ICI, ON PARLE FRANGLAIS: FRENCH GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON THE USE OF ENGLISH AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE ACQUISITION OF ENGLISH Peter Hofstee S1054929 BACHELOR THESIS English Language and Culture Faculty of Humanities Universiteit Leiden First supervisor: Tony Foster Second supervisor: Dick Smakman June 2014 Hofstee 2 ABSTRACT The increasing dominance of English has given rise to various language attitudes and government measures attempting to curb the influence of English on the first language. France is a paradigmatic case of language planning and language policy, and even today many of the measures are still in place as to ensure that the usage of English is kept to a minimum. This thesis investigates the attempts by the French government to limit the use of English in the public domain, and asks the question whether these attempts have an impact on the acquisition of English as a second language in France. By examining not only the historical origins of France’s language management, but also the current dissemination of opinions and attitudes in the media, it can be concluded that many of the negative effects emanating from the government measures, such as relatively low English proficiency, are the result of France’s unchanged linguistic culture predating the French Revolution that continues to fuel France’s language policy today. Hofstee 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction 4 2 The origins of France’s linguistic culture 7 2.1 The spread of standard French 2.2 The threat of English to the nation and language 3 Policies, attitudes and opinions towards English 7 10 16 3.1 Language policy versus language attitudes 16 3.2 The political community: the role of the government 17 3.3 The speech community: discord among the public 20 4 The influence of language policy on English acquisition and proficiency 25 4.1 Languages in the French educational system 25 4.2 The effectiveness of France’s language policy 30 5 Conclusion 34 Works cited 38 Appendices 42 Appendix A: The linguistic regions of France 42 Appendix B: Influence of the Loi Toubon 43 Hofstee 4 1 INTRODUCTION Today the English language is, incontestably, one of the most influential languages in the world and, with “its growing global use as language of science, technology, sport, computers, popular music, trade and commerce” (Spolsky 76), it is nowadays widely recognised as a world language or international language of communication, the lingua franca. As more and more people all around the world acquire English as their second language (henceforth abbreviated as L2), it follows that gradually more and more discourse is taking place in the L2 rather than the mother tongue. This is evidenced by the use of loanwords and the rise of New Englishes, e.g. South Asian English and Singapore English (Crystal 144). The dominant position of English as a lingua franca (henceforth abbreviated as ELF) has given rise to various language attitudes, where the recurring question appears to be whether a language and its speakers should be protected against such influx. This notion stems from the idea that language and culture are interconnected, thus when a language becomes influenced by another language the culture of its speakers is influenced as well. This issue of linguistic purism is hotly debated: some commentators argue that this is a task impossible to accomplish, let alone maintain, whereas others, especially at the government level, insist that a certain degree of control or management should be maintained. As to what extent this control should be carried out, then, often remains unclear. As a global language, English can be considered to be a successor of the French language, which used to be the European lingua franca and “the language of diplomacy” (McArthur 377). Unsurprisingly, then, the French are widely known – perhaps even notorious – for their strong linguistic attitudes, not only regarding their own French tongue, but also regarding the dominant position of English. Within the field of Hofstee 5 sociolinguistics, considerable research has been carried out as to map the linguistic culture1 of France. However, little emphasis is placed on the relation between language policy on the one hand and language acquisition on the other hand. In other words, the effects of governmental policies on L2 learning appears to be somewhat overlooked. According to Stephen Krashen’s Input Hypothesis, which is part of his 1982 Monitor Model, acquiring an L2 is complicated or problematised if there is a lack of comprehensible input: “If input is understood, and if there is enough of it, the necessary grammar is automatically provided” (Saville-Troike 45). In France, anglophone television programmes are all dubbed in French, thus limiting the overall amount of exposure to English considerably. In addition, the French government creates French neologisms for anglophone words in an attempt to reduce the incursion of ELF. For example, cloud computing is literally translated with “informatique en nuage” (“Vocabulaire de l’informatique et de l’internet”). As a consequence, by restricting the usage of English in the public domain the French have more limited exposure to English than other European countries. These measures are just two examples of France’s language policy, which can be viewed from a similar Krashenian point of view using the Affective Filter Hypothesis. “The ‘affective filter’ is a metaphorical barrier that prevents learners from acquiring language even when appropriate input is available. ‘Affect’ refers to feelings, motives, needs, attitudes, and emotional states” (Lightbown and Spada 37). France’s language policy might therefore be regarded as a discouraging or demotivating factor in English L2 language learning. Within Krashen’s framework, France’s language policy might operate as an affective factor in English L2 acquisition. 