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Associate Professor, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, &
Lead Researcher, ALTUS & Ford Foundation Project on Conflict & Security Sector
Governance in West Africa.
First published in 2014 by:
CLEEN Foundation
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Since the 1990s, the 15 countries of the Economic Commission of West
Africa States (ECOWAS) have established rule of law, functioning state
institutions and relatively good governance. Furthermore, these ECOWAS
countries have also experienced relatively strong rates of economic growth
that is higher than the Africa average. However, in the recent past, these
ECOWAS countries have also witnessed three waves of insecurity on a scale
large. The continued growth of the economies of West African states and the
wellbeing of their peoples will depend on the ability of these countries to
address the collective and individual security challenges which they currently
face. There is therefore an intimate link between security, public welfare,
democracy, and development. In most post-conflict countries in West Africa,
emphasis has been on violence cessation and not much is heard of the need
for accountability and a democratic control of the security sector. A key
theme in the seven-country case studies2 on which this policy brief is based is
that in both post-conflict and democratizing countries of West Africa,
democratic control of the security sector is a sine quo non for future progress;
it is an issue that can no longer be safely ignored. The institutional challenges
facing the security sector in each of the seven countries studies are identified.
Creative innovations and strengths are also identified. Efforts by ECOWAS to
set security sector norms for the whole region are reviewed, along with the
challenges of turning norms into practical realities. Against this background,
this brief asks the question: What can be learned from the recent experiences
of these seven countries in improving the management of their security
sectors? Are some of the lessons transferrable? This Policy Brief highlights
some of the key lessons that West African countries can easily harvest as lowlying fruits from the recent experiences of their neighbours.
2
Countries studied are Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger Republic, Nigeria, and
Sierra Leone. For the detailed studies see Conflicts and Security Governance in West
Africa, Abdul Raufu Mustapha, ed., Malthouse Press Limited and CLEEN Foundation,
2013, Lagos, Nigeria.
3
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1. Introduction
5
2. (In)security Challenges in West Africa
12
o Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
o Islamist terrorism & Cross-Border Banditry
in the Sahel
12
14
3. Security Governance: Divergent Experiences
of the 7 Study Countries
17
4. A Good Practice Guide to Security Governance
in West Africa
29
5. Conclusion
34
6. References
37
4
1. Introduction
The 15 countries of the West Africa sub-region, organized under the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), stretch from
Senegal in the west to Nigeria in the east. Since the Third Wave of
Democratization from the late 1980s, most of these countries ‘have
established rule of law, functioning state institutions and relatively good
governance.’ 3 Such is the tempo of democratization that in Ghana,
Senegal, and Benin Republic incumbent ruling parties have been defeated
at the polls, leading to peaceful alternation in governance, while Nigeria
has enjoyed the longest spell of civilian rule in its post-colonial history.
Furthermore, the ECOWAS countries have also experienced relatively
strong rates of economic growth: in 2012 they grew at the average GDP
growth rate of 6.9 per cent, a rate that is higher than the Africa average.
However, it is not all good news from the ECOWAS sub-region, as in the
recent past, the zone ‘has witnessed three waves of insecurity on a scale
large enough to prompt bilateral and collective responses by its member
states and the intervention of external actors.’4
As a consequence of this instability, West Africa is also a region of
profound experimentation in the development of collective security
institutions and mechanisms. At a 2010 conference to review the progress
achieved in this regard, participants, including past and current Heads of
State and other senior officials, pointed out some of the considerable
achievements of the West African states under ECOWAS over the last two
decades. The conference:
3
Adjoa Anyimadu, ‘Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the
Indian Ocean’, Africa 2013/02, Chatham House, London, July 2013, p.7.
4
Okey Uzoechina, 2014, ‘Security Sector Reform and Governance Processes in West
Africa: From Concepts to Reality’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces (DCAF), Policy Brief No. 35, February, p. 1
5
mentioned the fact that the region had been transformed from a
zone of crippling wars (in the Greater Mano River Basin) in the
1990s into a space where no active war is raging today, as
evidence of the progress that has been made. It did not also
escape the attention … that democratic culture was steadily taking
root in the region.5
Some of the achievements of the West African states include:
i. The restoration of peace to Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote
d’Ivoire;
ii. Aversion of war through effective preventive diplomacy in Togo
and Guinea Bissau;
iii. The adoption and implementation of institutional and legal
frameworks for conflict prevention, management, resolution,
peace-keeping and peace-building;
iv. The adoption and effective application of constitutional
convergence principles with an accompanying sanctions
regime.
v. The institutionalization of “home-grown” strategies in preventive
diplomacy and military intervention…6
These achievements notwithstanding, the conference went on to note that
the West Africa ‘region remains precariously fragile and susceptible to
relapse into violence and reversals in
the democratization processes.’7 This precariousness is because the peace
‘efforts have been piecemeal, mandates are often overlapping or unclear,
5
ECOWAS, 2010, ‘Two Decades of Peace Processes in West Africa: Achievements –
Failures – Lessons', Monrovia, Liberia, 22-26 March 2010,
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/dept/h/h1/en/rapport/Final_Report_Two_Decades_English.
pdf, p..4
6
ibid.
6
and strategy has not been sufficiently anticipatory to stem the tide of
insecurity.’8 There remains the difficulty of translating agreed norms into
sustainable practice.
Indeed, another high-level conference in 2013, this time organized by the
pan-African organization, African Governance Institute (AGI) in Dakar,
re-emphasised this theme of the fragility of peace in West Africa. It is also
significant that the AGI conference connected this fragility with the
governance of the security sector, noting that negative:
recent developments in West Africa, especially in Mali and
Guinea Bissau and elsewhere … [are] consequences of poor
governance in armed and security forces. … [and] in order to
address the emerging human security challenges facing the
continent, there is a need to reconsider the missions, the
structures, the training and logistics of the armed and security
forces.9
Participants at the AGI conference specifically pin-pointed ‘the bad
governance of the armed forces’ as a major challenge facing African
countries, noting that ‘there was a disconnect between democratic
governance and the governance of the armed forces’.10 Two important
challenges were noted regarding the poor governance of the security
forces: (1) the 'politicization of the armed forces’, and the ‘defence
corruption vulnerability of nations and … the corruption in African armed
and security forces.’11 An intimate connection was made between the lack
of democracy in a country, the poor governance of its armed forces, the
7
ibid, p.5
Uzoechina, 2014, p.2
9
African Governance Institute, ‘High-Level Policy Dialogue and Strategic Thinking
Session on Governance of African Armed Forces’, policy Brief No. 1, Dakar, April 9,
2013.
10
ibid, p. 3
11
ibid, pp. 3-5
8
7
country’s susceptibility to corruption, and the threat to the human security
of the citizenry. Two key lessons were highlighted:
countries with higher levels of democratization faced lower risk of
corruption in the armed and security forces, while those with low
levels of democracy faced higher levels of corruption in the armed
and security forces as well as bigger threats to their existence as
independent entities. The second lesson … was that it was realistic
and practical for the armed forces of nations, together with
involved regional organizations and civil society, to tackle this
problem and to make significant improvement.12
The AGI conference thereby put on the agenda, the democratic
governance of the security forces and the role of civil society
organizations in the process. The conference went on to highlight 9 key
points for the democratic governance of the security forces, including the
fact that the ‘good governance of the armed and security forces is a
prerequisite for entrenching accountable, inclusive and participatory
democracy in an environment of peace and security’.
