This art icle was downloaded by: [ 141.213.236.110] On: 16 Decem ber 2014, At : 08: 06 Publisher: Rout ledge I nform a Lt d Regist ered in England and Wales Regist ered Num ber: 1072954 Regist ered office: Mort im er House, 37- 41 Mort im er St reet , London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Publicat ion det ails, including inst ruct ions f or aut hors and subscript ion inf ormat ion: ht t p: / / www. t andf online. com/ loi/ cj ms20 Religious Governance and the Accommodation of Islam in Contemporary Spain Avi Ast or Published online: 06 Jan 2014. Click for updates To cite this article: Avi Ast or (2014) Religious Governance and t he Accommodat ion of Islam in Cont emporary Spain, Journal of Et hnic and Migrat ion St udies, 40: 11, 1716-1735, DOI: 10. 1080/ 1369183X. 2013. 871493 To link to this article: ht t p: / / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 1369183X. 2013. 871493 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTI CLE Taylor & Francis m akes every effort t o ensure t he accuracy of all t he inform at ion ( t he “ Cont ent ” ) cont ained in t he publicat ions on our plat form . However, Taylor & Francis, our agent s, and our licensors m ake no represent at ions or warrant ies what soever as t o t he accuracy, com plet eness, or suit abilit y for any purpose of t he Cont ent . Any opinions and views expressed in t his publicat ion are t he opinions and views of t he aut hors, and are not t he views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. 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Term s & Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 Condit ions of access and use can be found at ht t p: / / www.t andfonline.com / page/ t erm sand- condit ions Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2014 Vol. 40, No. 11, 1716–1735, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.871493 Religious Governance and the Accommodation of Islam in Contemporary Spain Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 Avi Astor This article analyses the governance of Islam in contemporary Spain. Rather than presuming the existence of a singular and all-encompassing ‘Spanish model’ of religious governance, I focus on the critical role of actual practices of modelling in shaping the institutions and organisations implicated in the regulation of Islam, as well as the concrete strategies that have guided policies of Muslim accommodation. Modelling practices, I argue, have been particularly significant in Spain due to its late transition to democracy and the absence of viable frameworks for regulating religious diversity from within its own past. In determining which frameworks to use as models for religious governance, public actors have been influenced by a variety of factors, including (i) their respective political and social agendas; (ii) the professional networks, organisational fields and other means of knowledge circulation through which they have gained exposure to exogenous models; and (iii) religious, cultural, linguistic and historical factors that have made certain models more accessible or attractive than others. Given that these factors have varied at different levels of government, so too have practices of modelling influential in the development of national and sub-national approaches to governing Islam. Keywords: Religious Governance; Institutions; National Models; Spain; Islam Introduction Islamic Spain, or Al-Andalus, was a major centre of Muslim civilization for nearly eight centuries during Islam’s ‘Golden Age’. Although the Spanish Inquisition had the eventual effect of eradicating Islam from Spanish society, Spain’s Muslim heritage remains apparent in its culture, language and architecture. Consequently, some view Spain as a potential bridge between Islam and the West. This view has been put to task by the re-emergence of a significant Muslim presence in Spain over the past Avi Astor is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel. Correspondence to: Avi Astor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel. E-mail: avi.astor@gmail.com © 2014 Taylor & Francis Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1717 Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 several decades, primarily due to high levels of immigration from Muslim-majority countries in Africa and South Asia. A recent study estimates that there are roughly 1.7 million Muslims currently residing in Spain (Observatorio Andalusí 2013). The growth of Spain’s Muslim population has coincided with several profound political and social transformations within Spanish society, including the transition from dictatorship to democracy and the shift from religious homogeneity to plurality. Amid these transformations, new frameworks for governing religious diversity have emerged at the national, regional and local levels. These frameworks have had a significant impact on the accommodation of Spain’s Muslim population, as well as the manner in which Muslims have organised and made claims upon the state. The aim of this article is to illuminate how these frameworks have developed and been specified with respect to Islam. Theoretical Background ‘Religious governance’ refers to the ‘regulation or steering’ of church–state relations and religious diversity (Bader 2007, 873). Several influential studies have linked the governance of Islam in European contexts to pre-existing national church–state models. Fetzer and Soper (2005) provide one of the clearest elaborations of this view in their seminal study on the governance of Islam in France, Britain and Germany. They argue that the distinctive patterns of Muslim accommodation evident in each country are rooted in inherited institutional arrangements and policy legacies regulating church–state relations, as opposed to the size, resources or social characteristics of their respective Muslim populations. Since the publication of Fetzer and Soper’s study, a lively and critical debate has emerged on the nature of national church–state models and their utility for analysing the governance of Islam. Some have argued that Fetzer and Soper exaggerate the singularity and internal coherence of church–state models, overlooking how such models are contested, fragmented and rife with internal inconsistencies and contradictions (Bowen 2007; Hofhansel 2010). Others have contended that approaches which attribute too much explanatory power to national church–state models tend to ignore variation within countries, as well as patterns of convergence across countries (Bader 2007; Nielsen 2009). ‘Models approaches’ have also been criticised for failing to address how and why policies shift over time (Bader 2007). The limitations of such approaches are evident in recent studies that highlight empirical gaps between policies predicted on the basis of national church–state models and actual policies regulating Islam (Maussen 2012; van den Breemer and Maussen 2012).1 In light of these critiques, I do not presume the existence of a singular and allencompassing Spanish model of religious governance that explains all aspects of Muslim accommodation. Instead, I focus