WORKING PAPER 1 posted 23 December 2013 CHINA'S AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE: CONCEPT, ISSUES AT STAKE AND REGIONAL IMPACT By Alex Calvo Introduction. News in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region have been dominated in the past couple of weeks by Beijing's 23 November announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East-China Sea.1 Four aspects are particularly relevant. First, it covers Japan's Senkaku Islands,2 which China claims under the name Diaoyu. Second, it includes the waters between Japan and Taiwan. Third, it requires aircraft flying through it to provide information, regardless of whether they are China-bound. Fourth, it has been accompanied by renewed speculation about a similar move in the South China Sea. TСe oППiМial announМement requireН all “AirМraПt ПlвinР in tСe East CСina Sea Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone” to proviНe “ПliРСt plans … maintain tСe tаo-way radio communications, and responН in a timelв anН aММurate manner to tСe iНentiПiМation inquiries”, maintain “transponНer iНentiПiМation” anН “Мlearlв mark tСeir nationalities anН tСe loРo oП tСeir reРistration iНentiПiМation”, following Chinese instructions. The text also warned that “CСina's armeН ПorМes аill aНopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or reПuse to Пolloа tСe instruМtions.” anН stateН tСat tСe ADIZ аoulН Мome into ПorМe tСat same Нaв.3 Commenting on Beijing's move two days later, Andrew S. Erickson (US Naval War College) eбplaineН tСat tСe CСinese Air ForМe “soon МonНuМteН its Пirst patrol in tСe гone, аitС tаo larРe reconnaissance aircraft monitoring the area, early warning aircraft supporting and fighters providing Мover”, aННinР tСat “Нespite boilerplate НisМlaimers to tСe Мontrarв, BeijinР's aМtion appears tarРeteН precisely at stoking tension between China and Japan, and putting pressure on the U.S.-Japan allianМe”. EriМkson believes tСat “partiМularlв problematic is the fact that official Chinese statements imply that Beijing intends to use military force if necessary to ensure that all aircraft Мomplв аitС BeijinР’s instruМtions аitСin its НeМlareН ADIZ”, stressinР tСat “tСis is an unrealistiМ expectation, as an ADIZ is not sвnonвmous аitС national airspaМe”.4 Professor Tomohiko Taniguchi, senior adviser to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, considered Beijing's move to leaН to “a аСole neа Рame”, anН stresseН an aspeМt oП CСina's ADIZ аСiМС Сas attraМted much criticism, namely that in contrast with other such zones planes traversing them but not heading to 1 2 3 4 “AnnounМement oП tСe AirМraПt IНentiПiМation Rules Пor tСe East CСina Sea Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone oП tСe P.R.C.”, Xinhua, 23 November 2013, available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201311/23/c_132911634.htm TСe preМise limits are “tСe area enМloseН bв CСina’s outer limit oП tСe territorial sea anН tСe ПolloаinР siб points: 33º11’N (NortС LatituНe) anН 121º47’E (East LonРituНe), 33º11’N anН 125º00’E, 31º00’N anН 128º20’E, 25º38’N anН 125º00’E, 24º45’N anН 123º00’E, 26º44’N anН 120º58’E.” “Statement bв tСe Government oП tСe People's RepubliМ oП CСina on EstablisСinР tСe East CСina Sea Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone” Xinhua, 23 November 2013, available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm “AnnounМement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the P.R.C.”, Xinhua, , 23 November 2013, available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201311/23/c_132911634.htm AnНreа S. EriМkson “WatМС TСis SpaМe: CСina’s Neа Air DeПense Zone ”, China Real Time, Wall Street Journal blogs, 25 November 2013, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/11/25/watch-this-space-chinas-new-airdefense-zone/ NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 tСe Мountrв in question are nevertСeless requireН to iНentiПв tСemselves. TaniРuМСi noteН tСat “no nation Сas ever attempteН” to Нo so.5 Map accompanying the announcement. 6 While reaction to the ADIZ by China's neighbors has generally been negative, no clear consensus has emerged on how to respond. Once again, we have been witness to the very different ways in which China and other countries see developments in the region. What for the Chinese is essentially a defensive measure, not directed against anyone in particular, and covering territories under Chinese sovereignty since times immemorial, is perceived by others as yet another small step in a relentless expansion which may end up unleashing a conflict of incalculable consequences. These very different perceptions are one of the factors that may make it difficult to reach some sort of 5 6 Intervieа аitС ProПessor TaniРuМСi. “CСina Air Zone Move a `Serious CСallenРe'”, Bloomberg TV, 28 November 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/video/china-air-zone-move-a-serious-challengeQ7TeaXd3SM2vXKKN8H4eOA.html Map taken Пrom “AnnounМement oП tСe AirМraПt IНentiПiМation Rules Пor tСe East CСina Sea Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone oП tСe P.R.C.”, Xinhua, , 23 November 2013, available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201311/23/c_132911634.htm 2 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 diplomatic settlement, although there are other forces pushing in the opposite direction. The purpose of this paper is to describe China's ADIZ, summarize the role and characteristics of Air Defense Identification Zones, examine the response by some the main actors involved (Russia, often forgotten, and Taiwan, strangely left out of many reports, included), the opinions of some experts, and place this development in a wider context, looking at the future courses of action that the main powers in the Indian-Pacific Region may follow. Map of the overlapping Chinese and Japanese air identification zones, containing also the location of the disputed undersea gas fields.7 What is an ADIZ? A brief overview of civil aviation law. Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) are not a Chinese invention. Before considering Beijing's move it is necessary to examine in some detail their characteristics and place within public international law, as well as some of the existing such zones. This must be preceded by a brief introduction to civil aviation law and public international law concerning airspace. 7 Map taken Пrom “Vieаpoints: CСina air гone tensions”, BBC, 28 November 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25116119 3 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 After the invention of aircraft and the initial development of air travel, an attempt was made to regulate the phenomenon by means of treaties, meaning that this is an area of the law where this is the most significant source of rules. The most important treaty is the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, аСiМС not onlв proviНeН tСe “essential Пrameаork” but “establisСeН tСe International Civil Aviation OrРaniгation (ICAO)”, a UN-specialized agency headquartered in Montreal.8 The Convention currently has 190 parties.9 A key aspect of the convention, whose significance may become apparent later when discussing Washington's and Taipei's reaction to BeijinР's ADIZ, is tСe НistinМtion betаeen “state airМraПt” anН “Мivil airМraПt.” TСe Convention onlв reРulates tСe latter, аСile НeПininР tСe Пormer in its ArtiМle 3.b as “airМraПt useН in militarв, Мustoms anН poliМe serviМes”.10 BeПore tСat, tСe Convention makes it Мlear in its Пirst artiМle tСat “everв State has eбМlusive sovereiРntв over tСe airspaМe above its territorв”, anН НeПines tСat territorв in ArtiМle 2 as “tСe lanН areas anН territorial аaters aНjaМent tСereto unНer tСe sovereiРntв, suгeraintв, proteМtion, or manНate oП suМС State”. TСe Мonvention also restricts the operation of state aircraft, in Мomparison аitС Мivilian airМraПt, statinР tСat “No state airМraПt oП a МontraМtinР State sСall Пlв over tСe territorв oП anotСer State or lanН tСereon аitСout autСoriгation” (ArtiМle 3.М).11 The Chicago Convention tries to strike a balance between national sovereignty and the right to selfdefense on the one hand, and freedom of aerial navigation and the safety of civilians in the other, аСen in its ArtiМle 3.bis it states tСat “TСe МontraМtinР States reМoРniгe that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. This provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the CСarter oП tСe UniteН Nations”. Art. 3.b reМoРniгes tСat a partв to tСe Convention “in tСe eбerМise oП its sovereignty, is entitled to require the landing at some designated airport of a civil aircraft flying above its territory without authority or if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that it is being useН Пor anв purpose inМonsistent аitС tСe aims oП tСis Convention” аСile restriМtinР tСe means oП НoinР tСis to tСose “appropriate” anН “Мonsistent аitС relevant rules oП international laа”. Furthermore, it lays down a duty to publish any resulting regulations.12 A problem of course is that it is rather difficult to intercept an aircraft without using or at least risking lethal force if it persists in disregarding the instructions received. Concerning the tension between national sovereignty and the demands of widespread air travel, the Convention requires authorization by the concerned state before regular scheduled flights can take plaМe. It also alloаs parties “Пor reasons oП militarв neМessitв or publiМ saПetв” to “restriМt or proСibit uniПormlв tСe airМraПt oП otСer States Пrom ПlвinР over Мertain areas oП its territorв” (ArtiМle 9-a), an important proviso being that such exclusions must affect all countries equally. Also, the resultinР eбМluНeН areas must be oП a “reasonable eбtent anН loМation as not to interПere 8 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 345. “CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SIGNED AT CHICAGO ON 7 DECEMBER 1944 ”, website of the International Civil Aviation Organization, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/chicago.pdf 10 “Convention on International Civil Aviation”, NintС EНition, 2006, website of the International Civil Aviation Organization, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf 11 “Convention on International Civil Aviation”, NintС EНition, 2006, аebsite oП tСe International Civil Aviation Organization, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf 12 “Convention on International Civil Aviation”, NintС EНition, 2006, аebsite oП tСe International Civil Aviation Organization, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf 9 4 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 unneМessarilв аitС air naviРation”.13 The Convention does not explicitly refer to ADIZs, which are a later development. Without going into further details concerning the above, we can note that when not over any country's territory or territorial sea, aircraft are thus free to fly wherever they want as a general rule. This does not mean that there are no international regulations, with Article 12 of the Convention and its annexes containing detailed provisions designed to promote safety. We will not go into them, but we do need to note that for these same safety reasons international airspace, that is those portions of the atmosphere not above any state's territory or territorial sea, are divided into flight inПormation reРions (FIRs), “Пor аСiМС a state is responsible anН аitС аСose aeronautiМal authorities all foreign civil aircraft are required to co-operate”.14 FIRs Мan be НeПineН as “areas established for the facilitation of airspace and air traffic management. FIRs generally involve a subjaМent State аСiМС Сas unНertaken responsibilitв Пor proviНinР air traППiМ Мontrol serviМes”.15 The idea behind a FIR is to ПaМilitate naviРation, “Some nations, Сoаever, purport to require all militarв aircraft in international airspace within their FIRs to comply with FIR procedures, whether or not they utilize FIR services or intend to enter national airspace. The United States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its FIR procedures to foreign military aircraft in such circumstances. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace need not identify themselves or otherwise comply with FIR procedures established by other nations, unless tСe UniteН States Сas speМiПiМallв aРreeН to Нo so”.16 Sometimes a state, invoking the right to self-defense, may close a portion of international airspace bordering on its territory. The most famous instance is probably the UK's 200 nautical mile maritime exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands in 1982, later turned into a total exclusion zone17, and finally extended to 12 miles outside Argentina's coast.18 “TСe Soviet Union, аitСout protesting the creation of an exclusion zone in principle, advised the British government that it considered the latest statement of policy unlawful, 'because it arbitrarily proclaim[ed] vast expanses oП СiРС seas МloseН to sСips anН МraПt oП otСer Мountries'”. PerСaps of greater interest to the issue at 13 14 15 16 17 18 18 “Convention on International Civil Aviation”, NintС EНition, 2006, аebsite oП tСe International Civil Aviation Organization, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 348. Ruаantissa Abeвratne “In searМС oП tСeoretiМal justiПiМation Пor air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гones”, Journal of Transportation Security, March 2012, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 87-94, p. 88, available at http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/20/art%253A10.1007%252Fs12198-011-00832.pdf?auth66=1387118989_c8e6875ebf7a22f53f60d7d1ceea54d0&ext=.pdf “AIR FORCE OPERATIONS & THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR AIR, SPACE, AND CYBER FORCES”, (Maбаell Air Force Base: The Judge AНvoМate General’s SМСool, 2009), available at http://www.afjag.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100510-059.pdf Which did not mean that London was restricting her Armed Forces to operate within that area, despite the controversy surrounding the sinking of the ARA Belgrano when outside the associated maritime exclusion zone. “WitС tСe arrival oП tСe BritisС battle Рroup into tСe maritime eбМlusion гone, on 30 April 1982, tСe BritisС Рovernment declared this same area to be a total exclusion zone (TEZ) from which all non-British ships and aircraft were excluded. Most significantly, 'any military or civilian ships or aircraft found within the zone without due authority from the Ministry of Defense in London were to be regarded as hostile and liable to attack by British forces.' Later, on 7 May 1982, following the 4 May Argentine Exocet attack on the British destroyer, HMS Sheffield, the total exclusion zone аas eбtenНeН bв Great Britain to tаelve miles oПП tСe Мoast oП ArРentina” James M. Rвan, “SOME PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR A JOINT FORCE COMMANDER CONTEMPLATING THE USE OF BLOCKADE, VISITAND SEARCH, MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS, MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONES, CORDON SANITAIRE, AND MARITIME WARNING ZONES DURING TIMES OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT”, paper submitted to the US Naval War College, 8 February 2009, p. 19, available at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA378469 5 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 stake is tСe ПaМt tСat “AПter tСe ArРentine ПorМes on tСe FalklanН IslanНs СaН surrenНereН, Great Britain lifted the Total Exclusion Zone on July 22,1982), but, at the same time, asked the Argentine Government (via the Swiss Government) not to allow its military aircraft or warships within a zone measuring 150 sea miles radius around the Falkland Islands. Similarly Argentina was warned not to allow her civil aircraft and shipping within that zone without the prior agreement of the British Government”.19 It is also possible for a state to temporarily restrict the use of a portion of international airspace аСile МonНuМtinР militarв Нrills in international аaters. TСis is Нone bв НeМlarinР a “saПetв гone” anН issuinР “Рeneral warnings to shipping and aircraft not to enter when the activity is being carried out”. OtСer states tenН to Мomplв, as lonР as “tСeв are not too eбtensive or prolonРeН”.20 We should note, however, that there are different interpretations of the right by non-coastal states to conduct military activities in a country's EEZ.21 For our purposes, it is particularly important to remember that China has persistently insisted that such right does not exist, meaning that drills should be authorized by Beijing.22 This has not prevented countries like the US or South Korea from carrying them out and insisting publicly that they intend to keep doing so,23 although sometimes they seem to have restricted the assets deployed or moved drills from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan.24 These differing interpretations of the rights of coastal states in their EEZs have led Mark J. Valencia (National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China) to warn that “Unless some unНerstanНinР anН aММommoНation are reaМСeН reРarding various 'red lines,' serious international inМiНents are likelв to inМrease in ПrequenМв anН intensitв”, aННinР tСat “TСe U.S. should consider taking the lead in negotiating a set of voluntary guidelines regarding foreign military activities in EEZs that would be conducive to a stable and secure maritime environment in 19 20 21 22 23 24 L. F. E. GolНie “Maritime War Zones anН EбМlusion Zones” in HoraМe B. Robertson, eНitor, The Law of Naval Operations, (Newport: US Naval War College, 1991), p. 173-4, available at https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ac93a6c1-825a-4b7e-8088-3e7977179c3e/Maritime-War-Zones---ExclusionZones.aspx Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 348. For a Мomparison oП US anН CСinese vieаs, anН some МritiМal Мommentarв on botС, see Erik FranМб “AmeriМan anН CСinese vieаs on naviРational riРСts oП аarsСips”, Chinese Journal of International Law, (2011) 10 (1): 187-206, available at http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/187.full.pdf+html For a summarв oП tСe main reasons аСв CСina opposes ПoreiРn militarв aМtivities near Сer sСores, see “WСв CСina opposes US-SoutС Korean militarв eбerМises in tСe Yelloа Sea”, People's Daily, 16 July 2010, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7069743.html “At a МonПerenМe earlв in DeМember 2010, titleН “Globaliгation anН tСe Laа oП tСe Sea” anН jointlв orРaniгeН bв tСe Korea Maritime Institute (Seoul, South Korea), the Centre for Oceans Law and Policy (COLP) (Virginia, United States) and the Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea (Utrecht, The Netherlands), the opening statement of John Norton Moore, Director of COLP, focused on the absolute essential nature of the freedom of navigation of military vessels in the EEZ. In his address to the conference, Vice Admiral James W. Houck, US Navy Judge Advocate General, dwelt on what he called the excessive maritime claims of some countries especially with respect to the EEZ. By treating this zone rather as territorial sea, some States hamper or simply want to exclude military operations, exercises and activities based on security or environmental considerations. He emphasized the continued intention of the United States to challenge suМС eбМessive Мlaims as to tСe Пuture” Erik FranМб “AmeriМan anН CСinese vieаs on naviРational riРСts oП аarsСips”, Chinese Journal of International Law, (2011) 10 (1): 187-206, p. 192, available at http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/187.full.pdf+html “WasСinРton anН Seoul аill launМС a militarв Нrill on SunНaв tarРetinР PвonРвanР in tСe Sea oП Japan, НelaвinР a similar move in tСe Yelloа Sea aПter opposition Пrom BeijinР over tСe joint eбerМise” Li Xiaokun anН Ai YanР“USROK drill in Sea oП Japan”, China Daily, 21 July 2010, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/201007/21/content_11027704.htm 6 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 Asia”.25 Finallв, аe Мan note tСat a “no Пlв гone” maв be НeМlareН as a means oП аaРinР limiteН аar or carrying out humanitarian intervention, in which case a country or coalition of states will seek to prevent another from operating aircraft, or military aerial assets in particular, over its national territorв or part tСereoП. TСis is not Пullв НevoiН oП Мontroversв, sinМe “TСe CСarter oП tСe UniteН Nations, in Article 2(4), prohibits the 'threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence' of a member state under most circumstances, and many practitioners and observers have wondered whether the establishment of a no-fly zone would constitute a violation of tСis proСibition.”26 What we have said about different views of the rights of coastal states in their Exclusive Economic Zones is yet another reminder of the legal clash which constitutes an essential component of the complex situation in East Asia. It is not just countries fighting over where to draw their respective territorial waters or EEZs, within an agreed legal framework. Rather, it is that and much more, the tensions also involving a struggle about the rules themselves. Not just their interpretation and the facts. A study on the rights of warships and coastal states pointed out that US and Chinese “opposinР positions … are СarН to reМonМile at present”.27 This is something that should not come as a surprise. China was alien to the birth and development of international law as we know it. She found herself in the mid XIX Century suddenly dispossessed of her privileged position in East Asia, inМluНinР tСe “Tribute Sвstem” аСiМС аas so Мentral to CСinese selП-perceptions. In its place, she had to contend with a whole new sets of rules, culturally alien, and due to power realities interpreted in a clearly unbalanced way. After (almost) unifying, at least on land, within what she considers to be the nation's rightful borders, and following three decades of substantive (even if fragile) economic development, it is no surprise that next step is seen by many Chinese as securing the maritime approaches to the country and regaining the respect of neighbors, which in a global world is not to be taken as restricted to bordering countries. Both goals are connected, and imply a strong view of surrounding waters. As noted by the US Naval War College's James R. Holmes, “BeijinР НeПines oППsСore аaters as 'blue national soil.' IП tСat’s more tСan a МatМСв pСrase, it envisions exercising the absolute territorial sovereignty at sea that governments exercise within tСeir lanН Пrontiers”.28 Going back to aviation law, we can thus note some important points. First of all, the view that the air above a country's territory is an extension of that territory, and therefore subject to national sovereignty.29 Also the definition of territory as including territorial waters but not a country's EEZ 25 26 27 28 29 Mark J. ValenМia “ForeiРn Militarв AМtivities in Asian EEZs: ConПliМt AСeaН?”, SpeМial Report 27, National Bureau oП Asian Research, May 2011, available at http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Preview/SR27_EEZs_preview.pdf This summer, Valencia insisted on tСis, аritinР tСat “Sooner ratСer tСan later, an aРreement аill be neeНeН on a set oП voluntarв РuiНelines Пor militarв and intelligence-gathering activities in foreign exclusive economic zones and on definitions of permitted and prohibited МonНuМt tСere. TСese аoulН Сelp avoiН unneМessarв inМiНents аitСout banninР anв aМtivities outriРСt” Mark J. ValenМia “CСina anН US must aРree on rules Пor аaters in eбМlusive eМonomiМ гone”, South China Morning Post, 31 August 2013, available at http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1300695/china-and-us-must-agree-ruleswaters-exclusive-economic-zone For a stuНв oП tСe НiППerent leРal issues involveН, see JeremiaС Gertler, CoorНinator, “No-Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational, and Legal ConsiНerations Пor ConРress”, ConРressional ResearМС ServiМe, 18 MarМС 2011, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41701.pdf Erik FranМб “AmeriМan anН CСinese vieаs on naviРational riРСts oП аarsСips”, Chinese Journal of International Law, (2011) 10 (1): 187-206, available at http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/187.full.pdf+html James R. Holmes, “TСe Commons: BeijinР’s 'Blue National Soil'”, The Diplomat, 3 January 2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2013/01/03/a-threat-to-the-commons-blue-national-soil/ AlreaНв Мlear in tСe 1919 Paris Convention, аСose artiМle 1 states tСat “TСe HiРС ContraМtinР Parties reМoРniгe tСat every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory. For the purpose of the 7 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 (Economic Exclusive Zone), a concept born after the Chicago Convention. Third, the different reРime appliМable to “Мivilian” anН “state” airМraПt, anН tСe НeПinition oП tСe latter to inМluНe not only military assets but also those in the service of a government in law-enforcement duties.30 Finally, the fact that national sovereignty is meant to be compatible with freedom of aerial navigation, subject to exceptions on account on national security and that international law restricts the means through which a country may regulate its airspace, with the lives of civilians a paramount consideration. First day cover commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 1919 Paris Convention, the first international treaty to 31 regulate civil aviation. The Chicago Convention prohibits the use of force when it comes to pushing an aircraft to land, however tСis ban is qualiПieН, tСe teбt (ArtiМle 3 bis a)) saвinР tСat “tСis provision sСall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of tСe UniteН Nations”.32 International lawyers have interpreted this as an “oblique reПerenМe to tСe inherent right of a state to use force in self-defense, as confirmed by Article 51 of the [UN] CСarter”, arРuinР tСat “in trulв eбМeptional МirМumstanМes, a state аoulН be entitleН to sСoot Нoаn a civil aircraft if that is tСe onlв аaв to avoiН an antiМipateН Рreater loss oП liПe”. An eбample аoulН be the use of a hijacked airliner as a weapon, as in the 9/11 attacks. In addition, commentators have present Convention, the territory of a State shall be understood as including the national territory, both that of the motСer Мountrв anН oП tСe Мolonies, anН tСe territorial аaters aНjaМent tСereto”, “Convention RelatinР to tСe Regulation oП Aerial NaviРation SiРneН at Paris, OМtober 13, 1919 (Paris Convention)”, , available at http://library.arcticportal.org/1580/1/1919_Paris_conevention.pdf 30 Something to remember in East Asia, given the significant role of coastguards and other state agencies in the dispute over contested territories. 