The two high-level pan-African conferences summarized above draw our
attention to the urgent challenge of the promotion of good governance in
the armed and security forces of West African states and the need to
strengthen the capacity of these forces to resist and limit partisan
politicization on the one hand, and systemic corruption, on the other.
Indeed, as noted by the former Minister of State for Defence in Nigeria,
Erelu Obada, for the West African states to
address their current marginalization in world affairs, and achieve their
full potential, they must address the question of the security of lives and
12
ibid
8
property across their countries and the general stability of the West
African sub-region and the Gulf of Guinea (GOG).13
This ALTUS/Ford Foundation sponsored study of the governance of the
security sector in seven West African states is aimed at contributing to a
better understanding of the dynamics of the security forces in the subregion.14 For the most part, the country-researchers are nationals or longtime residents of the countries they are studying, with in-depth knowledge
of the political system and security sector of their respective study
countries. These researchers came from a range of social science
disciplines, necessitating flexibility in the methodological approach.
Despite this flexibility, however, efforts were made at a methodological
workshop to establish some common concerns, but without forcing the
case studies into a pro forma straight jacket. While each country specialist
was regarded as an expert ‘soloist’ in their field, attention was drawn to
the need to ensure that the country studies spoke sufficiently to each other
to establish a melodious ‘orchestra’.15 Specifically, a qualitative case study
approach was adopted for each country study. Apart from a general review
of the political and security histories of each country, two case studies
were chosen for each country to highlight the actors, institutions,
challenges, and successes of the management of the security sector. As
much as possible, one case study was to highlight strong points and
successes, while the second was to draw attention to challenges and
13
Hon. Erelu Olusola Obada, (former) Minister of State for Defence, Nigeria, ‘Nigeria’s
Defence Priorities: Domestic Stability for Regional Security’, Chatham House, London,
18 July 2013.
14
Originally, eight countries were selected for study, but it was impossible to get a local
researcher to undertake the study in Chad. In a similar vein, the local researcher
responsible for the Mali study dropped out halfway into the project, leaving the ALTUS
Secretariat to conduct the study within its secretariat.
15
For our general methodology see OECD, 2007, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security
System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice, Paris; and Abdul Raufu Mustapha,
October 2012, ‘Soloists & Orchestras: Methodological Reflections on the Comparative
Study of Security Sector Governance & Conflict in West Africa’, CLEEN, Lagos.
9
failures. In essence therefore, our studies amounted to both within-country
and across-country comparisons, making it possible to draw out both
positive and negative lessons from within each country and comparatively,
across our seven countries.
To improve comparability, efforts were made to ensure that each study
addressed the question of public security from the same stand-point. We
noted, for example, that Wole Soyinka’s parody of African tyrannical
regimes in Kongi’s Harvest presents us with the conflation of the person
of the ruler with the state. The ruler is the state, and by extension, the
security of the state is reduced to the security of the ruler. Even with the
wave of democratization after the 1980s, many African states still suffer
from this personalization of the state by the leadership. In the country
studies, we sought to move beyond the narrow identification of security
with the person of the leadership, or even with state institutions. We
adopted a wider definition of security as human security, concerned, not
just with the institutions of the state, but also with the integrity of the
society, and with the well-being of the individual citizen.
This connection between the state, the governance of its security sector,
and the welfare of the citizenry is examined from a number of angles in
the country studies. Some key questions addressed are: What kind of state
exists in each case? What political, social, and economic contexts
characterize each state? What is the historical context of the evolution of
the security sector? What is the nature of civil society? What are the
demographic dynamics of the state? What is the threat perception (internal
and external) of state elites? What is the effectiveness
and legitimacy of state institutions? How active are non-state actors and
institutions in the security sector? What influences do religious beliefs and
institutions wield? What is the availability of information – media or
rumours - upon which the citizen can base their demands on the state? Are
the mandates of security forces clearly defined and limited by law? Do
10
security forces use their powers proportionately? Are there policies to deal
with illegal and discriminatory actions by the security services? What is
the level of the political neutrality of the security forces? Are the
operations of the security forces gender sensitive? As might be expected,
each researcher emphasised those questions that were pressing in their
respective countries.
From these questions, key themes emerge in the evaluation of the
democratic content of the governance of the security sector in each
country:
(1) Accountability & Transparency: (what is the quality of
Parliamentary, Judicial, and societal oversight of the security
sector? How transparent is the budgeting process for the security
services?);
(2) Redress: (are there Independent human rights bodies, national
commissions, and Ombudsman through which the citizen can seek
redress?);
(3) Legitimacy: (what level of confidence do affected local
populations have in the security forces?);
(4) Voice & Participation of civil society: (are different social
groups represented in the security & justice systems?)
(5) Professionalism of armed forces: (how committed are the
security services to their professional ethics?)
Various practical research methodologies - desk research; interviews with
key stakeholders; perception surveys of selected communities; focus group
discussions with specific groups; and media analyses - were used
wherever appropriate and practicable to get to grips with these questions
in the context of the history of each country. Based on these approaches,
key actors studied in our country studies include the core Security bodies
- army, police, immigration, intelligence; important oversight bodies –
executive, parliament; Financial and administrative arrangements for the
11
management of the security sector – ministries of defence, internal affairs,
and opaque security votes; Justice & law enforcement bodies – judiciary,
prisons; Non-statutory security bodies – private security companies,
vigilantes; Public complaint bodies – National Human Rights
Commission; and Civil society organizations. In each country study, an
effort was made to cover as many of these themes and questions as
possible.
As noted earlier, there is a huge gap in West Africa between the norms
and protocols adopted by the ECOWAS states, and the practical realities
in each country. The translation of norms into reality is often stymied by
insufficient political will, lack of personnel, and the lack of adequate
resources. In the country studies, we seek to identify effective, yet cheap
and accessible, measures which some countries have used to improve the
governance of their security sector. It is hoped that these good practices in
some countries can become important lessons for others across the subregion. Countries can also learn from each other’s mistakes.
2. (In)security Challenges in West Africa
The quality of the governance of the security sector in the West Africa
sub-region should be evaluated against the threats of insecurity facing the
sub-region. These include piracy and maritime violence across the Gulf of
Guinea, Islamist political violence across the Sahel, the activities of narcotraffickers from some Latin American countries, the proliferation and
trafficking in small arms, and the large scale trafficking of persons,
especially women and children.
