Afr.j.polit. sci. (1998), Vol. 3 No. 2, 69-79
Good Governance, Security and
Disarmament in Africa
Laurie Nathan*
Abstract
Militarisation in Africa is primarily a symptom of intra-state crises. The crises
gave rise to a security vacuum which states and groups seek to fill through violence.
The ensuing vicious cycle of insecurity will not be broken, and substantial
demilitarisation will not be achieved, without addressing the structural causes of
the crises. The priority in this regard is the establishment of good governance.
While a positive relationship may exist between disarmament, development and
security, the more significant relationship is between good governance, secuirty
and disarmament.
Introduction
I argue in this paper that militarisation in Africa is essentially a product of weak
states and intra-state crises. It derives less from efforts to maintain security and
pursue national interests against other states, than from the absence of security
within states. The conclusion from this argument is that demilitarisation in Africa
will not be achieved on a meaningful scale without addressing satisfactorily the
structural causes of national crises and insecurity. The first part of the paper
presents a critique of the conventional approach to security which relies on military
force. The second part traverses the well-known alternative perspective which
postulates demilitarisation on the ground that a positive relationship exists between
disarmament development and security. The third and final parts suggest that
in the context of intra-state crises, the challenge of demilitarisation is better
understood in terms of the relationship between good governance, security and
disarmament.
1027-0353 © 1998 African Association of Political Sciencr
70 Laurie Nathan
Rethinking Security'
The extent of militarisation in a given society is a function of historical, geographic,
cultural, political and strategic factors. It flows also from philosophical assumptions
about state sovereignty, international relations, domestic governance and the
use of force. The concept of security is central in this regard: how is security
conceived? what constitutes a threat to security? whose security is at issue? and by
what means should security be sought? How these questions are answered at a
conceptual level will have a major bearing on policy and strategy.
The conventional approach to security was shaped by the political conditions of
the Cold War. For close on forty years the international system was characterised
by acute tension between rival ideological blocs and the prospect of another world
war. In these circumstances, the debate around security focused on states and
military stability (Booth, 1994: 3). Security policy was concerned chiefly with
defending the sovereignty, territory and political independence of the state. The
predominant response to perceived challenges was the threat or use of force.
Fuelled by the self-serving interests of military establishments, the perpetual
tendency was to build larger armies and arsenals in anticipation of worst-case
scenarios.
This approach has a number of major shortcomings: it ignores the root causes
of conflict; it fails to take adequate account of the security of people and the many
non-military threats to their security; it contributes to a militarist ethos in civil
society; and it diverts resources from more constructive employment. This
approach may also be counter-productive if the military steps taken by a state to
strengthen its security induce insecurity in other states. The likely reaction of those
states might be to build their own military capacity, leading inexorably to an arms
race. The net result of this scenario, referred to as the "security dilemma", is a
reduction in the security of all the states concerned (Buzan, 1991).
Moreover, as in the case of apartheid South Africa, states which lack internal
legitimacy typically invoke the notion of "national security" to justify the suppression
of their citizens. In such circumstances, "national security" amounts to little
more than regime security. The principal source of people's insecurity is their own
government rather than potential foreign aggressor (Thomas, 1991). Systematic
repression requires considerable sums to be spent on the security forces at the
expense of development and the provision of welfare services. The resultant
deterioration in standards of living further diminishes the security of citizens and,
in some instances, intensifies popular resistance against the state. Olu Ademiji
describes this vicious cycle as follows:
Very often, arms acquisitions by Third World countries in the interests of
security are made at the apparent cost of primary or basic needs in the area
of social and economic well-being. Given the fragile economic base, which
Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa 11
cannot sustain the expenditure on arms, and the equally fragile political
base, which requires arms acquisition, self-preservation often dictates a
choice of defence over development. The non-military threats to security
are thus neglected, creating further cause for instability (quoted in Vale,
1992).
In the light of these problems, United Nations (UN) agencies, independent
commissions and peace scholars have long sought to promote alternative security
theories and strategies (e.g. Booth, 1991 and 1994; Boulding, 1992; Brandt
Commission, 1980; Brundtland Commission, 1987; Life and Peace Institute,
1990; and Palme Commission, 1984 and 1989). In the post Cold War era, many of
their ideas have been adopted by the mainstream discipline of strategic studies
(e.g. Chipman, 1992), as well as by military leaders (e.g. Worner, 1991) and
governments.
Government support is evident, at least at the level of discourse, in the proposal
to establish a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in
Africa (CSSDCA) (ALF 1991; Nathan, 1992). The proposal, formulated in 1991
by African heads of state and government under the auspices of General Obasanjo' s
Africa Leadership Forum, is modeled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe and draws heavily on the paradigm employed by the Palme
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1984 and 1989).