31 PiМture taken Пrom “THE POSTAL HISTORY OF ICAO. TСe 1919 Paris Convention: TСe startinР point Пor tСe reРulation oП air naviРation”, аebsite oП tСe International Civil Aviation OrРaniгation, available at http://www.icao.int/secretariat/PostalHistory/1919_the_paris_convention.htm 32 “Convention on International Civil Aviation”, NintС EНition, 2006, аebsite oП tСe International Civil Aviation Organization, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf 8 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 noteН tСat “TСere is stronР support Пor tСe vieа tСat tСis provision is merely declarative of Мustomarв international laа” anН tСat, ПurtСermore, “TСe riРСt oП selП-defense, however, is strictly limited by the principles of necessity and proportionality, and every reasonable precaution must be exhausted in order to avoid the loss oП liПe”.33 Concerning the possibility of shooting down civil aircraft transporting drugs, some countries in Central America pressed for this in the negotiations leading to the protocol incorporating Article 3 bis into the Chicago Convention. Although this was rejected, Peru shot one down in 200134, in a widely-publicized incident,3536 and Brazil passed a law in 2004 providing domestic legal cover to do so.37 Other countries, such as Bolivia38 and Venezuela,39 have also announced or passed legislation to provide for this. From an East-Asian perspective, this is a reminder of the difficulty of stopping an aircraft that refuses, for whatever reason, to land or change course. Thus, while at sea, in areas like the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, ships have often clashed and used non-lethal weapons like water cannons, with both sides employing a limited and managed degree of force, it is difficult to translate those policies into tСe air, into tСe “tСirН Нimension oП аarПare”.40 The scope for lethal incidents and the resulting escalation is thus much greater when we are no longer just talking about two-dimensional borders at sea. On the other hand, the growing role of drones could balance this, since their downing does not 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 PСillip A. JoСnson “SСootinР Doаn DruР TraППiМkers”, in MiМСael N. SМСmitt, eНitor, Liber Amicorum Professor Jack Grunawalt, ( : Naval War College Press, 1998), p. 84, available at https://ia601209.us.archive.org/5/items/lawofmilitaryope72grun/lawofmilitaryope72grun.pdf The plane was founН not to be МarrвinР НruРs but missionaries. Natalia TarnaаieМki anН Sebastian Rotella “2 KilleН as Missionarв Plane Is SСot Doаn in Peru”, Los Angeles Times, 21 April 2001, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/21/news/mn-53816 In addition to the death of US missionaries, the cooperation between US and Peruvian authorities in the latter's policy of shooting down drug-carrying planes contributed to the controversy, and led to reports on previous instances of downing oП suspeМteН airМraПt. “As earlв as 1994, a memo Пrom U.S. State Department laавers аarneН about tСe НanРer oП downing civilian planes suspected of carrying narcotics. The lawyers wrote that shooting down civilian aircraft would violate international laа. TСeв urРeН Рovernment poliМвmakers not to partiМipate in Peru’s anti-aircraft war. Their аarninРs аent unСeeНeН; U.S. personnel took part in a МounternarМotiМs arranРement аitС Peru” , “PoliМies InМonsistent on SСootinР SuspeМteН DruР Planes”, The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 12 July 2001, available at http://www.icij.org/project/us-aid-latin-america/policies-inconsistent-shooting-suspected-drug-planes See “A Revieа oП UniteН States Assistance to Peruvian Counter-Drug Air Interdiction Efforts and the Shootdown of a Civilian AirМraПt on April 20, 2001”, Report oП tСe SeleМt Commitee on IntelliРenМe, UniteН States Senate, OМtober 2001, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_rpt/peru_report.pdf anН “UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT SHOOT DOWN CIVIL AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN DRUG TRAFFICKING: MEMORANDUM FOR JAMIE S. GORELICK DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL”, аebsite oП tСe US Department of Justice, 14 July 1994, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/shootdow.htm Additional primary sources can be found at MiМСael L. Evans, eНitor, “SСootНoаn in Peru: The Secret U.S. Debate Over Intelligence Sharing with Peru and Colombia”, National SeМuritв ArМСive EleМtroniМ BrieПinР Book No. 44, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 23 April 2001, available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB44/ Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 352. TraМeв Knott “Bolivia FinaliгinР SСoot-Нoаn Laа to Combat DruР FliРСts”, InSight Crime: Organized Crime in the Americas, 28 August 2012, available at http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/bolivia-shoot-down-law-drug-flights GeoППreв Ramseв “Veneгuela to AНopt 'SСoot-Doаn' PoliМв Пor SuspeМteН DruР FliРСt”, InSight Crime: Organized Crime in the Americas, 23 May 2012, available at http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/venezuela-to-adopt-shootdown-policy-for-suspected-drug-flights For a discussion of the potential destabilizing effect of the employment of aircraft in putting into question Japan's actual control over the Senkaku Islands, see Alex Calvo, "The third dimension of warfare and tactical stability in the Senkaku Islands", Birmingham "'on War": The blog of the postgraduate students at the Centre for War Studies, University of Birmingham, 09 January 2013, Birmingham University, available at http://warstudies.wordpress.com/2013/01/09/the-third-dimension-of-warfare-and-tactical-stability-in-the-senkakuislands/ 9 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 imply loss of life and therefore while raising tensions it may not escalate matters to the degree that the capture, injury, or death of a pilot or a crew could.41 Let us now turn our attention to the origins of the ADIZs. We have earlier mentioned that for navigation and safety purposes, the airspace above international waters is divided into flight information regions (FIRs). During the Cold War, this was considered to be insufficient, and both tСe UniteН States anН tСe Soviet Union set up ADIZs “to ensure tСeв аere not surpriseН bв suННen inМursions into tСeir national airspaМes”. We МoulН basiМallв НeПine an ADIZ as “A гone tСat provides an early warning system to help a country detect possible incursions into its sovereign airspaМe”.42 The practice spread, and nowadays a number of countries Сave ADIZ, inМluНinР “US, CanaНa, Russia, Japan, SoutС Korea, Taiаan anН Vietnam”,43 in aННition to “Norаaв anН tСe UniteН KinРНom, InНia, Pakistan anН CanaНa”, amonР otСers, аitС tСe US СavinР Пour (“ContiРuous US ADIZ; Alaska ADIZ; Guam ADIZ; and Hawaii ADIZ”).44 In tСe СeвНaвs oП tСe ColН War, in “tСe 1950s anН 1960s”, a number oП “Мoastal states establisСeН manв ADIZs in tСe airspaМe over tСe oМeans to Сelp proteМt tСemselves Пrom unаanteН intruНers anН to аarn oП potential nuМlear strikes”. More recentlв, “tСe СeiРСteneН МonМerns oП states about tСreats Пrom tСe air sinМe September 11, 2001, anН tСe reМent resurРenМe oП major militarв poаers” Сave prompteН reneаeН interest in them.45 At a media conference following China's ADIZ announcement, Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun saiН tСat “SinМe tСe 1950s, more tСan 20 Мountries inМluНinР some major Мountries anН CСina’s neiРСborinР Мountries Сave suММessivelв establisСeН Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zones”. 46 Although not explicitly regulated in International Law, a certain practice has emerged. They are not declared following any formal procedure, rather countries simply announce them, providing a set of geographical coordinates. Even after an ADIZ has been set up, the area is still considered to be part of international airspace.47 TСus, altСouРС “tСere is no overаСelminР eviНenМe, eitСer Пrom a scholastic or legislative perspective that lends legal legitimacy to the establishment of ADIZs, such a concept has never been challenged as being inconsistent with existing laа”, аitС “no reМorНeН 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 Aleб Calvo “Robot Wars in tСe PaМiПiМ?”, The Tokyo Diplomat, 30 September 2013, Shingetsu News Agency, available at http://www.shingetsunewsagency.com/SNA/News/Entries/2013/9/30_Robot_Wars_in_the_Pacific.html Demetri Sevastopulo “Q&A: WСat is an air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гone?”, Financial Times, 29 November 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/26cf55ce-58da-11e3-a7cb00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2n8TGD3xK Demetri Sevastopulo “Q&A: WСat is an air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гone?”, Financial Times, 29 November 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/26cf55ce-58da-11e3-a7cb00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2n8TGD3xK Ruаantissa Abeвratne “In searМС oП tСeoretiМal justiПiМation Пor air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гones”, Journal of Transportation Security, March 2012, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 87-94, p. 87, available at http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/20/art%253A10.1007%252Fs12198-011-00832.pdf?auth66=1387118989_c8e6875ebf7a22f53f60d7d1ceea54d0&ext=.pdf Peter A. Dutton “Caelum Liberum: Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zones outsiНe SovereiРn AirspaМe”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), American Society of International Law, pp. 691-709, p. 691, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20617039 AnНreа S. EriМkson “DeПense Spokesman YanР Yujun’s Response to Questions on tСe EstablisСment oП TСe East China Sea Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone”, Andrew S. Erickson: China Analysis from Original Sources, 23 November 2013, available at http://www.andrewerickson.com/2013/11/defense-spokesman-yang-yujuns-response-to-questions-onthe-establishment-of-the-east-china-sea-air-defense-identification-zone/ Demetri Sevastopulo “Q&A: WСat is an air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гone?”, Financial Times, 29 November 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/26cf55ce-58da-11e3-a7cb00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2n8TGD3xK 10 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 instanМe oП protest aРainst tСe establisСment oП ADIZs” beПore CСina's. As an eбplanation Пor tСis, Ruаantissa Abeвratne МonsiНers tСat “TСis miРСt аell be beМause tСe messaРe oП aviation resonates peace and security of society at аСatever Мost”.48As a result, we can say that they are part of the international lanНsМape, tСeir ultimate tСeoretiМal justiПiМation beinР “tСe preМautionarв prinМiple which asserts that the absence of empirical or scientific evidence should not preclude States from takinР aМtion to prevent a Сarm beПore it oММurs”49, a view that may find its philosophical and legal roots not only in the Western, but also in the Chinese intellectual tradition.50 With regard to this view of the ultimate justification for ADIZs, we can note how it is the extent (covering territories claimed or administered by other countries), the manner (sudden and without general consultations), and the alleged intent, in addition to the rule that aircraft not bound for China should also provide flight plans, which have led to criticism against China, not the establishment of the EEZ itself. Among those stressing these points, not the setting up of the ADIZ in itself, we can find Rory MetМalП, аСo аrote an artiМle on “WСat's WronР WitС CСina's Air Defence Identification Zone (AnН WСat’s Not) ” saвinР tСat “IП CСina's neа гone НiН not inМluНe НisputeН maritime territorв, iП its requirements for compliance applied only to aircraft heading into Chinese airspace, and if neighbours like Japan and South Korea had been consulted ahead of the announcement, then there would be little or nothing for others to object to. Indeed, it could have been part of a wider strategy oП Мooperation to reНuМe maritime seМuritв risks in NortС Asia”.51 Andrew S. Erickson supported this view, re-postinР tСis artiМle in Сis bloР anН aННinР tСat “tСere is МonsiНerable МonМern amonР foreign observers about how China has (and how it has not) gone about the announcement and explanation of its ADIZ. Rory Metcalf cuts right to the heart oП tСis МritiМal НistinМtion”. EriМkson Нismisses tСe vieа in “ReМent CСinese аritinРs” empСasiгinР “opposition to Нouble stanНarНs anН” suРРestinР “tСat BeijinР is beinР opposeН just beМause it announМeН an ADIZ per se”.52 On the other hand some non-Chinese observers have tended to support or at least partly agree with such CСinese vieаs. Justin Bronk (Roвal UniteН ServiМes Institute), Пor eбample, аrote tСat “CСina’s actions do not seem especially unreasonable if one considers that all its neighbours in the region have put ADIZs in place to cover territories to which they attach significant national interest. 48 49 50 51 52 Ruаantissa Abeвratne “In searМС oП tСeoretiМal justiПiМation Пor air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гones”, Journal of Transportation Security, March 2012, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 87-94, p. 94, available at http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/20/art%253A10.1007%252Fs12198-011-00832.pdf?auth66=1387118989_c8e6875ebf7a22f53f60d7d1ceea54d0&ext=.pdf Ruаantissa Abeвratne “In searМС oП tСeoretiМal justiПiМation Пor air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гones”, Journal of Transportation Security, March 2012, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 87-94, p. 89, available at http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/20/art%253A10.1007%252Fs12198-011-00832.pdf?auth66=1387118989_c8e6875ebf7a22f53f60d7d1ceea54d0&ext=.pdf “As tСeir reМorНeН eППorts to Пormulate rules Пor usinР МoerМion suРРest, these writers accepted the premise that the state must monopolize force in order to maintain a stable political structure. But like late classical Western just war theorists,' the Chinese thinkers whose works I interpret here qualified their agreement that force could have a legitimate place in government, warning that rulers must never resort to violence for capricious cause or personal gain. Moreover, some Chinese writers declared as eloquently as their Western counterparts that decisions about war and punishments must be based on laws derived from natural patterns. By comparing classical Chinese political theory with Western concepts of natural law and the just war, this article adds a new perspective to current critiques of a certain conventional view of earlв CСinese leРal Мulture” Karen Turner “War, PunisСment, anН TСe Laа oП Nature in Earlв CСinese ConМepts oП TСe State”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Dec., 1993), pp. 285-324, p. 286, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2719452 Rorв MeНМalП “WСat’s WronР WitС CСina’s Air DeПenМe IНentiПiМation Zone (AnН WСat’s Not)”, The Interpreter, 27 November 2013, available at http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/11/27/Whats-wrong-with-Chinas-Air-DefenceIdentification-Zone-%28and-whats-not%29.aspx AnНreа S. EriМkson “WСat’s WronР WitС CСina’s Air DeПenМe IНentiПiМation Zone (AnН WСat’s Not)”, Andrew S. Erickson: China Analysis from Original Sources, 27 November 2013, available at http://www.andrewerickson.com/2013/11/whats-wrong-with-chinas-air-defence-identification-zone-and-whats-not/ 11 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 Viewed in this light, Chinese claims that international protestations over the zone are hypocritical Нo Сave a rinР oП trutС to tСem”.53 In contrast with the rules announced by Beijing, the traditional view is that ADIZs only imply a duty to provide flight plans by incoming aircraft, not by those simply traversing them. This is clearly explained in the US Navy Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, which states tСat “TСe UniteН States Нoes not reМoРniгe tСe riРСt oП a Мoastal nation to applв its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace should not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established by other nations, unless the United States has speМiПiМallв aРreeН to Нo so”.54 Some observers have noted the potential impact of the evolution of the law of the sea, and in particular that of the EEZ, on the concept of the ADIZ, although the two are conceptually different, at least in the standard view of international law. Peter A. Dutton (US Naval War College) wrote tСat “in tСe НeМaНes sinМe tСe 1950s muМС Сas МСanРeН in tСe international laа oП tСe sea, raisinР questions as to whether these legal developments have affected the status of maritime airspace or established new authorities that allow coastal states to regulate foreign aircraft in the airspace beвonН tСe territorial sea in НeroРation oП tСe overПliРСt ПreeНoms oП otСer states”.55 With regard to this, we may note the possibility that Chinese views on coastal states rights may also end up influencing the figure of the ADIZ, should Beijing succeed in shaping the rules governing the maritime and air approaches to its territory. The end result could be a hybrid between standard international law and Chinese legal concepts, which would reflect the situation on the ground, that of a much more powerful China yet one partly constrained by existing legal regimes and by her neighbors' interests. This should come as no surprise since international law, just like law in general, tends to evolve in accordance with political and social changes. Two alternative scenarios would be either a radical overhaul of international law, reflecting a sino-centric Asia56 and a de 53 Justin Bronk “CСina’s Air DeПenМe IНentiПiМation Zone anН its role in CСinese Geo-StrateРiМ PoliМв”, RUSI Analysis, Royal United Services Institute, 4 December 2013, available at http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C529EF792AB902/#.UqfjP-K83wq 54 “THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS”, Departвment oП tСe Navв Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Department of Homeland Security and US Coast Guard, July 2007, available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-99250defea93325c/ 55 Peter A. Dutton “Caelum Liberum: Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zones outsiНe SovereiРn AirspaМe”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), American Society of International Law, pp. 691-709, p. 691, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20617039 56 One sСoulН be МareПul аitС tСe term “sino-Мentrism”, tСouРС. “SinoМentrism Мan be a useПul assumption at times oП Chinese strength, when reality more or less matched belief in superiority. But even here one has to examine its exact effect on policymaking. Many believe that sinocentrism had led to a foreign policy of rigidity and inflexibility. But this is not necessarily the case. The Han, Tang, Ming, and Qing all in different periods displayed a flexible and extroverted pattern of foreign relations. Moreover, sinocentrism did not always demand foreign rulers' submission to China as vassals, even during periods of Chinese strength. The Tang, for example, did not insist on Japan's declaration of vassalage. From another perspective, if sinocentrism was indeed such an important motivational force, 'its relatively weak translation into impulses to conquer and physically dominate “inПerior” peoples' is puггlinР. It is Мlear tСat sinocentrism alone sheds little light on Chinese attempts at domination or the lack thereof. Although these examples demonstrate that the importance of sinocentrism in Chinese foreign policy making cannot be overstated, they also show tСat tСe eППeМt oП sinoМentrism on poliМв varies in НiППerent Мases anН neeНs to be empiriМallв НetermineН” ZСanР FenР “RetСinkinР tСe 'Tribute Sвstem': BroaНeninР tСe ConМeptual Horiгon oП HistoriМal East Asian PolitiМs”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, (2009) 2 (4), p. 545-574, available at http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/545.full.pdf+html 12 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 facto return to the Tribute System,57 or a Chinese failure to see international law evolve according to her views and interests leading the country to leave some of the existing normative regimes. In connection with this, some observers are warning about the possibility that Beijing may withdraw from UNCLOS if the current international arbitration case launched by the Philippines concludes with a decision against China.58 An alternative for China, however, would be to simply ignore the ruling and stick to her current strategy. With regards to the possible evolution oП airspaМe laа, it Сas been noteН tСat “Like tСe Paris Convention, the Chicago Convention was drafted while the oceans (hence the airspaces) were НiviНeН onlв betаeen territorial аaters anН СiРС seas”.59 Thus, the birth of EEZs without a corresponding figure in the air could be seen as providing an opening for an evolution of airspace law in a direction which may at least partly satisfy Chinese wishes to see changes in the legal reРime appliМable to tСe “Мommons” in a biН to better ensure her national security. The initial attempts, shortly after UNCLOS was concluded, by countries like Brazil to restrict operations by foreign state aircraft in their EEZs, employing the Chicago Convention as the basis, were unsuccessful,60 but this does not completely rule out the possibility that a coalition may emerge, led by China, of coastal states pushing for change in this direction. There are two other treaties, apart from the Chicago Convention and UNCLOS, which may provide a basis for coastal states to reРulate some aМtivities bв airМraПt ПlвinР in international airspaМe, tСe “аiНelв aММepteН 1972 London Dumping Convention61 and the related, but less widely accepted, 1996 Protocol to the LonНon Convention”62, botС oП аСiМС “seek to proteМt tСe marine environment from the effects of НumpinР”. Hoаever, like UNCLOS, tСeв Рrant Мoastal states a restriМtive ranРe oП poаers to 57 58 59 60 61 62 A cautionary tale when referring to the Tribute System is that there is still much work to be done to fully understand its meaning, operation, and evolution, this being a concept often used in a somewhat simplistic manner. For a discussion of some of the meaninРs anН a аarninР МonМeptinР tСe МonМept, see ZСanР FenР “RetСinkinР tСe 'Tribute Sвstem': BroaНeninР tСe ConМeptual Horiгon oП HistoriМal East Asian PolitiМs”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, (2009) 2 (4), p. 545-574, available at http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/545.full.pdf+html Ellen TorНesillas “Will CСina аitСНraа Пrom UNCLOS iП UN Мourt НeМiНes in Пavor oП PH?”, Yahoo News, 10 December 2013, available at http://ph.