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
The situation in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is one of the pressing security
challenges facing West African countries. Ghana’s Chief of Naval Staff,
12
Rear Admiral Geofrey Biekro in 2013 described the GoG as ‘one of the
most dangerous maritime areas in the world.’16 The countries of the GoG,
stretching from West to Central Africa, produced about 5.4 million barrels
of crude oil per day in 2012. The GoG is therefore an important area in the
global geo-politics of oil, attracting the attention of the major western
powers as well of those of sophisticated global syndicates of oil thieves
and pirates. In 2010, there were 45 reported cases of piracy in the GoG. In
2011 this rose to 65 cases, while 37 vessels were attacked in 2012. ‘What
had been primarily a problem in Nigeria’s Niger Delta has expanded with
attacks or raids in neighbouring Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire,
Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea since 2009.’17 In this context, the
territorial waters of Nigeria, Benin and Togo ‘are considered areas at
greatest risk of piracy and armed robbery at sea, theft of oil and other
cargo, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and trafficking of
counterfeit items, people, narcotics and arms.’18
U.S. Naval Intelligence Reports indicate that in the GoG, ‘about nine
hijacking incidents, 55 unauthorized vessel boarding, several kidnappings
and vessels fired upon’ happened in the first half of 2013.19 According to
some analysts, ‘piracy there had jumped 41% from 2011 to 2012 and was
on track to be even worse in 2013.’20 In a 2013 Human Cost of Maritime
Piracy Report, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) noted that West
Africa ‘has now overtaken Somalia as the world’s piracy hot-spot with
966 sailors attacked last year compared with 851 in Somalia.’ The IMB
16
Inemesit Akpan-Nsoh, Odita Sunday, and Anietie Akpan, ‘African navies meet over
piracy in Gulf of Guinea’, www.ngrguardiannews.com, 28 August 2013.
17
Erelu Obada, op cit.
18
Adjoa Anyimadu, op cit.
19
‘Nigeria laments rising insecurity in Gulf of Guinea’ http://premiumtimesng.com/,
August 29, 2013
20
Nick Turse, ‘The Terror Diaspora: The US Military and the Unraveling of Africa’,
TomDispatch.com, Tuesday, 18 June 2013
13
estimates the costs of the stolen goods in the GoG in 2012 at between 25
and 75 million euros ($33 million to $100 million).21
In response to this rising level of insecurity, the UN Security Council, in
February 2012, adopted Resolution 2039, which urged the states of the
region to cooperate in countering piracy at regional and national levels. In
response, in 2013 the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) convened joint
meetings to draft a regional strategy.22 A summit was held in Yaounde,
attended by 11 leaders of ECOWAS and ECCAS to produce a joint action
plan to tackle piracy and maritime criminality.
The ECOWAS-ECCAS Declaration on Maritime Security 2013 and the
draft ECOWAS Maritime Security Strategy seek to address the challenges
in the GOG through the establishment of an agreed Code of Conduct
Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and
Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa. The Political
Declaration on Maritime Safety requests ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf
of Guinea Commission to promote activities aimed at cooperation,
coordination, pooling together of resources among member states.23
Islamist Terrorism & Cross-Border Banditry in the Sahel
In the Sahel region across West Africa, the collective threat facing the
sub-region comes from Islamist terrorism, cross-border banditry, people
smuggling, and movement of illegal and harmful substances like
cigarettes, hard drugs, and light weapons. Since the 1960s, both Mali and
Niger have had problems with restive ethnic groups, especially Tuareg and
21
‘Leaders want naval force in Gulf of Guinea as Africa loses $300b to oil theft, others’,
www.ngrguardiannews.com, Monday, 24 June 2013
22
Adjoa Anyimadu, op cit.
23
Uzoechina, 2014, p. 11
14
Arab, in their northern regions. In recent times, however, this problem of
ethnic restiveness has worsened, and is further compounded by the rise of
violent Islamist movements. The scale of the Sahelian threat is difficult to
quantify, but most figures suggest that it is a growing threat. According to
the Global Terrorism Database from the University of Maryland,
there were 119 terrorist incidents in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa in
2001. By 2011, however, this number had risen close to 500. Another
report, this time from the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, counted 21 terrorist attacks in the
Maghreb and Sahel regions in 2001. However, during the Obama years,
the figures are said to fluctuate between 144 and 204 attacks annually.24
By 2010, Mali had become the epicentre of the Islamist security threat in
the Sahel. In that year, Tuareg nationalist restiveness in the country led to
violent instability which soon sucked in Salafi-Jihadist forces from across
North and West Africa, such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
from Algeria and Boko Haram and Ansaru from Nigeria. The Malian
army, infected by the ‘gangrene of corruption’ had become an institution
in which ‘nepotism and profiteering ran amok’, and it could do little as the
alliance of Tuareg and Salafi forces over-ran two-thirds of the national
territory.25 With money from contraband smuggling, drug trafficking, and
ransom payments, and well-armed from the armoury of the collapsing
Khadafi regime in Libya and captured Malian army stockpiles, these jihadi
forces were in ‘a position to contemplate the regional expansion of their
activities’.26 Mali soon became a lunch-pad from which these various
Jihadi forces wanted ‘to occupy a large territory in West Africa and to rule
it according to their concept of shari’a.’27
24
Nick Turse, op cit
Baz Lecocq et al, 2013, ‘One hippopotamus and eight blind analysts: a multilocal
analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali’, Review of African
Political Economy, 40, 137, pp. 343-357, p. 347
26
François Heisbourg, 2013, ‘A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali’, Survival:
Global Politics and Strategy, 55:2, 7-18, p. 9
27
Lecocq et al, op cit, p. 350
25
15
In response to the growing threat of instability, ‘ungoverned spaces’,
narco-trafficking, and Salafi extremism in the Sahel, agencies of the US
State Department created the Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2002, initially
focusing on four countries − Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Niger − but later
transformed to Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in
2005, covering several other countries including Nigeria.28 The TSCTP
and its Defence Department companion programme, Operation Enduring
Freedom-Trans-Sahara, were collapsed into the U.S. Africa Command
(Africom) in 2008.29 Between 2009 and 2013, the US government is
reported to have spent between $520 million and $600 million ‘in a
sweeping effort to combat Islamist militancy in the region’.30 In 2011, the
EU also developed the ‘European Union strategy for security and
development in the Sahel’, identifying poverty, States’ weak capacity of
governance, the regional repercussions of the Libyan conflict,
narcoterrorism, and religious fundamentalism as the threats to European
countries emanating from Sahelian countries.31 In 2013, when the Jihadi
forces threatened to overrun Bamako and take over the whole of Mali, the
French were forced to intervene militarily.32 At the other end of West
Africa, African countries have also been responding to the threat of crossborder banditry and Islamist terrorism. In 1998, the governments of Niger,
Chad and Nigeria established a multi-national joint task force (MNJTF) to
patrol areas prone to those attacks. Cameroon subsequently joined the
MNJTF.33
28
Erelu Obada, op cit
Nick Turse, op cit
30
Adam Nossiter, Eric Schmitt, & Mark Mazzetti, ‘French Strikes in Mali Supplant
Caution of U.S.’, New York Times, January 13th 2013
31
African Governance Institute, June 2013, ‘Note on the European Union Strategy for
Security and Development in the Sahel’, Policy Brief No. 4, Dakar
32
Hussein Solomon, 2013, ‘ Mali: West Africa's Afghanistan’, The RUSI Journal, 158:1,
12-19
33
Erelu Obada, op cit
29
16
Furthermore, in February 2013, ECOWAS heads of state also adopted the
Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism, and
annexed to that declaration is the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy
and Implementation Plan. In these documents, ECOWAS condemns
terrorism in all its forms, including kidnapping, hijacking, hostage taking,
demand and payment of ransom, bombing of public and private property
and critical infrastructure, acts of sabotage and the desecration of religious
and other cultural sacred places. In the Counter-Terrorism Strategy and
Implementation Plan, the heads of state approved the establishment of the
ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit, an ECOWAS arrest
warrant, and a blacklist of terrorist and criminal networks.34 As with most
ECOWAS good intentions, the translation of norms into practical reality
remains the key challenge.