on the critical role that actual practices of modelling have played in shaping the governance of Islam in Spain. My analysis builds on the work of neo-institutionalists who have examined the dynamics of modelling in both political-legal and organisational fields (Beckert 2010; DiMaggio Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 1718 A. Astor and Powell 1983; Meyer et al. 1997). Scholars working within this tradition have noted that both public and private actors tend to engage (either consciously or unconsciously) in practices of modelling when confronting conditions of uncertainty brought about by social change. In the sphere of religious governance, uncertainty may derive from a variety of sources, including political transformations that unsettle existing church–state relations, processes of religious diversification that generate new claims for recognition and accommodation, and dramatic events that call into question existing governance frameworks. Under such circumstances, public actors commonly search for exemplars that they may draw upon for guidance in their efforts to minimise conflict, promote religious freedom or achieve other political and social objectives. This, of course, begs the question of where actors look to find such exemplars. Bowen (2012) takes up this issue in his analysis of Muslim accommodation in France. He asserts that public actors involved in the governance of Islam draw on distinct ‘working schemas’ rooted in French history. He traces these schemas to influential national leaders and intellectuals whose political initiatives or philosophical ideas played a formative role in shaping French approaches to governing religion. He adds that it is possible for multiple and contradictory schemas to exist simultaneously within a single national space. Variation in policy trends over time in France, he argues, reflects different weightings of the ‘relatively constant schemas’ that have surfaced during the course of French history (Bowen 2012, 355). Although past initiatives and ideas advanced within a given national territory undoubtedly contribute to the constitution of national policy repertoires, they are not the only resources available to actors involved in religious governance. Scholars of ‘world society’ have highlighted how knowledge about various models of governance circulates through discursive formations, professional networks and organisational fields whose boundaries are not necessarily coterminous with those of the nationstate (Meyer and Scott 1994; Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer 2010). Such models may prove to be a valuable resource to public actors in need of workable solutions to challenges related to religious diversity. Being attentive to how models of governance circulate within and across national boundaries is critical for avoiding the possible distortions resulting from ‘methodological nationalism’, or the presumption that social processes develop and function strictly along the lines of the nation-state (Koenig 2007). The influence of modelling practices on the governance of Islam is especially important to consider in newly emerging democracies seeking to solidify their status as modern, progressive nation-states (cf. Meyer et al. 1997). In such settings, approaches to regulating religious diversity inherited from the past may be politically untenable or at odds with accepted international norms. Consequently, public actors commonly look to other national contexts for guidance in designing religious governance frameworks. Religious, cultural, linguistic and historical connections may play an important role in determining which contexts they look to for guidance (Holzinger and Knill 2005; Simmons and Elkins 2004). Public actors, however, rarely adopt exogenous models wholesale, but rather adapt them to context-specific material, Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1719 political and social circumstances (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Hence, it is possible for institutional or organisational diffusion to occur without generating convergence in policy outcomes (Koenig 2007; Radaelli 2005). In the analysis that follows, I argue that practices of modelling have been influential in shaping the design of institutions and organisations implicated in the governance of Islam in Spain, as well as concrete strategies of Muslim integration and accommodation. I begin by analysing the influence of modelling practices on the framework for church–state relations established during Spain’s democratic transition. I then examine how the specification of this framework with respect to Islam in the aftermath of the transition was shaped by the broader context of national redefinition characteristic of the period. The third part of this article deals with how practices of modelling influenced the state’s pursuit of its security agenda following the Madrid bombings of 2004. The final section centres on the impact of modelling practices on sub-national approaches to governing Islam, with a particular focus on the region of Catalonia. Modelling Spain’s Church–State Regime Prior to Spain’s democratic transition during the late 1970s, the Spanish state was officially Catholic, and the Church enjoyed wide-ranging powers and privileges in the spheres of education, politics and the economy. A Concordat established in 1953 between the Church and Franco’s regime exempted Catholic clergy from taxation, guaranteed state subsidies for religious personnel and solidified the Church’s control over religious education. Franco’s close ties with the Church built upon a long tradition of Catholic confessionalism developed through Spanish history (DíazSalazar 2008). Although religious minorities were permitted to worship in private during Franco’s rule, they were highly constrained in their ability to outwardly express their religious identities (Morán 1995). Towards the end of the dictatorship, a younger generation of reformist-minded Spanish clergy empowered by progressive changes within the Vatican, and pressured by the international community, pushed for the enactment of legislation that was more tolerant of religious diversity, as well as a gradual distancing of the Church from Franco’s regime. In 1967, the government passed a Law of Religious Liberty that permitted the creation of non-Catholic religious associations. This enabled the modest Muslim population residing in Spain at the time to create several small associations during the years that followed (Moreras 2002). By the time of Franco’s death in 1975, there was a general consensus among both political elites and Church leaders about the need to reform the existing framework governing church–state relations. Strong disagreement remained, however, between pro- and anti-clerical parties regarding the degree and substance of the reforms that should be implemented, as well as how they should be elaborated in the new constitution. Constitutional deliberations were influenced by the spirit of consensus pervading Spain’s democratic transition. Still vivid memories of the Spanish Civil Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 