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-inbox/china-withdraw-unclos-un-court-decides-favorph-153936547.html Peter A. Dutton “Caelum Liberum: Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zones outsiНe SovereiРn AirspaМe”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), American Society of International Law, pp. 691-709, p. 692, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20617039 “NonetСeless, sСortlв aПter UNCLOS аas МonМluНeН, some Мoastal states attempteН to assert tСat tСe neа EEZ is a гone in which permission is required for military activities, including overflight by the military aircraft of other states. Brazil, for instance, attempted to obtain the agreement of the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization to designate the status ofthe airspace over the EEZ as equivalent to national airspace. The committee, however, rejected this effort to use the Chicago Convention as an instrument for redefining the law of the sea as 'flagrantly contradicting tСe relevant provisions [oП UNCLOS] аСiМС equate tСe EEZ . .. аitС tСe СiРС seas as reРarНs ПreeНom oП overПliРС'” Peter A. Dutton “Caelum Liberum: Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zones outsiНe SovereiРn AirspaМe”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), American Society of International Law, pp. 691-709, p. 694, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20617039 “CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION BY DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTER”, аebsite oП UniteН Nations, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201046/volume-1046-I-15749-English.pdf “TСe ProtoМol, аСiМС is meant to eventuallв replaМe tСe 1972 Convention, represents a major change of approach to the question of how to regulate the use of the sea as a depository for waste materials. Rather than stating which materials may not be dumped, it prohibits all dumping, except for possibly acceptable wastes on the so-called 'reverse list', МontaineН in an anneб to tСe ProtoМol”, “Convention on tСe Prevention oП Marine Pollution bв DumpinР oП Wastes anН OtСer Matter”, аebsite oП tСe International Maritime OrРaniгation, available at http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Convention-on-the-Prevention-of-Marine-Pollutionby-Dumping-of-Wastes-and-Other-Matter.aspx 13 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 achieve this goal.63 TСe LonНon ProtoМol bans as a Рeneral rule (Art. 1.4.1, НeПininР “НumpinР”) “anв Нeliberate Нisposal into tСe sea oП аastes or otСer matter Пrom ... airМraПt … at sea”,64 but, as UNCLOS Нoes, eбempts state airМraПt Пrom tСis rule, saвinР (ArtiМle 10.4) tСat “TСis ProtoМol sСall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under international laа”, altСouРС tСis is qualiПieН аitС tСe assertion tСat “eaМС ContraМtinР Partв sСall ensure bв tСe adoption of appropriate measures that such vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of this Protocol and shall inform the Organization aММorНinРlв”. TСe qualiПiМation means, Сoаever, tСat it is tСe relevant state itselП аСiМС is in МСarРe of making sure the Convention is followed, without any role for the coastal state. We must also note that the ProtoМol onlв applies (ArtiМle 10.1.3) “at sea in areas аitСin аСiМС [tСe Мoastal state] is entitleН to eбerМise jurisНiМtion in aММorНanМe аitС international laа”. TСereПore, “like UNCLOS, the London Convention and Protocol provide no basis for a coastal state to exercise legal jurisНiМtion over ПoreiРn state airМraПt in tСe airspaМe above tСe EEZ”, anН Dutton МonМluНes tСat “Пor militarв purposes, ПreeНom oП overПliРСt in tСe airspaМe above tСe EEZ remains ПunНamentallв unchanged by international treaty law developments in tСe seМonН СalП oП tСe tаentietС Мenturв”65 To conclude this section, we may refer again to a state's inherent right to self-defense, since as we will see next, one of the motivations or explanations for China's move, and more generally for her maritime expansion, is to seek to establish a protective buffer zone around her territory, and in particular around her main population and industry centers. The existence of such a right is not controversial in itself, in particular when we have in mind a conventional cross-border mass attack. The problem comes when we envision lesser forms of resort to armed force, which happen to be much more common than the former. These include many forms, among them support for crossborНer insurРents, anН “armeН inПiltration anН inНireМt aРРression”. As noteН bв a stanНarН international laа teбtbook, “international praМtiМe sСoаs tСat militarв aРРression inМreasinРlв takes the form of gradual infiltration of armed forces and groups of volunteers supported by a foreign Рovernment into tСe territorв oП anotСer state”, in аСiМС Мase “tСe 'invasion' oП tСe territorв oП a State Нoes not take plaМe all oП a suННen anН on a larРe sМale, but over a lonР perioН anН pieМemeal”. The problem then is whether self-defense as recognized in international law covers these situations.66 International law still has not developed a comprehensive framework to deal with subconventional conflict. What we find in Asia is a mutual perception that such gradual encroachments are taking place. While, for example, Indians complain about Chinese incursions in the Himalayas, Chinese denounce foreign military activities in their EEZ. The matter is made more complex by the existence of territories claimed by two or more parties. In those cases, the one sending troops (or civilians) into them can and does claim that it is not crossing any border, and accuses the other side of being the trespasser. We may see similar conflicting views of China's ADIZ, a defensive measure for Beijing, yet another small offensive step for her neighbors. 63 Peter A. Dutton “Caelum Liberum: Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zones outsiНe SovereiРn AirspaМe”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), American Society of International Law, pp. 691-709, p. 694, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20617039 64 “LonНon Convention 1996 ProtoМol to tСe Convention on tСe Prevention oП Marine Pollution bв Dumping of Wastes anН OtСer Matter, 1972, anН Resolutions AНopteН bв tСe SpeМial MeetinР”, аebsite oП tСe National ToбiМs Netаork, available at http://www.ntn.org.au/cchandbook/library/documents/londonprotocol96.pdf 65 Peter A. Dutton “Caelum Liberum: Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zones outsiНe SovereiРn AirspaМe”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), American Society of International Law, pp. 691-709, p. 694, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20617039 66 Antonio Cassese, International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 363. For an overview of the issue of self-defense in international law, see p. 354-365 and 371-373. 14 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 China's views, motivations, and strategy. Let us now examine the reasons which may have prompted Beijing to declare its East China Sea ADIZ. We may at least cite the following, on the understanding that they are not completely separate goals but that they may overlap to some extent: gaining strategic depth at sea (pushing out potentially hostile military forces from her EEZ), acting in accordance with her territorial claim on the Senkaku Islands, seeking to master the airspace between Taiwan and Japan (and putting a dent on tСe “strateРiМ quaНranРle”), takinР anotСer small step ПorаarН in Сer inМremental strateРв oП territorial eбpansion (“МabbaРe strateРв”), anН reaМtinР to domestic pressure (popular and/or military). We will later deal with another possible angle, better protection for her strategic nuclear submarine fleet. Concerning coastal defense,67 one of the drivers behind different interpretations of coastal state rights' under UNCLOS is precisely the Chinese perception that military activities near her coast pose a vital threat, even in peace time. In 2010, at an online chat with citizens, Major General Luo Yuan (deputy secretary general with the PLA Academy of Military Sciences) explained why China opposed U.S.-South Korean joint drills in the Yellow Sea, reminding his auНienМe tСat “in terms oП security, Chairman Mao Zedong once said, 'We will never allow others to keep snoring beside our beНs'”.68 Protected by ample buffer territories elsewhere, in her land borders, it is foreign navies that currently constitute the single greatest potential threat to China.69 This sense of vulnerability is grounded, among others, on geography70 and history. Geographically, China's coast and rivers are home to most of her population and industrial centers.71 Historically, this is one of two major avenues for foreign invasion and interference7273, with the XIX Century exposing Chinese maritime 67 68 69 70 71 72 To gain a historical perspective on this issue a visit to Hong Kong's Museum of Coastal Defense is useful. Website available at http://hk.coastaldefence.museum/en/section1-1.php “WСв CСina opposes US-SoutС Korean militarв eбerМises in tСe Yelloа Sea”, People's Daily, 16 July 2010, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7069743.html “TСe Рreatest militarв tСreat to CСina Мomes Пrom tСe U.S. Navв. TСe CСinese Сave beМome СiРСlв НepenНent on seaborne traНe anН tСe U.S. Navв is in a position to bloМkaНe CСina’s ports iП it аisСeН. SСoulН tСe UniteН States Нo that, it woulН Мripple CСina. TСereПore, CСina’s primarв militarв interest is to make suМС a bloМkaНe impossible.” George Friedman, The Geopolitics of China: a Great Power Enclosed, Austin, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2008, p. 8, available at http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_china “CСina’s most vulnerable point, sinМe tСe arrival oП Europeans in tСe аestern PaМiПiМ in tСe miН-19th century, has been its coast. Apart from European encroachments in which commercial interests were backed up by limited force, China suffered its most significant military encounter -- and long and miserable war -- after the Japanese invaded and occupied large parts of eastern China along with Manchuria in tСe 1930s.” GeorРe FrieНman, The Geopolitics of China: a Great Power Enclosed, Austin, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2008, p. 5, available at http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_china The tension between the coast and the inland regions is one of the cleavages in Chinese history. The post-Mao economic reforms have led to a widening gap, which the authorities may now be seeking to narrow down by promoting the (re)industrialization of some areas of the interior, in a policy which may also be driven by rising labor costs in the coastal regions. Before that, Mao had sought to shift part of industry to more secure, inland regions. Although the reversion to a coastal-oriented economic development policy does not begin until his death and defeat of the Gang of Four, it is Mao's rapproachment with the United States which gives China the room for manouvre to go back to a coastal-oriented development policy without undue danger to her national security. Thus, while ideology may have preventeН Mao Пrom movinР aаaв Пrom Мentral planninР, Сis praРmatiМ ПoreiРn poliМв openeН tСe Нoor to it. “Mao’s goal was threefold, Marxism aside. First, he wanted to recentralize China — re-establishing BeijinР as CСina’s Мapital and political center. Second, he wanted to end the massive inequality between the coastal region and the rest of China. TСirН, Сe аanteН to eбpel tСe ПoreiРners Пrom CСina. In sСort, Сe аanteН to reМreate a uniteН Han CСina.” GeorРe Friedman, The Geopolitics of China: a Great Power Enclosed, Austin, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2008, available at http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_china George Friedman, The Geopolitics of China: a Great Power Enclosed, Austin, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2008, available at http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_china 73 And China's integration into the world economy has reinforced Beijing's acute awareness to master the maritime approaМСes to tСe Мountrв “TСere is a Мlear strateРiМ sСiПt unНer аaв in CСina on ПorМe planninР. HistoriМallв a 15 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 vulnerability,74 and China remains very much concerned about conventional threats from the sea.75 76 Some observers had already publicly demanded China set up an ADIZ as part of her efforts to seМure Мontrol over Сer immeНiate аaters. For eбample in an artiМle last вear titleН “LeРal Solutions Пor Suppression oП AМts Detrimental to CСina Marine Territorв SeМuritв”, SСenР HonРsСenР (Zhejiang Sci-tech Universitв) МomplaineН tСat “In reМent вears, Нetrimental aМts bв ПoreiРn States have imposed critical threat to marine territory security of China, such as dozens of islands of China in Nansha regions are occupied unlawfully by other States, and increasing military operations by ПoreiРn States in аaters anН in spaМe above CСina's eМonomiМ eбМlusive гone are prominent as аell” anН НemanНeН, amonР otСer measures tСat an “Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone sСoulН be established to suppress flight targeting at China by foreign military aircrafts through space above CСina's eМonomiМ eбМlusive гone”.77 In the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Chinese authorities had already considered setting up an ADIZ.78 It should be noted that, while an EEZ and an ADIZ are different figures in international law, a certain analogy may be drawn, in the sense that in both cases a state exercises a number of rights in an area otherwise not under its sovereignty, doing so in defense of its interests while not questioning the right of passage.79 Technological developments, extending the range of key weapons systems,80 and doctrinal developments, such as 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 major land power, China is now putting the accent on building long-range maritime power to help underpin geopolitical interests, inМluНinР аinninР neа allies anН saПeРuarНinР its enerРв anН eМonomiМ investments in Нistant lanНs.” Cesar CСelala “CСina plaвs maritime МСess”, The Japan Times, 22 January 2009, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090122cc.html “Prior to tСe 19tС Мenturв, it СaН not ПaМeН enemies Мapable oП posinР a naval tСreat anН, as a result, it СaН little interest in spenНinР larРe sums oП moneв on builНinР a navв.” GeorРe FrieНman, The Geopolitics of China: a Great Power Enclosed, Austin, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2008, p. 4, available at http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_china Whereas India appears to be more worried about non-state aМtors, at least in Мlose аaters. “TСreats to InНia’s Мoasts, today, are mainly sub-conventional in nature. Terrorist attacks on vital installations located along the coasts such as oil platforms, atomic power plants, naval bases, industrial hubs and cities, causing extensive damage feature as the most potent threat. Smuggling of drugs, arms and explosives via the sea route by criminal groups forms the second set of threats. Criminal groups engaging in these activities not only breach the security of the coast but also network with terrorists and provide logistical support for terror operations. Indian coasts are also vulnerable to illegal inflow of both migrants and refugees from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, especially along the Odisha and Tamil Nadu coasts. Though such people do not pose a direct security threat, the probability that terror operatives can sneak into the country in the guise of migrants or refugees remains. Finally, numerous fishing boats which venture into the sea each day also pose a security threat as many such fishing boats could be used for smuggling in arms and infiltrators. The situation is aggravated by the fact that checking every one of these tens of thousands of boats for suspicious cargo is almost impossible. ” PusСpita Das, “WСitСer Coastal SeМuritв?”, IDSA Comment, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 26 November 2009, available at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/WhitherCoastalSecurity_pdas_261109?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm _campaign=Feed%3A+IdsaUpdates+%28IDSA+Updates%29 . “tСe Yelloа Sea is tСe Рateаaв to CСina's Мapital reРion anН a vital passaРe to tСe СeartlanН oП BeijinР anН Tianjin. In history, foreign invaders repeatedly took the Yellow Sea as an entrance to enter the heartlanН oП BeijinР anН Tianjin” “WСв CСina opposes US-SoutС Korean militarв eбerМises in tСe Yelloа Sea”, People's Daily, 16 July 2010, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7069743.html SСenР HonРsСenР “LeРal Solutions Пor Suppression oП AМts Detrimental to CСina Marine Territorв SeМuritв”, Law Science Magazine, 2012 (1), available at http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-FXAS201201018.htm Peter A. Dutton “Caelum Liberum: Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zones outsiНe SovereiРn AirspaМe”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), American Society of International Law, pp. 691-709, p. 691, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20617039 Ruаantissa Abeвratne “In searМС oП tСeoretiМal justiПiМation Пor air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гones”, Journal of Transportation Security, March 2012, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 87-94, p. 88-89, available at http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/20/art%253A10.1007%252Fs12198-011-00832.pdf?auth66=1387118989_c8e6875ebf7a22f53f60d7d1ceea54d0&ext=.pdf “TСe airМraПt Мarrier U.S.S. GeorРe WasСinРton НispatМСeН to tСe Yelloа Sea Сas a Мombat raНius oП 600 kilometers anН its aircraft has a combat radius as long as 1,000 kilometers. Therefore, the military exercise in the area has posed a 16 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 tСe UniteН States' “Air-Sea Battle” maв Сave also proviНeН aННeН urРenМв to tСis perМeiveН neeН.81 Writing for China Brief, Harry Kazianis (Center for Strategic & International Studies) called CСina's ADIZ “a reaМtion to a reaМtion”, notinР tСat just like tСe Air-Sea Battle may be designed to counter China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the new zone may be designed against the US conМept. Kaгianis believes tСat “CСinese anН U.S. militarв planners are alreaНв enРaРeН in a МonМeptual arms raМe ”.82 Gaining information about approaching and nearby operating civilian aircraft may be seen as contributing to China's spacial awareness, while extending that gain to military (or to be more precise state) aircraft would constitute an even greater step forward for Beijing. In a way, securing this maritime belt could be seen from Chinese eyes as a necessary counterpart to the country's opening-up to the world and reliance on foreign trade and investment. Whereas Mao had preferred to close off the country to keep it united, Deng, under pressure to raise living standards, unleashed long-repressed forces that resulted in sky-high economic growth, albeit one heavily reliant on the coastal regions and the SLOCs connecting the country to her export markets and sources of energy and commodities.83 The stress on command of the sea and airspace, or (to be more accurate at least in the short term) on denying them to hostile forces, may thus be judged as a necessary counterpart from a Chinese national security perspective, the alternative being reverting to a closed economic system, a domestic impossibility. This is why one should be careful not to oversimplify the complex CСinese politiМal lanНsМape аitС reПerenМe to “Мonservatives” anН “moНerniгers”, anН also аСв one should appreciate the multifaceted nature of global economic integration, which on the one hand increases international exchanges and raises the cost of open war, thus making it less likely, while contributing to insecurities or perceptions of insecurity, which may feed tensions and make limited conflicts more prevalent. НireМt seМuritв tСreat to CСina's СeartlanН anН tСe BoСai Rim EМonomiМ CirМle. ” “WСв CСina opposes US-South Korean militarв eбerМises in tСe Yelloа Sea”, People's Daily, 16 July 2010, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7069743.html 81 In India, on the other hand, while we can also observe a trend towards greater attention to coastal security, this has been prompteН bв tСe 2008 Mumbai sаarm attaМk. “TСe Mumbai 2008 terror episoНe not onlв laiН bare tСe аiНe Рaps in the Indian coastal security apparatus, but also brought to fore the lackadaisical attitude of the governments, both state and central, towards coastal security. Coastal security, a hitherto disregarded issue, became important only after the Mumbai 2008 terror attaМks. Until tСen, seМurinР tСe Мountrв’s lanН borНers remaineН tСe Нominant НisМourse on national security, with India having fought three wars with Pakistan and a border war with China as well as continuing to grapple with various threats emanating from across the borders such as terrorism, infiltration, smuggling of arms and drugs, etc. Though activities like smuggling and refugee flows through the Indian coasts posed a challenge to security, these were not considered grave enough to merit conМerteН attention.” PusСpita Das “WСitСer Coastal SeМuritв?”, IDSA Comment, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 26 November 2009, available at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/WhitherCoastalSecurity_pdas_261109?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm _campaign=Feed%3A+IdsaUpdates+%28IDSA+Updates%29 . 