3. Security Governance: Divergent Experiences of the 7 Study
Countries
Beyond the two common challenges of coastal piracy and Sahelian
terrorism, each country in the sub-region also faces challenges that are
peculiar to it, such as the Niger Delta militancy, the large-scale
vandalization of national infrastructure, and ethno-religious violence in
Nigeria; repeated armed forces mutiny in Burkina Faso; spasmodic rebel
activity in the Casamance region of Senegal; the repeated threat of food
insecurity and Tuareg restiveness in Niger Republic; north-south regional
conflict and violence in Ivory Coast; repeated Tuareg rebellions in Mali;
and mass poverty and youth unemployment in post-war Liberia and Sierra
Leone. In the context of these shared and specific threats, each country in
the West Africa sub-region must seek to promote its domestic stability as a
first step to the realization of regional security. To succeed in this task,
each country must balance the needs of security, with those of the
democratic rights of its citizenry.
34
Uzoechina, 2014, p. 10
17
The seven country studies in this project highlight the situations specific to
each country. The security sector in Burkina Faso is shaped by its
landlocked nature, its’ sharing of borders with many countries, its border
crises with neighbours which twice led to wars with Mali, and the
authoritarian nature of its political system. Apart from these political and
geo-political triggers for conflict in Burkina Faso, there are also societal
factors, especially conflicts over chieftaincy and access to land. Despite
democratization since 1991, the nature of the political regime is more
oligarchic than democratic. This democratic deficit, even with the
existence of a liberal constitution and lawful political institutions has
meant that Burkina Faso has weak parliamentary institutions, weak
judiciary, and a weak civil society. This institutional situation is made
worse by bad relationship between military and civilians, marked by
military riots in 2006 and 2011, during which civilians were attacked,
women raped, and property looted. There have also been periodic attempts
by sections of the military against the person of the president, including an
attempt in 2013 which led to the death of a former presidential guard.
The Burkina Faso study also highlights the fragmentation of the control
over the security forces with two ministers in charge of security and
national defence. The Ministry of Territorial Administration,
Decentralization and Security (Ministere de L’adinistration Territoriale, de
la decentralization et de la securite or MATDS) and the Minister of
Defence and Veterans between them control the security institutions. The
national police is controlled by MATDS while the gendarmerie and the
army are under the minister of defence and veterans. However, this
institutional fragmentation goes hand-in-hand with the concentration of
control in the person of the President who is simultaneously Commanderin-Chief of national armed forces, chairman of the Superior Counsel of
Defence, and Defence Minister. In the context of this concentration of
control, the capacity for civil society to oversee the security sector is
limited by its’ lack of expertise, and a political climate that regards the
discussion of security sector issues as taboo. At the same time, the
18
judiciary lacks independence, thereby compounding the lack of options
faced by society. Though parliament has formal oversight and budgetary
powers through which it can oversee the functions of the security forces,
strong pressure from the ruling party (le Congres pour la democratie et le
progress CDP) in the national assembly has ensured that parliament does
not stray outside the narrow limits set by the government. The weakness
and inability of parliament, the judiciary, and civil society to properly
oversee the security sector means that there is little or no democratic
control of the sector for the promotion of public welfare and public
security. Instead, regime survival is the main concern. However, since the
2011 crisis, the Burkina Faso army has made lots of changes to burnish
its’ dented image within the civilian population. These changes
notwithstanding, the military remains an unsteady institution, as
demonstrated by the 2013 attempt by some elements within the military to
attack the person of the President. Democratic governance of the military
remains weak because of the nature of overall oligarchic political control,
and the weakness of parliament, the judiciary, and civil society.
The Ghana study highlights the close connection between democracy and
the quality of the governance of the security sector. In the 1970s and
1980s, Ghana had all the attributes that contributed to state collapse in
other parts of Africa. However, this potential for violent disintegration was
not realized because of democratic reforms carried out in the 1980s and
1990s. A second reason highlighted by the study was the strength and
resilience of social networks and civil society organizations in Ghana.
Reforms of the security sector from above and civil society mobilization
from below contributed to the relatively efficient and legitimate
governance of the security sector in Ghana. Incremental reform started
with the 1992 constitution which created a Police Council. Prior to 1996,
the intelligence institutions were removed from security sector reforms
under the guise of protecting national security. This only contributed to a
culture of impunity on the part of these agencies. In 1996, the Security and
Intelligent Services Act (Act 526) formally sought to establish democratic
19
control of the security services. After 1996, the National Security Council
(NSC) was created to bring all security outfits under centralized
democratic control. The NSC was made answerable to Parliament, though
accusations of impunity continued to be heard. On its part, Parliament set
up the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Intelligence
(PSCD & I) and the Public Accounts and Finance Committee to oversee
the functioning and budgets of the security services.
Ghana was also able to carry out reform of its police force through the
establishment of two Presidential Commissions set up to look into the
Ghana Police Service. These commissions have led to improved
performance of the police, especially in terms of training and equipment.
Another important message coming out of the Ghana study is the
importance of the decentralization of the intelligence institution through
the creation of Regional Security Committees (REGSEC) and District
Security Committees (DISEC) and the opening up of these committees to
civil society participation. However, it should also be noted, however, that
these committees have in some instances been accused of the abuse of
powers and political interference. This suggests that even in the relatively
successful case of Ghana, the problem of the politicization of the security
sector remains a challenge. This limitation is highlighted in the case study
of Yendi where in 2001, the politicization of the security institution
resulted in three days of violence without the intervention of the security
forces.
These shortcomings, notwithstanding, the Ghana case suggests that the
long spell of democratic rule from 1992 has resulted in the improved
protection of human rights, greater transparency, and popular participation
in security matters. However, despite the relative peace and tranquillity at
the national level, Ghana has nevertheless suffered from low level violent
conflict at the communal level. In the two case studies explored in the
Ghana country study, Yendi in 2002 and Hohoe in 2012, chieftaincy, land,
20
and ethnic conflicts are two major threats to human security at the subnational level.