1720 A. Astor War (1936–1939) led both liberal and conservative parties to place great priority on evading a re-division of the country along traditional ideological lines. While preserving the extensive powers and privileges enjoyed by the Church under Franco’s regime was clearly untenable, so too was returning to the staunchly secularist and anti-clerical policies of the Second Republic (1931–1936) in the years preceding the Civil War (Gunther and Blough 1981). In elaborating Spain’s new constitution, political elites party to the drafting process looked to other national contexts for models they could draw upon as both practical exemplars for drafting constitutional provisions and symbolic resources for justifying such provisions through linking them to precedents set by other modern and advanced countries. In basing provisions regulating church–state relations on exogenous models, political elites also sought to preclude controversy by allaying concerns that their decisions reflected the interests of a narrow segment of Spanish society.2 After considering models from a variety of national contexts, it was ultimately agreed to establish a framework that drew inspiration from the cooperative church– state models of Italy and Germany (Motilla 1985).3 The appeal of the Italian and German frameworks resulted, in part, from matters of religious and cultural proximity. Arguably more important, however, was the general perception that these frameworks provided the best available option for reaching a workable compromise between pro- and anti-clerical positions. The resulting constitutional framework for church–state relations established the new democratic state as non-confessional and neutral with respect to religion, while also including a provision for the state to maintain cooperative relations with the Church and other religious confessions. This was satisfactory to defenders of the Church since it did not entail a strict separation of church and state, and included explicit mention of the Catholic Church. It was acceptable to pluralists in so far as it disestablished the Church and created the possibility for the state to develop cooperative relations with other confessions (Manuel 2002). During the years following the constitution’s passage, the state proceeded with adapting existing legislation to the new constitution. As part of this process, the 1967 Law of Religious Liberty, which still recognised Catholic doctrine as the inspiration for Spanish law, was replaced with an alternative law in 1980. The new ‘Organic Law of Religious Liberty’ (LOLR) stipulated that the state should maintain cooperative relations with those ‘Churches, Confessions, or Communities’ that had achieved ‘deep rootedness’ (notorio arraigo) in Spanish society, and provided basic guidelines for what such relations should entail (Ciáurriz Labiano 1984). The guidelines were modelled largely on the international treaties that the state had previously established with the Vatican in 1976 and 1979. Instituting ‘deep rootedness’ as a requisite for recognition was meant to limit the number of religions with which the state was obligated to establish formal cooperative relations.4 It referred to a religion’s numerical presence and territorial scope in Spanish society. A committee appointed by the Advisory Commission on Religious Liberty (CALR) subsequently determined that these criteria could be interpreted Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1721 historically, and therefore did not require that a given confession have a certain number of followers or associations at the moment of its solicitation for recognition (Fernández-Coronado González 1995). This interpretation was likely influenced by the fact that plans to establish agreements with the Protestant and Jewish communities were already in place at the time of the LOLR’s drafting, despite their small presence in Spain at the time. As I explain below, this had significant implications for the subsequent inclusion of Islam within Spain’s cooperative church– state regime. Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 Modernization, Symbolic Politics and the Celebration of Spain’s Muslim Heritage Although the framework of selective cooperation between church and state elaborated in the Spanish constitution and the LOLR was modelled on the Italian and German examples, the subsequent specification of this framework with respect to Islam followed a distinctive trajectory in Spain. Whereas in Italy and Germany Muslims have had to engage in a prolonged struggle for official recognition, in Spain Muslims were extended recognition at a relatively early phase of Islam’s development in the country. This, I argue, resulted from the instrumental value of Spain’s Muslim heritage for political projects aimed at refashioning Spain as a modern and plural society during the post-transition period. A central aim of Spain’s first democratic administrations was to repair the tarnished image that Spain had acquired during Franco’s rule and to bring key societal institutions in line with existing European norms and standards. At the national level, Felipe Gonzalez’s Socialist administration (1982–1996) launched several initiatives aimed at modernising Spain’s economy, welfare institutions and public education system (Espina 2007; Lawlor, Rigby, and Amodia 1998). Gonzalez also sought to enhance Spain’s international status and influence through lobbying for its inclusion in the European Economic Community and other international organisations. At the local level, major cities took strides to bolster their global image through encouraging foreign investment and tourism, pursuing innovative urban reforms and hosting major international events (Leontidou 1995; Smith 2005). Initiatives concerning Islam and other minority religions during this period were driven by the desire among public actors to partake in the construction of a more modern and multicultural Spain. Through relatively generous policies of religious accommodation, national and local administrations symbolically demonstrated the new course of development they envisioned for Spain’s future. Since religious diversity was not yet an issue of public concern, initiatives concerning religious minorities did not pose great political risk. In 1984, the state granted Judaism and Protestantism official recognition as ‘deeply rooted’ religions. Five years later, the Muslim Association of Spain (AME) petitioned for official recognition to be extended to Islam. As illustrated by the following excerpt from the petition, the AME strategically leveraged Islam’s historical legacy in the Iberian Peninsula to demonstrate its deep connection to Spanish identity and culture: 1722 A. Astor Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 The Islamic religion is of the spiritual beliefs that have configured Spain’s historical character. Our culture and tradition are inseparable from the religious principles which have cultivated the deepest essences of the Spanish people and being. The Islamic faith, for its scope and number of believers, has achieved deep rootedness