to his construction of phronesis. The final part, ‘Aristotelian Action Research: Wisdom and Eudaimonia Transposed, Social Research Transformed’, includes five brief chapters, each offering initial thoughts about the implications of the previous journey on particular topics, such as its relevance to Marxist thought, as well as to learning and educative processes. It is in this final section that the more political aspects of the previous analysis are considered. Rather than attempting to convey the many intersecting strands of Aristotle’s thinking which are woven through Eikeland’s account, in the following pages I will introduce briefly some of the pivotal ideas around which Eikeland’s rendering of phronesis is organized. These will lead to a brief summary of some of the implications of the analysis for action research. My objective is to whet the appetite of those who may wish to embark on the journey through this complex but fascinating text. Phronesis and its relation to virtue Those who are familiar with Aristotle’s work at even a cursory level will know that a central concern for the philosopher was ‘virtue’ and how it can be developed and nurtured. Simply put, for Aristotle a virtue is ‘what makes something work at its best’ (p. 53). It is the best possible expression of something, and connotes mastery. The ability to exercise virtue only comes about through a ‘hexis’ or ‘habitus’ in that it is an acquired ability, rather than being a capacity such as seeing, which a person can perform excellently without any practice (p. 53). For instance, in order to become courageous, one must be courageous. In order to become patient, one must be patient. In this way, the very means by which a person develops a virtue is through enacting it. This is a paradoxical notion, but perhaps one which Eikeland would suggest is such in an ‘excellent’ way. Aristotle divides the virtues into two categories: the intellectual virtues, which are to do with ‘excellences of mind’; and ‘ethical virtues’ which concern themselves with excellences of ‘character’. The ethical virtues are ‘a logoi’, that is, they have to do with non-lingual, non-discursive conduct. They pertain to the way in which one ‘is’ (p. 56). Eikeland explains that for Aristotle, ethical virtue is ‘concerned with the formation of character through people becoming habituated and accustomed to it, and thereby gradually avoiding, or seeking spontaneously the right kinds and amounts of pleasures and pains in acting and feeling’ (p. 55). Phronesis is unique in that Aristotle classifies it as both an intellectual and an ethical virtue (p. 53). In this way, phronesis demands the development of both ‘excellence of mind’, and ‘excellence of character’. Eikeland devotes an entire Downloaded from arj.sagepub.com at Oslo and Akershus University College of applied sciences on April 14, 2015 446 Action Research 8(4) chapter each to ‘Phronesis as an Intellectual Virtue’ and ‘Phronesis as an Ethical Virtue’, and I cannot do justice to the intricacies of his argument here. However, there are three aspects of Eikeland’s analysis of particular note. First, as both an intellectual virtue and an ethical virtue, phronesis operates through the integration of a logical, more abstract engagement with the world and a more embodied, holistic sort which incorporates tacit knowledge gained through experience. Furthermore, in order for a person to master phronesis, they must be able to discern which kind of excellence – intellectual or ethical – to bring to bear when making judgements about a particular situation. Second, I found Eikeland’s explication of the role of ‘practice’ and ‘habit’ very illuminating in the way of thinking about phronesis as a virtue. Aristotle is clear that virtues are not present from birth, but need to be carefully cultivated. In developing virtue, getting correct training from childhood is important, however, phronesis is not the kind of virtue which can be developed through ‘discussion, lecturing and knowing alone’ (p. 186) which would be possible were it solely an ‘intellectual virtue’. Instead, it is developed through a gradual process of socialization and inculcation by being around and learning from the practices of virtuous others. This is why community is so vital to the development of phronesis. As both an intellectual virtue and an ethical virtue, it can only be nurtured through developing both the logical aspects which can be taught abstractly, but ALSO, the ways of being which can only be developed through engagement with virtuous others. The type of engagement one has with others seeking to enact phronesis is the focus of my third point, and that is the role of deliberation. Deliberation is vital because Aristotle stresses that phronesis occurs not through compliance with externally sanctioned rules or commandments, but instead acts in response to specific contexts. Asserting that it is impossible to understand all of the details of a context by oneself – Aristotle argues that one can only come to truly virtuous ways of being through deliberating with others. What is particular about Aristotle’s version of deliberation is that it is always focused on the means by which virtuous ends might be achieved, rather than on what might constitute such ends. For the person of excellent character, the virtuous end point of action is always already determined (p. 211). However, deliberating and deciding the means by which actions are realized requires both the ability to see things clearly and correctly with the mind and the capacity to bring appropriate previous experience and practical knowing to bear on the specific situation. This leads to the second aspect of Eikeland’s book which I would like to outline, the way which he elaborates on Aristotle’s ways of knowing, or ‘gnoseology’. Aristotle’s ways of knowing Eikeland’s exposition of Aristotle’s gnoseology is important because it addresses the question: ‘through what kinds of knowing might phronesis be engendered?’ As alluded to earlier, Aristotle’s understanding of epistemology is highly nuanced and multi-dimensional. Eikeland offers a way of thinking about it as Downloaded from arj.sagepub.com at Oslo and Akershus University College of applied sciences on April 14, 2015 Book Review 447 along a continuum between more active and more passive ways in which the ‘knower’ relates to that which is ‘known’. On the more active end, are situated praxis (doing), poiesis (making) and khresis (using), where on the more passive end of the continuum are knowing through pathos – that is, passivity, receptivity, and reactivity. Eikeland himself coins two words which encompass Aristotle’s ideas from this side of the continuum – ‘theoresis’ by which he means, ‘a spectator speculating’, and ‘theoria’ or insight (p. 81). What is interesting here is that although these ways of knowing are located on the more passive end of the continuum, and comprise ‘observing at a distance’, Eikeland stresses that for Aristotle, they would still include an ‘active’ dimension. The knower is always seen to be involved in the activity of knowing. ‘Relationality’ is also central to every way of knowing, active or passive. Eikeland elaborates on this idea when he writes: ‘. . . when knowledge forms like these are enacted among human beings, there is an intrinsic connection between a) relational knowledge forms and ways of knowing like these, b) constitutional political forms regulating relations between citizens, and c) justice, considered to be the highest ethical virtue because it concerns relations to others’ (p. 81). In other words, action and relationality are always implied in any way in which we come to know anything. I would encourage those readers particularly interested in epistemological concerns and distinctions between ‘episteme’, ‘sophia’, ‘telkne’, ‘poietike’, ‘phronesis’, ‘praxis’, ‘khresis’ and ‘nous’ to read Chapter 4 closely, or at least to study Table 3 at the end of the book which outlines their connections. I must admit that I found Eikeland’s exposition of Aristotle’s ways of knowing, and their connection to phronesis rather difficult to follow. What does seem important is that how we know anything is a very complex interpenetration of both logic and experience – and that according to Aristotle, we can only really know anything in relation to it. What Aristotle’s extended ‘gnoseology’ points out is that there are a myriad of subtle distinctions between the different ways we come into those ‘knowing’ relations, and Western science for the most part has jettisoned some of the most important ways in which knowledge for human beings is generated – that is through hands-on, practical engagement with the world around them. This leads to Eikeland’s thoughts about action research. How might Aristotle’s thinking inform action research? Eikeland sets out the connections between Aristotle’s thinking and action research in two different sections of the book; within the two opening chapters, and in a 20-page chapter entitled ‘Neo Epistemic, Dialogical Action Research’ at the end of the book. I actually found Eikeland’s examination of action research in the early chapters by far the more illuminating than the latter exposition. In these carefully constructed chapters he lays out the broad argument for Aristotle’s relevance to action research, delving into questions concerning the interplay of acting and knowing, questions of quality and validity, and also placing Aristotle’s ideas in relation to other contemporary action research scholars. He argues that the very way in which Aristotle did Downloaded from arj.sagepub.com at Oslo and Akershus University College of applied sciences on April 14, 2015 448 Action Research 8(4) philosophy – grounded in the specific, working with the practicalities of living day to day – actually constitutes a form of action research itself (p. 34). Such an assertion begs the question of how does Eikeland himself conceptualize action research. Eikeland sees two moves as crucial for action research: moving experimentation from the ‘lab’ to different spheres of life; and inviting subjects of research to interpret findings (which he argues would strengthen the validity of research findings) (p. 21). Key to action research in his view is that knowledge and competence is developed from within practical contexts, skills and desires, rather than from externally observed engagements (p. 21). Within such a view, the distinction between ‘episteme’ and ‘theoria’ is not all that clear, they both work together in the creation of practical, political, and ethical ‘knowledge’ (p. 24). In the ending chapter devoted to action research Eikeland develops these ideas more fully. He alludes to the way in which action research might parallel phronesis as both an intellectual and ethical pursuit by suggesting, ‘In line with distinctions introduced through the previous discussion of Aristotle, we need to work both with a theoretically oriented or directed, dialogical action research, and with a practically oriented or directed, deliberative and phronetic action research. Action research and action researchers have to work with developing systematic practically based insight as an aim in itself as well, challenging how basic social research has been done methodologically and organised institutionally for the most part in the modern period’ (p. 459). Furthermore, he suggests that, ‘What we can learn from Aristotle then, is that systematic space for both dialogue and deliberation – both of which constitute the soul and mind of every human activity and community, is necessary in practical social life, work life, private life professional, ethical and political’ (p. 463). The template for this sort of engagement as a possibility is offered in the Epilogue. Here Eikeland most clearly reveals the personal agenda at the heart of his work. In what was one of the most engaging parts of the book for me, he tells his own story of attending an ‘experimental’ school (the Forsoeksgymnaset I Baerum) in Norway between 1971 and 1975. Within it, the teachers and students together shared responsibility for the teaching curriculum, as well as all aspects of the school’s administration and care (including the gardening duties and recruitment of new teachers!). This experiment, Eikeland reveals, made a profound impact on him. Through it, he came to believe that educative structures could indeed be created which could foster the creation of spaces in which deliberation and reflection leading to excellences of the intellect and character could develop and flourish. It is with that challenge, then, that Eikeland leaves us – the possibility of creating spaces in which the virtue of phronesis might be nurtured and developed in our schools, organizations and communities. It is perhaps an aim for all of us, whether action researchers or not, who aspire to act virtuously in our relations with others and the planet which sustains us all. Donna Ladkin Professor of Leadership and Ethics Cranfield School of Management, UK Downloaded from arj.sagepub.com at Oslo and Akershus University College of applied sciences on April 14, 2015