82 “In CСinese analвsis, tСese eППorts are necessary to resist growing threats from the U.S. military against the integrity of CСinese borНers. TСe ADIZ is tСus likelв a response not onlв to Japan’s “nationaliгation” oП tСe Diaoвu/Senkaku IslanНs, but to tСe U.S. operational МonМept НubbeН “Air-Sea Battle” (ASB) СiРСliРСteН in CСinese analвsis as prooП oП tСe tСreat oП possible U.S. militarв intervention in CСina’s interests. ASB is itselП a reaМtion to CСina’s earlier eППorts to develop Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, suggesting that Chinese and U.S. military planners are already enРaРeН in a МonМeptual arms raМe to proНuМe Пrameаorks Пor МontrollinР aММess to tСe Near Seas” Harrв Kaгianis “AirSea Battle anН ADIZ: A ReaМtion to a ReaМtion”, China Brief, Volume 13 Issue 24, Jamestown Foundation, 5 December 2013, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41720&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=73 0e43928bd2bd8cc7a8bf49cc1b5bd6#.UqyzAOK83wo 83 “Prior to tСe 19tС Мenturв, it СaН not ПaМeН enemies Мapable of posing a naval threat and, as a result, it had little interest in spenНinР larРe sums oП moneв on builНinР a navв.” GeorРe FrieНman, The Geopolitics of China: a Great Power Enclosed, Austin, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2008, p. 8, available at http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_china 17 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 Concerning this purported aim of the ADIZ, some observers have claimed that it is largely a “sвmboliМ move”, sinМe CСina is eitСer unable (Пor laМk oП assets), or unаillinР (to avoiН an open confrontation and in line with her incremental strategy) to enforce it. Writing for RUSI, Justin Bronk explained that Beijing had made it clear she was not planning to shoot down aircraft entering tСe гone unannounМeН, aННinР tСat “TСe announМement tСat CСina is not tСreateninР to sСoot Нoаn intruders raises the question of what role China actually assigns to its new ADIZ in national security poliМв”. In ansаer to tСat question, Сe saiН tСat “It is СiРСlв probable tСat tСe CСinese Рovernment views the ADIZ as largely symbolic, rather than a tool to significantly expand the airspace under CСina’s НireМt Мontrol”. Bronk also believes tСat “TСe CСinese military is well aware that it cannot expect to enforce the conditions of the ADIZ where it overlaps with the Japanese zone without a Пull sМale militarв МonПrontation”.84 Chinese authorities seemed to emphasize the security purposes of the ADIZ when announcing it. At a media conference devoted to the announcement, held that same day, Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun аas askeН about BeijinР's reasons, anН Сis replв аas tСat “Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone is an area of air space established by a coastal state beyond its territorial airspace to timely identify, monitor, control and react to aircraft entering this zone with potential air threats. It allows earlyаarninР time anН proviНes air seМuritв”, aННinР tСat BeijinР's “aim” аas “saПeРuarНinР state sovereiРntв, territorial lanН anН air seМuritв, anН maintaininР ПliРСt orНer” anН tСat it аas “a necessary measure taken by China in exercising its self-НeПense riРСt”. YanР eбplaineН tСat it аas “not НireМteН aРainst anв speМiПiМ Мountrв or tarРet” anН tСat it НiН “not aППeМt tСe ПreeНom oП overПliРСt in tСe relateН airspaМe”. In response to anotСer question, YanР elaborateН, saвinР tСat “tСe easternmost point oП tСe Zone is so Мlose to CСina tСat Мombat airМraПt Мan soon reaМС CСina’s territorial airspace from the point. Therefore it is necessary for China to identify any aircraft from this point to assess its intentions and examine its identities so as to allow enough early-warning time Пor responsive measures in maintaininР air seМuritв”.85 Second, declaring an ADIZ over the Senkaku Islands may seem to be a step in line with Beijing's territorial demands over the islands. China publicly insists that they are part of her territory, and reinforces the message with constant naval (and recently aerial) incursions. Thus, seeking to get other countries to provide information about flights may be seen as a necessary concomitant, while on a political plane it could constitute a step forward in challenging Tokyo's claims to be in control. This is very important for China, in particular with the US in mind, since America takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands while considering them to fall under the aegis of the US-Japan Security Treaty by reason of Tokyo's control over them. Control, however, is not an all or nothing proposition, and by slowly eroding perceptions and realities on the ground Chinese planners may hope to gain an opening to split Washington from Tokyo, opening the way to American neutrality in operations designed to gain the islands. At an operational plane, a report by tСe Center Пor StrateРiМ anН International StuНies (CSIS) noteН tСat “CСina maв also be responНinР to recent Japanese warnings that it reserves the right to shoot down unmanned drones that pose a threat to Japanese airspace. By creating an ADIZ that includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Beijing 84 Justin Bronk “CСina’s Air DeПenМe IНentiПiМation Zone anН its role in CСinese Geo-StrateРiМ PoliМв”, RUSI Analysis, Royal United Services Institute, 4 December 2013, available at http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C529EF792AB902/#.UqfjP-K83wq 85 AnНreа S. EriМkson “DeПense Spokesman YanР Yujun’s Response to Questions on tСe EstablisСment oП TСe East China Sea Air Defense IdentifiМation Zone”, Andrew S. Erickson: China Analysis from Original Sources, 23 November 2013, available at http://www.andrewerickson.com/2013/11/defense-spokesman-yang-yujuns-response-to-questions-onthe-establishment-of-the-east-china-sea-air-defense-identification-zone/ 18 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 may believe it has established a basis for challenging and, if necessary, taking action against Japanese airМraПt operatinР in tСis гone”.86 Third, it is very important to note that China's ADIZ covers the waters directly between Japan and Taiwan. Since Taipei's strategy in the event of an open crisis would be to gain time while US and Allied forces deployed, those waters and the skies above them are critically important. The most significant US forces in the theater are deployed in Japanese and South-Korean bases, and these could be first available. Initial media reaction to Beijing's announcement focused, to a great extent, on its impact on Japan and on the reaction by that country's government. Without in any way seeking to dispute the significance for Japan, it would be a mistake to overlook the potential impact on Taiwan. As noted by Zachary Keck in The Diplomat, “tСe East CСina Sea ADIZ is likelв aimeН in no small part at Japan in Рeneral anН tСe Senkaku IslanНs in partiМular. Still, tСere’s anotСer more important ПaМtor at plaв Сere Пor CСina: Taiаan”, amonР otСer reasons beМause it “eППeМtivelв Мuts oПП US ПorМes in Japan anН SoutС Korea Пrom Taiаan”.87 As explained by Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, tСere is a “strateРiМ quaНranРle” МoverinР tСe аaters Пrom SinРapore to SoutС Korea to Japan anН Нoаn to Australia, аСiМС is oП Рreat importanМe to US anН AllieН ПorМes, sinМe it is “a central area where the U.S. and several core allies are reaching out to shape collaborative defense Мapabilities to ensure НeПense in НeptС…. FreeНom to operate in tСe quaНranРle is a baseline requirement for allies to shape collaborative capabilities and policies. Effectiveness can only emerРe Пrom eбerМisinР evolvinР ПorМes anН sСapinР МonverРent МonМepts oП operations”. CСina's ADIZ, just like Taiwan, fall squarely within that quadrangle, prompting Laird and Timperlake to аarn tСat “TСe PRC is puttinР Нoаn its marker onto tСe quaНranРle and if not dealt with will unНoubteНlв eбpanН its НeПinitions oП air anН maritime НeПense outаarН”. TСeв believe tСat tСe move is “Мlearlв a siРniПiМant Рambit to take a bit out oП tСe strateРiМ quaНranРle anН to Пoment НisМorН amonР allies”.88 Speaking to Bloomberg TV, Professor Taniguchi also noted that the ADIZ аas aimeН at “tСe militarв airМraПt oП tСe surrounНinР nations” anН tСat it “аill aППeМt verв seriouslв tСe ПorаarН Нeploвment oП tСe UniteН States's”, аСiМС eбplaineН аСв Australia аas “verв muМС conМerneН as аell”.89 KeМk stresses tСat “tСe ADIZ Сappens to Мover tСe eбaМt areas tСat tСe U.S. or Japan аoulН Сave to traverse in orНer to promptlв responН to a PLA invasion oП Taiаan”, aННinР tСat “TСus, iП CСina can deny U.S. and allied forces the ability to operate in the waters and airspace covered by the ADIZ, the U.S. would be unable to use its immense military resources in South Korea and Japan in defense of Taiwan. Instead, the U.S. military would have to travel from Guam, the Philippines and other nations located around the South China Sea (until China establishes an ADIZ over that body oП аater as аell). TСis is аСere tСe tвrannв oП НistanМe reallв аeiРСs Сeavilв on U.S. ПorМes”. TСe Рreat НistanМes involveН in operatinР over tСis СuРe area means tСat “Clearlв, air anН naval ПorМes ПaМe siРniПiМant МСallenРes in proviНinР presenМe anН operational eППeМtiveness”, anН “TСis is 86 Nicholas Szechenyi, Victor Cha, Bonnie S. Glaser, Michael J. Green, and Christopher K. Johnson, China's Air Defense Identification Zone: Impact on Regional Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), , 26 November 2013, available at http://csis.org/publication/chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-impact-regional-security 87 ZaМСarв KeМk “ForРet Japan: CСina’s ADIZ TСreatens Taiаan”, The Diplomat, 5 December 2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/forget-japan-chinas-adiz-threatens-taiwan/ 88 Robbin LairН anН EН Timperlake “TСe PRC DeМlares an Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone: CСallenРinР tСe PaМiПiМ DeПense QuaНranРle”, Second Line of Defense, 2 December 2013, available at http://www.sldinfo.com/the-prc-declaresan-air-defense-identification-zone-challenging-the-pacific-defense-quadrangle/ 89 Intervieа аitС ProПessor TaniРuМСi. “CСina Air Zone Move a `Serious CСallenРe'”, Bloomberg TV, 28 November 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/video/china-air-zone-move-a-serious-challengeQ7TeaXd3SM2vXKKN8H4eOA.html 19 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 why a key element of shaping an effective U.S. strategy in the Pacific will rest on much greater ability for the allies to work together and much greater capability for U.S. forces to work effectively аitС tСose allieН ПorМes”, sometСinР tСat anв restriМtion on movement maв make more НiППiМult to achieve90 Map accompanying Laird and Timperlake's article, illustrating how China's ADIZ strandles across some of the key sealines Пor inМreaseН МoorНination amonР tСe maritime НemoМraМies anН НepiМtinР tСe “strateРiМ quaНranРle” anН tСe “strateРiМ trianРle” Haаaii-Guam-Japan.91 Taiwan's key geographical location has long been recognized, with General MacArthur describing tСe islanН as an “unsinkable” Мarrier.92 Two further reasons why Taiwan are important are, the fact 90 ZaМСarв KeМk “ForРet Japan: CСina’s ADIZ TСreatens Taiаan”, The Diplomat, 5 December 2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/forget-japan-chinas-adiz-threatens-taiwan/ 91 Map taken Пrom Robbin LairН anН EН Timperlake “TСe PRC DeМlares an Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone: CСallenРinР tСe PaМiПiМ DeПense QuaНranРle”, Second Line of Defense, 2 December 2013, available at http://www.sldinfo.com/theprc-declares-an-air-defense-identification-zone-challenging-the-pacific-defense-quadrangle/ 92 “CСieП amonР tСem аas Formosa, аСiМС Сe НesМribeН as an 'unsinkable Мarrier-tender.' He said: 'The Geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in tСe verв Мenter' oП AmeriМa's strateРiМ Нispositions in tСe PaМiПiМ” William ManМСester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1978), p. 676. 20 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 that it combines Chinese culture with the knock on the door at five o'clock in the morning being from the milkman,9394 and for Japan the fact that Tokyo's rule on the island was relatively benign.95 Third, some observers have seen the establishment of an ADIZ as another small step toward what they see as the gradual encroachment in other countries' territories, be they on land or at sea. These voices tend to stress that these small steps are part of a larger game, being interconnected and designed not to elicit a violent response, so that they can proceed, moving Beijing closer to her goals, without prompting an open conflict. In an article on China's ADIZ, Professor Chellaney (Centre Пor PoliМв ResearМС in Neа DelСi) reПerreН to suМС pattern oП aМtions as a “salami-sliМe” strateРв, НeПininР it as “IrreНentist CСina’s inМremental enМroaМСments into neiРСbors’ borНerlanНs”. He also noteН tСat in Maв 2012 tСe PLA's Major General ZСanР ZСaoгСonР СaН МalleН it a “МabbaРe” strateРв,96 aННinР tСat “TСis involves assertinР a Мlaim, launМСinР Пurtive incursions into the coveted territory, and erecting — one at a time — cabbage-style multiple layers oП seМuritв arounН a МontesteН area so as Нenв aММess to an opponent”. StressinР tСis РraНualistiМ approaМС, CСellaneв eбplaineН tСat “As part oП its step-by-step strategy, Beijing has no intention of enforcing its air-defense identification zone immediately. Efforts at enforcement will come later аСen МirМumstanМes are more Пavorable. RiРСt noа, tСe prioritв oП CСina’s leaНers is to prevail in the game of chicken that they Сave starteН”. CСellaneв also believes tСat a Мomponent oП tСis strategy is to time moves to coincide with events elsewhere, in this case the announcement of an interim deal on Iran's nuclear program97 When discussing China's incremental approach to disputed territories, we should perhaps not consider it in isolation but see it as part of her grand strategy of limited conflict. It is not just in “peaМe” time tСat BeijinР Сas been seen to take small steps not siРniПiМant enouРС in anН bв themselves to prompt war, but also when war has indeed broken out China's goal has been to act 93 94 95 96 97 Observers closer to Beijing but who wish to stress the potential for the PRC to develop politically tend to look towards Singapore, rather than Taiwan, as a potential role-model. “at a time аСen BeijinР is still arРuinР tСat multi-party democracy is not suitable for China, Taiwan's status as the first anН onlв CСinese НemoМraМв represents a rival politiМal sвstem” DaППвН Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 4. Although there are different views on this, generally speaking we do not see the kind of events that took place in other areas under Japanese control, while the economy developed significantly during that period. General Zhang Zhaozhong was specifically referring to his country's dispute with the Philippines, in an interview with state TV. A translation oП tСe intervieа inМluНes tСe ПolloаinР НesМription oП tСe strateРв: “TСe ПisСermen МonНuМt normal production there. In the area around the island, fishing administration ships and marine surveillance ships are conducting normal patrols while in the outer ring there are navy warships. The island is thus wrapped layer by layer like a cabbage. As a result, a cabbage strategy has taken shape. ... If the Philippines wants to go in, in the outermost area, it has first to ask whether our navy will allow it. Then it has to ask whether our fishery administration ships and marine surveillanМe sСips аill alloа it. TСereПore, our ПisСermen Мan Мarrв out tСeir proНuМtion saПelв аСile our Мountrв’s marine rights and interests as well as sovereignty are safeguarded. Is that not satisfactory? ... We can adopt this method elsewhere. We have not resorted to war and we have not forced the others to do anything, have we? You have invaded anН tСen leПt. You Сave violateН CСinese laа anН CСina’s sovereiРntв anН territorial inteРritв, Сaven’t вou? WСв НiН you point your guns at our fishermen? As you have first violated the law and pointed your guns at our fishermen, you would never be allowed to enter the area. ... We should do more such things in the future. For those small islands, only a few troopers are able to station on each of them, but there is no food or even drinking water there. If we carry out the “МabbaРe” strateРв, вou аill not be able to senН ПooН anН НrinkinР аater onto tСe islanНs. WitСout the supply for one or two weeks, the troopers stationed there will leave the islands on their own. Once they have left, they will never be able to Мome baМk”, anН Мan be ПounН at “CСina boasts oП strateРв to 'reМover' islanНs oММupieН bв PСilippines”, China Daily Mail, 28 May 2013, available at http://chinadailymail.com/2013/05/28/china-boasts-of-strategy-to-recover-islandsoccupied-by-philippines/ BraСma CСellaneв “CHELLANEY: CСina’s Рame oП МСiМken”, Washington Times, 8 December 2013, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/8/chellaney-chinas-game-of-chicken/ 21 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 quiМklв anН НeМisivelв, “teaМСinР a lesson” to Сer neiРСbors,98 while avoiding long and costly campaigns of uncertain result and potentially destabilizing consequences.99 As noted by Brahma CСellaneв, tСis reПleМts Sun Tгu's НoМtrine: “SinМe tСe Mao ZeНonР era, CСina Сas aНСereН to anМient tСeorist Sun Tгu’s aНviМe: 'TСe abilitв to subНue tСe enemв аitСout anв battle is tСe ultimate reflection of the most supreme strategy.' This approach involves taking an adversary by surprise by exploiting its weaknesses and seizing an opportunistic timing, as well as camouflaging offense as defense. As Sun Tzu said, 'All warfare is based on deception.' Only when a war by stealth cannot achieve the souРСt objeМtives sСoulН an overt аar be unleasСeН”.100 To be fair, other great empires have also relied on similar doctrines in the past, since it is difficult to secure one's objeМtives merelв bв open ПorМe. ConМerninР tСe “AmeriМan аaв oП аar”, altСouРС some historians have focused on short, sharp, displays of overwhelming military power,101 a look at US history also sСoаs a lonР strinР oП “small аars”, in partiМular iП one looks at tСe Marine Corps.102 Finally, we may consider whether the setting up of the ADIZ may have been at least partly motivated by either popular or military pressure. There is certainly a sizable portion of the Chinese public who favor a muscular foreign policy, although of course the same could be said about other countries. We could also mention a great deal of mistrust towards Japan due to historical reasons, and in the case of Taiwan a widespread belief that the island is part of China, regardless of the will of its population, that is without the need to gain the consent of the Taiwanese, seen as an object not a subject. To this (mutual) mistrust concerning Japan and the rejection of the principle of selfdetermination we must add the widespread perception among Chinese commentators that the country is finally able to make a comeback after one century (from the Opium Wars to the end of the Civil War) of interference by a number of actors (chief among them Great Britain, France, 98 99 100 101 102 “AММorНinР to one CСina-watcher, the 1962 War, ostensibly fallout from a contentious boundary dispute, was in reality the interim finale of an intense rivalry, with the purpose of cutting India down to size. This is corroborated in an authoritative biography of Nehru with a quote from a Chinese official who explained that the prime objective of the 1962 аar аas to НemolisС InНia’s 'arroРanМe' anН 'illusions oП РranНeur' anН tСat CСina 'СaН tauРСt InНia a lesson anН, iП neМessarв, tСeв аoulН teaМС Сer a lesson aРain anН aРain.'” MoСan Malik MoСan, “War Talk: Perceptual Gaps in ‘CСinНia’ Relations”, China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, Volume 9, Issue 20, 07-10-2009, available at www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35589&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=127f567 fb8 For a look at the most significant features of Chinese strategic thinking and war-making style, see Brahma Chellaney, “Hoа CСina Fights: Lessons From the 1962 Sino-InНian War”, The Daily Beast, 29 October 2012, available at BraСma CСellaneв “CСina’s stealtС аars oП aМquisition”, The Japan Times, 29 April 2013, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/29/commentary/chinas-stealth-wars-of-acquisition/#.UqjqNeK83wo Korea will expose the difficulty of waging total war in the nuclear era and in the Asian landmass, this being one of the reasons for the rift between Truman and MacArthur. The latter clearly supported the view that force should be applied НeМisivelв “'OnМe аar is ПorМeН upon us, tСere is no alternative tСan to applв everв available means to brinР it to a sаiПt enН. War’s verв objeМt is viМtorв – not prolonged indecision.' And, once again: 'In war, indeed, there can be no substitute Пor viМtorв'”, GeorРe C. Kenneв, introНuМtion, DouРlas MaМArtСur, “An OlН SolНier FaНes Aаaв into Neа Glorв”, Life, 30th April 1951, cited by Vorin E. Whan, editor, A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArhur, (New York: 1965), p. 245 and 251, cited by William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1978), p. 789. The still ongoing debate about Vietnam reflects these conflicting views, with some voices believing that the US was wrong to concentrate on conventional operations against the North Vietnamese Army to the detriment of counterinsurgency and others defending the priority given to defeating conventional units. Yet others stress that in some conflicts one may need to wage two very different wars at the same time, against two different kinds of enemies. For the vieа tСat it аas riРСt to МonМentrate on Мonventional operations, see Dale AnНraНe, “WestmorelanН аas riРСt: learninР the wrong lessons Пrom tСe Vietnam War”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2008, p. 145–181, for the opposite perspective see Lewis Sorley, A Better War: the Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 1999). The need not to falsely choose between the two is made clear in West Bing, Area Security, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1969), available at smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/bingwestareasecurity1969.pdf 22 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 Russia, Japan, and the US), and three decades of diplomatic and economic isolation. That is, that this last century and a half have been an exception, an aberration, a deviation from the natural course of Chinese history, and that therefore the time has come to fully recover sovereignty and revert to the country's traditional preeminence. A look at China's online landscape, for example, reveals strong support in some quarters for a robust posture abroad, and in particular in AsiaPacific. Of course, as usually happens when trying to gauge public opinion, it may be difficult to measure to what extent a vocal minority reflects the larger population or whether, on the contrary, there is a silent majority holding other views.103 Some observers believe that, once Maoism has been discarded in the economic arena, the regime may be forced to rely on Chinese nationalism to retain popular support, but the picture may perhaps be a bit more nuanced. Others have noted that “Мвber-nationalism had an enormous influence upon the Chinese government and its foreign policy НeМisions”.104 In a study on Chinese netizens' attitudes towards the two Koreas it was noted that “CСinese netiгens Сave alreaНв proven to be a major plaвer in tСe makinР oП CСinese ПoreiРn poliМв”, aННinР tСat аitС reРarНs to Japan tСeв “appear to Пrequentlв take МonМiliatorв poliМies oПП the table, forcing China's foreign policy elite to choose among a narrowing range of hard-line poliМies”.105 AnotСer autСor, stuНвinР CСinese online vieаs oП Latin AmeriМa, аrote tСat “It is possible that both the optimists and the skeptics are correct, that democratization and nationalism are beinР promoteН online at tСe same time”.106 The ADIZ has certainly been noticed by Chinese Мitiгens aМtive online, “On Sina Weibo, CСina’s Tаitter, over 200,000 reМent posts mention tСe air defense map; of those sampled, the vast majority lauded Beijing for defending their sovereignty and territorial inteРritв”.107 We should however be careful not to automatically think that because a policy is popular, it has simply been prompted by popular pressure. As is often the case, government decisions may well constitute a response to different goals and pressures. The degree to which the military may be lobbying for a forceful approach to territorial disputes may also be difficult to judge accurately. Although this has been said by some observers, and there are certainly some public figures who would confirm the view, such as the above quoted General Zhang Zhaozhong, we once more face the dilemma whether they represent the silent majority or are the exception.108 It may make sense from an institutional point of view to support policies justifying 103 104 105 106 107 108 It is however possible and inНeeН useПul to МonНuМt stuНies. “TСere is no аaв to НireМtlв assess tСe vieаs oП CСina's policymaking elite toward the two Koreas. The views of China's netizens, however, can be studied and are worth studying: they provide a window into how Chinese society more broadly views the two Koreas, as well as the ways that elite CСinese poliМвmakers, аСo aПter all are CСinese too, likelв tСink anН Пeel about tСe Koreas” Peter Gries “Disillusionement anН Dismaв: Hoа CСinese Netiгens TСink anН Feel About tСe Tаo Koreas”, Journal of East-Asian Studies 12 (2012), p. 32 available at http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Gries.2012.JEAS.ChinaKoreas.pdf MinРsСenР Li “CСinese Nationalism in an Unequal Cвber War”, China Media Research, 5 (4) 2009, p. 63, available at http://www.chinamediaresearch.net/readmore/vol5no4/CMR090407-Mingsheng-Li-done-new-1.jpg Peter Gries “Disillusionement anН Dismaв: Hoа CСinese Netiгens TСink anН Feel About tСe Tаo Koreas”, Journal of East-Asian Studies 12 (2012), p. 32 available at http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Gries.2012.JEAS.ChinaKoreas.pdf Kai chi-LeunР “Sino-Latin AmeriМan Relations in QianРРuo Forums”, in Simon SСen anН SСaun Breslin, Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), p. 257 DaviН Wertime “CСinese Netiгens ApplauН BeijinР’s AРРressive Neа DeПense Zone”, China File, 25 November 2013, available at http://www.chinafile.com/chinese-netizens-applaud-beijing-s-aggressive-new-defense-zone For an in-depth examination of civil-military relations in China, see Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics, (Washington: National Defense University, 2010), available at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/china-perspectives/ChinaPerspectives-2.pdf A study of key historical episodes having shaped the relation between Party and Army can be found at Andrew Scobell, “SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED”, in Seventy-Five Years of Civil-Military Relations: Lessons