The CSSDCA initiative promotes a set of principles and policies grouped in four
baskets or calabashes: security, stability, development and co-operation. The
security calabash revolves around the argument that national and regional security
should be broadened beyond military matters to include political, social, economic
and environmental factors. Abuse of human rights, a lack of self-sufficiency in
food and energy, environmental degradation, underdevelopment and a host of
other critical problems constitute grave threats to the security of people. These
problems also threaten the security of states since they may lead to bloody conflict
between governments and citizens.
Security is consequently defined as an all-encompassing concept that enables
citizens to live in peace and harmony; have access to resources and the basic
necessities of life; participate fully and freely in the processes of governance; and
enjoy the protection of fundamental rights. This broad definition marks a radical
departure from the state-centric model of security in Africa. Indeed, the CSSDCA
proposal makes a point of distinguishing between the security of people and the
security of states. The former is fulfilled by satisfying the political, cultural and
socio-economic needs of individuals and communities, and the latter is not assured
where these needs are not met.
South Africa's democratic government elected in April 1994 has embraced the
CSSDCA approach to security (see Republic of South Africa, 1994 and 196). Some
72 Laurie Nathan
military officers who served under the previous regime claim that the approach is
not new at all since the apartheid security doctrine of Total Strategy similarly
emphasised the political and socio-economic dimensions of security (see Swilling
and Phillips, 1989). The two models are in fact diametrically opposed: whereas the
latter sought to militarise all aspects of national policy, the former seeks to
demilitarise the notion of security. This difference is apparent in the following
summary features of the new thinking on security:
• Security is conceived as a holistic phenomenon that is not restricted to
military matters but broadened to incorporate political, social, economic and
environmental issues.
• The objects of security are not confined to states but extend at different levels
of society to include people, regions and the global community.
• Threats to security are not limited to military challenges to state sovereignty
and territorial integrity; they include poverty, oppression, social injustice and
ecological degradation.
• The objectives of security policy therefore go beyond achieving an absence
of war to encompass the attainment of democracy, sustainable economic
development, social justice and protection of the environment.
• The state's responsibility for ensuring the security of its citizens does not lie
exclusively or even predominantly with the police, military and intelligence
services. It is shared by many government departments and ultimately
resides with Parliament.
• As discussed below, disarmament and other forms of demilitarisation are
more likely to enhance than undermine the security of people and states.
Disarmament entails reductions in forces, military spending and weapons
holdings. Since World War II the UN has devoted much attention to the necessity
for progress in this area in the interests of international peace and security. In 1978
the General Assembly resolved that the ultimate goal of the international community
is general and complete disarmament under effective international control; the
resolution has served as a guiding principle in subsequent UN deliberations on the
subject (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1989). The
Organisation of African Unity has endorsed this position, and African states have
repeatedly declared their commitment to conventional and nuclear disarmament
(Tokareva, 1989; and United Nations, 1990).
There are two essential motivations for disarmament. First, arms build-ups and
the growing sophistication of weaponry in many regions make the world a more
dangerous place: they heighten political instability, increase the risk of hostilities
and raise the human and economic costs of warfare. Second, armaments divert
financial resources and skilled labour from more productive ends. They are amajor
cause of the net outflow of capital from countries in the South, contributing greatly
to underdevelopment. In short, there is a positive relationship between disarma-
Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa 73
ment, development and security. The new South Africa government follows this
logic in its White Paper on Defence (Republic of South Africa, 1996: 5). It
maintains that the greatest threats to the South African people are criminal violence
and socio-economic problems like unemployment, poverty, poor education and
inadequate social services. The Reconstruction and Development Programme
(RDP) is thus "the principal long-term means of promoting the security of citizens
and, thereby, the stability of the country". There is consequently "a compelling
need to reallocate state resources to the RDP", and to rationalise the armed forces
and contain military spending accordingly.
Militarisation and Structural Crisis
Demilitarisation cannot be considered solely in terms of disarmament since it also
encompasses a range of qualitative relationships, processes and values in the
political, social and economic spheres (Cock, 1989). Andreski identifies the
following trends as indicators thereof:
First,... an aggressive foreign policy, based on a readiness to resort to war;
second, the preponderance of the military in the state, the extreme case
being that of military rule; third, subservience of the whole society to the
needs of the army which may involve a recasting of social life in accordance
with the pattern of military organisation; and fourth, an ideology which
promotes military ideas (quoted in Cock, 1989: 3).
The most important aspect of militarisation is arguably a tendency by governments
or opposition groups to rely on force in the management of international and/
or domestic relations and conflict. Such reliance is a critical issue from a normative
perspective because it leads directly to destruction of life, property and, in extreme
situations, entire communities. From an analytical perspective, it is often the
principal source of other forms of militarisation, necessarily requiring the devotion
of human and material resources to military means. As argued below, this tendency
is so dominant and pervasive in African countries wracked by insecurity that it
precludes substantial disarmament.