The Liberia country study emphasises the importance of history in the
structuring and management of the security sector in African states. It
draws attention to the historical division between the settler elites of
Monrovia who founded the state of Liberia, and the bulk of the indigenous
population of the hinterland excluded from that state. It is argued that the
institutions of the Liberian state were shaped by the settler state’s constant
fear and insecurity, due to the poor and oppressive relations with the
indigenous communities. As a result, from its foundation, Liberia built
coercive institutions characterized by predation and impunity. Regime
security took precedence over the security of the population and personal
presidential control of the security apparatus was the norm. For example,
President Tubman is reported to have set up four security organizations,
each of which struggled to gain his confidence. Societal monitoring for
regime survival was the primary objective of the security sector. Single
party rule by the settler controlled True Whig Party further compounded
presidential stranglehold on the security sector. The violent overthrow of
settler rule in a military coup led by officers from the indigenous
population was followed by 14 years of civil war, the rise of warlordism,
large scale extra-judicial killings, and the intensification of the culture of
impunity.
Post-civil war, modern democratic Liberia still carries the weight of this
historical legacy via obsolete laws and the lack of legislative competence.
Defence Act 2008 and National Security and Intelligence Act 2011 for the
first time address the issue of civilian oversight of the security sector.
Despite these advances, the ingrained culture of impunity, poor legislative
capacity, and a weak judiciary continue to stymie civilian democratic
control of security forces. Some training for parliamentarians has made a
difference in their oversight abilities, but high turnover of parliamentarians
at elections undermines this achievement. Within the security sector itself,
21
the multiplicity of statutory and non-statutory bodies have created a
situation of confused jurisdiction. For example, the Liberia country study
pointed out the lack of communication between the Police and the
Ministry of Justice. In this context of institutional ambiguity, the use of ad
hoc special Presidential Committees as fact-finding commissions of
inquiry has become pronounced and these have tended to pre-empt and
substitute for other statutory institutions such as the legislature and the
judiciary. The continuing politicization of the security sector operations is
suggested by the selective implementation of the recommendations of
these presidential commissions.
The Mali case study highlights the repeated cycles of Tuareg rebellions
that have challenged the security sector of that country, culminating in the
recent rebellion by Tuareg forces, the involvement of actors affiliated to
the Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the construction of a panSahelian alliance with other Islamist forces such as the Movement for
Divine Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Boko Haram, and
the subsequent intervention of ECOWAS and French forces. The history
of the management of the security sector in Mali from the 1960s is
coloured by the need to contain this long-standing separatist threat from
the north. After the 1991 revolution, Mali was generally regarded as a
stable, democratic, if poor, country. This turned out not to be the case as
the regime of Amadou Toumani Toure was generally regarded as corrupt
and intolerant; few Malians mourned the collapse of the regime at the
hands of an army that was alienated by security sector neglect, nepotism,
and corruption.35
The Mali study suggests that the security sector in the country is hampered
by a lack of institutional coordination. No single institutional framework
governs all the disparate sections of the security sector. Individual
ministers, like the Minister for Internal Security and Civil Protection, are
responsible for the security apparatus under their ministry. In the case of
35
Baz Lecocq et al, 2013, op cit
22
this ministry, these include the National Police, gendarmerie, and the
National Guard. Similarly, the Minister of Defence and former
Combatants is responsible for the control of military units, while the
Minister of Territorial Administration and Local Authorities is responsible
for security in the regions and the interior. Regional units of the police
come under the authority of Regional Governors whilst at the same time
coming under the technical direction of the Police Director-General. There
is also the Higher Council on Military Services consisting of serving
military personnel and the military command structure which advices on
military conditions of service.
The Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister’s office provide a
measure of coordination. Ordinarily, a central coordinating organ should
ensure that proper coordination takes place between these various
ministries and security organs. As the Mali study notes, however, the two
bodies responsible for this coordination, the Council on National Defence
and the National Defence Committee, lack the necessary institutional
muscle to carry through this coordination, despite the fact that both bodies
are headed by the President. As a result of the 1991 revolution in Mali,
attempts have been made to further clarify the constitutional control over
the security sector. Parliamentary committees have been set up with
oversight functions over the security services, but these remain quite
weak. Security sector governance is still focused on counterterrorism, and
needs to be broadened to address peace-building and conflict sensitivity
questions. Meanwhile, ethnic and regional inequalities between north and
south Mali continue to plague the country, despite the current peace
efforts. Some commentators have also drawn attention to continuing
threats to the human rights of Arab, Tuareg and Peul individuals in the
north.
However, one important innovation in Mali is the Democratic Question
and Answer Forum which holds every year on December 10th, and
provides an avenue for the population to raise questions about all aspects
23
of the governance of the country, including the governance of the security
sector.
Niger Republic might be regarded as an oasis of relative peace, nestled
within the embrace of very turbulent countries - Mali to the west, northern
Nigeria to the south, Chad to the east, and Libya and Algeria to the north.
However, as the Niger country study shows, since the 1980s Niger has had
its own share of the ‘Saharan Security Crisis’ and the ‘Islamist Security
Problem’, manifested in periodic violence, Tuareg rebellions, banditry,
communal strife, and kidnappings. At the heart of the Saharan crisis is the
question of the relationship between the minority Tuareg population in the
north and the state. The Niger study warns however that the Saharan
question should not be reduced to a Tuareg question because of the
multiplicity of domestic and international interests involved. The Niger
study notes the connection between ethnic rebellions and criminal
banditry. In the Tuareg and Tubu rebellions, it is noted that it was well
established criminal networks involved in smuggling and kidnapping, that
subsequently shifted their hostile attentions towards the state. The
economic undertones of these rebellions made it possible for the Nigerien
state to make common cause with Fulani and Arab economic interests in
the north to set up ethnic self-defence militias to defeat the Tuareg and
Tubu rebels.
As in Mali, in Niger, some security forces are controlled by the ministry of
defence, while others are controlled by the Interior ministry. In Niger,
however, the legal framework for running the security sector helps to
diffuse any tensions between the various services by clearly demarcating
their spheres of operations. Protocols of cross-service collaboration in the
management of the security services also seem very well articulated.
These good institutional features notwithstanding, the Niger study went on
to point out a high level of civilian political interference in the
management of the security forces. It was further noted that civilian
authorities have tended to squeeze the military budget as a means of
24
keeping the army weak. This is the exact opposite of the strategy in
Nigeria under civilian rule, where higher levels of military spending has
been used to re-professionalize the army and keep it out of politics.
Parliamentary committees in Niger have the task of overseeing the
operations of different arms of the government. The study points out
however that, while most parliamentary committees have members with
cognate experience and professional affinity to the ministries they oversee,
this is not true of the defence and security committee because no
parliamentarians come from a military background. This committee is
unfortunately dominated by parliamentarians from teaching backgrounds.
Another shortcoming of the oversight process in parliament is that while
parliamentary debates are done in the open and sometimes broadcast in the
media, defence and security matters are frequently handled in camera. The
Niger study also notes the lack of resources of the judicial system and the
consequent weakness of its conflict resolution potential. The ability of the
judicial system to oversee the criminal investigation work of the police is
also poor. Still, improvements in the penal code since 2003 have enhanced
the rights of citizens, including the right to mandatory medical
examination after any arrests.