Learned, (Carslile: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College (SSI), 2003), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24- 23 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 greater defense spending and a bigger political and social role for the military, but on the other hand a look into history shows that it is sometimes political leaders who are more ready to resort to force, with professional soldiers being more cautious.109 It is also possible that some members of China's military may prefer to devote more resources to domestic security. In addition, some observers have referred to the dearth of military leaders in the top ranks of the regime, and Communist Party suspiМions oП lettinР tСe ArmeН ForМes beМome too poаerПul, notinР tСat “SinМe tСe CCP Мame to power, the civil-military relationship has been clearly defined so as to prevent the generals from manipulatinР CСina’s politiМs. TСis reПleМts Mao’s oПt-cited dictum that 'The Party commands the Рun, but tСe Рun must never МommanН tСe Partв'”. Hoаever, tСeв Сave also noteН tСat, аСile “tСe PLA’s inПluenМe over CСinese politiМs anН ПoreiРn poliМв isn’t as stronР as tСe PentaРon’s”, perСaps “aПter вears oП ПosterinР a 'Мult oП militarв' amonР CСinese, tСe PLA’s inПluenМe is bounН to Рroа anН beМome an inМreasinРlв inРraineН Пeature oП CСina’s politiМs – anН its ПoreiРn poliМв”.110 The incident last year, when a Chinese vessel painted with her radar a Japanese ship, led to renewed speculation over the actual degree of the Party's control over the military,111 with Stratfor wondering whether it may be evidence of unauthorized actions by junior officers,112 concluding Сoаever tСat “Given tСe Мlose ties between the Party, the military and the government, and the nature of a large and sophisticated Chinese bureaucracy, it is difficult to give much credence to the iНea tСat tСe ForeiРn Ministrв spokesperson’s statement аas inНiМative oП tСe militarв’s indepenНenМe Пrom tСe Partв, or even Пrom tСe Рovernment”. StratПor also sees CСina's “Мompleб maritime strateРв” as НrivinР “BeijinР to relв inМreasinРlв on its naval anН air ПorМe eбperts to МraПt a МompreСensive anН viable strateРв”, anН toРetСer аitС tСe neeН to resort to the military to face natural Нisasters, plus its role in internal seМuritв, it “naturallв raises tСe visibilitв anН inНeeН, in some аaвs, tСe leveraРe oП militarв oППiМials”.113 Another piece from the same source explains that “For most oП moНern China's history, the military has been an internal force without much appetite for more worldly affairs. That is now changing, appropriately, due to China's growing global prominence and reliance on the global economy. But that means that a new balance must be found, and China's senior leadership must both accommodate and balance the military's perspective and what the military advocates for. As Chinese leaders deal with a generational transition, expanding international involvement and an increasingly difficult economic balance, the military is coming 109 110 111 112 112 113 a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=100618, whereas the post-Deng era is covered in detail in Nan Li, Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era: Implications for Crisis Management and Naval Modernization, (Newport: US Naval War College, 2010), available at https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-StudiesInstitute/Publications/documents/China-Maritime-Study-No-4-January-2010.aspx “TСis Нoes not mean tСat вou are аarmonРers. On tСe Мontrarв, tСe solНier above all otСer people praвs Пor peaМe, Пor Сe must suППer anН bear tСe Нeepest аounНs anН sМars oП аar” General Douglas MacArthur, Farewell Speech Given to the Corps of Cadets at West Point, 12 May 1962, available at http://www.nationalcenter.org/MacArthurFarewell.html Le HonР Hiep “CСina's 'Cult oП tСe Militarв'”, The Diplomat, 2 December 2011, available at http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/chinas-cult-of-the-military/ “As Japan protests tСe reМent move bв a CСinese naval vessel to loМk its Пire-control radar on a Japanese ship, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson claimed Wednesday that the Ministry did not know about the specific event until it learned about it in the media. The statement has reinvigorated discussions about the rising influence of the People's Liberation Army and the level of political control over what is seen as an increasingly assertive militarв”, “TСe RisinР Role oП CСina's Militarв” Stratfor, 7 February 2013, available at http://www.stratfor.com/sample/geopoliticaldiary/rising-role-chinas-military Other authors have gone as far as comparing the situation with that in Japan before the War “ It is noа beinР suРРesteН that much like young Japanese officers in the 1930s, young Chinese military officers are increasingly taking charge of strategy with the result that rapid military growth is shaping the nation's broader foreign policy objectives”, HarsС V. Pant “Tale oП tаo НeПense poliМies”, Japan Times, 16 March 2011, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/eo20110316a2.html “TСe RisinР Role oП CСina's Militarв” Stratfor, 7 February 2013, available at http://www.stratfor.com/sample/geopolitical-diary/rising-role-chinas-military 24 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 into its own and making its interests heard more clearly. How this balance plays out will be tremenНouslв siРniПiМant”.114 Trefor Moss, a HK-based independent journalist, criticized some media outlets for runninР stories аarninР oП tСe PLA's РroаinР politiМal Мlout, saвinР tСat “TСe idea of the PLA getting out of control, or at least of asserting greater influence over foreign policy, is of course an attractive one for the lazy headline-writer. It's news, unlike the long and deliberate arc of incremental military modernization, which is the real story of what's happening with the PLA”. Moss also reПereН to tСe Мase oП Major General Luo Yuan, аСo “Сas beМome a minor celebrity thanks to his forthright commentary on territorial Нisputes”, inМluНinР tСe above quoteН intervieа about tСe PСilippines. Moss stresseН, Сoаever, tСat Сe аas “a small ПisС in a biР CСinese power-ponН” anН tСat “tСe Рovernment, аСile toleratinР (or perСaps enМouraРinР) Сis confrontational stanМe, НiН oП Мourse Мompletelв iРnore Сis aНviМe” anН МСose “Мivilian laа enПorМement sСips ratСer tСan tСe PLA Navв to СanНle its spat аitС Manila”. Moss believes tСat tСe CСinese militarв is Сappв аitС a subsiНiarв role in ПoreiРn aППairs anН is not “trвing to grab inПluenМe over ПoreiРn poliМв”, beinР Мontent аitС its status “so lonР as tСe Рovernment Мontinues to ramp up military spending – as it Сas Нone reliablв Пor over tаo НeМaНes”.115 Other authors, such as the late Ellis Joffe, one of the pioneers in the academic study of the Chinese military, were also traНitionallв pruНent аСile notinР Сoа in reМent вears “tСe militarв Сas moveН Мloser to tСe Мenter of decisionmaking on certain issues, and, as the Hong Kong handover demonstrated, is publicly playing a newly prominent role in upholding the most valued national asset of all—Chinese sovereiРntв”.116 Experts react to the news. The announcement of the ADIZ led many observers to comment on the move and other countries' reactions. As is often the case, some of the most critical views came from InНia. ProПessor CСellaneв eбplaineН on Сis FaМebook paРe tСat tСis аas “CСina's territorial Мreep in action: After claiming 80% of South China Sea, it sets up air defense identification zone enМompassinР Senkakus”.117 These words do not only reflect the strong suspicions that Chinese actions prompt in India, but also the connection between events in the East China and the South China Seas felt by many in Asia. Chellaney went even further, drawing a parallel between Chinese aМtions in tСe Himalaвas anН at sea, saвinР tСat “WСat CСina Сas Нone to Japan tСrouРС its provocative new aerial zone is the equivalent of what it did to India by intruding 19km into LaНakС”.118 King College's Alessio Patalano explained in a video blog entrв tСat, аСile ADIZs “are not illeРal, are not aРainst international laа”, anН inНeeН some oП CСina's neiРСbors СaН alreaНв НeМlareН tСem, “tСe main issue, tСe main problem” аas tСat in BeijinР's Мase all planes МrossinР it аere requireН to provide fligСt plans, even iП not bounН Пor CСina, sometСinР “beвonН tСe borНers oП international stanНarН praМtiМe”. DesМribinР tСe situation as a “politiМal Рame” in аСiМС tСe East CСina Sea СaН beМome “an arena аСere tСe balanМe betаeen tСe tаo most important reРional actors, Japan and CСina, are reНeПininР tСeir relationsСip”, Patalano tСen proМeeНeН to eбplain some oП tСe аaвs in аСiМС reРional aМtors maв manaРe anН Мontain tensions “in tСe meantime”, beПore a “politiМal 114 115 116 117 118 “CСina's Militarв Comes Into Its Oаn”, Geopolitical Weekly, Stratfor, 18 January 2011, available at http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110117-chinas-military-comes-its-own TreПor Moss “PLA InПluenМe Over CСinese PolitiМs: FaМt oП FiМtion?”, The Diplomat, 10 August 2012, available at http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/pla-influence-over-chinese-politics-fact-of-fiction/ Ellis JoППe, “3. THE MILITARY AND CHINA’S NEW POLITICS: TRENDS AND COUNTER-TRENDS”, in James Mulvenon et al, editors, The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999), p. 23, available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145/CF145.chap3.pdf Facebook page of Brahma Chellaney, 23 November 2013, available at https://www.facebook.com/chellaney?fref=ts Facebook page of Brahma Chellaney, 27 November 2013, available at https://www.facebook.com/chellaney?fref=ts 25 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 solution” to tСe МonПliМt МoulН be ПounН. AmonР tСe “praМtiМal steps tСat sСoulН be taken” bв Japan anН CСina “in orНer to avoiН inaНvertent esМalation”, Сe listeН “СiРС-level meetinРs” anН “Сot lines”. Patalano also reМommenНeН Tokвo anН BeijinР to “start tСinkinР oП tСe elements tСat brinР them toРetСer”, suМС as tСe neeН to enjoв tСe saПe use oП “tСe maritime anН air spaМes”. WitС tСis Рoal in minН, tСe tаo Мountries maв take steps to “make it saПer to Нo so”, like enРaРinР in joint “searМС anН resМue operations” anН tСe “МoorНination oП ПliРСt patСs”.119 Japan's Response. On the other hand, from a Japanese perspective, the ADIZ increases the pressure on the country's outposts and the vital sea lines of communication connecting it to the rest of the world. It threatens to open a rift with Washington, while at the same time offering the potential for deeper defense relations with the fellow maritime democracies and Vietnam, although this is not something to be taken for granted. Beyond national security and the economy, important enough in and by themselves, the ADIZ's position between Japan and Taiwan highlights the contested identity of the latter and its connection to Japanese identity itself. An independent Taiwan is not only beneficial for Japan when it comes to guarding its southern flank but it is also a bridge with its past and the chance to highlight some positive aspects of its colonial experience. President Ma's accommodating attitude has been criticized by the opposition and for all these reasons is seen with concern by Japanese authorities. With regard to the Japanese Government's response to the ADIZ announcement, according to a 24 November Мommunique bв Tokвo's ForeiРn AППairs Ministrв, “Mr. JuniМСi IСara, DireМtor-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of MOFA lodged Japan's strong protest to Mr. Han Zhigiang, Minister of the Chinese Embassy in Japan concerning the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea that the Ministry of National Defense of China СaН announМeН on tСe same Нaв”. In tСe protest it аas saiН tСat tСe ADIZ аas “totallв unaММeptable as it included the Japanese territorial airspace over the Senkaku Islands, which is an inherent territorв oП Japan”, aННinР tСat CСina's “unilateral” move аas “eбtremelв НanРerous as it МoulН unilaterally escalate the situation surrounding the Senkaku Islands and lead to an unexpected oММurrenМe oП aММiНents in tСe airspaМe”.120 The reaction in the Japanese press was, generally speakinР, also Сostile to CСina's НeМision. In partiМular amonР tСe “аeeklв tabloiНs,” аitС “Пive out oП nine” publisСinР artiМles НesМribinР “sМenarios tСat raiseН tСe possibilitв oП a sСootinР аar”. 121 Further commentary by government officials and experts quickly moved to three key issues: Washington's posture, instructions to civil airlines, and the possibility that Beijing may declare another ADIZ, covering the South China Sea. Ideally, Japan would like to have seen the United States confirm in no uncertain terms that it was not recognizing China's ADIZ, and see this followed by military flights into it and orders to its airlines not to comply with Beijing's instructions and abstain from reporting flight plans. The result was a draw, with America sending two B-52s into the ADIZ in defiance of Chinese regulations, but shying away from instructing its civil airlines to take the same stance. It thus seems that America is following what we could call a partial appeasement policy, consisting in de facto accepting the ADIZ with the purported goal of avoiding risking the life of civilian passengers, while refusing to 119 “Dr Alessio Patalano on CСina's neа air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гone (ADIZ)”, War StuНies KCL, Youtube, 9 December 2013, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VG2okbTBSJU&feature=youtu.be 120 “Assistant Press SeМretarв(International Press Division), MOFA Japan”, аebsite oП tСe Japanese ForeiРn AППairs Ministry, 24 November 2013, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000100.html 121 Mark SМСreiber “ImpenНinР Japan-China war has the makings of a Clancy МlassiМ”, The Japan Times, 7 December 2013, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/07/national/impending-japan-china-war-has-the-makingsof-a-clancy-classic/#.UqSDmfTuITU 26 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 diplomatically acknowledge it and continuing to fly military planes regardless of Beijing's regulations. As always happens with compromise policies, some people may see it as an attempt to strike a balance, supporting regional allies and sending a message to Beijing, while seeking not to escalate tensions and minimizing the chances of an incident resulting in the downing of an airliner. Others may see it as a sign of weakness, increasing the chances of a Chinese miscalculation, giving the impression that in the event of hostilities, particularly if limited in scope, Washington would not dare to send her Navy in harm's way. The possibility that Beijing may have such a scenario in mind was stressed by Professor Tomohiko TaniguМСi, senior aНviser to tСe Japanese prime minister, аСo saiН tСat “For CСina, to senН oППiМial vessels almost every day to Japan's waters and to up the ante by establishing its own air defense identification zone over the Senkakus both serve the same purpose, which is to dilute Japan's administrative control over the islands so that one day, applying the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to tСe proteМtion oП tСe islanНs miРСt invite some serious seМonН tСouРСts”. He aННeН tСat tСis аas “anotСer attempt bв BeijinР to establish a fait accompli about its territorial claims by forcefully МСanРinР tСe status quo”, stressinР tСat “No responsible member oП tСe rules-based international orНer sСoulН pursue suМС an eбСibit oП ПorМe”122 Concerning the US-Japan Security Treaty, we should remember that the US takes no official position on the ultimate sovereignty over the islands, аСile pleНРinР to НeПenН Japan, unНerstanНinР “Japan” as МomprisinР all territories unНer administration by Tokyo. The window is thus clearly open to a miscalculation since, once could argue that, once a territory ceased to be under Japanese administration, it would no longer be covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty. Of course, one could also argue that the offensive operations leading to that loss of control may trigger American intervention, but here we should remember that there are many ways in which Tokyo may lose control over one or more of the Senkaku Islands. Setting aside traditional amphibious operations, where Chinese capabilities are still moНest anН аСiМС ПurtСermore are verв “noisв”, tСere are tСere otСer аaвs to establisС a presence, including an aerial assault for example.123 Concerning instructions to civil airlines, while Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways originally complied аitС CСina's request to proviНe ПliРСt plans, tСeв later “reverseН Мourse ПolloаinР pressure Пrom tСe Japanese Рovernment”.124 The response by Taiwan. Let us now turn our attention to Taiwan, whose reaction to the ADIZ is evidence of its divided identity and Taipei's difficult balancing act in trying to survive as a de facto independent while not overly challenging Chinese claims to the Island. We have earlier explained the potential significance of the ADIZ in the event of a major crisis. Although Taipei protested the setting up of China's ADIZ, the response was relatively low-key, as noted by a number of observers. TСe AsaСi SСimbun НesМribeН Taipei as “notiМeablв quiet on tСe matter, Нespite tСe ПaМt some oП its 122 Facebook page of Tomohiko Taniguchi, 23 November 2013, available at https://www.facebook.com/tomohiko.taniguchi.12?fref=ts. The full comments were posted by Professor Taniguchi on his Facebook page, indicating that they had been made to journalist Ken Moritsugu, who partly reflected them in Ken MoritsuРu “CСina sets air НeПense гone over East CСina Sea”, AP News, 23 November, available at http://m.apnews.com/ap/db_268780/contentdetail.htm?contentguid=aRKTguV3 123 Alex Calvo "The third dimension of warfare and tactical stability in the Senkaku Islands", Birmingham "'on War": The blog of the postgraduate students at the Centre for War Studies, University of Birmingham, 09 January 2013, Birmingham University, available at http://warstudies.wordpress.com/2013/01/09/the-third-dimension-of-warfare-andtactical-stability-in-the-senkaku-islands/ 124 Demetri Sevastopulo “Q&A: WСat is an air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гone?”, Financial Times, 29 November 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/26cf55ce-58da-11e3-a7cb00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2n8TGD3xK 27 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 oаn airspaМe Пalls unНer BeijinР's ADIZ”, aННinР tСat “analвsts” saа it as reПleМtinР “PresiНent Ma Ying-jeou's empСasis on improvinР ties аitС CСina”. TСis empСasis Сas leН to better relations on the surface, while a lack of transparency in dealing with Beijing has helped feed fears that Ma had not always placed the Island's interest at the forefront, which seems to have contributed to his low approval ratings.125 While the government issued a statement on 29 November saying that the ADIZ аoulН “not Сelp tСe Нevelopment oП Мross-straits relations”, tСe legislative branch went further. After protests from the opposition benches, talks took place with ruling party lawmakers. The outМome аas a joint statement saвinР tСat “A riРorous protest sСoulН be submitteН to CСina anН efforts made to fall in step with allies in the region. Flight plans should not have to be submitted" (to Beijing). At present Taiwanese commercial airlines are doing so126 , as confirmed by President Ma СimselП in an intervieа аСere Нespite НesМribinР tСe ADIZ as “unСelpПul to tСe positive Нevelopment oП relations betаeen Taiаan anН CСina” Сe stresseН “aviation saПetв” anН eбplaineН that if airlines operating in the region wanted Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) to submit tСeir ПliРСt plans to CСina on tСeir beСalП, “аe аill proviНe tСat serviМe”. Ma saiН, Сoаever, tСat “Taiаan's Air ForМe patrols anН traininР operations” in tСe overlappinР area аitС CСina's ADIZ (some 23,000 square km) would not be affected. He also explained that there was an overlap between Japan's ADIZ and Taipei's FIR and that since 2009 Taipei had been following Japanese instructions to submit flight plans of all civilian planes going through that overlapping area. 127 Ma's words are notable in a number of counts. First of all, his distinction between civilian planes (to submit flight plans to Beijing) and military aircraft (to ignore China's ADIZ) echoes American policy and could well end up representing the most widespread reaction to the Chinese move. It could be seen as a balance, accommodating China's ADIZ in order to reduce the risk of incidents involving airliners while refusing to set a precedent which could be taken as meaning that, whatever the diplomatic protests, the new zone was being accepted. The irony lies in the fact that, as seen earlier, one of China's motivations was pushing for a security envelope, a belt of sea and air devoid of potentially hostile military assets, rather than just getting civilian planes to provide flight information. On the other hand, though, Beijing may see this as a first step, and in addition welcome its symbolic value. Second, the public acknowledgment that Taipei is providing flight plans to Tokyo concerning airliners flying through the area where both countries' air identification zones is significant on two counts. It constitutes evidence that overlapping ADIZs do not necessarily translate into conflict, if a 125 “A tСirН area oП НissatisПaМtion is аitС tСe KMT’s Мross-Strait policies. Clearly some voters are disappointed that the advent of normal cross-Strait trade and transport has not led to the promised economic boom. Others complain that trade liberalization has undermined certain Taiwanese industries, such as the towel producers. The government also took criticism as a result oП tСe sМanНal over melamine МontaminateН milk poаНer imports Пrom CСina in 2008. Ma’s government is commonly attacked for being non transparent in its policy making over China. For instance, despite its parliamentary majorities, recent cross-Strait agreements have not been subjected to parliamentary scrutiny or ratification. Such concerns explain why there appears to be limited public understanding of what the proposed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China will actually contain and limited trust in the Рovernment’s abilitв to put Taiаan’s interest Пirst in suМС an aРreement. TСe Пirst tСree variables mainlв applв to voters that may have actually supported Ma in 2008. However, for those on the anti Chinese side of Taiwanese politics, Ma’s tаo вears prove tСat Ma is Сell bent on saМriПiМinР Taiаan’s sovereiРntв anН МonspirinР to Мooperate аitС tСe People’s Republic of China (PRC) towards the goal of unification. Such accusations abound in the anti-KMT media and bloРospСere.” DaПвНН Fell, Prospects for Taiwan and Cross-Strait Relations: 20 125 10-2016, (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 2009), p. 3, available at http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/12053/1/Taiwan_China_Relations_New_Ash_volume_paper.pdf 126 SatosСi Ukai anН AkiСiko Kaise “Taiаan sСoаs restraineН reaМtion to CСina's ADIZ”, TСe AsaСi SСimbun, 30 November 2013, available at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/special/isles_dispute/AJ201311300046 127 Lee Shu-Сua anН Y.L. Kao “PresiНent Ma to urРe CСina not to НesiРnate ADIZ in SoutС CСina Sea”, Focus Taiwan, , 6 December 2013, available at http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201312060021.aspx 28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 measure of pragmatism can be found on both sides. In addition, acting in this way with regard to Japan may allow Ma to claim that he is not bending to Beijing's will and that he is no Chinese puppet,128 but that instead he is simply following the same moderate, pragmatic, policy that has been in place towards another major neighboring country. Only time will tell whether Taipei can persist in this complex balancing act,129 but at least in the short term this may among others provide additional momentum to successfully conclude the current round of fisheries negotiations with Tokyo.130 The first agreement in this area was a significant diplomatic success for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and one in which he invested considerable political capital. Together with the launching of the 2+2 regular dialogue with Russia, it shows a picture of a pragmatic Abe, very far from some of the criticism often metered at the Japanese leader. Concerning Ma, Shannon Tiezzi has warned that, in setting up an ADIZ overlapping with Taiwan's, Beijing risks prompting a “baМklasС” in tСe IslanН, anН enН up ПaМinР less aММommoНatinР Пuture Taiаanese leaНers. Tieггi believes tСat “Ma YinР-jeou’s presiНential leРaМв is ineбtriМablв tieН to Сis enРaРement аitС tСe mainland. Should Ma Ying-jeou end his term in disgrace, it will be politically difficult for either a KMT or DPP suММessor to Мontinue tСe same level oП Мooperation аitС BeijinР”, and concludes her pieМe in TСe Diplomat аritinР tСat “As a result, CСina’s aРРressive move to soliНiПв its Мlaims over some uninhabited rocks might jeopardize its chances at a far larger prize — eventual unification 128 In tСe past Сe Сas sometimes been aММuseН oП beinР Сostile to Japan “Earlier tСis montС, Masaki Saito, Japan's top envoy to Taiwan, resigned as director of the Interchange Association, Tokyo's de facto embassy in Taipei. Saito stepped down after he angered the Ma administration in May by referring to Taiwan's international status as 'unresolved.' Ma blocked Saito from contacting him, the prime minister or the foreign minister, effectively making his job in Taiwan impossible. 