The problem of militarisation in Africa is largely a consequence of structural
conditions which constitute an intra-state crisis. Four structural conditions are
central in this regard: authoritarian rule and abuse of human rights and freedoms;
acute socio-economic deprivation and inequity; the exclusion of minority or
majority groups from governance and economic opportunity because of their race,
ethnicity or religion; and weak states in the sense of lacking the institutional
capacity to manage normal political and social conflict in a consensual and nonviolent
way.
These conditions constitute a crisis because they render people and states
74 Laurie Nathan
profoundly insecure and give rise to a societal propensity towards large-scale
violence. The risk of violence increases when the four conditions listed above are
present simultaneously, mutually reinforcing and exacerbated by other structural
factors. At the national level, these factors may include the lack of coincidence
between nations and states as a result of the colonial imposition of borders, and
scarcity and degradation of natural resources. At the international level they
include the debt crisis; the imbalance in economic power and trade relations
between North and South; military support to dictators by foreign states; and the
structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.
Contrary to the analytical premise of much of the academic and policy literature
on peace and conflict, intra-state crises are not confined to situations of extreme
violence. Crises and violence are better understood as related but distinct phenomena,
the latter being typically a manifestation of the former. As illustrated below,
violence is cither an organised and deliberate response to a crisis or a spontaneous
and sporadic outcome thereof.
• If groups are marginalised because of their race, ethnicity or religion, and if
more generally citizens are subject to oppression and repression, the potential
for armed rebellion will be high; and since authoritarian regimes do not
rule with the consent of the governed, they must rely on force to stay in power.
• If people arc hungry and have no access to resources and economic opportunities,
some of them may turn to banditry as a means of subsistence. They
may also initiate riots in protest against corruption and the accumulation of
wealth by the ruling elite.
• If the state is too weak to maintain law and order, banditry and other types of
criminal activity will flourish. Communities, and in some cases the state
itself, will privatise security.
• If the state does not have the legitimacy and institutional capacity to resolve
the low-level political and social conflict that characterises all societies,
some individuals and groups will attempt to protect their interests and settle
their disputes through violence.
These examples demonstrate that violence is not intrinsically the worst-case
scenario, nor peace the ideal state of affairs. For the governments and citizens of
stable Western democracies, the concept of peace is unproblematic. Defined
narrowly as the absence of widespread physical violence, it is held to be an
unqualified good in terms of orderly politics and the sanctity of life. In authoritarian
states, in contrast, oppressed groups may prize freedom and dignity more than
peace and may be prepared to provoke and endure extreme violence to achieve the
right of citizenship. Since hostilities threaten relationships of power and privilege,
peace serves the interests of the regime and the foreign powers which support it.
Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa 75
The cessation of hostilities is thus not so much a goal in its own right as an
outcome of the antagonists' willingness to reach a settlement that addresses the
root cause(s) of violence. Both ethically and analytically, the primary objective of
efforts to prevent and resolve African crises is best formulated as the establishment
of peace with justice (see Galtung, 1969). This formulation is not meant in a
simplistic and romantic sense. Rather, it helps to explain why the termination of
civil wars is so difficult as disputants invariably have conflicting views on the
constituent elements of justice in a new dispensation.
In the situations depicted above, the use of force and resultant militarisation
compound the crisis. As noted, in the previous section, they promote a culture of
violence, perpetuate and deepen insecurity and conflict, divert resources from
development, and lay productive capacity to waste. For these reasons.
demilitarisation in Africa is regarded as a high priority by certain local and foreign
organisations. They focus on, in particular, the demobilisation of former combatants;
the proliferation of light weapons; conventional arms transfers; unstable
civil-military relations; disproportionate military spending; and the role of mercenary
outfits like Executive Outcomes. These efforts will not yield significant
results, however, because they focus on the symptoms rather than the causes of
intra-state crises. The vicious cycle of insecurity might be mitigated through such
efforts but it will not be reversed without overcoming the structural problems that
generate and define the crises. Put differently, the crises create a security vacuum
which state and non-state actors seek to fill by violent means; demilitarisation is
contingent on the filling of that vacuum by legitimate political means.
Good Governance
At the most fundamental level, then, demilitarisation in African countries depends
on the resolution of national conflict through inclusive multi-party negotiations
and the introduction of democratic and effective governance. Only in these
circumstances can development and human security be achieved and sustained.
While a positive relationship may exist between disarmament, development and
security, the relationship posited here is between good governance, security and
disarmament.
Itisnocoincidencethat, forexample, the process of light weapons disarmament
in Mali followed the ending of military rule and the Taureg rebellion in that
country. Similarly, the process of demilitarising the South African state flowed in
the first instance from the demise of the Cold War and then escalated with the
advent of democracy (see Nathan, 1998). The South African White Paper on
Defence motivates demilitarisation in precisely these terms: "While the potential
for instability and conflict remains [in the post-apartheid era], the salient fact is thai
the government is no longer unrepresentative and at war with its own people ami
neighbouring states in Southern Africa" (Republic of South Africa. 1996 2>
76 I-Murie Nathan
Conversely, civil society in South Africa remains highly militarised, chiefly in the
form of violent crime and private security, because gross poverty and inequity have
not yet been ameliorated.