1 Linguistic culture is defined as “the sum totality of ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, prejudices, myths, religious strictures, and all the other cultural ‘baggage’ that speakers bring to their dealings with language from their culture. Linguistic culture also is concerned with the transmission and codification of language and has bearing also on the culture’s notions of the value of literacy and the sanctity of texts” (Schiffman 112). Hofstee 6 The attempts by the French government to limit the use of English in the public domain raises the question whether these attempts have an impact on the learning of English as a second language in France.2 In order to answer this, a literature review will be conducted, focusing on three subquestions. First, what are the origins of France’s linguistic culture? It is necessary to reveal the motivations and driving forces behind the French ideas and beliefs regarding language in order to be able to determine whether their language policy works as intended or not. Second, what does the French government do to enforce and maintain these convictions? In other words, it must be determined what exactly comprises France’s language policy towards English, how it is carried out and by whom. In order to establish whether the convictions of the political community are a reflection of those of the speech community, a media search will be conducted, focusing mainly on (online) newspapers and magazines, as to paint a picture of the public attitudes towards the hegemony of English as reflected in the French media. Third, what are the effects and consequences of France’s language policy on English and acquisition and proficiency? In order to answer this, it must be determined how English is taught and to what extent students are exposed to English input. As mentioned above, these elements will then be discussed within the framework of Krashen’s affective factors. Finally, France’s language policy can then be evaluated in terms of its effectiveness: do the French succeed in rejecting the English language? In other words, do the measures to curb the influence of English work out as the creators intended, or are they maintained not for their pragmatic effectiveness, but rather for the cultural values that they (have come to) represent? 2 It is important to note that ‘French’ and ‘France’ as used here denotes the area of metropolitan France, or the so-called Hexagone, thus excluding la Francophonie, overseas territories and French-speaking countries such as Belgium, Canada, Congo, Madagascar and Mali. The term ‘French’ will thus only refer to French as spoken by the inhabitants of metropolitan France, since including other areas would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Hofstee 7 2 THE ORIGINS OF FRANCE’S LINGUISTIC CULTURE The attitudes towards the English language that exist in France today are the result of the long and complex history of the nation’s language views on ideology as well as language planning, which can be traced back to as early as the pre-revolutionary times of the Ancien Régime. In order to be able to put the current convictions towards English into perspective, an analysis of France’s linguistic culture is required, since the ideas and opinions towards English inherently emanate from the approaches to their own French tongue. The French language, itself a product of linguistic convictions, is incontestably connected with a strong sense of cultural ideology,3 including but not limited to factors such as pride, patriotism and national unity. In fact, many of the motives that underly France’s linguistic culture today are still, to a certain extent, essentially the same as they were roughly two centuries ago. 2.1 The spread of standard French4 Nowadays metropolitan France appears to be a uniform linguistic unity in which mutual intelligibility across the country is often taken for granted, but up to relatively recent times this was not the case. After the fall of the Roman Empire, Latin “developed into GalloRomance from about the ninth century AD” (Ager 15). This resulted in a large diversity of regional languages throughout the geographical area that is now the French Republic, which can be grouped into three broad areas. The Langues d’Oïl were spoken in the northern half of 3 Unfortunately, the term ideology tends to carry doubtful connotations, e.g. pertaining to totalitarianism. In this discussion, therefore, the term cultural ideology will be used instead, as to indicate that we are dealing with a form of social philosophy that is part of French linguistic culture. 4 It should be noted that, for the purpose of this thesis, section 2.1 is a general and rather simplified account of the spread of standard French. Hofstee 8 France; the Langue d’Oc, or Occitan, was used in the southern half of France; and FrancoProvençal in the mid-east of France (Appendix A, The linguistic regions of France). Also present are Breton in the northwest, Catalan in the south and Alsaçien in the northeast, which are still in use today. The three main areas, the Langues d’Oïl and the Langue d’Oc in particular, consisted in turn of a number of regional dialects. Hence, mutual intelligibility from the north across the south of France was nearly impossible due to the wide range of dialectal differences. Within the domains of administration and legislation, as well as in Church, Latin was used. However, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the use of French gradually started to take over from Latin. Several factors, including famines, epidemics and the Papal Schism of 1378, weakened the position of Latin even more (Judge, “French: A Planned Language?” 