in Spain. (Tatary Bakry 1995, 167) Although there were just 17 Muslim associations registered in Spain when the petition was submitted, the CALR unanimously approved the AME’s bid for official recognition. This decision reflected the overlapping agendas of the Muslim community and Gonzalez’s administration. Through formalising relations with Islam, as well as with other historically oppressed religions, the administration sought to fashion a new image of Spain as a modern, plural society that had transcended its legacy of religious intolerance. This generated a paradoxical situation in which Islam was recognised institutionally as a religion deeply rooted in Spanish society during a period when it was still viewed socially as a foreign tradition practiced primarily by immigrants (cf. Moreras 2002). The official recognition of Islam paved the way for the establishment of a cooperative agreement between the state and Spain’s Muslim leadership. As a condition of the agreement, Muslims were required to form a single federative entity that could serve as an official interlocutor with the state. Under the leadership of Mansur Escudero, a group of Spanish converts eagerly sought to take a leading role in the process by creating the ‘Federation of Islamic Religious Entities’ (FEERI) in 1989. From the outset, however, the federation proved unviable due to personal rivalries and ideological differences between the leaders of its constituent associations. In 1991, the AME elected to exit the FEERI and formed its own federation, the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (UCIDE). The state, however, did not compromise on its demand for a single interlocutor and pressured the two federations to form an umbrella commission, the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE) (Arigita 2006). The CIE was established with haste in 1992 so that the state could carry out its objective of signing cooperative agreements that very year with the three minority religions (Islam, Judaism and Protestantism) that had attained official recognition. The year 1992 was chosen for its symbolic marking of the 500th anniversary of the conquest of Granada and the expulsion of the Jews. The 1992 agreement between the state and the CIE established a series of rights and privileges for Muslim communities, including the protection and recognition of mosques as inviolable spaces, the right to religious accommodation in public establishments, the provision of Islamic religious instruction in the school system, tax exemptions for federated Islamic associations, and the right of the CIE to participate in the conservation of Islamic historical sites and artefacts. As with the agreements between the state and the Jewish and Protestant federations, the agreement between the state and the CIE was approved by unanimous votes. During parliamentary discussions on the agreements, elites from across the political spectrum celebrated religious diversity, emphasising the importance of correcting for historical injustices and recovering Spain’s diverse cultural and religious Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1723 Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 heritage. The following remarks of Juan Iglesias Marcelo, who spoke for the Socialists’ Party in the Senate, typify the rhetoric employed by political elites during parliamentary discussions on the agreements: Until the 15th century, as you all know, Spain is a meeting point of cultures, beliefs, religions, science; Spain is the common territory in which the great currents of Western thought and culture meet. Ethnically Spain is configured as a genetic soup of many ingredients: it is a crucible of culture, an extraordinarily fruitful linguistic amalgam, a pantheon where different gods live together. The nostalgia, which is still kept alive today, of Sefarad, the old nostalgia of Al-Andalus… are signs that that tradition is a tradition that must be conserved, that must be kept alive. Beginning in the 15th century, a gust of intolerance arrives, a gust of dogmatism. I do not want to be excessively severe with my judgments, but the period of expulsions arrives, the period of persecutions: the Arabs, the Muslims, the Jews, the Moriscos…. With these legal initiatives… we recuperate our best historical tradition, we return to a past that we should never have lost, but that we did lose and now happily recover. (Cortes Generales, October 14, 1992, 7091) The generous set of rights and privileges established by the 1992 agreement between the state and the CIE thus reflected the celebratory climate surrounding religious diversity characteristic of the period. Elites from across the political spectrum saw religious diversity, which was still relatively minimal in Spain at the time, as a tool that they could leverage to demonstrate their support for a more modern and plural society. Muslims took advantage of this climate by soliciting official recognition and negotiating an extensive set of formal rights and privileges. Models of Entrepreneurial Urban Governance and the Promotion of ‘Cathedral Mosques’ During the 1980s and 1990s, municipal governments in several Spanish cities actively encouraged the establishment of ornate ‘cathedral mosques,’ in most cases by ceding public land to mosque developers.5 The interest of municipal officials in cathedral mosques was tied to their objective of enhancing the global and cosmopolitan image of their cities through promoting multicultural architecture and strengthening relations with foreign governments and investors. This approach to urban development was inspired by models of ‘entrepreneurial urban governance’ that had begun developing in de-industrialising European and North American cities during the 1970s and 1980s (Harvey 1989). These models entailed a specific strategy of urban regeneration that involved dedicating increasing levels of resources to ‘placemarketing’ so as to encourage foreign investment, tourism and the arrival of creative classes (Hubbard 1996). In Madrid, a 12,000 m2 Saudi-funded mosque was erected on land ceded by the municipal government and inaugurated in 1992. Similarly, Valencia’s main mosque was built in 1994 on donated public land. In Andalusia, municipal governments were especially welcoming of cathedral mosques, as one of the main appeals of the region Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 1724 A. Astor among tourists and Arab investors was (and still is) its rich Islamic heritage (Rogozen-Soltar 2007). Hence, major mosque projects were launched in five different Andalusian municipalities during the 1980s and 1990s, though some did not come to fruition until the following decade.6 Barcelona was an exception to this trend in so far as no cathedral mosque was established in the city, despite its relatively large Muslim community. This, however, was mainly the result of practical difficulties with the specific mosque projects that were proposed and dissension between foreign Arab donors and the local Muslim community, as opposed to the disinterest of city officials. Indeed, Barcelona’s municipal government made a concerted