'The way President Ma treated Ambassador Saito in such an unfriendly manner will definitely reinforce the image that he is a Chinese nationalist,' Jaushieh Joseph Wu, research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in the National Chengchi University in Taipei, said earlier this month. Wu used to serve in the previous Democratic Progressive Party government. Kuo Chen-lung, former deputy editor-in-chief of the China Times, a national daily in Taiwan, agreed that the government's response to Saito was 'disproportional.' 128 'It was very rude for a foreign representative to comment or even take a stand on domestic issues,' he said, but added that Saito had only taken the same stance as the proindependence opposition party. Saito's resignation is the latest incident that has threatened to sour Japan-Taiwan relations. Shortly after Ma took office last year, Taiwan's then prime minister, Liu Chao-shiuan, threatened war with Japan over a collision between Taiwanese and Japanese vessels in disputed waters. Meanwhile, territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea continue to be claimed by Taiwan, Japan and China. According to Wu, Ma displays a streak of anti-Japan nationalism that runs counter to the feelings of many Taiwanese, who see Japan as an ally against China. 'When the DPP was in power, Taiwan was described by some Japanese politicians as the only Japan-friendly country in East Asia,' Wu saiН.” Mariko Kato, “Will Warmer Ties Burn Taiаan?”, The Japan Times, 30 December 2009, available at httpp://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20091230f1.html 129 WСiМС seems to be tСe most likelв Мourse oП aМtion in tСe immeНiate Пuture “A ranРe oП НomestiМ anН international factors will determine which direction China Taiwan relations move towards over the next six years. My analysis suggests that the most likely scenario by 2016 will be a continuation of the status quo, in other words maintaining Taiаan’s Нe ПaМto politiМal inНepenНenМe. It is also possible tСat bв 2016 tСe Пirst steps toаarНs a Мompromise Пormula will have been taken, though this will require a new level of flexibility from political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The hopes of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalists for more drastic solutions of reunification or independence are likelв to be НasСeН in tСe Пoreseeable Пuture” DaПвНН Fell, Prospects for Taiwan and Cross-Strait Relations: 2010-2016, (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 2009), p. 11, available at http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/12053/1/Taiwan_China_Relations_New_Ash_volume_paper.pdf 130 More generally, the Japanese leg is necessary for Taipei to gain some room to maneuvre when seeking to launch diplomatic initiatives and secure some sort of accomodation in the region. Alex Calvo, "President Ma's Peace Initiative and the Strategic Triangle Beijing-Taipei-Tokyo", TESS Working Papers, 31 August 2012, The Eurasia Studies Society (TESS), available at eurasiasociety.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/mas-peace-initiative-and-the-strategictriangle-calvo.doc 29 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 аitС Taiаan”.131 . A reminder of the dangers of opening up new fronts when victory over an island is yet to be achieved. The main Taiwanese opposition party, the DPP, did not just protest against the administration's policy but conducted an opinion poll on 3-4 December, showing, out of 1,338 valid responses, 75.2% against the Civil Aeronautics Administration complying with the Chinese request for flight plans, аitС 15.4% Пor. 64.6% МonsiНereН PresiНent Ma's response to Сave been “too soПt”, аitС 23% juНРinР it “Пine” anН 2% “too stronР” (10.4% НiН not eбpress an opinion). Taiаan's leaНer saiН tСat tСe ADIZ аas “not МonneМteН to sovereiРntв”, a statement 75.2% saiН tСeв НisaРreeН аitС, аitС 52% reРisterinР a “stronР objeМtion”.132 Former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui emerged as a harsh critic of Taipei's policy of МomplianМe. He saiН tСat it eviНenМeН PresiНent Ma's “one-CСina minНset”, aННinР tСat it riskeН makinР Taiаan appear beПore otСer Мountries as belonРinР to CСina. He askeН “Is Taiаan an [independent] country or аСat? IП tСe US anН Japan Мan [reПuse to Мomplв аitС CСina’s requirements], аСв Мan’t Taiаan?”, aННinР tСat tСe СeaН oП tСe state sСoulН aМt in aММorНanМe аitС “tСe best interests oП tСe nation anН its people”. Also МritiМal oП tСe Ma aНministration аas former representative to Japan Koh Se-kai, who stressed the different approach by the Taiwanese leader to tСe Senkaku/Diaoвu/Diaвutai Нispute anН to CСina's ADIZ. He saiН tСat “TСe НiППerenМe in Ma’s handling of the two incidents underscores his pro-China stanМe… He Сas Рiven up eбpanНinР tСe nation’s militarв МapaМitв anН improvinР its publiМ НiplomaМв beМause oП CСina, аСile аillinРlв turneН СimselП into tСe leaНer oП a 'Мlient state'”.133 The significance of China's ADIZ for Taiwan rests too on the fact that it includes the Senkaku Islands, which Taipei also claims, under the name Diaoyutai. While Taiwan's claim to a large extent rests on the same arguments put forward by Beijing, she stresses that they used to be part of Taiwan Prefecture under the Qing. In CСinese СistoriМal НoМuments, tСeв “are Рenerallв МonsiНereН to Сave been part oП tСe aНministrative гone oП Taiаan”,134 while in a Foreign Policy article written last вear bв Taiаan’s ForeiРn Minister YunР-lo Lin, titleН “TСose IslanНs BelonР to Taiаan”, he insisteН tСat “tСe Diaoвutai IslanНs aМtuallв Пorm an inСerent part oП tСe territorв oП tСe RepubliМ oП China (Taiwan) based on the islands' geographical location, geological structure, relevant historical eviНenМe, anН international laа”.135 Two significant points can be made here. First of all, as noted bв Tieггi, “iП mainlanН CСina Нoes Рain Мontrol oП tСe islanНs, it аoulН eППeМtivelв be aНministerinР part oП Taiаan”.136 Second, the arguments put forward by Taipei in claiming the Senkaku Islands, and tСe title itselП oП Lin's artiМle, maв eviНenМe a НeРree oП “nativiгation” oП tСe Мlaim, in tСe sense 131 132 133 134 135 136 SСannon Tieггi “WСв CСina's Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone Is Terrible For Cross-Strait Relations”, The Diplomat, 28 November 2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/why-chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-is-terriblefor-cross-strait-relations/ CСris WanР “PubliМ НisaРrees аitС ADIZ response: poll”, The Taipei Times, 6 December 2013, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/12/06/2003578421 Lee Hsin-ПanР anН StaМв Hsu “ADIZ stanМe unНermines nation: Lee”, The Taipei Times, 1 December 2013, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/12/01/2003578043/1 SСannon Tieггi “WСв CСina's Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone Is Terrible For Cross-Strait Relations”, The Diplomat, 28 November 2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/why-chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-is-terriblefor-cross-strait-relations/ Yung-Lo Lin “TСose IslanНs BelonР to Taiаan”, Foreign Policy, 18 October 2012, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/18/those_islands_belong_to_taiwan#sthash.eHwwmhNU.dpbs SСannon Tieггi “WСв CСina's Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone Is Terrible For Cross-Strait Relations”, The Diplomat, 28 November 2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/why-chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-is-terriblefor-cross-strait-relations/ 30 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 that in addition to referring to the Republic of China, it also rests on facts specifically connected to Taiwan, such as geography and geology. A reminder tСat tСe “One-CСina PoliМв” аСiМС Taipei adheres to and to which most governments subscribe may be slowly evolving, not least with reference to Japan.137 Washington's position. Initially, China's ADIZ prompted two official US statements on 23 November, one from the Pentagon and the other from the State Department. The text from the DeПense Department saiН tСat tСe UniteН States аere “Нeeplв МonМerneН” anН saа tСe neа ADIZ as “a НestabiliгinР attempt to alter tСe status quo in tСe reРion”, aННinР tСat “tСis unilateral action inМreases tСe risk oП misunНerstanНinР anН misМalМulations”. TСe teбt maНe it Мlear tСat tСe move аoulН “not in anв аaв МСanРe Сoа tСe UniteН States МonНuМts militarв operations in tСe reРion” anН stresseН WasСinРton's “Мommitments to our allies anН partners”, enНinР аitС an eбpliМit reminНer tСat “ArtiМle V oП tСe U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku IslanНs”.138 Two aspects are significant, from a Japanese perspective. One in line with Japanese interests, the other against. On the plus side for Tokyo, the Senkaku Islands were explicitly referred to by name, and not through a formula referring to their administration. As explained above, a view that American commitment to these islands is contingent on Tokyo's de facto control (since Washington takes no official position concerning their ultimate sovereignty) may leave the door open to a miscalculation, should Beijing believe that a quick and bloodless landing (there are no Japanese troops deployed, only Coastguard units and air assets providing a defensive envelope) would result in Washington having second thoughts about engaging Chinese forces. On the negative siНe Пor Japan, tСe statement reПerreН onlв to “militarв operations”, not Мivilian ПliРСts, altСouРС on the other hand this may be expected since the text came from the Pentagon, not the White House or the State Department. TСe Мommunique Пrom tСe State Department also saiН tСat tСe UniteН States аere “Нeeplв МonМerneН” anН МalleН tСe aМtion “unilateral” anН “esМalatorв”, НesМribinР it as “an attempt to МСanРe tСe status quo” anН aННinР tСat it аoulН “Мreate risks oП an inМiНent”. AПter stressinР tСe importanМe oП “ПreeНom oП overПliРСt anН otСer internationallв laаПul uses oП sea anН airspaМe” to “prosperitв, stabilitв, anН seМuritв in tСe PaМiПiМ” it eбplaineН tСat WasСinРton НiН not “support eППorts” bв anв Мountrв to applв “ADIZ proМeНures to ПoreiРn airМraПt not intenНinР to enter its national airspaМe”. TСe teбt also reminНeН reaНers oП tСe UniteН States' Мommitment “to our allies anН partners” anН eбpresseН a аisС to “see a more Мollaborative anН less МonПrontational Пuture in tСe PaМiПiМ”.139 Also significant was US Ambassador Caroline Kennedy's maiden speech, where she criticized CСina's “unilateral aМtions” in the East-CСina Sea, saвinР tСat tСeв “unНermine seМuritв”.140 She 137 Which has been taking some small but significant steps to more clearly distinguish Taiwan as a state in her own right. Alex Calvo "Japan Quietly Leads on Increased Recognition of Taiwan", Shingetsu News Agency News, 26 July 2012, Shingetsu News Agency, available at http://www.shingetsunewsagency.com/SNA/SNA_News/Entries/2012/7/26_Japan_Steps_toward_Recognition_of_Tai wan.html 138 “Statement bв SeМretarв oП DeПense CСuМk HaРel on tСe East CСina Sea Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone”, Website oП the US Embassy to the Republic of the Philippines, 23 November 2013, available at http://manila.usembassy.gov/statement-secretary-defense-chuck-hagel-east-china-sea-air-defense-identificationzone.html 139 “Statement on tСe East CСina Sea Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone”, Website oП tСe US Department oП State, 23 November 2013, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218013.htm 140 DeboraС Kan anН Yuka HaвasСi “Caroline KenneНв Warns CСina Over AРРression”, KTVU News, available at http://www.ktvu.com/videos/news/caroline-kennedy-warns-china-over-aggression/vCKGRM/ 31 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 also noteН tСat “Japan Сas sСoаn Рreat restraint tСis past вear, anН аe urРe tСem to Мontinue to Нo so”. AПter НesМribinР Сis late ПatСer's aНmiration Пor Japan anН Нesire to visit tСe Мountry as president, as well as the tight nature of joint US-Japan defense arrangements, Kennedy quoted Winston Churchill141, saвinР “At tСe same time, as Winston CСurМСill saiН, 'We arm to parleв'”.142 US Ambassador Caroline Kennedy delivering a statement shortly after her arrival in Japan. 143 The idea was clear: diplomacy can only succeed if supported by military might, which is not an end in itself but indispensable for a country's or an alliance's credibility. Quoting from the leader of an island which refused to surrender reinforced the message, made more personal on account of the strong connection between her late father and that island. Caroline Kennedy's grandfather was US Ambassador to the United Kingdom in her darkest hour, where he became associated with a wellmeaning but ultimately self-defeating attempt to preserve peace at all costs,144 whereas his father 141 Granted honorary American citizenship by the US Congress, bestowed by President Kennedy at a White House Мeremonв on 9 April 1963. JoСn Plumpton “A Son oП AmeriМa TСouРС a SubjeМt oП Britain”, Finest Hour, No 60, Summer 1988, Churchill Center, available at http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/biography/redux/churchillhonored-with-us-citizenship 142 “AmbassaНor Caroline KenneНв AННresses ACCJ anН tСe AmeriМa-Japan SoМietв”, website of the US Embassy to Tokyo, 27 November, available at http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20131127-01.html 143 PiМture taken Пrom HoаarН LaFranМСi “AmbassaНor Caroline KenneНв lanНs in Japan. CoulН tСe timinР be more perПeМt?”, Cristian Science Monitor, 15 November 2013, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ForeignPolicy/2013/1115/Ambassador-Caroline-Kennedy-lands-in-Japan.-Could-the-timing-be-more-perfect 144 “KenneНв, a Пormer Wall Street speМulator anН eб-chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, had closely aligned himself with the appeasement policies of the previous prime minister, Neville Chamberlain. During his three years in London, he had made no secret of his belief that 'wars were bad for business, and what was worse, for his business,' as journalist James 'Scotty' Reston put it. The U.S. ambassador believed this so firmly that he even used his official position to commandeer scarce cargo space on transatlantic ships for his own licour export business. After Chamberlain and the French prime minister handed over much of Czechoslovaquia to Adolf Hitler at Munich in September 1938, Kennedy remarked happily to Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovak minister to Britain: 'Isn't it wonderful [that the crisis is over]? Now I can get to Palm BeaМС aПter all!'” Lвnne Olson, Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour, (London: Random House, 2011), p. 4. For a more sympathetic view of 32 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 аrote “WСв EnРlanН Slept”145 analyzing what had gone wrong. Thus, in her family history itself, the new US ambassador to Japan can observe the difficult choices one faces when trying to avoid war. Infograph posted by China's Defense Ministry, denouncing the flight by by two US B-52s through her newly-declared 146 ADIZ In Japan on his way to China, US Vice President Joe Bidden also said that Сis Мountrв аas “Нeeplв МonМerneН” but aРain tСis seemeН to Пall sСort oП Japanese Сopes anН eбpeМtations.147 On the other СanН, tСe messaРe Пrom tСe leРislative branМС oП Рovernment seemeН stronРer, аitС “tСe Democratic and Republican leaders of the U.S. Senate ForeiРn Relations Committee” issuinР a letter on 5 DeМember urРinР BeijinР “not to implement” tСe ADIZ anН aННinР tСat CСina's reМent aМtions tСreateneН “vital national interests oП tСe UniteН States”.148 However, beyond these generic declarations of support for Japan, the vexed issue of what instructions to give to civil airlines seemed to open a rift between Tokyo and Washington. While Japanese authorities ordered the country's carriers to disregard Chinese regulations and abstain from 145 146 147 148 Joseph Kennedy see Will Swift, The Kennedys Amidst the Gathering Storm: A Thousand Days in London, 1938-1940, (Washington: Smithsonian, 2008). John Fitzerald Kennedy, Why England Slept, (New York: W. Funk, inc, 1940). ImaРe taken Пrom “Neа ADIZ over SoutС CСina Sea planneН: ПoreiРn ministrв”, Want China Times, 28 November 2013, available at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131128000132&cid=1101 “BiНen: US 'Deeplв ConМerneН' at CСina's Air DeПense Zone”, Voice of America, 3 December 2013, available at http://www.voanews.com/content/biden-us-deeply-concerned-at-chinas-air-defense-zone/1802361.html PatriМia ZenРerle “Keв U.S. laаmakers urРe CСina to baМk oПП on air НeПense гone”, Reuters, 6 December 2013, available at http://ph.news.yahoo.com/key-u-lawmakers-urge-china-back-off-air-011057564.html 33 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 reporting flight plans to Beijing, Washington took the opposite decision. As noted by the Wall Street Journal, “Japanese oППiМials on SunНaв plaвeН Нoаn publiМlв—but complained privately— that the U.S. isn't following Tokyo in rebuffing Beijing's demands for foreign airlines to file flight plans when navigating through China's new air-defense zone. The developments came as Japan openlв questioneН tСe CСinese militarв's abilitв to poliМe tСe гone”.149 Washington's decision not to force a showdown with Beijing was confirmed by different official sourМes. TСe US reМommenНeН tСat МommerМial airlines Мomplв аitС CСinese reРulations “Пor tСe saПetв anН seМuritв oП passenРers”. US AmbassaНor to tСe PСilippines PСilip GolНberР saiН tСat “Even iП аe Нon’t believe ADIZ is аarranteН, tСe UniteН States Нoes not impose an ADIZ on aircraft that are not entering US airspace. But at the same time, we can't with commercial aircraft, take chances as I mentioned of miscalculation so we have recommended to our commercial airlines tСat tСeв Рive suМС notiПiМation”.150 Facing criticism from those who saw this as a concession, White House spokesman Jay Carney insisted that it was not the case, explaining that Washington НiН “not aММept tСe leРitimaМв oП CСina's requirements”.151 Instructions to civil airlines are indeed a key issue, prompting some observers to note how American policy had evolved from initial defiance to later partial accommodation. For example Professor Chellaney posted a comment on his FaМebook paРe saвinР tСat “Team Obama, МСanРinР course, appears willing to accept China's new air-НeПense гone”.152 Summing up the situation, Reuter's Paul Carsten аrote tСat “TСe UniteН States Сas maНe Мlear it аill stanН bв treatв obligations that require it to defend the Japanese-controlled islands, but it is also reluctant to get НraРРeН into anв militarв МlasС betаeen tСe Asian rivals”.153 This policy will probably be praised by some as an expression of moderation, avoidance of foreign entanglements, balance between opposition to the zone and desire to avoid an escalation, and stress on diplomacy. Others may see it as a sign of weakness, lack of strategic direction, moral relativism, a failure to gauge the significance of what is at stake, and distraction with events in other regions of the world. Professor Chellaney summed up the latter view when he called the flight by two B-52s “tokenism” anН МalleН Пor a “МreНible response”, askinР PresiНent Obama to “turn Сis attention Пrom tСe preoММupations oП the Middle East to tСe potentiallв Мombustible situation in East Asia”, assertinР “U.S. leaНersСip” in orНer to make Сis Asian “pivot” real anН “Сelp tame CСina’s belliРerenМe” аСile reassurinР Сis Мountrв's allies. He aННeН tСat “At stake in tСe East CСina Sea are not just some flyspeck islands, but regional power balance, a rules-based order, freedom of navigation of the skies and seas, and access to maritime resources, including seabed minerals. If China gets its way, the path to a SinoМentriМ Asia аoulН open”.154 The view from Seoul: South Korea extends her own ADIZ. Seoul's position is particularly relevant both because China's ADIZ covers some waters claimed by South Korea and because, 149 150 151 152 153 154 Yuka HaвasСi anН AnНв Pasгtor “Japan, U.S. at OННs Over CСina's Air Zone”, The Wall Street Journal, 1 December 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303562904579230894060384128 CatСerine S. Valente “GolНberР: CСina’s neа air-НeПense гone МoulН Мreate tension”, TСe Manila Times, 2 DeМember 2013, available at http://manilatimes.net/goldberg-chinas-new-air-defense-zone-could-create-tension/57380/ “BiНen: US 'Deeplв ConМerneН' at CСina's Air DeПense Zone”, Voice of America, 3 December 2013, available at http://www.voanews.com/content/biden-us-deeply-concerned-at-chinas-air-defense-zone/1802361.html Facebook page of Brahma Chellaney, 6 December 2013, available at https://www.facebook.com/chellaney?fref=ts Paul Carsten “CСina's parliament: Japan Сas "no riРСt to МritiМise" air НeПenМe гone”, Reuters, 7 December 2013, available at http://ph.news.yahoo.com/china-39-parliament-japan-quot-no-criticise-quot-171808784.html BraСma CСellaneв “CHELLANEY: CСina’s Рame oП МСiМken”, Washington Times, 8 December 2013, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/8/chellaney-chinas-game-of-chicken/ 34 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 following Beijing's move the ROK took a similar step on 8 December, extending her own air defense zone, effective 15 December. This followed an earlier South Korean request to China to withdraw her ADIZ since it overlapped with Seoul's, a request which Beijing turned down. Both Tokyo and Washington appeared to be comfortable with the Korean move, and publicly made it clear that they saw it in a very different light from Beijing's, stressing that they had been consulted and the Seoul had followed international rules. Apart Пrom eбtenНinР to “parts oП airspaМe also inМluНeН in tСe CСinese гone”, tСe Korean гone is siРniПiМant sinМe it “Мovers a submerРeН reeП tСat SoutС Korea Мontrols but tСat CСina also Мlaims”. In aННition, аe sСoulН note tСat it “also overlaps аitС parts oП tСe Japanese air НeПense гone”. Concerning these different overlaps, Defense Ministry Spokesman Kim Min-seok told the media tСat Seoul аoulН “НisМuss аitС neiРСborinР Мountries steps to prevent aММiНental МlasСes аitСin tСe SoutС Korean гone”, aННinР tСat it НiН “not inПrinРe upon anв Мountrв's airspaМe” anН that Seoul had sufficiently explained the move to neighboring countries before announcing it. The American reaМtion аas supportive, аitС tСe State Department saвinР tСat tСe Korean НeМision “avoiНs МonПusion Пor, or tСreats to, Мivilian airlines”. In tСe аords of State Department Spokeswoman Jen Psaki “TСe UniteН States Сas been anН аill remain in Мlose Мonsultation аitС our allies anН partners in the region to ensure their actions contribute to greater stability, predictability, and consistency with international praМtiМes”.155 One of the reasons that may have prompted Seoul's move was the adverse reaction in the country's media when it became known that China's ADIZ included the submerged rock of Ieodo (Suyan for the Chinese), whereas the South Korean zone did not. Both countries claim sovereignty over it, while South Korea retains effective control156 over it.157 Concerning South Korean policy with regard to civilian flights through the Chinese ADIZ, it seems to be a middle-of-the-road approach, with instructions to Korean Airlines and Asiana Airlines to report flight plans only when crossing into the zone bound for China and not when simply traversing it.158 As to Tokyo's reaction, although this was the first time that South