The Nigeria country study raises the paradox of intensified conflict and
violence with the return to democratic rule. It is argued that the military
and political capacities of the state to deal with this violence are being
overstretched. Secondly, the point is made that in the social struggles
between the state and segments of the society, force has always been the
first response of the Nigerian state. Periods of military rule from 1966
have intensified this militaristic approach to security challenges. Since the
return to democratic rule in 1999, tensions over the division of political
and financial powers between the different levels of the federal system,
ethnic and regional grievances, and religious mobilization have all
combined to fuel repeated cycles of violence across the country.
25
A major challenge after the return to civilian rule in 1999 was the reform
of the security sector which was seen as part and parcel of the
democratization process. Five steps were taken in this regard:
(1) de-politicization of the officer corps and its subordination to
civil authority;
(2) constitutional re-definition of the role of the military;
(3) expanded budgetary allocation to re-professionalize and reequip the military;
(4) attempts to de-militarize public order through repeated efforts
to reform and re-train the police;
(5) and, the establishment of a judicial commission of enquiry to
investigate human rights abuses before the advent of the
democratization process.
Under military rule, the police was understaffed and underequipped. It was
also unaccountable and highly politicized. It is sad commentary on the
state of public order in Nigeria that despite efforts to reform the police and
take the military out of civil life, the militarization of public order
continues through joint military and police formations, special purpose
security organs called Joint Task Forces (JTF) or Special Task Forces
(STF) that are now responsible for everyday policing in 28 out of
Nigeria’s 36 states.36 Increased number of policemen and women without
the corresponding increase in resources and training has stymied the
attempt to reform the police service. Conflicting jurisdictions between the
Federal Ministry of Police Affairs and the Police Service Commission has
been detrimental to the reform of the police. Some have called for the
abolition of the Ministry. The constitutional provisions which confer
exclusive control of the police on the federal government is also being
hotly debated, with state governments calling for the right to establish
state police forces of their own. State governors claim that despite their
heavy financial support for the police forces in their respective states, and
36
Ikenna Emewu, ‘Insecurity stretches military operations in 28 states –NSA’,
http://sunnewsonline.com/new/, July 5, 2013
26
despite their constitutional position as chief law officers of their states,
actual control of the police remains in the hands of a remote federal
government. In many cases, state governments are circumventing the ban
on state police forces by promoting communal vigilantes or religious
groups like the Islamic Hisbah. Tensions between the police and these
vigilantes are a potential threat to public order.
The involvement of foreign agencies and consultants in military and police
reforms led to tensions within the security services. The reform process
was also hampered by over-centralization in the Presidency and the
Defence Headquarters to the exclusion of other stakeholders in the
military, parliament, and civil society. The Nigeria country study
highlights the continuation of a culture of militarism, impunity, and
brutality by the security forces, despite the return to civil rule. In case
studies of Odi and Zaki Biam, the study demonstrates the enduring nature
of the culture of ‘punitive expeditions’ and ‘collective punishments’ which
the Nigerian security forces developed during the period of colonial
occupation and pacification in the late 1800s and early 1900s. In both Odi
and Zaki Biam, however, we also see the recourse to the courts which
have pronounced in favour of the aggrieved communities. In the case of
the more recent Islamist Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, the
study notes how the culture of impunity and extra-judicial killings by the
security forces initially led to the escalation of the conflict. Accusations of
atrocities against troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force - MJTF
(Chad, Niger, Nigeria, & Cameroon) fighting Boko Haram have led to
questions about the accountability of this multinational formation.
The Nigeria country study presents the picture of a country in which
divisionist tendencies abound and in which tensions and violence
permeate state-society relations. The absence of a comprehensive
constitutional resolution of these matters has led to a strategy of ‘keeping
the lid’ on the smouldering cauldron, often through the forceful
suppression of dissent. Frequently, violence breeds further violence,
27
leading to an escalating cycle of disorder. Meanwhile, the management of
the security sector is itself corrupted and tainted by the general
dysfunctional politics of the state and the abuse of their office by officials
of the state. For example, some members of the security forces have been
court marshalled, for allegedly aiding Boko Haram insurgents,37 while
there have also been repeated accusations of security forces involvement
in oil theft in the Niger Delta.38 Comprehensive constitutional review has
become an imperative for dampening some of the forces generating the
tensions in Nigerian society. Such a review must also address the question
of the democratic management of the security sector.
Our last country study comes from Sierra Leone, another country that
witnessed the descent into civil war on account of its poor management of
the security sector. The study notes that the marginalization of the
citizenry by extractive state institutions and corrupt elites was instrumental
in causing the civil war. Under one-party rule, pre-war Sierra Leone had a
security sector that was fused into the party-state with military
commanders being given seats in parliament. The recruitment of security
officials on ethnic and political bases tended to undermine morale,
efficiency, and professionalism. Institutional malaise led to poor training
and equipment, poor conditions of service, lack of institutional
coordination, and ultimately, the breakdown of the chain of command and
the subsequent precipitation of the civil war. Before the war, the security
sector was therefore ethnically biased, patrimonial in character, and was
dominated by the executive.
Post-civil war Sierra Leone was subjected to a security sector reform that
was heavily influenced by external agencies; in post conflict countries,
security sector reforms often take place in a context of institutional
37
Jude Owuamanam ‘18 soldiers face discipline for aiding Boko Haram, others’,
http://www.punchng.com/, July 1, 2013
38
Chika Amanze-Nwachuku, ‘Concerns Mount over Rise in Crude Oil Theft,
Divestment’, http://www.thisdaylive.com/, 2nd August 2013
28
fragility and resource scarcity. However, externally driven security sector
reforms often raise important questions about long term sustainability and
local ownership. In the context of post-war reconstruction, much attention
has been on demobilization, small-arms control, and re-integration
programmes. The Sierra Leone study notes that insufficient efforts was put
into the democratic control of the security forces, though the security
sector review noted the need to insulate security sector institutions from
partisan political interference. However, despite the lack of sufficient
democratic oversight in the post-civil war security sector reform, the 2007
elections showed a paradoxical increase in professionalism and
operational effectiveness on the part of the security forces. But the study
warns that increased professionalism should not be seen as a substitute for
democratic control.