effort to find a location for a cathedral mosque to be built in the city during the mid-1990s after Joan Gaspart, an influential businessman involved in the tourism industry, cited the need for a large mosque to attract visitors from Arab countries and to maintain Barcelona’s competitiveness with Madrid.7 Hence, in contrast to France, where the promotion of cathedral mosques was connected to the objective of fostering a distinctively ‘French Islam’ (Maussen 2009), the proliferation of cathedral mosques in Spain during the 1980s and 1990s was driven by broader strategies of urban regeneration and development. Indeed, the increasing prevalence of cathedral mosques arguably ran counter to the development of a distinctly Spanish Islam, as the funding for their construction came primarily from foreign donors. But since problems related to Islamic fundamentalism and Muslim integration were not yet issues of public concern in Spain, mosque projects initiated during the period aroused relatively little debate.8 Some local Muslim communities, however, voiced their preoccupation with foreign-funded mosques, as they perceived the growing influence of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Middle Eastern countries as a threat to their ability to fashion Spanish Islam in accordance with their own principles and traditions. Political Disinterest and Institutional Stagnation The seemingly unproblematic assimilation of Islam into Spain’s institutional and material religious panorama during the 1980s and 1990s generated optimism regarding the future integration of Muslim minorities in Spanish society. Several scholars cited Spain as exemplary for its inclusive approach towards accommodating Islam (Shadid and van Koningsveld 1995; Vertovec and Peach 1997). Yet initiatives concerning Islam during the period resulted from a specific set of contextual circumstances that proved to be ephemeral. Towards the end of the 1990s, the main policy programmes pursued by the state began to change, as did the political climate surrounding diversity. This was due, in part, to the victory of José María Aznar’s conservative Partido Popular (PP) in the 1996 general elections. Aznar’s administration pursued a programme of re-traditionalizing Spain through initiatives aimed at preserving Spain’s Catholic heritage and values, and devoted little attention to the needs of non-Catholic religions (Magone 2009). Moreover, high levels of immigration Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1725 from North Africa and Latin America, as well as the emergence of several notable conflicts between immigrant and native communities during the late 1990s and early 2000s, contributed to the construction of diversity as a social problem to be managed, rather than celebrated (Zapata Barrero 2003). As a result of rising rates of immigration from Muslim-majority countries during this period, the number of Muslims residing in Spain increased precipitously. Spain’s Moroccan population, which numbered just 90,000 in 1996, grew to 420,000 by 2004. Pakistani, Senegalese and Algerian communities also came to have a significant presence in certain parts of the country. Islam’s transformation into a minority religion with a substantial following generated increasing public concern regarding its growing presence in Spain. In several Spanish municipalities, mosques came to be perceived as symbolic of the ‘colonization’ of neighbourhood life by Muslim immigrants, leading to several highly visible anti-mosque campaigns (Astor 2012; Moreras 2009). Politicians seeking to capitalise on heightened levels of xenophobia, especially towards Moroccans, began to take a tougher stand on matters linked to immigration and ethno-religious diversification. The celebration of religious and cultural diversity characteristic of the posttransition period thus gave way to more critical viewpoints and discourses, particularly among the Right. This led to a new phase in the state’s accommodation of Islam—a phase characterised above all by neglect. Despite the fact that Aznar’s tenure in power between 1996 and 2004 coincided with the highpoint of Islam’s growth in contemporary Spain, his administration did not promote any federal initiatives to facilitate the implementation of the 1992 agreement with the CIE. This, along with the CIE’s inefficacy in making claims upon the state due to fractures within its leadership, led to very few measures of religious accommodation during the period. National Security and Religious Governance after the Madrid Bombings The Madrid bombings of 2004 sparked a new phase in the state’s approach to regulating Islam. Three days after the bombings, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and the Socialist Party achieved a landslide victory in the general elections. National security was understandably at the core of Zapatero’s agenda upon entering into office. In addition to buttressing the activity of government agencies formally charged with ensuring national security, the state sought to become more actively implicated in the integration of Muslims in Spanish society. Testimonies about the dangers of ‘non-integrated’ Muslim immigrants that surfaced during parliamentary hearings on the bombings were influential in pushing this shift in approach. However, Zapatero’s administration desired to avoid establishing initiatives that would single Islam out for unique treatment, fearing that doing so might contribute to the alienation of Muslim minorities.9 In December of 2004, the administration’s Council of Ministers created the ‘Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (FPC)’, an entity dedicated to supporting Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 1726 A. Astor the organisation and integration of Muslims, Jews and Protestants in Spain. Through creating the FPC, the state sought to enhance national security by combating social exclusion and promoting the civic integration of Muslim minorities—a strategy that was not unique to Spain (Bleich 2009). Although the FPC was technically private, it was publically funded. The creation of the FPC marked an important moment in the evolution of church–state relations in Spain, as it constituted the first direct avenue for non-Catholic religious entities to access federal funding (Hernández 2006).10 Until the recent crisis and change of administration, the FPC provided between 2.5 and 5 million Euros annually to religious federations and communities. The FPC was innovative in so far as it was without precedent in Europe. Nevertheless, its design and mission built upon several existing domestic and international trends. For instance, the creation of private foundations that received and managed public funding was becoming increasingly prevalent in other institutional domains in Spain (Contreras Mazarío 2007). In addition, instruments aimed at controlling Islam through providing financial incentives for integration had previously been developed in other European countries and in the Spanish region of Catalonia (Bowen 2007; García-Romeral and Griera 2011; Maussen 2009). Moreover, as I explain in greater detail below, the