It follows from the above that the potential for demilitarisation in Africa is
greater in democratic societies than in authoritarian states. Nevertheless, the
realisation of that potential is frequently inhibited by one or more of three factors.
First, countries which are democratic and free from large-scale violence will be
reluctant to scale down their military capability if they are threatened by instability
in neighbouring states. Second, they may be confronted by extremist groups which
reject an inclusive political dispensation and resort to terrorism.
Third, good governance is not restricted to free and fair elections, respect for
human rights and the other features of democracy. It also entails efficiency and
effectiveness in fulfilling the functions of the state. These qualities are missing in
most African countries, which lack the skills base, expertise, resources and
infrastructure to meet the security and welfare needs of citizens. In the absence of
the requisite institutional capacity, the values and principles of democracy cannot
be "operationalised", the security vacuum will not be filled, and endeavours to
demilitarise the state and civil society will be thwarted. For example, adherence to
the rule of law presupposes the existence of a competent and fair judiciary, police
service and criminal justice system; the expectation that police would respect
human rights is unrealistic if they have not been trained in techniques other than
the use of force; democratic civil-military relations rest not only on the organisational
culture of the armed forces but also on the proficiency of departments of defence
and parliamentary defence committees; and illegal trafficking in small arms will
not be stemmed through policy and legislative measures if governments are unable
to control their arsenals and borders. The building of capacity in these and other
areas is necessarily a long term endeavour.
Conclusion
If security is conceived narrowly in terms of the state and its military strength, then
the maintenance of large armed forces and other forms of militarisation will be
regarded as an essential and effective basis for stability. This logic has proven to
be fallacious in Africa and elsewhere. The security of the state is patently not
synonymous with the security of citizens, and the latter derives less from military
protection than from meeting basic human rights and needs. Where these rights and
needs are neglected, and where the state's capacity to govern is weak, a security
vacuum arises and will be filled by violence for defensive and offensive purposes.
Demilitarisation will not in itself resolve the crisis of insecurity because it does
not go to the heart of the underlying structural problems. Since the problems are
numerous, complex and deep-rooted, they have no single, simple or short-term
solution. They can be overcome only by entrenching respect for political pluralism
Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa 11
and human rights; accommodating ethnicity and other forms of diversity; building
ihe capacity of state departments and local authorities; and achieving at least
some degree of economic growth and equity. These measures, often referred
to as "post conflict peace building", are the cardinal means of preventing
crises and are therefore as much pre-crisis as post-crisis imperatives. The term
"post conflict peace building" is also inapt since peace building has everything to
do with the ongoing management of social and political conflict through good
governance.
In this paper I have sought to develop a conceptual and strategic framework for
understanding militarisation and the challenge of demilitarisation in Africa. The
framework does not provide a sufficient basis for formulating a programme of
action, however, since it operates at too high a level of generalisation. Viable
programmes have to be grounded in a more detailed analysis of structural problems
and militarisation in individual countries and regions, and have to be developed by
local actors rather than driven by outsiders. Finally, it should be noted that there are
political risks and social and economic costs associated with many aspects of the
demilitarisation agenda, such as demobilisation of combatants, a reduction in
military spending, downgrading the political status of armed forces and the closure
of military bases. These risks and costs militate against any hasty and radical
process and reinforce the imperative of involving local actors in shaping and
managing the agenda.
Notes
* Executive Director, Centre forConflict Resolution, University of Cape Town.
South Africa.
I. This section is drawn from Nathan (1994: Chapter 2).
References
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on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa. Ogun State
(Nigeria): Africa Leadership Forum.
Booth, K. (ed). (1991) "New Thinking about Strategy and International Security".
London: Harper Collins.
Booth, K. (1994) "A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations".
Southern African Perspectives, No. 30, Centre for Southern African
Studies, University of the Western Cape.
Boulding, E. {ed). (1992) "New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflict and
Security Re-Examined". Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Brandt Commission. (1980) "North-South: A programme for SunivaT'. London:
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Brundtland Commission. (1987) "Our Common Future: The Report of the World
78 Laurie Nathan
Commission on Environment and Development". Oxford: Oxford University
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Chipman, J. (1992) "The Future of Strategic Studies". Survival, Vol. 34,
No. I, pp. 109-131.
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Co-operation in Africa". Southern African Perspectives, No. 13, Centre for
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Nathan, L. (1994) "The Changing of the Guard: Armed Forces and Defence Policy
in a Democratic South Africa". Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.
Nathan, L. (1998) "The 1996 Defence White Paper: An Agenda for State Demilitarisation?"