4. A Good Practice Guide to Security Governance in West Africa
From these country profiles, it becomes obvious that serious challenges
face the ECOWAS countries in the quest for the democratic governance of
their security sector institutions. Even our best case scenario, Ghana, is in
need of further reforms. This need for region-wide reform of the
governance of the security sector is reflected in the draft ECOWAS
Regional Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance which
seeks to ‘clarify what security means in the West African context, whose
security is to be guaranteed, what the objectives of security are, what the
challenges to security are and the required reforms, who is involved in
providing and overseeing security, and how security objectives can be
translated into effective outcomes.’39 This draft defines security as human
security within the wider society, and puts the democratic governance of
security institutions at its core. The realization of this vision would
necessarily require the involvement of not just the security institution, but
also the political class and civil society institutions. Furthermore,
ECOWAS draft instruments such as the Supplementary Protocol on
39
Uzoechina, 2014, p. 5
29
Democracy and Good Governance and the Supplementary Act on the
Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security Services of
ECOWAS seek to establish the framework for implementing the
objectives of the Framework for Security Sector Reforms.40 The
Supplementary Act on the Code of Conduct seeks to establish the basis for
the tripartite interaction between the security institutions, the political
class, and the wider society. It reaffirms the subjection of the armed forces
and security services to democratically constituted authority and
prescribes professional training for the armed forces in areas such as
constitutional law, human rights and international humanitarian law and
peacekeeping.41
Though most of these recent developments within ECOWAS are still at
the norm-setting stage, they come on top previous experimentation with
conflict resolution (ECOMOG), and democratisation (the wave of national
conferences of the early nineties).42 Transferring norms into reality can
therefore be facilitated by looking to the experiences of these countries, as
we have tried to do in our seven country studies. Against this background,
the question then is: What can be learned from the experience of these
seven countries in the management of their security sectors? Below are
some of the key lessons from our seven country studies which ECOWAS
countries can easily harvest as low-lying fruits from the recent experiences
of their neighbours:
•
Wider societal democratic context is critical for proper
governance of the security sector: In Ghana, there is a close
connection between democracy and the improved protection of
human rights, greater transparency and popular participation in
40
Ibid, p. 12
Ibid, p. 10
42
OSIWA, Open Society Initiative for West Africa, November 2012, Governance
Monitoring Project report on Liberia 2011, //C:/CLEEN/Governance-Monitoring-Projectreport-on-Liberia-2011.htm.
41
30
security matters. Democracy and improved security sector
governance must therefore be seen as inextricably interlinked.
•
Gradual Institutionalization of constitutional oversight is
important: In Ghana, Parliament systematically set up institutions
through which it could conduct oversight functions vis-a-vis the
security forces. In 1996, the Security and Intelligent Services Act
(Act 526) was passed and the Parliamentary Select Committee on
Defence and Intelligence (PSCD & I) and the Public Accounts and
Finance Committee were established to oversee the functioning
and budgets of the security services. It is important to translate
constitutional provisions for democratic oversight into concrete
institutions with clearly defined powers, composition, and
mandates. However, this process of institutionalization can be a
gradual process.
•
Decentralization of the security institution and civil society
participation increases efficiency and legitimacy: In Ghana, the
decentralization of the security sector institutions through the
creation of Regional Security Committees (REGSEC) and District
Security Committees (DISEC) and the opening up of these
committees to civil society participation has had positive
contributions. The twin processes of institutional decentralization
and increase in societal inclusion within the security sector should
be adopted wherever appropriate.
•
Coordination and control of various arms of the security sector
important: Despite decentralization, it is important that a
coordinating organ is established to minimize inter-agency friction.
Such coordinating organs can also enhance the process of
democratic control. The locus of overall control should be clearly
identified.
31
•
Clear Jurisdictions and Protocols of Collaboration between
services: In Niger the legal framework for running the security
sector helps to diffuse any tensions between the various services by
clearly demarcating their jurisdictions and spheres of operations.
Protocols of cross-service collaboration also seem very well
articulated. This reduces inter-agency rivalries and misadventures.
A clear understanding of the hierarchy of institutions and their
respective mandates should be unambiguously established to avoid
confusion.
•
Presidential Commissions can be frequently used to evaluate
reform needs: In Ghana, such commissions led to improved police
performance. In Liberia, however, ad hoc Presidential
Commissions tend to displace statutory oversight bodies, while in
Nigeria, these commissions have had mixed results in terms of
improvements in police numbers and effectiveness. Commissions
should supplement the constitution, not replace it. Parliamentary
Commissions may be more open to democratic input than
Presidential Commissions, even if they lack executive teeth.
•
Use Truth & Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) to draw a line
under the authoritarian past and set new human rights standards:
In Nigeria and some other West African countries, there was also
the establishment of commissions of enquiry to investigate past
human rights abuses and set the proper tone for the future. Where
possible, the judicial process should be used for dealing with past
cases of impunity; otherwise, the TRC can be used.
•
Training for Parliamentarians in oversight functions important: In
the parliament of Niger Republic, there is a lack of technical
professional capacity to effectively carry out oversight functions.
In Liberia, some training for parliamentarians has made a
difference in their oversight abilities, but high turnover of
32
parliamentarians tends to undermine this achievement. Continuous
training of parliamentarians is needed. Technical support staffs
within parliamentary bureaucracies also need training. As is the
case in Senegal, civil society groups can contribute to these
training exercises.
•
Need for Constitutional Reforms and the resolution of
Constitutional disputes over who controls the Police: Conflict–
inducing constitutional issues need to be addressed. In particular,
the conflict over the control of the police between the central and
regional governments needs to be speedily addressed. In many
West African states, for example in Mali, Ghana, and Nigeria,
there is a tension between central and regional government control
over the police. This tension increases the chances of the
politicization of policing. Constitutional reforms should adequately
address the question of the control of policing between national
and sub-national units.
•
Create formal Platforms for Civil Society-Security sector
interactions: Mali’s Democratic Question and Answer Forum is a
good example of such a forum. New technologies like the social
media and the internet can also be used to widen the reach of such
fora. Both for substantive and symbolic reasons open and regular
meetings between the security services and civil society groups
will go a long way to dispel misunderstandings.
•
Adequate and transparent budgeting for the security services: In
Niger Republic, civilian authorities have tended to squeeze the
military budget as a means of keeping the army weak. This is the
exact opposite of the strategy in Nigeria under civil rule, where
higher levels of military spending has been used to reprofessionalize the army and keep it out of politics. Systemic
corruption is a major threat to the efficiency and legitimacy of the
33
security forces. It is important that the security budget be both
adequate, and transparently managed.
•
Comprehensive reform of the military and police might be
necessary: In Nigeria, four related reforms were simultaneously
pursued: (1) de-politicization of the officer corps and its
subordination to civil authority; (2) constitutional re-definition of
the role of the military; (3) expanded budgetary allocation to reprofessionalize and re-equip the military; (4) and attempts to demilitarize public order through repeated efforts to reform and retrain the police. Reform of security sector institutions should not
be limited to post-conflict countries alone.
•
Trade-off between professionalism and democratic control is
unnecessary: The tendency to see security sector reforms in terms
of increased professionalization to the exclusion of increased
democratic control is unnecessary. Both should go hand-in-hand.
Periodic review of the security sector with civil society
participation, including that of women’s groups, will go a long way
to identify challenges which need to be addressed.
5. Conclusion
The growth of the economies of West African states and the wellbeing of
their peoples will depend on the ability of these countries to address the
collective and individual security challenges which they currently face. In
this regard, there is an intimate link between security, public welfare,
democracy, and development. None can be pursued in isolation from the
others. Furthermore, just as security can no longer be reduced to the
narrow confines of regime security, the governance of the security sector
cannot be left to the executive alone. How other societal forces are able to
contribute to this important task will determine how democratic the
34
governance of the security sector is. However, scholars have noted the
tendency for demands for civilian oversight and civil participation in
relevant processes to be met with institutional and political resistance by
members of the security services and the executive arms of government.