Korea's air defense zone crossed into Japan's, and despite recent tensions over historical and territorial issues, plus perennial mistrust between the two countries, the Japanese Government seemed ready to accept the move or at least not turn it into an issue. Since the two zones now overlap, sooner or later Tokyo and Seoul will have to negotiate either an agreed boundary or, at least, some sort of working understanding. In the past there have been some attempts to reach an agreement on air defense zone boundaries, without success. While there is no guarantee that future negotiations will bear fruit, neither Tokyo nor Seoul seem, at present, to wish to turn the matter into yet another burden on their troubled relationship. TСus, a Japanese ForeiРn AППairs Spokesman saiН on 8 DeМember “We Нon't see any immediate 155 “S. Korea eбpanНs air НeПense гone aПter CСinese move”, Stars anН Stripes, 8 DeМember 2013, available at http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/s-korea-expands-air-defense-zone-after-chinese-move-1.256632 156 SinМe tСis, anН otСer РeoРrapСiМal Пeatures НisМusseН in tСe artiМle, are uninСabiteН, tСe аorН “Мontrol” is emploвeН аitСout НistinРuisinР it Пrom “paМiПiМation”, аСile notinР that in counterinsurgency environments their meaning does not coincide, as explained in West Bing, Area Security, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1969), p. 5, available at smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/bingwestareasecurity1969.pdf 157 Demetri Sevastopulo anН Simon MunНв “S Korea eбpanНs air НeПenМe гone amiН risinР tensions”, The Financial Times, 9 December 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/148dbc1e-5fc6-11e3-a4cd00144feabdc0.html#axzz2myoZTqrS 158 Demetri Sevastopulo “Q&A: WСat is an air НeПenМe iНentiПiМation гone?”, Financial Times, 29 November 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/26cf55ce-58da-11e3-a7cb00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2n8TGD3xK 35 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 problem аitС tСe SoutС Korean ADIZ”.159 Translation: we may not necessarily like it, or accept it in all its details, but it is neither urgent nor appropriate to discuss it now. Anyway, this is a reminder that tensions and differences can and fortunately sometimes are contained and managed in East Asia, although when this happens the degree of media attention is lower. Talking to the Financial Times, Mike Green (Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington) explained that the intention beСinН tСe SoutС Korean move аas to “pusСbaМk aРainst BeijinР”, aННinР tСat Seoul СaН askeН WasСinРton to urРe Tokвo to “take a muteН response”. Green also saiН tСat, ПolloаinР a “Сoneвmoon perioН аitС BeijinР” bв tСe neа SoutС Korean leaНer, “some of the more conservative and traditional foreign policy elites are worried she has gone too Пar” anН tСat in НeМlarinР a neа ADIZ “BeijinР Рave tСem an opportunitв to МorreМt Мourse someаСat”.160 It was not just Tokyo that chose not to make a major issue of South Korea's expanded air defense zone, with Beijing also offering a restrained response. On 6 December, aware that South Korea was preparinР to eбpanН its ADIZ, CСina saiН tСat sСe аas “reaНв to maintain МommuniМation аitС tСe ROK side under the conНition oП equalitв anН mutual respeМt”. CСinese ForeiРn Ministrв Spokesman saiН tСat tСe eбpansion “sСoulН be in line аitС its national laаs anН international norms”, aННinР tСat an ADIZ “is not part oП a Мountrв’s territorial airspaМe anН Сas notСinР to Нo with the administrative rights over sea and airspace. It is established for identification and early аarninР”.161 Although the timing may have been determined, or at least influenced, by Beijing's decision, the expansion of the South Korean ADIZ was not a complete surprise. For a number of years Seoul had appeared interested in widening her ADIZ, and in November 2012 she called on Beijing to alter her air-defense zone in order to reflect the country's concerns. Following a Chinese refusal, South Korean officials let it be known that they would ponder changes to their own zone. It was not only China, but also Japan and the United States which were aware of South Korean intentions. As a result of these previous talks, and other factors such as not covering any Japanese territory, an artiМle bв tСe Wall Street Journal МonМluНeН tСat “TСe move to proМeeН is unlikelв to siРniПiМantlв raise tensions in tСe reРion”, eбplaininР tСat “CСina Сas reaМteН Мalmlв to tСe SoutС Korean plans, which have also been accepted bв tСe U.S. anН Japan”.162 US Vice President Joe Biden took advantage of his trip to the Far East to discuss the issue with South Korean President Park Geun-hye at a meeting on 6 December in Seoul. Following the gathering, a US official said that Biden had "expressed understanding" for the decision. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Spokesman Hikariko Ono eбplaineН tСat “Unlike tСe CСinese aМtion, we reached an understanding beforehand, so this would not create an immediate problem for JapanKorea relations”, aННinР tСat Seoul СaН maНe it Мlear tСat tСe eбpansion аoulН not aППeМt ПreeНom 159 Demetri Sevastopulo anН Simon MunНв “S Korea eбpanНs air НeПenМe гone amiН risinР tensions”, The Financial Times, 9 December 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/148dbc1e-5fc6-11e3-a4cd00144feabdc0.html#axzz2myoZTqrS 160 Demetri Sevastopulo anН Simon MunНв “S Korea eбpanНs air НeПenМe гone amiН risinР tensions”, The Financial Times, 9 December 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/148dbc1e-5fc6-11e3-a4cd00144feabdc0.html#axzz2myoZTqrS 161 Demetri Sevastopulo anН Simon MunНв “S Korea eбpanНs air НeПenМe гone amiН risinР tensions”, The Financial Times, 9 December 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/148dbc1e-5fc6-11e3-a4cd00144feabdc0.html#axzz2myoZTqrS 162 Alastair Gale and Min-JeonР Lee “SoutС Korea EбpanНs Air-DeПense Zone”, The Wall Street Journal, 8 December 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303722104579245253671874542 36 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 of navigation by commercial airliners. A spokesman for the South Korean Defense Ministry, Kim Min-seok, empСasiгeН tСis, saвinР “We аill МoorНinate аitС relateН Мountries to fend off accidental militarв МonПrontations anН to ensure saПetв oП airplanes”.163 Map showing some of the different, overlapping, air defense zones in East Asia. 164 The Russian enigma: how should we read Moscow's silence? Russia is not always associated in the minds of observers with the Asia-Pacific, but the country is major regional power and although not directly involved in the ADIZ dispute no analysis of the situation would be complete without examining Moscow's position.165 In doing so, however, we find a dearth of official statements. A 163 Alastair Gale and Min-JeonР Lee “SoutС Korea EбpanНs Air-DeПense Zone”, The Wall Street Journal, 8 December 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303722104579245253671874542 164 PiМture taken Пrom “Neа SoutС Korean ADIZ overlaps аitС CСina anН Japan”, Tаeeter aММount oП M. Taвlor Fravel, 8 December 2013, available at https://twitter.com/fravel/status/409700957292085248/photo/1 165 For a discussion whether Washington and Moscow may improve their relations due to shared interests in the AsiaPacific Region, see Alex Calvo, "America's Failed (Bi-Partisan) Russia Policy: An Asia-Pacific Addendum", TESS Working Papers, 8 June 2012, The Eurasia Studies Society (TESS), available at http://eurasiasociety.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/an-asia-pacific-addendum-to-cohen-alex-calvo1.pdf 37 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 look at the website of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry does not seem to reveal any communique or other statement about this issue.166 The press does not seem, either, to have collected any comments by high-ranking politicians and officials. An exception was Alexei Pushkov, head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Russia's lower house of Parliament, who noted tСat tСe US anН Сer allies аere enРaРeН in a “аar oП nerves” аitС CСina.167 Alexei Pushkov, head of the Russian Congress' Foreign Affairs Committee. 168 Therefore, we cannot really point out at anything specific on open sources from the Russian administration, although there is certainly some interesting commentary on the situation in East Asia. Furthermore, we may ask ourselves why Russia has issued no official statement. It may be tempting to see it as evidence that this is no vital matter for Moscow, but the fact that statements are regularly issued on matters which objectively speaking are of minor importance to Russia would militate against this explanation. Another possibility is that Russia is playing a subtle long-term game, observing developments in the Pacific, taking discrete yet significant steps such as deeper relations with Tokyo and weapons sales to Vietnam, while keeping a low profile. Russia is clearly not interested in a stronger China, but at the same time has no interest to see the country destabilize. We often ask ourselves who lost China, without realizing that the Soviet Union also lost China, a divided, weak China fitting with Moscow's interests, as Russian pre-war policy towards the country shows. An ideal end game for Russia may be a China strong enough to resist pressure from her maritime facade but not strong enough to turn that strength inwards, towards Central Asia and Siberia. A China too distracted to be a cause of concern for Russia. In addition, a North Korea less dependent on China, with a more multi-vectorial foreign policy and range of economic relations, would fit with Russia's need to diversify her energy exports and maximize her influence in North166 The author would like to thank Russian researcher Maria Kuchma for her assistance in checking the Russian-language version of the Foreign Ministry's website and confirming that no statement had been issued on China's ADIZ as of 7 December 2013. 167 SourМe pointeН out bв Maria KuМСma “ ША " " К , ”, Ria Novosti, 8 December 2013, available at http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982757837.html 168 PiМture taken Пrom “ ША " " К , ”, Ria Novosti, 8 December 2013, available at http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982757837.html 38 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 East Asia, playing off one side against the other, and providing strategic cover for the much needed development of her Far East. Thus, Moscow may simply have no incentive to enter the debate on China's ADIZ, at least publicly, at this stage. It is clear, though, that where Russian and Chinese interests have clashed directly, namely in the Arctic, Moscow has drawn a line in the sand. It is also significant that, while Russian leader Putin may not have publicly addressed the ADIZ controversy, Сe СappeneН to travel to Vietnam, аСere Сe “pleНРeН to eбpanН militarв supplies to Vietnam, a move tСat looks set to raise МonМerns Пrom BeijinР as tensions over tСe SoutС CСina Sea linРer”. According to Zhang Mingliang (an expert on China's relations with South-East Asia from Guangzhou's Jinan University), Beijing probably watched closely any talks on future military cooperation НurinР Putin's visit. He noteН tСat “Russia Сas been tСe biРРest supporter of Vietnam in tСe SoutС CСina Sea”, МitinР submarine sales anН oil Нevelopment Мooperation in аaters МlaimeН bв China.169 Rumours about possible Russian-Taiwanese cooperation in building submarines continue but have not been confirmed.170 Despite the above explained little official commentary, some reports in the media may provide a glimpse of Russian views on the dispute. An article in the government daily Rossiiskaya Gazeta eбplaineН tСat tСere СaН been no reaМtion Пrom Russia “beМause East CСina Sea is quite far from Russia's borНers”, аСile notinР tСat otСer Мountries СaН reaМteН to CСina's move, anН tСe state oП affairs may lead to potential complicated conflict situations in the region.171 On a more general plane, some Russian commentators have described the potential opportunities from the growing МonПrontation in tСe PaМiПiМ, аitС one eбpert аritinР last вear tСat “Russia Сas a МСanМe to position itself as a neutral force in the region, which can be capitalized into essential geopolitical and purely economic benefits in conditions of a standoff between two blocs, especially those that СвpotСetiМallв are equal in strenРtС”172 anН anotСer voiМe aННinР more reМentlв tСat “Russia’s Рoal is to acquire reliable guarantees of its own security with regard to China, while avoiding full involvement in the growing Sino-American global rivalry and reaping all the benefits a third party Мan eбpeМt in suМС a situation”.173 It is thus clear that we will have to keep watching Russia policy towards the Pacific very carefully. China's next step: an ADIZ on the South China Sea? With regard to a possible second Chinese ADIZ, over the South China Sea or part of it, a number of observers have warned about this possibility. Professor Taniguchi posted a comment on his Facebook page on 27 November saying 169 170 171 172 173 Kristine Kаok “Putin voаs to boost Russian militarв supplies to Vietnam amiН SoutС CСina Sea Нispute”, South China Morning Post, 6 December 2013, available at http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1354235/putin-vows-boostrussian-military-supplies-vietnam-amid-south-china-sea Jyh-PernР WanР “Is Russia HelpinР Taiаan BuilН Submarines?”, China Brief, Volume 11 Issue 4, Jamestown Foundation, 10 March 2011, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37632&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=37 0f7b6ab59d670ac53ac3a8a24bffcc “Е , , :В -К Ф.” anН “Э В А , .” OleР Kirianov “К В А ”, Rossiiskaвa Gaгeta, 3 DeМember 2013, available at http://www.rg.ru/2013/12/03/azia-site.html. The author would like to thank Maria Kuchma for pointing out this source and providing a summary and translated excerpt. Pavel Salin “Russia’s TСree RoaНs to Asia”, Russia in Global Affairs, 27 December 2012, available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-Three-Roads-to-Asia-15818 Vassilв KasСin “TСe Sum Total oП All Fears”, Russia in Global Affairs, 15 April 2013, available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Sum-Total-of-All-Fears-15935 39 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 tСat iП BeijinР “in tСe Пuture eбtenНeН also to Мover tСe SoutС CСina Sea, tСe so-called ADIZ and the surface line Beijing is drawing in the sea both will constitute a three dimensional 'no-entry' spaМe”.174 There seems to be at least some support for such fears. Voice of Russia reported that on 25 November Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang had said that Beijing was ready to set up a second ADIZ, over the South China Sea. After describing the East-China Sea ADIZ as “a buППer гone to НeПenН tСe territorial inteРritв oП CСina”, Сe aННeН tСat anotСer suМС гone аoulН “be establisСeН in Нue Мourse” over tСe SoutС CСina Sea.175 Two days earlier, at a media conference following the ADIZ announcement, asked whetСer CСina аoulН “establisС otСer Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zones”, DeПense Spokesman YanР Yujun replieН tСat “CСina аill establisС other Air Defense Identification Zones at the right moment after necessary preparations are МompleteН”.176 Taiwanese President Ma eбplaineН in an intervieа tСat Сe аoulН ask “ask CСina not to establisС an air НeПense iНentiПiМation гone (ADIZ) over tСe SoutС CСina Sea”.177 The issue is significant for Taiwan from many different perspectives, among them Taiping Island, a sizable feature in the South China Sea under Taipei's control. KMT legislator Yang Ying-xiong asked Director-General of the National Security Bureau (NSB) Tsai Der-sСenР about tСe IslanН, enquirinР “as to Сoа Taiаan аas prepared to respond if the PRC attempted to eбtenН its ADIZ to TaipinР IslanН”. Der-sheng replied that negotiations had already taken place with the PRC's Defense Ministry, adding that Taipei аoulН МonsiНer it to be “an unПrienНlв Рesture iП CСina insisteН on eбtenНinР tСe Мurrent ADIZ to the South CСina Sea”.178 One of the consequences of a South China Sea ADIZ may be a deepening of the defense cooperation between Vietnam and India. For the time being, the Indian Navy is saying that they are not unduly worried by the East-China Sea ADIZ, since they do not “reРularlв” operate air assets there, but that they are watching possible Chinese moves in the South China Sea. Navy Chief AНmiral D K JosСi saiН “Yes, аe Нo Сave units аitС inteРral air element anН sometimes tСeв Нo operate (in South China Sea). ThereПore, tСis partiМular issue (CСina’s ADIZ in East CСina Sea) is unНer Мlose eбamination”.179 Some observers believe that the reaction by other powers to the East China Sea ADIZ will determine whether Beijing proceeds to declare another one. For example Professor Chellaney МonsiНers tСat “IП CСina is able to riНe out international МritiМism аСile СolНinР its РrounН, it аill be emboldened to set up a similarly expansive air-defense zone in the South China Sea, more than 80 174 175 176 177 178 179 Facebook page of Tomohiko Taniguchi, 27 November 2013, available at https://www.facebook.com/tomohiko.taniguchi.12?fref=ts. “Neа ADIZ over SoutС CСina Sea planneН: ПoreiРn ministrв”, Want China Times, 28 November 2013, available at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131128000132&cid=1101 Andreа S. EriМkson “DeПense Spokesman YanР Yujun’s Response to Questions on tСe EstablisСment oП TСe East CСina Sea Air DeПense IНentiПiМation Zone”, Andrew S. Erickson: China Analysis from Original Sources, 23 November 2013, available at http://www.andrewerickson.com/2013/11/defense-spokesman-yang-yujuns-response-to-questions-onthe-establishment-of-the-east-china-sea-air-defense-identification-zone/ Lee Shu-Сua anН Y.L. Kao “PresiНent Ma to urРe CСina not to НesiРnate ADIZ in SoutС CСina Sea”, Focus Taiwan, , 6 December 2013, available at http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201312060021.aspx Queena Yen “Taiаan veбeН bв CСina's ADIZ: NSB МСieП”, The China Post, 5 December 2013, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2013/12/05/395227/Taiwan-vexed.htm “Navв Closelв WatМСinР CСina Claims”, The New Indian Express, 7 December 2013, available at http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Navy-Closely-Watching-China-Claims/2013/12/07/article1932211.ece 40 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 percent of which it now formally claims”.180 Another possibility would be for China to start declaring an ADIZ in a portion of that body of water. Ian Storey (Institute of Southeast Asian StuНies in SinРapore) believes tСat it аoulН be “absolutelв outraРeous” iП CСina set up an ADIZ covering tСe аСole area аitСin tСe “nine-НasС line”. InsteaН, Сe МonsiНers it more likelв Пor BeijinР to establish such a zone in the northern portion of the South China Sea, in particular over the waters around Hainan Island. Concerning this possibility, Gary Li (IHS Maritime) said that a Chinese ADIZ in tСe nortСern portion oП tСe SoutС CСina Sea аoulН be “verв, verв sensitive”. Li aННeН tСat it would almost certainly overlap with that of Vietnam, which reaches northward until some 100 kilometer from Hainan Island, and which also includes the disputed Paracel Islands.181 The nuclear strategic calculus: is Beijing trying to better protect her submarine fleet? In addition to furthering her territorial demands and turn it into what some observers mockingly call “Lake BeijinР”, a SoutС CСina Sea ADIZ maв also be НesiРneН to enСanМe tСe seМuritв oП CСina's nuclear strategic submarine fleet. This was pointed out by Termsak Chalermpalanupap (Institute of SoutСeast Asian StuНies; ISEAS, in SinРapore), аСo believes tСat “CСina wants safe passage for its submarines based in Hainan to the South China Sea and to the Pacific passing through the waters betаeen soutСern Taiаan anН nortСern PСilippines”, aННinР tСat “CСina sees its ADIZ as part oП its strateРiМ militarв posture”. CСalermpalanupap sees it as “a serious possibilitв tСat soon CСina аill also НeМlare its ADIZ over tСe SoutС CСina Sea”.182 Previous studies have noted that Beijing may be seeking to achieve air and naval superiority over the South China Sea in order to turn it into a safe haven for her strategic naval nuclear forces, allowing submarines to patrol undetected and thus assuring China's second-strike capability.183 The recent leaks concerning the ability to strike at cities in the US West Coast could reinforce the attention paid to this aspect of China's ADIZ.184 The 180 181 182 183 184 BraСma CСellaneв “CHELLANEY: CСina’s Рame oП МСiМken”, Washington Times, 8 December 2013, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/8/chellaney-chinas-game-of-chicken/ Demetri Sevastopulo “CСina СeiРСtens Пears oП аiНeninР tensions in Asian airspaМe”, Financial Times, 29 November 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e657c1da-58bf-11e3-a7cb-00144feabdc0.html Paramesаaran PonnuНurai “Will BeijinР DeМlare a SpeМial Air DeПense Zone Over tСe SoutС CСina Sea?”, Radio Free Asia, 10 December 2013, available at http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/east-asia-beat/sea12102013211631.html “Пormer rear aНmiral anН МommanНer oП tСe Maritime Self-Defense Force's antisubmarine air wing ... Kawamura believes Beijing is trying to turn the South China Sea into 'a safe haven' for its nuclear-powered submarines, which are armed with ballistic missiles that can reach the United States. For that purpose, seizing the Senkakus — just 190 km east of Taiwan and close to the northern gateway to the South China Sea — is inНispensable, Kaаamura saвs” Reiji YosСiНa “BeijinР's Senkaku Рoal: Sub 'saПe Сaven' in SoutС CСina Sea”, Japan Times, 7 November 2012, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121107f1.html anН “reМent Нevelopments in CСina's nuМlear аeapons proРram suggest that there is another important dimension to Beijing's increasing assertiveness in enforcing its claimed jurisdiction in the semi-enclosed sea: protecting a new generation of nuclear-powered submarines armed with atomic warheads and based at Sanya on China's Hainan Island. "Without understanding the nuclear dimension of the South China Sea disputes, China's maritime expansion makes little sense," says Tetsuo Kotani, a special research fellow at the Okaгaki Institute in Tokвo” MiМСael RiМСarНson “NuМlear eНРe to sea Нisputes”, Japan Times, 5 September 2012, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120905mr.html “CСinese state-run meНia revealeН Пor tСe Пirst time tСis аeek tСat BeijinР’s nuМlear submarines Мan attaМk AmeriМan cities as a means to counterbalance U.S. nuclear deterrence in the Pacific. On Monday, leading media outlets including CСina Central TV, tСe People’s Dailв, tСe Global Times, tСe PLA Dailв, tСe CСina YoutС Dailв anН tСe GuanРmin Daily ran identical, top-СeaНlineН reports about tСe 'aаesomeness' oП tСe People’s Liberation Armв navв’s strategic submarine ПorМe. 