In: J. Cock and P. McKenzie (eds). From Defence to Development:
Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa. Cape Town: David
Philip ad Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, pp. 41-57.
Palme Commission. (1984) "Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament".
London: Pan.
Palme Commission. (1990) "Final Statement of the Palme Commission on
Disarmament and Security Issues". Disarmament, Vol. 13, No. l,pp. 135-136.
Republic of South Africa (1994) White Paper on Intelligence for the Republic of
South Africa.
Swilling, M. and Phillips. M. (1989) "State Power in the 1980s: From Total
Strategy to Counter-revolutionary Warfare". In: Cock and L. Nathan (eds).
War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa. Cape Town: David
Philip, pp. 134-148.
Thomas, C. (1991) "New Directions in Thinking about Security in the Third
World". In: K. Booth (ed). New Thinking About Strategy and International
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Tokareva, Z. (1989) "Organisation of African Unity: 25 Years of Struggle".
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Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa 79
Vale, P. (1992) "War and Peace in the Third World". In: Mailman, W. (ed).
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Afr.j.polit. sci. (1998), Vol. 3 No. 2, 69-79
Good Governance, Security and
Disarmament in Africa
Laurie Nathan*
Abstract
Militarisation in Africa is primarily a symptom of intra-state crises. The crises
gave rise to a security vacuum which states and groups seek to fill through violence.
The ensuing vicious cycle of insecurity will not be broken, and substantial
demilitarisation will not be achieved, without addressing the structural causes of
the crises. The priority in this regard is the establishment of good governance.
While a positive relationship may exist between disarmament, development and
security, the more significant relationship is between good governance, secuirty
and disarmament.
Introduction
I argue in this paper that militarisation in Africa is essentially a product of weak
states and intra-state crises. It derives less from efforts to maintain security and
pursue national interests against other states, than from the absence of security
within states. The conclusion from this argument is that demilitarisation in Africa
will not be achieved on a meaningful scale without addressing satisfactorily the
structural causes of national crises and insecurity. The first part of the paper
presents a critique of the conventional approach to security which relies on military
force. The second part traverses the well-known alternative perspective which
postulates demilitarisation on the ground that a positive relationship exists between
disarmament development and security. The third and final parts suggest that
in the context of intra-state crises, the challenge of demilitarisation is better
understood in terms of the relationship between good governance, security and
disarmament.
1027-0353 © 1998 African Association of Political Sciencr
70 Laurie Nathan
Rethinking Security'
The extent of militarisation in a given society is a function of historical, geographic,
cultural, political and strategic factors. It flows also from philosophical assumptions
about state sovereignty, international relations, domestic governance and the
use of force. The concept of security is central in this regard: how is security
conceived? what constitutes a threat to security? whose security is at issue? and by
what means should security be sought? How these questions are answered at a
conceptual level will have a major bearing on policy and strategy.
The conventional approach to security was shaped by the political conditions of
the Cold War. For close on forty years the international system was characterised
by acute tension between rival ideological blocs and the prospect of another world
war. In these circumstances, the debate around security focused on states and
military stability (Booth, 1994: 3). Security policy was concerned chiefly with
defending the sovereignty, territory and political independence of the state. The
predominant response to perceived challenges was the threat or use of force.
Fuelled by the self-serving interests of military establishments, the perpetual
tendency was to build larger armies and arsenals in anticipation of worst-case
scenarios.
This approach has a number of major shortcomings: it ignores the root causes
of conflict; it fails to take adequate account of the security of people and the many
non-military threats to their security; it contributes to a militarist ethos in civil
society; and it diverts resources from more constructive employment. This
approach may also be counter-productive if the military steps taken by a state to
strengthen its security induce insecurity in other states. The likely reaction of those
states might be to build their own military capacity, leading inexorably to an arms
race. The net result of this scenario, referred to as the "security dilemma", is a
reduction in the security of all the states concerned (Buzan, 1991).
Moreover, as in the case of apartheid South Africa, states which lack internal
legitimacy typically invoke the notion of "national security" to justify the suppression
of their citizens. In such circumstances, "national security" amounts to little
more than regime security. The principal source of people's insecurity is their own
government rather than potential foreign aggressor (Thomas, 1991). Systematic
repression requires considerable sums to be spent on the security forces at the
expense of development and the provision of welfare services. The resultant
deterioration in standards of living further diminishes the security of citizens and,
in some instances, intensifies popular resistance against the state. Olu Ademiji
describes this vicious cycle as follows:
Very often, arms acquisitions by Third World countries in the interests of
security are made at the apparent cost of primary or basic needs in the area
of social and economic well-being. Given the fragile economic base, which
Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa 11
cannot sustain the expenditure on arms, and the equally fragile political
base, which requires arms acquisition, self-preservation often dictates a
choice of defence over development. The non-military threats to security
are thus neglected, creating further cause for instability (quoted in Vale,
1992).