Under different pretexts concerning ‘national security’, secrecy has been
strengthened in many countries. In the process, democratic oversight of
the security sector has been considerably restricted.43 In most post-conflict
countries in West Africa, emphasis has been on violence cessation and not
much is heard of the need for accountability and a democratic control of
the security sector. A key conclusion of all our seven country studies is
that in both post-conflict and democratizing countries of West Africa,
democratic control of the security sector is a sine quo non for future
progress; it is an issue that can no longer be safely ignored.
There is therefore the need for concerted action on the part of civil society,
parliament, and the judiciary to widen the scope of democratic governance
of the security sector; the initiative need not be left to the executive alone.
Increased roles for civil society could include monitoring the performance
of security institutions and parliament, budget analysis, legal assistance to
ensure compliance with human rights norms, policy advocacy, and
working with the media, international actors and other stakeholders to
improve and increase information available to the public on oversight
needs, challenges and opportunities.44
Whilst recognizing the important role of civil society in promoting the
democratic governance of the security sector, we should also note the fact
that ‘the state is the most legitimate platform for the provision of public
security.’45 The executive is usually in control of security institutions
43
Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert, Katrin Kinzelbach, 2008, Public Oversight of the Security
Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organizations, UNDP, Bratislava, p.9
44
ibid, p. 10
45
Marina Caparini and Eden Cole, 2008, ‘The Case for Public Oversight of the Security
Sector: Concepts and Strategies’, in Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert, Katrin Kinzelbach, eds.,
35
through a range of ministries and other institutions, while parliament
commonly performs a number of key functions in relation to the security
sector, including the establishment of the legal basis for the security
services to operate, scrutinizing defence and national security policies, and
holding ministers and public officials accountable for how these policies
are implemented. Parliament can also exercise control over defence and
security budgets and procurement decisions, review how money was
spent, and investigate allegations of policy failure or abuses by the defence
and security sector.46 Many of the recommendations of our seven country
studies are aimed at helping civil society, parliament, and the executive to
carry out their respective responsibilities in the context of current West
African realities. The ultimate objective is that the military and other
security and intelligence agencies be under democratic civilian control,
whilst enjoying professional autonomy through their insulation from party
political pressures and systemic corruption.
2008, Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society
Organizations, UNDP, Bratislava, p. 16
46
Ian Leigh, 2008, ‘Executive, Legislative and Judicial Oversight and Guidance over the
Security Sector’, , in Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert, Katrin Kinzelbach, eds., 2008, Public
Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organizations, UNDP,
Bratislava
36
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ECOWAS International Conference TWO DECADES OF PEACE
PROCESSES IN WEST AFRICA: ACHIEVEMENTS – FAILURES –
LESSONS,
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Mali’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 55:2, 7-18
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39
CLEEN Foundations’s Publications
JOURNEY TO CIVIL RULE
A Report on the Presidential Primaries of the All Peoples Party (APP) & Peoples’
Democratic Party (PDP) February 13-15, 1999 Published in 1999
POLICING A DEMOCRACY
A Survey Report on the Role and Functions of the Nigeria Police in a Post-Military Era,
Published in 1999
LAW ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
Quarterly Magazine, Published since the first quarter of 1998
CONSTABLE JOE
A Drama Series On Police Community Relations In Nigeria, Published in 1999
POLICE-COMMUNITY VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA
Published in 2000
JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA
Philosophy And Practice, Published in 2001
GENDER RELATIONS AND DISCRIMINATION IN NIGERIA POLICE FORCE
Published in 2001
FORWARD MARCH
A Radio Drama Series on Civil Military Relations In Nigeria, Published in 2001
HOPE BETRAYED
A Report on Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria,
Published in 2002
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLICE IN NIGERIA
Published in 2003
POLICE AND POLICING IN NIGERIA
Final Report on the Conduct of the Police In the 2003 Elections, Published in 2003
40
CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE NIGER DELTA
Monograph Series, No. 2, Published in 2006
CRIMINAL VITIMIZATION SAFETY AND POLICING IN NIGERIA: 2005
Monograph Series, No. 3, Published in 2006
CRIMINAL VITIMIZATION SAFETY AND POLICING IN NIGERIA: 2006
Monograph Series, No. 4, Published in 2007
BEYOND DECLARATIONS
Law Enforcement Officials and ECOWAS Protocols on Free Movement of Persons and
Goods in West Africa, Published in 2007
POLICE AND POLICING IN WEST AFRICA
Proceedings of a Regional Conference, Published in 2008
IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER
A Post-Election Survey Report, Published in 2009
CRY FOR JUSTICE
Proceedings of a Public Tribunal on Police Accountability in Nigeria
Published in 2009
GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE
Establishing a School-Based Crime Prevention Programme
Published in 2009
ANOTHER ROUTINE OR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE?
Police Reform in Nigeria 1999 till date, Published in 2009
POLICING WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN NIGERIA
Training Manual, Published in 2009
CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN NIGERIA:
Conference Proceedings, Monograph Series, No. 5
Published in 2009
41
CRIMINAL VITIMIZATION SAFETY IN LAGOS STATE
Monograph Series, No. 6, Published in 2010
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA:
Conference Proceedings, Monograph Series, No. 7
Published in 2010
POLICING ELECTION IN NIGERIA
Assessment of the Role of Nigeria Police in Election
in Nigeria, Published in 2010
ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS IN THE
NIGERIA POLICE FORCE
Conference Proceedings Monograph series 8,
Published in 2010
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO VICTIMS OF GUN VIOLENCE
AND ROAD ACCIDENTS, Conference Proceedings
Monograph series No. 9, Published in 2010
POLICE STATION VISITORS WEEK REPORT 2010 CLEEN
Foundation
POLICING ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA:
Assessment of the Role of the Nigeria Police force
in elections in Nigeria, Published in 2010
TRAINING MANUAL ON PEACE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS FOR SECURITY INSTITUTIONS
IN NIGER
CLEEN Foundation Published in 2010
REPORT OF CONFERENCE ON MAKING DEMOCRACY
WORK FOR NIGERIA PEOPLE
Monograph Series No. 11, Published in 2011
YOUNG PEOPLE AMD THE POLICE IN LAGOS
Monograph Series No. 12, Published in 2011
PROVIDING EFFECTIVE POLICING DURING
42
THE 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS:
Conference Proceedings,
Monograph Series No.13, Published in 2011
RESPONDING TO EMERGENCY TRENDS
OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA
Conference Proceedings,
Monograph Series No.16, Published in 2011
POLICE INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
IN WEST AFRICA, Published in 2011
CRIME VICTIMIZATION, SAFETY AND POLICING
IN NIGERIA, Published in 2011
OPERATIONALISING INTELLIGENCE-LED
POLICING IN NIGERIA
Conference Proceedings
Monograph Series 17, Published in 2012
GOVERNANCE AND INSECURITY IN
SOUTH EAST NIGERIA Published in 2012
POLICE REFORM IN NIGERIA
CIVIL SOCIETY FINAL REPORT CSO PANEL
Published in 2012
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, POLICING AND GOVERNANCE
IN NIGERIA,
Monograph Series, No. 18, Published in 2013
EXTERNAL POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
THE POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION
Conference Proceedings, Published in 2013
43