FPC’s emphasis on combating social exclusion and promoting the civic integration of Muslims drew upon broader European trends which had already begun to take root in certain Spanish cities and regions. Practices of modelling were thus critical in shaping how state actors carried out the new security agenda that emerged in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings. With that said, those involved in designing the FPC did not simply copy models from other geographic contexts and institutional domains, but rather adapted and innovated them through creatively exploiting the opportunities afforded by the institutional arrangements established during the post-transition period. Specifically, the cooperative agreements that the state had previously established with Muslim, Jewish and Protestant federations enabled Zapateros administration to design a foundation whose activities targeted Muslim communities and organisations without singling Muslims out for entirely unique treatment. In addition to providing public funding to Muslim, Jewish and Protestant organisations, the FPC has developed a series of initiatives to promote public awareness of religious diversity, improve data on religious minorities and facilitate access to resources of use to actors involved in religious governance. With respect to Islam in particular, it has encouraged Muslim associations to become registered with the Ministry of Justice’s Registry of Religious Entities, supported Spanish courses for imams, and published textbooks for Islamic religious instruction. It has also developed a series of electronic and printed materials that provide guidance to local governments regarding the accommodation of Muslims’ religious and spiritual needs. In doing so, it has become a transmission belt for the diffusion of international and domestic ‘best practices’ to different regional and local contexts. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1727 Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 Modelling Practices and Sub-national Approaches to Religious Governance: The Catalan Example Although Spain’s national government initiated a more proactive approach to governing Islam after the Madrid bombings, precedents for a such an approach had emerged earlier in the northeastern region of Catalonia. Within Spain, Catalonia is distinctive in so far as the Generalitat—Catalonia’s regional government—and the capital city of Barcelona’s municipal government have developed their own agencies and frameworks for governing religious diversity. In other regions, by contrast, issues related to religious diversity have generally been subsumed under broader rubrics of immigration and cultural accommodation. Although several other regional and municipal governments have worked together with Muslim organisations to institute measures facilitating religious accommodation, such measures have generally been developed on an ad hoc basis and do not necessarily reflect a principled approach to religious governance. Catalonia’s exceptionality with respect to religious governance has resulted from a variety of factors, including its aspiration for a greater degree of political and cultural autonomy from the Spanish state, the high level of religious diversity within its population, and the particular sensibility of several Catalan politicians to religious issues.11 Through establishing regional and local agencies dedicated to regulating religious diversity, public officials in Catalonia pursued the dual objective of augmenting Catalonia’s level of self-determination and religious governance frameworks that were more attuned to the specificities of the region.12 A central priority of these agencies has been to facilitate the integration and accommodation of the region’s sizeable Muslim population—currently the largest in Spain (García-Romeral and Griera 2011). As at the national level, practices of modelling have been instrumental to the development of more localised approaches to religious governance in Catalonia. However, whereas approaches to religious governance at the national level have been designed primary by political elites and technical consultants, approaches to religious governance in Catalonia have been developed by a wider variety of state and civil society actors. Given that these actors differ from national political elites in their professional backgrounds, networks and organisational environments, as well as in their political objectives, they have been inclined to draw upon an alternative set of local, national and international exemplars. Catholic activists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been particularly influential in developing approaches to religious governance in Catalonia, either through providing consultative services to regional and local authorities, or through their direct involvement in the design and administration of public agencies dedicated to religious governance. Their active participation in religious governance in the region has been made possible by the political trust they earned through their prior involvement in addressing the material and cultural needs of religious minorities during the 1970s and 1980s—before minority integration and religious accommodation had entered the agenda of formal government agencies. Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 1728 A. Astor As in other southern European contexts, the relative weakness of social welfare institutions in Spain has led the Catholic Church and its affiliated organisations to assume much of the responsibility for providing essential services to immigrants and other groups in need of assistance in Catalonia and in other Spanish regions, (Itçaina 2006; Pettersson 2010). In addition to being motivated by principles of charity and hospitality, many of the Catholics initially involved in accommodating Muslims drew inspiration from the Catholic ideal of ecumenism—an ideal the Church had begun to prioritise with increasing rigour since the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) (Aloisi 1988). Through their interest in ecumenism, several of these activists and NGOs became involved in the international interfaith movement, a decentralised network of coalitions and organisations dedicated to promoting mutual understanding and respect across religions. Some drew upon the knowledge and information they acquired from participating in the movement to promote the development of interfaith organisations in Spain (Griera and Forteza 2011). Through their work on interfaith relations, Catholic activists and NGOs in Catalonia came to be viewed by public officials as experts in matters of religious diversity and were entrusted with designing and administering more formal public agencies. During the mid-1990s, Pascual Maragall, then mayor of Barcelona, called upon Joan Botam, a Cappuccino priest serving as president of the Ecumenical Center of Barcelona, to create an interfaith commission to advise the city government regarding on how to address issues of religious diversity. Two years after its formation, the commission proposed the creation of an interfaith centre, leading