FRAMEWORK ( CONCEPTUAL)
44
we assume that we can shift between frameworks
with sufficient ease? Relativism about progress
beckons. There are three main options to stave it
off. One is to question the extent to which observa
tions are theory-laden. Perhaps there is some kind
of observational bedrock after all. The second is to
suggest that some of our theories are stable and
appropriate, insofar, for example, as they carve the
world at its joints. Perhaps we have some innate
theories, aligned with the world, for instance. The
last option, advocated by Donald Davidson is to
"reject the dualism of [ conceptual] scheme and
world" (1973: 20). If there are no such conceptual
schemes, then the worry about relativism is a
non-starter.
Davidson's argument is subtle and cannot be
fully summarized here. It relies on the depen
dence of thought on language, among other
such controversial claims. One of his key ideas,
however, is that one cannot be in a position to
recognize that another inhabits a radically differ
ent theoretical or conceptual space to one's own:
"meaningful disagreement ... depends entirely on
a foundation-some foundation-in agreement"
(Davidson 1973: 19). Grant that we communicate
by using sentences, to which we assign truth val
ues. In order for me to understand you, I must be
able to recognize some of the words that you use.
And I should take you to be disagreeing with me
only if I think that what we mean by several of
those words is shared.
Bibliography
Davidson, D., "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual
Scheme," Proceedings andAddresses of theAmerican
PhilosophicalAssociation 47: 5-20, 1973.
Feyerabend, P.K., "An Attempt at a Realistic
Interpretation of Experience," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 58: 143-170, 1958.
---, "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism," in
H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), Scientifi-c Explanation,
Space and Time, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, Vol. 111, 28-97, Minneapolis, 1962.
Kuhn, T.S., "The Function of Dogma in Scientific
Research," in A.C. Crombie (ed.), Scientifi-c Change,
347-369, New York, 1961.
---, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?"
in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the
Growth ofKnowledge, 1-23, Cambridge UK, 1970.
---, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in
Scientifi-c Tradition and Change, Chicago, 1977.
---, The Structure of Scientifi-c Revolutions, Chicago,
1996.
Laudan, L., Science and Values, Berkeley, 1986.
Popper, K.R., "Normal Science and Its Dangers," in
I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the
Growth ofKnowledge, 51-58, Cambridge UK, 1970.
---, The Myth ofthe Framework, London, 1995.
Rowbottom, D.P., "Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and
Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group
Level," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science,
42: 117-124, 2011.
---, "Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism
in Science, Part 11: Striking the Balance," Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science, 44: 161-168, 2013.
DARRELL P. ROWBOTTOM
Framing
The concept of framing is integral to theories
of language, communication, and cognition. It
implies the intentional shift in the expectation
and interpretation of social relations by introduc
ing modes of verbal or non-verbal communication
that go beyond the mere transmission of informa
tion between sender and receiver. This form of
communication, also called meta-communica
tion, marks the sequences of social interactions
as having a different meaning than before, and
it provides a further context of interpretation for
those who participate in these processes of com
munication. By introducing a new frame of refer
ence, framing insinuates a specific understanding
of the communicated message and places the
transmitted information into the context of social
relations. The concept of framing is therefore used
to analyze those changes in social interaction
and discourse, as introduced by layers of meta
communication that provide new interpretative
contexts and establish a conceptual focus for
the organization of social relations. The study of
FRAMING
these seemingly insignificant shifts in verbal and
non-verbal communication is highly relevant for
understanding the expectations and interpreta
tions involved in human interaction with regard to
religious practice and discourse.
Originating in the field of social psychology
and the study of symbolic interaction, the concept
of framing was first and foremost elaborated by
Gregory Bateson in his study of play and fantasy
(1955). Conceiving play and fantasy as forms of
meta-communication, Bateson theorizedframe as
a marker that changes the meaning and context of
social interaction in a way that the messages com
municated within the frame have a different mean
ing than those communicated outside of the frame
(Handelman 2004; Houseman 2012). Broadening
the concept of framing toward the organization
of experience in everyday life, Erving Goffman
laid the foundation for the theory of framing as a
schema of interpretation (1974). Goffman further
elaborated the concept of framing to analyz e dif
ferent layers of verbal and non-verbal communica
tion in social interaction. He successfully applied
his frame analysis to areas such as the study of
"interaction ritual" and theatrical performances,
as well as to the codes of gender in advertisement
and language ideologies.
Theories of framing most sustainably impacted
the study of religion in the field of ritual studies,
where anthropologists and scholars of religion
used concepts of framing to distinguish between
ritual and theater (Turner 1974; Schechner 1981).
Ritual and theater, for example, differ in how
theyframe the context of interpretation and what
forms of social interaction are expected in the
respective situation. Whereas in ritual and the
ater the forms of social interaction differ in what
roles the participants play within the context of
social relations, ritual and theater are themselves
framed by audible and visible markers (Needham
1967; Rappaport 1999). These markers can be the
stage or sacred place, or the costume or dress,
which signal the difference in context by employ
ing culturally established codes. Subsequently,
Don Handelman developed the complementary
45
frames of meta-communication in ritual and play,
in more systematic terms, as modes of social inter
action that model and mirror social order (1977;
1990; 2001).