In the light of these problems, United Nations (UN) agencies, independent
commissions and peace scholars have long sought to promote alternative security
theories and strategies (e.g. Booth, 1991 and 1994; Boulding, 1992; Brandt
Commission, 1980; Brundtland Commission, 1987; Life and Peace Institute,
1990; and Palme Commission, 1984 and 1989). In the post Cold War era, many of
their ideas have been adopted by the mainstream discipline of strategic studies
(e.g. Chipman, 1992), as well as by military leaders (e.g. Worner, 1991) and
governments.
Government support is evident, at least at the level of discourse, in the proposal
to establish a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in
Africa (CSSDCA) (ALF 1991; Nathan, 1992). The proposal, formulated in 1991
by African heads of state and government under the auspices of General Obasanjo' s
Africa Leadership Forum, is modeled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe and draws heavily on the paradigm employed by the Palme
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1984 and 1989).
The CSSDCA initiative promotes a set of principles and policies grouped in four
baskets or calabashes: security, stability, development and co-operation. The
security calabash revolves around the argument that national and regional security
should be broadened beyond military matters to include political, social, economic
and environmental factors. Abuse of human rights, a lack of self-sufficiency in
food and energy, environmental degradation, underdevelopment and a host of
other critical problems constitute grave threats to the security of people. These
problems also threaten the security of states since they may lead to bloody conflict
between governments and citizens.
Security is consequently defined as an all-encompassing concept that enables
citizens to live in peace and harmony; have access to resources and the basic
necessities of life; participate fully and freely in the processes of governance; and
enjoy the protection of fundamental rights. This broad definition marks a radical
departure from the state-centric model of security in Africa. Indeed, the CSSDCA
proposal makes a point of distinguishing between the security of people and the
security of states. The former is fulfilled by satisfying the political, cultural and
socio-economic needs of individuals and communities, and the latter is not assured
where these needs are not met.
South Africa's democratic government elected in April 1994 has embraced the
CSSDCA approach to security (see Republic of South Africa, 1994 and 196). Some
72 Laurie Nathan
military officers who served under the previous regime claim that the approach is
not new at all since the apartheid security doctrine of Total Strategy similarly
emphasised the political and socio-economic dimensions of security (see Swilling
and Phillips, 1989). The two models are in fact diametrically opposed: whereas the
latter sought to militarise all aspects of national policy, the former seeks to
demilitarise the notion of security. This difference is apparent in the following
summary features of the new thinking on security:
• Security is conceived as a holistic phenomenon that is not restricted to
military matters but broadened to incorporate political, social, economic and
environmental issues.
• The objects of security are not confined to states but extend at different levels
of society to include people, regions and the global community.
• Threats to security are not limited to military challenges to state sovereignty
and territorial integrity; they include poverty, oppression, social injustice and
ecological degradation.
• The objectives of security policy therefore go beyond achieving an absence
of war to encompass the attainment of democracy, sustainable economic
development, social justice and protection of the environment.
• The state's responsibility for ensuring the security of its citizens does not lie
exclusively or even predominantly with the police, military and intelligence
services. It is shared by many government departments and ultimately
resides with Parliament.
• As discussed below, disarmament and other forms of demilitarisation are
more likely to enhance than undermine the security of people and states.
Disarmament entails reductions in forces, military spending and weapons
holdings. Since World War II the UN has devoted much attention to the necessity
for progress in this area in the interests of international peace and security. In 1978
the General Assembly resolved that the ultimate goal of the international community
is general and complete disarmament under effective international control; the
resolution has served as a guiding principle in subsequent UN deliberations on the
subject (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1989). The
Organisation of African Unity has endorsed this position, and African states have
repeatedly declared their commitment to conventional and nuclear disarmament
(Tokareva, 1989; and United Nations, 1990).
There are two essential motivations for disarmament. First, arms build-ups and
the growing sophistication of weaponry in many regions make the world a more
dangerous place: they heighten political instability, increase the risk of hostilities
and raise the human and economic costs of warfare. Second, armaments divert
financial resources and skilled labour from more productive ends. They are amajor
cause of the net outflow of capital from countries in the South, contributing greatly
to underdevelopment. In short, there is a positive relationship between disarma-
Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa 73
ment, development and security. The new South Africa government follows this
logic in its White Paper on Defence (Republic of South Africa, 1996: 5). It
maintains that the greatest threats to the South African people are criminal violence
and socio-economic problems like unemployment, poverty, poor education and
inadequate social services. The Reconstruction and Development Programme
(RDP) is thus "the principal long-term means of promoting the security of citizens
and, thereby, the stability of the country". There is consequently "a compelling
need to reallocate state resources to the RDP", and to rationalise the armed forces
and contain military spending accordingly.