to the creation of the ‘Interreligious Center of Barcelona,’ the first sub-national public agency dedicated to facilitating the integration of religious minorities (Puig 2012). The agency has subsequently been renamed the Office of Religious Affairs (OAR) and is currently responsible for the governance of religious diversity in Barcelona. The OAR was established under the umbrella of Barcelona’s Civil Rights Department (RDC), an agency charged with promoting human rights and combating discrimination in the city. As a result, the OAR’s mission has a strong human rights dimension, and its general philosophy and goals were developed through borrowing language from human rights doctrine such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the City (Grigolo 2012). In developing policies to address the specific challenges generated by Barcelona’s growing Muslim population, the OAR has looked to models developed in British, American, and, to a lesser extent, French cities with a longer history of regulating religious diversity. The selection of these contexts has resulted, in part, from linguistic factors, as those administering the OAR have generally been more proficient in English and French than in other European languages. But it has also resulted from the ties that they have forged with British, American and French organisations through their involvement in interfaith networks and coalitions.13 The knowledge and ideas to which they gained exposure through their relations with these organisations have been influential in shaping the frameworks for religious governance that they have promoted in the Catalan context. Consider, for instance, the following Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1729 remarks made by Francesc Torradeflot, the former director of the UNESCO Center of Catalonia, an NGO that previously administered the OAR:14 Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 For many years, we at the UNESCO Center of Catalonia helped local governments to manage religious diversity…In fact, we were one of the first in the country—even before the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence—to create a language [for managing religious diversity] through copying Anglo-Saxon materials. Because before they did not speak about the ‘management’ of religious diversity here in Spain… When I say copy, I don’t mean that we plagiarized, but rather we took their language and we circulated it here. (Personal Interview, May 30, 2013) The point here is not that the UNESCO Center of Catalonia and other actors involved in the development of approaches to religious governance in Barcelona and other cities in Catalonia followed a truly ‘Anglo-Saxon model’. This would presume that such a model in fact exists when the specific governance frames or initiatives that were drawn upon may, instead, reflect broader European and North American trends, or, conversely, highly localised approaches specific to particular British or American cities. The point is rather that practices of modelling were influential in the development of a more proactive approach to ‘managing’ religious diversity at the local level. In Barcelona, the OAR has drawn upon specific governance strategies and instruments that it has learned about from studying initiatives in British, American and French cities to expand its approach to religious governance from a narrow focus on interfaith dialogue to a broader agenda of promoting religious accommodation, consciousness-raising, and civic integration and participation. With respect to Islam, it has pursued these objectives through supporting Muslim communities in their efforts to establish mosques and other religious structures (i.e. cemeteries), combating ‘Islamophobia’ through awareness programmes in schools and government agencies, facilitating after-school programmes for Muslim youth to receive Islamic religious instruction, and promoting the use of intercultural mediators to resolve conflicts related to Islamic identity and practice. At the regional level, the Generalitat’s Directorate General of Religious Affairs (DGAR) has also been at the fore in developing a more proactive approach to religious governance. In 2004, the DGAR launched a programme that enables religious organisations to access public funding for integration-related activities. This programme, it should be noted, was developed prior to the creation of the FPC. The DGAR has also sought to open channels for Muslims and other religious minorities to engage in a more sustained way with public institutions and with the rest of civil society. Shortly before the 2004 Parliament of the World’s Religions in Barcelona, the DGAR supported the creation of a religious advisory council modelled on the example of Marseille Espérance, an organisation that brings together minority religious leaders and facilitates opportunities for interaction with public institutions in Marseille (Griera 2012). Despite the efforts of the DGAR and the OAR to facilitate the integration of Muslims in Catalonia, social tensions surrounding Islam’s presence in the region have 1730 A. Astor Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 persisted, particularly with regard to the presence, or proposed establishment, of mosques. In response to the high degree of conflict over mosques and other places of worship catering to religious minorities (i.e. evangelical churches), the DGAR spearheaded a ‘Law on Centers of Worship’. The aim of the law was to minimise misunderstandings and disputes over the establishment of places of worship through harmonising and clarifying municipal licensing requirements. After substantial debate over the law’s necessity, content and ideological basis, it was eventually passed by the Catalan parliament in 2009.15 Although it is still too early to evaluate the efficacy of the law, there are indications that it is being considered as a model by other Spanish regions. For instance, in the aftermath of several notable mosque conflicts in the Basque Country, the Basque Socialist Party proposed a law regulating places of worship that closely resembles the Catalan example. Conclusion The findings advanced in this article suggest that practices of modelling have been influential in shaping the institutions, organisations and strategies that have guided the governance of Islam, and religious diversity more generally, in contemporary Spain. Modelling practices were critical to the design of the cooperative church–state regime that has structured relations between the state and Muslim organisations. They also influenced the strategies of urban governance that contributed to the proliferation of cathedral mosques during the post-transition period, as well as the manner in which the state pursued its security agenda in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings. And finally, modelling practices have been instrumental to the development of sub-national approaches to regulating and accommodating Islam in Catalonia. In highlighting the role of modelling practices in structuring the governance of Islam in Spain, I have also brought attention to how such