Applying the concept of framing to the study of
cultural performances, anthropologists as well as
scholars of religion and drama used the concept
of framing to elaborate on the different social and
cultural features in the semiotics of ritual and reli
gious interaction. In examining the reflexivity in
ritual and theatrical performances, Bruce Kapferer
focused on those features in ritual framing that
revealed an inherent potential for transforma
tion and change, going beyond representation
and meaning (1979; 2004). Bruce Lincoln instead
used the concept of marked categories to further
elaborate on the concept of framing (2000). Other
theorists, in contrast, emphasized the modalities
in which meaning is communicated through ritual
frames. In this regard, Stanley Tambiah proposed,
with his performative approach to ritual, a notion
of framing that is modeled on the semiotics of
theatrical performances (1981). Subsequently,
Handelman enhanced the understanding of the
dynamics in ritual framing by introducing Moebius
framing as an alternative model to the rigidity of
a single ritual frame based on a representational
map-territory distinction. He challenged the
understanding of framing as lineal and mono
directional and emphasized its ever-changing and
transformational capacities (2004; 2006; 2012).
So far, within the academic study of religion,
framing has primarily been applied to analyzing
ritual and other forms of religious practice. There
is, however, a considerably different understand
ing of the concept of framing which has great
potential for the study of religious discourses such
as myth, cosmology, and ideology. This other, less
broad concept of framing is based on insights from
the sociological and political examination of rhet
oric and language ideology in social movements,
journalism, and mass media. Most prominently,
Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow conceptu
alized framing processes as a central dynamic in
social movements through which participants, in
46
their opposition to mainstream media coverage,
render political events meaningful and effica
cious. These framing processes function to orga
nize experiences in such a way that they mobilize
potential adherents and guide their political
action (2000). In their analysis of Islamic terror
ist movements, David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd
elaborated the concept of framing processes by
arguing against the indifferent use of religious
ideology. By viewing framing processes as key dis
cursive mechanisms, Snow and Byrd examined
the articulation of mobilizing ideas associated
with Islamic militancy and terrorist movements,
ranging from the Iranian revolution of the late
1970s to more recent movements like al-Qaeda. In
their attempt to account for ideological variation
and flexibility among Islamic oppositional move
ments, they address the ideological work required
to facilitate the mobilization of militants as well as
to motivate acts of violence.
In the field of journalism, the concept of fram
ing plays a much more important role in the
presentation of political agendas and in the rep
resentation of marginalized religious groups. In
this respect, Adam Shehata analyzed the role of
framing of political issues in the news media by
examining the dynamics of official dominance
and event-driven news from a comparative per
spective, specifically focusing on the Muhammad
cartoons controversy (2007). In a similar vein,
Ethan Yorgason and Chiung H. Chen explored the
American news magazines and how they used the
geopolitical frame as a mode of analysis to por
tray a branch of Mormonism in the United States
(2008). In revealing various processes of framing
by distinguishing between different layers in polit
ical language, these findings show that magazines
often represent this type of marginal religion as
a homogeneous entity and as a threat to main
stream society.
Despite its theoretical implications and its
potential for studying forms of social discourse
and practice, the concept of framing is not widely
used in the study of religion. In their experimen
tal study, Mark Chaves and James D. Montgomery
argue that some features of human decision-
FRAMING
making are not adequately described by standard
rational choice models of human behavior, requir
ing the inclusion of framing effects that arise on
the basis of religious choices (1996). Furthermore,
the implications of various forms of framing in
religious discourse and practice are of major
importance for cognitive theories of religion.
Robert Wuthnow, for example, studied prayer with
regard to its cognitive content or cultural framing.
Using empirical studies that examine prayers and
prayer-related aspects of religion, Wuthnow illu
minates methods and data for studying cultural
content and cognitive framing (2008).
Considering that the theoretical connectivity
of the various notions of framing at the moment
remain largely unexplored in the study of religious
practice and discourse, the analytical implica
tions these notions provide show that the concept
of framing has the potential to become a major
field of research within the study of religion. The
theoretical potential of this concept lies in how it
enables scholars of religion to analyze and con
nect operational forms of religious discourse and
practice that are not graspable at first sight. By way
of introducing different forms and layers of meta
communication, framing is a concept that enhances
the study of religious practices and discourses by
analyzing the various uses of distinctions between
map and territory and by considering the introduc
tion of different layers of abstraction.
Bibliography
Bateson, G., "A Theory of Play and Fantasy: A Report on
Theoretical Aspects of The Project for Study of the
Role ofthe Paradoxes of Abstraction in Communication,"
In American Psychiatric Association (ed.), Approaches
to the Study of Human Personality, 39-51, Washington,
1955.