Militarisation and Structural Crisis
Demilitarisation cannot be considered solely in terms of disarmament since it also
encompasses a range of qualitative relationships, processes and values in the
political, social and economic spheres (Cock, 1989). Andreski identifies the
following trends as indicators thereof:
First,... an aggressive foreign policy, based on a readiness to resort to war;
second, the preponderance of the military in the state, the extreme case
being that of military rule; third, subservience of the whole society to the
needs of the army which may involve a recasting of social life in accordance
with the pattern of military organisation; and fourth, an ideology which
promotes military ideas (quoted in Cock, 1989: 3).
The most important aspect of militarisation is arguably a tendency by governments
or opposition groups to rely on force in the management of international and/
or domestic relations and conflict. Such reliance is a critical issue from a normative
perspective because it leads directly to destruction of life, property and, in extreme
situations, entire communities. From an analytical perspective, it is often the
principal source of other forms of militarisation, necessarily requiring the devotion
of human and material resources to military means. As argued below, this tendency
is so dominant and pervasive in African countries wracked by insecurity that it
precludes substantial disarmament.
The problem of militarisation in Africa is largely a consequence of structural
conditions which constitute an intra-state crisis. Four structural conditions are
central in this regard: authoritarian rule and abuse of human rights and freedoms;
acute socio-economic deprivation and inequity; the exclusion of minority or
majority groups from governance and economic opportunity because of their race,
ethnicity or religion; and weak states in the sense of lacking the institutional
capacity to manage normal political and social conflict in a consensual and nonviolent
way.
These conditions constitute a crisis because they render people and states
74 Laurie Nathan
profoundly insecure and give rise to a societal propensity towards large-scale
violence. The risk of violence increases when the four conditions listed above are
present simultaneously, mutually reinforcing and exacerbated by other structural
factors. At the national level, these factors may include the lack of coincidence
between nations and states as a result of the colonial imposition of borders, and
scarcity and degradation of natural resources. At the international level they
include the debt crisis; the imbalance in economic power and trade relations
between North and South; military support to dictators by foreign states; and the
structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.
Contrary to the analytical premise of much of the academic and policy literature
on peace and conflict, intra-state crises are not confined to situations of extreme
violence. Crises and violence are better understood as related but distinct phenomena,
the latter being typically a manifestation of the former. As illustrated below,
violence is cither an organised and deliberate response to a crisis or a spontaneous
and sporadic outcome thereof.
• If groups are marginalised because of their race, ethnicity or religion, and if
more generally citizens are subject to oppression and repression, the potential
for armed rebellion will be high; and since authoritarian regimes do not
rule with the consent of the governed, they must rely on force to stay in power.
• If people arc hungry and have no access to resources and economic opportunities,
some of them may turn to banditry as a means of subsistence. They
may also initiate riots in protest against corruption and the accumulation of
wealth by the ruling elite.
• If the state is too weak to maintain law and order, banditry and other types of
criminal activity will flourish. Communities, and in some cases the state
itself, will privatise security.
• If the state does not have the legitimacy and institutional capacity to resolve
the low-level political and social conflict that characterises all societies,
some individuals and groups will attempt to protect their interests and settle
their disputes through violence.
These examples demonstrate that violence is not intrinsically the worst-case
scenario, nor peace the ideal state of affairs. For the governments and citizens of
stable Western democracies, the concept of peace is unproblematic. Defined
narrowly as the absence of widespread physical violence, it is held to be an
unqualified good in terms of orderly politics and the sanctity of life. In authoritarian
states, in contrast, oppressed groups may prize freedom and dignity more than
peace and may be prepared to provoke and endure extreme violence to achieve the
right of citizenship. Since hostilities threaten relationships of power and privilege,
peace serves the interests of the regime and the foreign powers which support it.
Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa 75
The cessation of hostilities is thus not so much a goal in its own right as an
outcome of the antagonists' willingness to reach a settlement that addresses the
root cause(s) of violence. Both ethically and analytically, the primary objective of
efforts to prevent and resolve African crises is best formulated as the establishment
of peace with justice (see Galtung, 1969). This formulation is not meant in a
simplistic and romantic sense. Rather, it helps to explain why the termination of
civil wars is so difficult as disputants invariably have conflicting views on the
constituent elements of justice in a new dispensation.
In the situations depicted above, the use of force and resultant militarisation
compound the crisis. As noted, in the previous section, they promote a culture of
violence, perpetuate and deepen insecurity and conflict, divert resources from
development, and lay productive capacity to waste. For these reasons.
demilitarisation in Africa is regarded as a high priority by certain local and foreign
organisations. They focus on, in particular, the demobilisation of former combatants;
the proliferation of light weapons; conventional arms transfers; unstable
civil-military relations; disproportionate military spending; and the role of mercenary
outfits like Executive Outcomes. These efforts will not yield significant
results, however, because they focus on the symptoms rather than the causes of
intra-state crises. The vicious cycle of insecurity might be mitigated through such
efforts but it will not be reversed without overcoming the structural problems that
generate and define the crises. Put differently, the crises create a security vacuum
which state and non-state actors seek to fill by violent means; demilitarisation is
contingent on the filling of that vacuum by legitimate political means.