8). For the medieval kings using their regional dialects, the decline of Latin usage brought about the problem of codification in law-making. Since there was no uniform French tongue yet, only diverse dialects, “codification meant the introduction of precision into existing law and language was an element in this search for precision” (Judge 8). After a period in which legislation was documented either in French or one of the dialects, the Ordonnances de Villers-Cotterêts of 1539 explicitly stated that all administration should be written “en langaige maternel français et non autrement” (Caput qtd. in Judge 9). The decree is often believed to mark the starting point of the spread of the French language. However, even though its effect on written texts was highly influential and eliminated the use of vernacular dialects, it should not be overlooked that all this merely applied to two specific areas. Firstly to the domain of legal documents, including usage in courtrooms, and secondly to the aristocracy. Thus the initial spread of French did not significantly affect the daily life of the majority of the population. Hofstee 9 This aristocratic nature did not change when Cardinal Richelieu founded the Académie française in 1635. Richelieu wanted “to create a centralized modern state” at a time when the nation was “in danger of disintegration” (Spolsky 63-4), and in order to achieve this centralisation the state had to take responsibility over various domains, including language. As a consequence, the Académie was given “the role of central direction and control to the language” (Ager 22), thus further developing the codification and standardisation of French by determining what constitutes le bon usage, i.e. what was believed to be good and proper usage of French. This civilising and prescriptive role of the Académie can be regarded to represent the foundation of the origins of France’s linguistic culture. Indeed, “[a]t this time was born the belief in the universality of standard French, in its innate clarity, precision, logic and elegance, and its superiority over any other language and certainly over any regional form of French or any regional language” (Ager 23). The glorification of standard Parisian French, which was not solely carried out by the Académie but also aided by writers and grammarians, is indicative of the unprecedented manner in which the elite was now dealing with their language. It is therefore with the creation of the Académie that the origins of the cultural ideology of the French language that continue to fuel the language policies carried out today explicitly come into play. These linguistic views were about to change with the French Revolution (1789-99), which “attacked the linguistic distinctions employed by the aristocracy, thereby to create a classless French” (Romaine 93). In addition to achieving equality by abolishing the feudal system, or Ancien Régime, one of the main goals of the Revolutionaries was to create a unified Republic, in which linguistic unity was a vital aspect. As mentioned above, it was predominantly the elite who spoke the to-be standard Parisian French variety, while the majority of the population used one of the local dialects. From a Revolutionist perspective Hofstee 10 this was highly undesirable, of course, and it was mainly by means of educational reform that Revolutionaries wanted to eliminate this linguistic factor of inequality. The strategy adopted by the Revolutionaries was in essence twofold. On the one hand it embraced the glorifying nature of the linguistic convictions as initiated by the aristocratic Académie, and on the other hand it consisted of repressing the local varieties of French, so that “[t]he rejection of regional languages now became a proof of patriotism” (Ager 26), and as such now became inherently associated with the Ancien Régime. As the linguistic diversity gradually decreased because of the increased centralisation of the French state and educational reform implemented after the Revolution, the use of standard French became much more widespread. However, by the 1950s a trend of renewed tolerance from the government towards the regional languages can be observed, in which they were again allowed to be taught in schools – albeit on an extracurricular basis – and “by 1997, 12,000 pupils were studying Occitan in school” (Spolsky 69). This revaluation, which will be further discussed in section 4.1, is in sheer contrast with decades of preceding language policy, and, paradoxically, the regional languages are no longer suppressed at a time when the vast majority of local varieties (with the exceptions of Breton, Catalan and Alsaçien) have almost completely disappeared. 2.2 The threat of English to the nation and language Given the fact that the French have undertaken a considerable amount of effort to achieve linguistic unity, it does not come as a surprise that once this unity had finally been achieved, it should be maintained. The Parisian variety of French was attributed its believed superior qualities and universal characteristics before the Revolution and, at first sight, one might argue that the motives for France’s language management are strictly linguistic in nature, as Hofstee 11 witnessed by terms such as precision, clarity and elegance. However, these ascribed qualities are inherently subjective and reflect an opinion or sentiment rather than an objective property. The main motive governing France’s initial language policies, as outlined above, was to use language as a means to gain control and “strengthening national identity” (Oakes qtd. in Bakke 50) within a nation that is characterised by a wide range of linguistic and cultural differences. Because of their marginal role, in contemporary France the regional languages do no longer pose a threat to the existence of standard French, a fact that is confirmed by the government’s recent acceptance of these languages. Interestingly, the motive underlying the elimination of dialects is the same motive that underlies France’s current language policy towards English: extra-linguistic factors such as fear and pride are what fuels the linguistic culture of France today. This chapter started with the claim that French linguistic culture is connected with a strong sense of cultural ideology, as to indicate that we are dealing with a set of ideas and beliefs. As indicated in section 2.1, the link between language and cultural ideology is clearly present in the spread of standard French. Judge observes that the French tongue is often “seen as the ‘cement’ of the nation” (“France: ‘One state, one nation, one language?’” 