Benford, R.D., and D.A. Snow, "Framing Processes and
Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,"
Annual Review of Sociology 26: 6n-639, 2000.
Chaves, M., and J.D. Montgomery, "Rationality and the
Framing of Religious Choices," journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 35(2): 128-144, 1996.
Goffman, E., Frame Analysis: An Essay on the
Organization of Experience, Cambridge MA, 1974.
47
FREEDOM
Handelman, D., "Play and Ritual. Complementary
Frames of Metacommunication," in AJ. Chapman
and Hugh C. Foot (eds.), It's A Funny Thing, Humour,
185-192, London, 1977.
---, Models and Mirrors: Towards an Anthropology
of Public Events, Cambridge UK, 1990.
---, "Framing, Braiding, and Killing Play," Focaal:
Tijdschriftvoor Antropologie 37: 145-156, 2001.
---, "Re-Framing Ritual," inJ. Kreinath, C. Hartung,
and A. Deschner (eds.), The Dynamics of Changing
Rituals: The Transformation of Religious Rituals
within Their Social and Cultural Context, 9-20, New
York, 2004.
---, "Framing," in J. Kreinath, J. Snoek, and
M. Stausberg (eds.), Theorizing Rituals: Issues, Topics,
Approaches, Concepts, Leiden, 2006.
---, "Postlude: Framing Hierarchically, Framing
Moebiusly," journal of Ritual Studies 26(2): 65-77,
2012.
Houseman, M., "Pushing Ritual Frames Past Bateson,"
journal ofRitual Studies 26(2): 1-5, 2012.
Kapferer, B., "Introduction: Ritual Process and the
Transformation of Context," Social Analysis 1: 3-19,
1979.
---, "Ritual Dynamics and Virtual Practice: Beyond
Representation and Meaning," Social Analysis 48(2):
35-54, 2004.
Lincoln, B., "On Ritual, Change, and Marked Categories,"
journal of the American Academy of Religion 68(3):
487-510, 2000.
Needham, R., "Percussion and Transition," Man 2: 606614, 1967.
Rappaport, RA., Ritual and Religion in the Making of
Humanity, Cambridge UK, 1999.
Schechner, R., "Performers and Spectators Transported
and Transformed," The Kenyon Review 3(4): 83-113,
1981.
Shehata, A., "Facing the Muhammad Cartoons: Official
Dominance and Event-Driven News in Swedish and
American Elite Press;' Harvard International]ournal
ofPress-Politics 12(4): 131-153, 2007.
Snow, D.A., and S.C. Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Processes,
and Islamic Terrorist Movements," Mobilization
12(2): 119-136, 2007.
Tambiah, S.J., "A Performative Approach to Ritual,"
Proceedings of the British Academy 65 (1979): 113-169,
1981.
Turner, V.W., "Liminal to Liminoid in Play, Flow, and
Ritual: An Essay in Comparative Symbology," Rice
University Studies 60(3): 53-92, 1974.
Wuthnow, R., "Prayer, Cognition, and Culture," Poetics
36(5-6): 333-337, 2008.
Yorgason, E., and C.H. Chen, "'Kingdom Come':
Representing Mormonism through a Geopolitical
Frame," Political Geography 27(4): 478-500, 2008.
JENS KREINATH
Freedom
This essay will confine itself to the role that free
dom plays in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is
an important tenet of these religions that human
beings are free, concerning the very reason why
God created such beings and the nature of his rela
tionship to them. God is supposed to have created
human beings so that they would come to know,
worship, and obey him, it being implied that they
do these things of their own free will. God also
desires that they enter into a loving communal
relation with him. But, again, it is assumed that
they must do so of their own free will, given the
personal nature of this relationship. Furthermore,
God's role as a judge who rewards the virtuous and
punishes the wicked requires that those who are
judged did those actions freely for which they are
judged. Unfortunately, there are apparent clashes
between this required freedom and some of God's
essential perfections, in particular his omniscience
and sovereignty. There also are apparent clashes
between God's freedom and some of his omni
properties, in particular his omnipotence and
essential goodness. Each of these alleged clashes
will be discussed in tum.
The Clash between God's Omniscience and
Human Freedom
God is not only omniscient, that is, believing and
knowing all and only true propositions, but is
essentially omniscient. An individual has a prop
erty essentially if it is not possible for it to exist
without having this property. Boethius ( c. 480524 ), in his De Consolatione Philosophiae argued
Vocabulary for the Study
of Religion
Volume2
F-0
Edited by
Robert A. Segal
Kocku von Stuckrad
BRILL
LEIDEN
I BOSTON
2015
Table of Contents
VOLUME I
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ vii
List of Contributors .................................................................................................................................................. viii
List of Articles ............................................................................................................................................................ xvii
Articles A-E ................................................................................................................................................................
1
VOLUME 2
Articles F-O ................................................................................................................................................................
1
VOLUME 3
Articles P-Z .................................................................................................................................................................
1
Index ............................................................................................................................................................................. 619