586407 Theoretical Approaches to Social Anthropology 15PANC008-A13/14 Dr Mahnaz Marashi Term 2 Assignment 3 Words: 1,961 “Compare and contrast the theories of Lévy-Bruhl with those of Tylor and Morgan, and/or with those of Boas and his students.” When considering the contribution of Lévy-Bruhl against the theories of the earlier ‘social evolutionists’ or ‘descriptive anthropologists’ it is critical to place such works within the paradigmatic scope of their time. This reflexive scope is something which should naturally rise from the considerations of anthropological material, but in fact this is a product of modern anthropology and similarly fits well with the content of this essay (Scholte, 1974). As it will be discussed, the fundamental oversights which were held against Bruhl’s work by his peers originate from his construction of discourse, which led to his synthesis to be devalued. The author in question has provided great speculation towards the distinction between the ‘primitive’ mind and that of the ‘civilised’. This is achieved through the consideration of social/cultural systems which provide a society with a given set of rules to make sense of the world. The greatest value to originate from this work was to identify that these mind sets do not differ in terms of rational acceptance of causal factors, but to suggest that the difference between the two binary oppositions are separated only by logical and supernatural speculation; towards understanding a shared universal psychic (Morgan, 1877) (Tylor, 1871). Before debating how this form of thinking and its resulting theories were envisaged, it is important to acknowledge which anthropological works and which subsequent authors can be found in contrast (if they do at all) to offer deeper comparative understandings. In this essay I will compare and contrast the core theories and surrounding philosophies of Lévy-Bruhl to those of Tylor, Morgan, and Franz Boas so that clearer distinctions can be made between ‘relativism’ and ‘rationality’; if they indeed are found in opposition or in a dialectical fashion. Prelogique I consider Lévy-Bruhl’s primitive mentality theory with stark contrast to the nature of Tylor’s work on ‘social evolution’, it is appropriate to start with Tylor as a basis towards acknowledging the disjuncture of their works. Racialist concerns from both Tylor, Morgan and Boas arose from Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of ‘prelogique’, this theory explains an opposition of ‘primitive mentality’ towards the logic of the ‘civilised’; this cemented Bruhl as irrelevant, but was he misunderstood? Prelogique does not, like Tylor (1871: 1), understand culture as synonymous with civilisation “Culture, or civilization, taken in its broad, ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”. Evans-Pritchard dissects the term prelogique from his work - The Intellectualist Interpretation of Magic (1933: 39), to paraphrase this explanation; prelogique does not incite a kind of linear-evolutionary path to a logical society. It entertains the idea that ‘primitive’ societies are no less rational than that of the ‘civilised’ world but manoeuvre the rationality in the domains of both logic and the supernatural; it is a ‘closed’ teleological system where contradictions can co-exist. Comparative Method Consequently primitive mentality theory is both culturally relative and partially phenomenological (in the sense of differential experience, but does not argue like Tylor - Primitive Culture (1871) that culture is an evolutionary entity; but a position in the spectrum of teleological ‘ends’. The nuance that highlights problems with Bruhl, is Evan-Pritchard’s understanding that there are supernatural systems of rationality in the ‘civilised’ world (1933: 43), especially as he compares in binary opposition ‘savage’ religions to Christianity which differ in dogma; a fundamental distinction. Pritchard states (1933: 53) “What he has done, in fact, is to take the formalised doctrines of savage religions as though they were identical with the actual mental experience of individuals”, separating social facts from their systems of relation distorts the objective of collective representation. This conceptualisation of the individual as an emitter of cultural praxis is reminiscent of Weber’s social action, or purpose through meaning, in which Boas especially was concerned as he considered Bruhl’s language and separation from collective representation (Durkheim, 1895) to be affiliated with racialist motives. Considering this aspect of Bruhl’s methodology one must simply ask the question, how can Bruhl be truly relativist when considering emic accounts if he constructs a world of ‘civilised’ and ‘savage’? Why create binary oppositions (a paradigmatic trait) (Strauss, 1949) to possibly assume that all ‘prelogical’ societies engage a singular form of the supernatural, or not consider relatively that rationality is a product of its context and not attained to historic influence? Participation Mystique The above will be tackled through a closer evaluation of Franz Boas’s key theories encompassing both ‘primitive thought’ and Lévy-Bruhl’s theoretical context. Lévy-Bruhl’s Participation Mystique –the projection of subconscious identity with objects, animals or entity’s which precede intellectual and mental considerations, is something Franz Boas translates culturally as ‘anthropomorphism’ in his work Primitive man (1911: 197-200 ). Furthermore Boas is able to shed light on an acceptance of supernatural belief as the basis for ‘primitive’ man’s behaviour, as he understands Darwin’s theory that mental cognition is not a result of biological evolution but one of ‘random’ but developmental generational kinship transition. However, can we truly suggest that either Bruhl was inherently less ‘relativist’ than Boas? The Boasian idea of anthropomorphism lends credit to the primitive man which does not conceive animals, or objects as a singular domain of definition (as Bruhl), but Boas explains this through an understanding that civilised man is consciously aware of the linguistic association of concepts and so is able to distinguish overtly singular definitions and logical causes. What we notice here is that Boas refers to ‘consciousness’, and Bruhl to Participation Mystique, rather than suggesting that Primitive man made ‘unconscious’ - therefore irrational associations between cultural praxis and natural entities. There are two nuances which do not at first glance warrant attention, but I will mention them, supposing no definitive ‘truth’ can be asserted (by anthropological definition) but they will complement the critically and value of both authors arguments and highlight in closer detail their theoretical positions. Boas, whilst being concerned about Bruhl’s relativity towards his language of ‘Prelogique’ fails to understand his own interpretation that it may be coming from his misunderstood comparison of linguistic meaning or even his attempt to provide casual factors for ‘primitive thought’ (Boas, 1911: 239–243), similarly Bruhl’s choice of ‘Mystique’ appears to ‘fetishize’ the exotic qualities of the subjects under study, but does so by a analysis of primitive practises. This is of course, a critical part of the debate – how to define ‘primitive’ mentality, but of course to understand how this process actually manifests itself we must as social anthropologies seek behaviours towards meaning, not to speculate about cognitive prowess; Bruhl seemingly has done more to advance this notion even if was accepted as an ‘arm-chair theorist’ (Sinha, 2007: 684). How Relative can ‘Relativism’ be? In reference to an author which has not been discussed at great length, Lewis Henry Morgan similarly influenced the social evolutionary argument of Edward Tylor (using technology, ritual and sustenance to explain cultural evolution), formulating the preceding three stages of civilisation that Tylor later reshaped into Religion, Metaphysics and Positivism. Essentially this was the key concept Marx and Engels took inside The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884), as the three authors argued that humans lived inside matriarchal clans and developed socially through the modes of production I.e. weapons, pottery and fire ; this instigates evidence of universal rationality (primitive thought) through social evolution. To refute this argument there have been authors such as Sahlins (1976) which instigate, like Lévy-Bruhl with Prelogique, that primitive societies do not practice singular cognitive meaning towards the function of particular items, the concept of ‘private property’ nor strictly towards objects to serve a practical and logical purpose. Therefore as Pritchard (1933: 42) notes Lévy-Bruhl’s critical flaw: “Whom is one to accuse of 'prelogical mentality', the South-African missionaries or the Negros of whom they record that "they only believe what they see" and that "in the midst of the laughter and applause of the populace, the heathen enquirer is heard saying 'Can the God of the· white men be seen with our eyes…”; from this, a critical two sided argument arises. If we are to understand by the works of Lévy-Bruhl and the Boasian school of descriptive ethnography we must note that Bruhl is distinguishing himself with cognitive relativism (Littleton, 1985: III), not through the cultural relativist considerations of Boas. It is Bruhl’s theoretical ability to link contradictory meanings in primitive societies with the rituals, and actions towards the value of this mentality. Alas, even as this explanation highlights the significance of varying forms of logic it does not directly