Good Governance
At the most fundamental level, then, demilitarisation in African countries depends
on the resolution of national conflict through inclusive multi-party negotiations
and the introduction of democratic and effective governance. Only in these
circumstances can development and human security be achieved and sustained.
While a positive relationship may exist between disarmament, development and
security, the relationship posited here is between good governance, security and
disarmament.
Itisnocoincidencethat, forexample, the process of light weapons disarmament
in Mali followed the ending of military rule and the Taureg rebellion in that
country. Similarly, the process of demilitarising the South African state flowed in
the first instance from the demise of the Cold War and then escalated with the
advent of democracy (see Nathan, 1998). The South African White Paper on
Defence motivates demilitarisation in precisely these terms: "While the potential
for instability and conflict remains [in the post-apartheid era], the salient fact is thai
the government is no longer unrepresentative and at war with its own people ami
neighbouring states in Southern Africa" (Republic of South Africa. 1996 2>
76 I-Murie Nathan
Conversely, civil society in South Africa remains highly militarised, chiefly in the
form of violent crime and private security, because gross poverty and inequity have
not yet been ameliorated.
It follows from the above that the potential for demilitarisation in Africa is
greater in democratic societies than in authoritarian states. Nevertheless, the
realisation of that potential is frequently inhibited by one or more of three factors.
First, countries which are democratic and free from large-scale violence will be
reluctant to scale down their military capability if they are threatened by instability
in neighbouring states. Second, they may be confronted by extremist groups which
reject an inclusive political dispensation and resort to terrorism.
Third, good governance is not restricted to free and fair elections, respect for
human rights and the other features of democracy. It also entails efficiency and
effectiveness in fulfilling the functions of the state. These qualities are missing in
most African countries, which lack the skills base, expertise, resources and
infrastructure to meet the security and welfare needs of citizens. In the absence of
the requisite institutional capacity, the values and principles of democracy cannot
be "operationalised", the security vacuum will not be filled, and endeavours to
demilitarise the state and civil society will be thwarted. For example, adherence to
the rule of law presupposes the existence of a competent and fair judiciary, police
service and criminal justice system; the expectation that police would respect
human rights is unrealistic if they have not been trained in techniques other than
the use of force; democratic civil-military relations rest not only on the organisational
culture of the armed forces but also on the proficiency of departments of defence
and parliamentary defence committees; and illegal trafficking in small arms will
not be stemmed through policy and legislative measures if governments are unable
to control their arsenals and borders. The building of capacity in these and other
areas is necessarily a long term endeavour.
Conclusion
If security is conceived narrowly in terms of the state and its military strength, then
the maintenance of large armed forces and other forms of militarisation will be
regarded as an essential and effective basis for stability. This logic has proven to
be fallacious in Africa and elsewhere. The security of the state is patently not
synonymous with the security of citizens, and the latter derives less from military
protection than from meeting basic human rights and needs. Where these rights and
needs are neglected, and where the state's capacity to govern is weak, a security
vacuum arises and will be filled by violence for defensive and offensive purposes.
Demilitarisation will not in itself resolve the crisis of insecurity because it does
not go to the heart of the underlying structural problems. Since the problems are
numerous, complex and deep-rooted, they have no single, simple or short-term
solution. They can be overcome only by entrenching respect for political pluralism
Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa 11
and human rights; accommodating ethnicity and other forms of diversity; building
ihe capacity of state departments and local authorities; and achieving at least
some degree of economic growth and equity. These measures, often referred
to as "post conflict peace building", are the cardinal means of preventing
crises and are therefore as much pre-crisis as post-crisis imperatives. The term
"post conflict peace building" is also inapt since peace building has everything to
do with the ongoing management of social and political conflict through good
governance.
In this paper I have sought to develop a conceptual and strategic framework for
understanding militarisation and the challenge of demilitarisation in Africa. The
framework does not provide a sufficient basis for formulating a programme of
action, however, since it operates at too high a level of generalisation. Viable
programmes have to be grounded in a more detailed analysis of structural problems
and militarisation in individual countries and regions, and have to be developed by
local actors rather than driven by outsiders. Finally, it should be noted that there are
political risks and social and economic costs associated with many aspects of the
demilitarisation agenda, such as demobilisation of combatants, a reduction in
military spending, downgrading the political status of armed forces and the closure
of military bases. These risks and costs militate against any hasty and radical
process and reinforce the imperative of involving local actors in shaping and
managing the agenda.
Notes
* Executive Director, Centre forConflict Resolution, University of Cape Town.
South Africa.
I. This section is drawn from Nathan (1994: Chapter 2).
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