practices have themselves been structured by a variety of contextual factors, including (i) the political programmes and objectives that state and civil society actors have sought to achieve through modelling; (ii) the nature of the professional networks, organisational fields and other means of knowledge circulation through which actors have gained exposure to exogenous models; and (iii) religious, cultural, linguistic and historical factors that have made certain models more accessible or attractive than others. In addition to conditioning which models have guided religious governance in Spain, contextual factors have influenced when modelling practices have emerged and how the institutional arrangements and political strategies resulting from such practices have been specified with respect to Islam. More concretely, actors implicated in religious governance have generally drawn upon exogenous models during periods of uncertainty brought about by political and social transformations (i.e. Spain’s democratic transition and large-scale immigration) and dramatic events (i.e. the Madrid bombings). In specifying these models with respect to Islam, public actors Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1731 have been cognizant of Islam’s unique place within Spanish history, often leveraging Spain’s Muslim heritage to advance their respective political and social objectives. While public actors in all European contexts arguably draw upon exogenous models of religious governance to some degree when designing and framing specific approaches to regulating Islam, they may be less inclined to do so in countries with rich traditions of regulating religious diversity. In such countries, there is a more ample selection of domestic policy legacies and models of governance from which to draw upon when addressing the challenges of accommodating Muslim identity and practice, and hence less of a need to look to exogenous policy models for guidance. Moreover, political elites in countries with a long history of accommodating religious diversity are generally less anxious to demonstrate that the policies they advocate are in line with broader international trends. In countries with little experience regulating religious diversity in a manner compatible with liberal and democratic norms, by contrast, domestic policy legacies and traditions are generally of less use to actors engaged in the governance of Islam. Hence, one might expect practices of modelling to play an especially prominent role in southern and eastern European countries that have only recently begun accommodating religious diversity. Being attentive to modelling practices is useful for illuminating how patterns of religious regulation and accommodation are influenced by professional networks, organisational fields, institutional norms and incentives, and other factors that have hitherto received scant attention in the literature on religious governance. This, in turn, facilitates a more complete understanding of the diversity of actors implicated in the development of religious governance frameworks, as well as the manner in which such frameworks circulate between different levels of governance and across national boundaries. This is critical for explaining patterns of convergence or divergence in approaches to religious governance both within and across different national contexts (Koenig 2007). Future research might focus on illuminating with greater clarity the networks of actors involved in religious governance, the nature of the organisational fields in which they are embedded, and the institutions that influence the domestic and international diffusion of religious governance frameworks. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Pompeu Fabra University’s Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration for supporting the research conducted for this project. I am also grateful to Camil Ungureanu, Gloria García-Romeral, Blanca Garcés, Zvezda Vankova, Petra Andits and Lucija Stojevic for their feedback on previous drafts of this paper. Notes [1] [2] For a more comprehensive review of these critiques, see Finotelli and Michalowski (2012). Offe (1996) has highlighted this function of modelling practices in eastern European countries undergoing post-communist transition. 1732 [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 08:06 16 December 2014 [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] A. Astor Specifically, provisions regarding church–state relations in the Spanish constitution were modelled on Article 137 of the Wiemar constitution of 1919 (later incorporated into the German Basic Law of 1949) and Articles 7 and 8 of the Italian constitution of 1948. In Italy, problems had resulted from a lack of specificity regarding the criteria that different confessions had to meet to establish agreements with the state (Ciáurriz Labiano 2004). The term ‘cathedral mosque’ refers to large, purpose-built mosques with visibly Islamic architecture (Maussen 2009). These municipalities included Marbella, Fuengirola, Pedro Abad, Granada, and Malaga. Macpherson, Ana. ‘Joan Gaspart: Barcelona Necesita un Casino y una Mezquita para Captar Más Visitantes.’ La Vanguardia, September 11, 1994. The controversy that emerged surrounding a mosque project in Granada’s Albaicin was an exception in this regard (Rosón Lorente 2008). This information was obtained from a personal interview with José María Contreras, the former director of Spain’s Directorate General of Religious Affairs and the first director of the FPC. The FPC does not, however, fund activities that are strictly religious in character. The former president of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol, and Barcelona’s former mayor, Pascual Maragall, were especially influential in promoting the development of public agencies dedicated to religious governance in Catalonia. International events, such as the 1992 Olympic Games and the 2004 Parliament of the World’s Religions in Barcelona, also contributed to the interest of public officials in issues of religious accommodation (Griera 2012). This information was obtained from a personal interview with Cristina Monteys, a civil servant who has been involved with the administration of the OAR since 2002 (when it was still the Interreligious Center of Barcelona). The interview was conducted on 15 May 2013. The UNESCO Center of Catalonia was officially placed in charge of administering the OAR in 2005, though it had provided consultative services to the OAR’s staff beforehand. Responsibility for administering the OAR has recently been transferred to Bayt al-Thaqafa, an NGO founded in 1974 by the Catholic activist, Sister Teresa Losada, to facilitate the integration of Muslims in Catalonia. One of the primary criticisms of the law voiced by Church officials and conservative politicians was that it did not adequately recognise the special place of Catholicism in Catalonia’s history and culture, and failed to distinguish between the ‘distinct realities’ represented by churches and mosques. References Aloisi, M. 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