'TСis is tСe Пirst time in 42 вears sinМe tСe establisСment oП our navв’s strateРiМ submarine ПorМe tСat we reveal on such a large scale the secrets of our first-generation underwater nuclear force,' the Global Times said in a lengthy article titled 'China for the First Time Possesses Effective Underwater Nuclear Deterrence against the United States.' The article features 30 photos and graphics detailing, among other things, damage projections for Seattle and Los Angeles after being hit by Chinese nuclear warheads and the deadly radiation that would spread all the way to CСiМaРo” Miles Yu “InsiНe CСina: NuМlear submarines Мapable oП аiНespreaН attaМk on U.S.”, Washington Times, 31 41 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 significance of China's ADIZ for Allied efforts to track Chinese submarines was described by naval analyst Pol Molas (Center Пor StrateРiМ StuНies oП Catalonia), eбplaininР tСat “Anti-submarine warfare (ASW), wherever it is 'played', implies teamwork. By imposing the ADIZ, Beijing could push out of the game one of the best ASW assets: the long range maritime patrol aircrafts. Without the constant watch of the MSDF P-3Cs squadrons, PLAN SSBNs could operate near the surface during wider periods, only hiding below the deep thermal layer to avoid the surface units threat. To be fair, Japanese ASW destroyers and diesel submarines are a serious threat to the Chinese SSBN fleet, however, without the Orion's 'ears' tСeв аoulН be spenНinР more time ПinНinР tСem”.185 Policy options open to China's neighbors. The different commentaries, official statements, and government actions, described to this point have already provided us with a view of some of the different options available to countries in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. We will now summarize them, grouping them under five different umbrellas: appeasement, diplomatic initiative, arbitration, a combination of civilian appeasement with military non-recognition, and defiance. Appeasement would basically mean accepting the ADIZ and its different regulations, including the demand that all planes, civilian and military, submit flight plans in advance. As is traditional in such situations, two views could emerge. On the one hand some voices may expect this to put an end to the tensions resulting from this development, and even pave the way to preventing conflicts emerging from the escalation of the different existing disputes. On the other hand, others may believe that this would only lead to further Chinese demands and end up leading to a conflict of even greater dimensions. Another aspect of the debate on the ultimate impact of such a policy is its potential influence on existing alliances. Some observers fear that, should the United States fail to appear as strong and resolute in the eyes of her regional allies they may conclude that they need to rearm and seek alternative alliances in order to guarantee their security. This could finally lead to a breakdown of the non-proliferation regime, should countries like Japan conclude that, deprived of support from Washington and unable to balance Chinese conventional capabilities, only nuclear weapons could deter an attack on their territory. This may, however, be too simplistic a view, at least on two counts (leaving aside the costs of exiting the current international legal regime on nuclear weapons). First of all, while nuclear weapons can lead to an strategic equilibrium, as seen during the cold war and at a regional scale in South Asia, this is no absolute guarantee against limited conventional attacks and asymmetrical force in the form of, for example, state-sponsored terrorism. In theory, a state could mainly rely on nuclear weapons to defend its territory and population, by threatening an aggressor to respond to any attack, whatever its nature, by resort to tСem (“tripаire” approaМС). Hoаever, in aМtual praМtiМe tСis аoulН be verв НiППiМult to implement, even more so when the other side also had nuclear weapons and therefore their employment would result in the mutual destruction of the two countries. A weaker country can indeed rely on nuclear weapons to prevent a massive conventional attack and to keep defense spending at a reasonable level while deterring a larger adversary. However, this reliance cannot be absolute, and will not allow that country to dispense with the need to develop conventional and counterinsurgency capabilities. Second, when unable to match a rival conventional force, resort to weapons of mass destruction is not the only alternative. It may also be possible to rely on asymmetrical doctrines and equipment, as has been urged on Taipei by some distinguished voices such as the US Naval War October 2013, available at http://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/31/inside-china-nuclear-submarines-capableof-widespr/ 185 Private communication to the author, 14 December 2013. 42 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 College's William S. Murray.186 Hardening targets, laying mines, deploying anti-ship missiles onshore and on fast patrol boats, are some of the potential tools. Another possible approach would be to launch a diplomatic offensive to try to, at least, reach some sort of agreement on the ADIZ (or failing that, limit the disagreements to aspects considered manageable), and ideally laying down a framework for the gradual settlement of the different territorial disputes and other differences in the region. As with any such ambitious undertaking, a number of obstacles could be expected. Among them, the large number of countries involved, the different nature and degree of intensity of some of the territorial disputes, and the difficulty of dealing with territorial disputes without at the same time tackling deeper differences. We must remember that some of these disputes do not just concern a given maritime border which different countries may draw through different lines, but significant aspects of the law of the sea such as the rights of coastal estates in their EEZ. The issue whether the Taiwanese can decide their own future and that of their children is also a major bone of contention, made all the more pressing by the feeling in some quarters that time may be running out for policies that seek to set aside the issue and keep the Island under an ambiguous legal status. In other cases, history is very much an issue, not only in terms of past events but also concerning current attitudes towards them and the way they are portrayed in the media and taught in schools. If we add to that the mistrust prompting some arms races, plus potential domestic pressure against concessions in more than a few countries, the picture that emerges is a complex one. This does not mean that it should be impossible to take diplomacy to a higher plane, although perhaps it would not be as quickly as we would wish. Some voices may prefer to try to first reach some basic confidence-building measures, to prevent an escalation of tensions, in line with Dr Patalano's suggestions. Next this could perhaps be followed by some partial agreements and maybe the setting up of some institutional architecture. China usually insists on bilateral dealings, rather than multilateral fora, which could be a problem. While some commentators present this position as resulting from Beijing's greater weight to most of her neighbors and mistrust of international institutions, the reasons may be more complex. Among them the cost in terms of image of seeing the long line of countries having territorial disputes with Beijing. A way to soften up this impression may perhaps be including all other territorial disputes in the region, in order to avoid portraying China as the only actor present in all of them. Another difference could appear between those observers who believe that negotiations on China's ADIZ could begin straight away, and those who fear that this could be taken to be a sign of weakness, thereby preferring to first defy Beijing's regulations in order to later negotiate from a position of greater strength. A third potential approach may be international arbitration.187 Could it be a way out of the current situation?. An answer to that question requires identifying its possible venues, the degree to which the parties to the dispute may be ready to accept it, and whether it may be feasible to seek an arbitration award concerning China's ADIZ without at the same time examining the underlying territorial disputes or even connected. With regards to the first issue, if all the parties involved wished to move forward with arbitration a number of possibilities would be open, including resort to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or an ad-hoc court. On the other hand, the Chicago Convention devotes Articles 84-86 to dispute 186 William S. Murraв, “RevisitinР Taiаan's DeПense StrateРв”, Naval War College Review, Summer 2008, Volume 61 No 3, p. 12-36, available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ae650b06-a5e4-4b64-b4fd-2bcc8665c399/RevisitingTaiwan-s-Defense-Strategy---William-S--.aspx 187 Which involves determinations of fact and of law, binding on participants, on not just a search for a solution to a single, isolated dispute. Antonio Cassese, International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 281. 43 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 resolution, allowing parties to take a matter to the Council and, if unsatisfied with the decision, “appeal Пrom tСe НeМision oП tСe CounМil to an aН СoМ arbitral tribunal aРreeН upon аitС tСe otСer parties to the Нispute or to tСe Permanent Court oП International JustiМe”,188 which nowadays would mean the ICJ.189 The text of the Convention does not seem to require the consent of all the parties involved. Therefore it may seem that even if one or more did not wish to submit the matter to arbitration, it could anyway move forward. Although arbitration is based on and requires the consent of the parties, this consent is sometimes contained in a treaty, so that by signing and ratifying it a state is consenting to arbitration in future instances, without the need to specifically consent to each and every dispute. The scope of such clauses, however, is not always clear. For example the Philippines have initiated arbitration proceedings against China under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), arguing that by ratifying it Beijing accepted compulsory arbitration, except in those matters where UNCLOS explicitly allows parties to opt out. On the other hand, Beijing says that the matters raised by Manila fall withing those opt outs and is therefore refusing to take part in the proceedings. At the time of writing the case is moving forward and an arbitration court has been convened, but it still has not ruled whether it has jurisdiction and, if so, issued any decision. Some observers believe that even if a ruling finally results and it favors Manila, it would unenforceable and therefore useless, whereas others emphasize the political and moral value of such an outcome for Manila and other countries involved in territorial disputes with Beijing 190 In the case of the Chicago Convention, if one or more of the parties sought arbitration and others refused, a similar situation may arise. Again, we may hear similar arguments on the ultimate impact of a ruling. Article 86 oП tСe Convention saвs tСat “TСe НeМisions oП tСe Permanent Court oП International JustiМe anН oП an arbitral tribunal sСall be Пinal anН binНinР”,191 but international law does not operate in a vacuum, isolated from political and military realities, and thus countries may be reluctant to launch such proceedings if unsure not only of the potential contents of the arbitration award but also of its effectiveness on the ground. Some voices may even fear pushing China into a corner. We must note, also, that in addition to the potential doubts about arbitration failing agreement to submit by the different parties, it may be arguable whether disputes on the declaration of an ADIZ fall within the scope of the Chicago Convention. Past arbitration cases have concerned different aspects of civilian air services, rather than the sort of dispute we are examining.192 FurtСermore, Нespite tСe provisions in tСe CСiМaРo Convention, “tСe CounМil Сas larРelв ПaileН to live up to tСe earlв eбpeМtations” МonМerninР “its arbitral manНate under Chapter XVIII oП tСe CСiМaРo Convention”.193 Arbitration has not made great headway either under the aeРis oП bilateral Мivil aviation aРreements, anН it Сas been noteН tСat “AltСouРС arbitration is a 188 189 190 191 192 193 “Convention on International Civil Aviation”, NintС EНition, 2006, аebsite oП tСe International Civil Aviation Organization, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf “PubliМations oП tСe Permanent Court oП International JustiМe (1922-1946)”, аebsite oП tСe International Court oП Justice, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/index.php?p1=9 For an overview of the Philippines-China international arbitration case, the different arguments and potential implications, see Alex Calvo, "Manila, Beijing, and UNCLOS: A Test Case?", The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Volume 11, Issue 34, No. 11, 26 August 2013, available at http://japanfocus.org/-Alex-Calvo/3988# Also published by The Asia Times, 3 September, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/World/WOR-01-030913.html “Convention on International Civil Aviation”, NintС EНition, 2006, аebsite oП tСe International Civil Aviation Organization, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf Vernon Nase “ADR anН international aviation Нisputes betаeen states — Part 2”, ADR Bulletin, Volume 6 Number 6, 11 January 2003, available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1259&context=adr Jon Bae “Revieа oП tСe Dispute Settlement MeМСanism Under the International Civil Aviation Organization: ContraНiМtion oП PolitiМal BoНв AНjuНiМation ”, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2013 4 (2), 19 February 2013, available at http://jids.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/10/19/jnlids.ids017.full 44 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 favoured source of dispute resolution by virtue of its inclusion in the bilateral agreements, in praМtiМe it is useН relativelв inПrequentlв”.194 Concerning the commitment to arbitration of the parties to the dispute, the above mentioned case initiated by the Philippines has confirmed Chinese suspicions of international tribunals. Of course Beijing is not alone in feeling little inclined to let matters of vital national interest be decided by ПoreiРners. It is no МoinМiНenМe tСat “tСe СeвНaв oП international arbitration аas tСe perioН betаeen the two World Wars, when Western States still made up a relatively homogenous group and were still paramount in tСe аorlН Мommunitв”.195 To this mistrust, felt by many countries, we must add the fact that many in China see International Law as flowing from an alien cultural tradition and having been shaped by some of the same forces which for a century kept the country nominally sovereign but in practice very much in foreign hands. Thus, legal disputes with other countries often do not just involve the interpretation of a given rule or its application to a given set of facts, but the legitimacy of not just that rule itself but of the legal system to which it belongs and which has given rise to it. This does not necessarily mean that it is impossible for international law to play a role in Asia's territorial disputes, but we have to be aware of this factor. Maybe it will be a different international law, incorporating Chinese notions, which will end up emerging and playing a role. Furthermore, even if Beijing was ready to submit the matter to arbitration it is not completely clear whether everybody else would. Finally, it could be argued that it may not be the best approach to try to tackle the ADIZ dispute without looking at the underlying disagreements, such as sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands, or the legal status of Taiwan. All these issues are inextricably linked and it could be difficult to reach an agreement on one without closely examining the rest. On the other hand one could also defend the view that peacefully solving one of them may help build trust and set up a precedent, on which others may be approached, leaving the most intractable ones to some distant future. The cases of Russia and Japan, and Taiwan and Japan196, show that it is indeed possible to set aside territorial disputes and reach agreements in areas such as economic and energy cooperation197 and fisheries, respectively. A fourth policy could be to combine appeasement in the civilian aviation industry, ordering carriers to provide flight plans to Beijing, with defiance in the military sphere, ignoring this request when it came to state aircraft and stepping up their presence in the ADIZ. We have already noted the two very different ways in which it could be seen, from a balanced middle-of the road approach designed to minimize the danger to civilians while preventing the emergence of a legal or diplomatic precedent, to a sign of weakness that may invite further unilateral action by Beijing. This 194 Vernon Nase “ADR anН international aviation Нisputes betаeen states — Part 2”, ADR Bulletin, Volume 6 Number 6, 11 January 2003, available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1259&context=adr 195 Antonio Cassese, International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 281. 196 Alex Calvo, "Adult Wisdom: The Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Deal", The Tokyo Diplomat, 19 April 2013, Shingetsu News Agency. The author would like to thank Dr Daffyd Fell (SOAS) for the chance to discuss this issue аitС Dr Alessio Patalano (KinР's ColleРe) at tСe RounНtable "Taiаan’s role in maritime Нisputes in tСe West-Pacific Ocean", Centre of Taiwan Studies, SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), University of London, 21 June 2013, part of the Seventh SOAS Taiwan Studies Postgraduate Summer School, program available at http://www.soas.ac.uk/taiwanstudies/events/21jun2013-taiwans-role-in-maritime-disputes-in-the-west-pacificocean.html 197 For a look at the prospects for increased energy trade between Russia and Japan, and its implications, see Alex Calvo, "Can Russia Assist Japan in Fueling Its Energy Future? ", Journal of Energy Security, July 2012 Issue, 23 July 2012, available at http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=376:can-russia-assist-japan-infueling-its-energy-future&catid=128:issue-content&Itemid=402 45 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 fourth option seems to be the one chosen by both Washington and Taipei, with Tokyo ordering her carriers instead not to provide flight plans. These different postures have caused a rift among allies, whose longer-term impact is still unclear. Finally, countries may choose to ignore the ADIZ, flying both private and state aircraft through it. This would send the strongest possible message to Beijing, while on the other hand it could lead to incidents endangering the life if civilians if China chose to try to effectively enforce her rules. As seen earlier, international law seeks to restrict the degree of force that may be used against civilian aircraft, but a fact remains: it is very difficult to stop one without physically endangering it. Additionally, some voices may see this as further fanning tensions, rather than working towards a solution. Others, however, may see a weak response as leading to further moves, as discussed earlier when dealing with appeasement. For the time being, the US and Taiwan seem to be leaning toward a mixture of appeasement in the civilian arena with defiance in the military. Whether this is a carefully-considered policy choice or an option by default in the face of a lack of a clear strategy is open to question. In the case of Taiwan, the country still has not decided what she wants to be when she grows up, or indeed whether she is free to decide what to be, and this complicates the Island's foreign and defense policies. In the case of Washington, Professor Andrew S. Erickson (US Naval War College) believes that “TСe U.S. Сas an impliМit МolleМtion oП approaМСes tСat toРetСer Мonstitute a strateРв ... but tСeв аoulН be more eППeМtive iП tСeв аere brouРСt toРetСer”. He is not alone in tСinkinР alonР these lines, with some voices being even more blunt. Naval analyst Ronald O'Rourke (ConРressional ResearМС ServiМe) believes tСat, аСile one МoulН eбamine “tСe МlassiПieН аar plans and decide if they reflect a strategy for conducting an upper-level war ...for situations short of war, it is not clear to me we have a strateРв Пor tСat”. He aННeН tСat to Нevelop suМС an strateРв, tСe US “neeНs to involve our allies — it’s not sometСinР аe Мan Нo ourselves”. O'Rourke's аorНs are significant in that they point at a key conundrum facing China's neighbors: the fact that in today's world there is no clear cut dividing line between war and piece, with countries often moving uneasily in some sort of grey zone, where a limited degree of force may well coexist with otherwise normal political and economic relations. Jim Thomas (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) МonsiНers tСat “We Нon’t Сave tСat strateРв toНaв”, anН usinР similar аorНs, SetС Cropsey (a Navy official during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations) holds the vieа tСat “No suМС strateРв eбists”, aННinР tСat “ПorminР one is НiППiМult”.198 Conclusions: another stage in long-running tensions, with the South China Sea looming large in the horizon. To conclude, we can say that China's ADIZ is yet another step in what for the Chinese is a return to their traditional status as a major power and the defense of their core national interests, and for their neighbors is unwarranted expansionism. These are radically different perceptions, very difficult to reconcile, despite the best efforts at diplomacy and a widespread desire not to see open warfare erupt in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. China, Japan, and the other countries involved in the tensions are aware that the key (from a Chinese perspective) to secure those major national goals or (from a maritime democratic perspective) to block them, is to effectively prevent (or respectively promote) the emergence of a well-coordinated coalition. This is why much expert and government attention, not just in Japan, has been directed at Washington's response and, specifically, at whether the United States would not just protest against the setting of 198 “TСe observations Мame at a СearinР late WeНnesНay called by Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., chairman of the House Seapoаer subМommittee, to НisМuss CСina’s РroаinР naval poаer” CСristopСer P. Cavas “No Clear StrateРв On CСina, Eбperts Saв”, Defense News, 11 December 2013, available at http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131211/DEFREG02/312110030/No-Clear-Strategy-China-Experts-Say 46 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS WORKING PAPER 1 China's ADIZ and stress this by deploying warplanes in the area without informing China but instruct its civilian airlines to also defy Beijing and fly through the EEZ disregarding instructions to provide flight plans in advance. The outcome for Japan seems to be a mixed one, with Washington having joined Tokyo in protesting the EEZ and even having flown two B-52s through it, but at the same time instructing civilian airlines to accept it de facto. Also worrying for Japan is Taipei's quiet acquiescence, although on the bright side for Tokyo President Ma's policy has been criticized by the opposition and some Taiwanese observers, and he may tilt a bit towards Tokyo to avoid accusations of being pro-Chinese and to gain some room for maneuver, something w0hich could help reach a successful conclusion to the current round of fisheries negotiations. This is, however, just an aspect of the wider confrontation gradually brewing in Asia. The major challenges for Japanese national security remain in place, and Tokyo will have to keep thinking of how to draw the US closer, prevent the finlandization or straight Anschluss of Taiwan, reach a pragmatic understanding with Russia, effectively coordinate with the other maritime democracies, and win the always important public relations battle, appearing as a responsible and peace-loving country while portraying Beijing as the aggressor. This, together with economic policy and the reconstruction of Tohoku, may be the litmus test to judge Shinzo Abe's second term as prime minister. China, on the other hand, would ideally need to find a way to secure her major national security objectives while preventing the emergence of a hostile coalition, a shooting war, a consumer boycott (formal sanctions are unlikely), or further damage to her soft power and prestige. Concerning Washington, her role in the Western Pacific may be at stake, although the way different countries in the region have sought her support these days that she is still seen as they key security guarantor in these waters. For Russia, a limited degree of tension may enhance her position vis a vis China and provide openings for greater influence in Asia and tradeoffs elsewhere. Some benefits, in the shape of better relations with Japan and additional weapons exports to Vietnam are already clear. Overall, there is still room for diplomacy, and ideally some sort of grand bargain providing an institutional framework to start solving the different territorial disputes and finding a way to accommodate China's desire to return to a great power status with her neighbors concerns. However, policymakers and observers are also considering other possible scenarios, however dreadful. Something they will be keenly watching is whether Moscow declares another ADIZ in the South China Sea, something which would widen the scope of countries directly involved in this controversy, including India and Russia, both of which have significant strategic stakes in Vietnam. Alex Calvo is a Professor of International Relations and International Law, European University in Barcelona, and Guest Professor at Nagoya University 47