defuse the presence of rationality within participation mystique, both Evans-Pritchard and Bruhl acknowledge that ‘primitives’ understand intangible rational causes for natural events but also simultaneously attach wider supernatural culture. If we return full circle to the comparison of Tylor and Bruhl we can understand that whilst Tylor saw primitive society as ‘child’ when compared to civilisation. There is angst felt here towards rationality when he explains this point is not a comparison of intelligence but an understanding that primitive peoples do not exhibit behaviours of education. Is ‘education’ by Tylor’s definition an aspect of rational mentality or a concept thus related to forms of collective culture? The latter shows the situation felt amongst Tylor, Morgan and Boas against Lévy-Bruhl, thus he was pigeon-holed as racialist and his works were condemned only later to be reviewed by Evans-Prichard (1933). By acknowledging how cognitive relativity contains a balance of both differentiation of cultural praxis and shared rational ‘common sense’ Horton (1993) attempts to progress the idea of the limitations of idioms vs. substance and the role of science. It is through these later attempts to bring back the argument of relativism and rationality that we can begin to piece together an understanding if there is a difference between ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ mentality. Conclusion To conclude, I have asserted several different perspectives upon how Tylor, Morgan and Boas are held in contrast to that of Lévy-Bruhl. All respective theories around a primitive mentality vs. a civilised logic have been identified with their resulting nuances and theoretical issues. I feel this particular discussion has provided several platforms to launch casual and empirical accounts of if and how rationality is dichotomous towards relativism when understanding the nature and value of science, as anthropology is in itself a product of ‘civilised’ society. To understand Lévy-Bruhl’s position we now know that ‘Western’ science (if this is to be congealed under the umbrella of civilised) is a product of scientific culture within its own right. His particular understanding provides us with the incentive to acknowledge our own research biases and ultimately a shared humanity. It sheds light on the face of pure neo-evolutionism as something distorted by lingering enlightenment cultures. Yet alternatively the social ‘evolutionary’ theories of Tylor and Morgan express the differences of value and emphasis on technological achievements from society to society. This is important as it highlights entities such as education, fire, government etc to be objects of a grounded rationality or social fact; be it paradigmatically or a synchronic definition. In short, the debate of how rationality can be constructed universally vs. how relativism can be relevant to objective knowledge does not achieve anything by destroying the concept of the other (Jraissati, 2013). They appear to be dialectical, two opposite poles emitting two different layers of understanding which are inherently based on culture themselves. What this informs us as anthropologists, is that we can be aware of this situation, to use it to further our grasp of objectivity through process in a balanced state. References Boas, F. 1911. The Mind of the Primitive Man, New York: The Macmillan Company. Durkheim, E. 1982 [1895] Durkheim: the Rules of the Sociological Method, Ed. S. Lukes. New York: The Macmillan Press. Engels, F. 1881 [2004]. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Newtown, Resistance Books. Evans-Pritchard, E. 1933. Levy-Bruhl’s Theory of Primitive Mentality from The Intellectualist Interpretation of Magic. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Horton, R. 1993. Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jraissati, Y. 2013. ‘Proving universalism wrong does not prove relativism right: Considerations on the ongoing color categorization debate’, Philosophical Psychology, pp 1 – 24. Littleton, S. 1985. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and the Concept of Cognitive Relativity, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Morgan, L. 1877. Ancient Society, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Company co-operative. Sahlins, M. 1976. Culture and Practical Reason, London: The University of Chicago Press. Scholte, B. 1974. ‘Towards a Reflexive and Critical Anthropology’, Reinventing Anthropology. pp. 430 – 457. Sinha, V. 2007. ‘The conceptualization of 'primitive mentality': Reading Lucien Levy-Bruhl and Franz Boas as methodologists’, Asian Journal of Social Science. 35. pp 681 – 708. Strauss, C. 1949. The elementary structures of kinship, Beacon Press. Tylor, E. 1920 [1871], Primitive Culture vol 1, 6th ed. London: John Murray. PAGE 8