45). As such, the French language has become a quintessential element of all things French: a unifying element of French republican citizenship and a symbol of the collective French cultural identity. However, from the 20th century onwards the French identity is felt to have come under pressure due to two factors. Firstly, the independence of French colonies after the Second World War led to the reduction of France’s political influence. Secondly, the emergence of the United States as the new dominant international power gave way to the spread of global English (ELF), which has gradually replaced French as the international language of diplomacy. This is evidenced by “the insistence of Britain and America in 1919 Hofstee 12 that the Treaty of Versailles be drawn up in English as well as French” (Grigg 370). Thus, it appears that in respect to the French collective identity, fear of disintegration is a driving force in France’s linguistic culture. The increasingly less influential role of both France as a political power and the French language as a lingua franca is seen as a threat to the identity of France, just as the regional languages were once seen as a threat to the unity of France. This sense of insecurity about the French cultural identity particularly applies to the dominant role of ELF and its hotly-debated connection with cultural ideology. On the one hand it can be said that ELF has lost its ideological and/or cultural baggage over time due to its global character, so it no longer carries with it a strong sense of culturally specific values of Anglo-American society. On the other hand, if ELF is perceived to carry cultural and ideological values specific to Anglo-American culture, as language and culture are seen as inherently connected to each other, ELF is capable of undermining the cultural ideology of a native language. The French conception clearly is the latter: Today many French people allegedly believe that the world’s newest international lingua franca, English, is similarly imbued with value-laden features often found to conflict with French values and norms. Moreover, it is said that many fear irreversible damage to their language and culture as a result of the penetration of the English language in France. (Flaitz 9-10) The French stance towards English thus stem from the belief that the English language carries with it “cultural conventions and ideological values characteristic of Anglo-Saxon culture” (Flaitz 2), just as the French government and intellectual elite believes that the standard French tongue embodies the cultural ideology of France. Therefore, English is capable of influencing or even corrupting the language and identity of France. Hofstee 13 Whereas other countries appear to be relatively sympathetic towards ELF, in the sense that there appears to be no strong desire to reject it, the French government acts otherwise. While France is not the only European country with an academy, as Italy has its Accademia della Crusca and Spain its Real Academia de la Lengua Española (Phillipson 14), the position of France in relation to other European countries is arguably somewhat different as their linguistic culture involves not only the Académie and the Revolution, but more recently and importantly, as noted above, the painful notion that the French language has been surpassed by English. This marginalization of French as the language of diplomacy, coupled with the “ideology of the intrinsic superiority of the [French] language” (Phillipson 47), has resulted in a lack of confidence in the identity of the French Republic. It stands to reason that if the government were confident about the nation’s national identity, the possible disintegration of that same identity would not pose a serious threat. However, the reduced political power and increasing foreign influences resulting from globalism are clearly seen as a fundamental threat to not only the French language but also French society. Indeed, “[t]he relationship between language and culture may be most strongly perceived (or imagined) during periods of national or cultural insecurity” (Flaitz 53). The reason for this insecurity lies in the interwoven connection between the Republic and the common French tongue, as the current socio-political unity of the nation could only have been created by establishing linguistic unity. Therefore, the strong belief in the ideological encumberedness of English results in fear as well as insecurity, which are the motives for the French government to attempt to curb the influence of ELF as to prevent the disintegration, alteration or corruption of the collective French cultural homogeneity. The motive of insecurity or fear is not limited to the assumption that English is culturally marked and capable of demolishing the foundations of contemporary France. In Hofstee 14 addition to fear of Anglo-American culture invading France, the purity of the French language itself is also at stake. “The French Academy of Sciences in 1982 saw a triple threat: the cultural and scientific dynamism of the USA, the laziness of speakers of French in maintaining the purity of the language and the burgeoning spread of English through the media and computers” (Spolsky 72). Recall that a great deal of language management has been carried out in order to establish a national and unifying standardised French tongue. With the dominant position of English, the French language and its speakers are liable to English influences, which has consequently lead to a sense of fear pertaining to le bon usage. Interestingly, at the time of the founding of the Académie, it was the French state that was seen as being at risk of falling apart whereas now it is the French language that is feared to disintegrate due to English influences, thus in effect breaking down what has taken nearly two centuries to build up. Because of this successful nation-wide achievement of linguistic unity, and because standard French has become the cement of the collective French identity, the French government promotes great pride in the French tongue, as it is automatically perceived as taking pride in the Republic as well. The language thus functions as a quintessential element of their image: France is no longer truly French without the proper French tongue. The Secretary of the Académie française confirms this claim by stating that the Académie needs to “fight against the pollution of our language, which is to our intellect what air is to our lungs” (Druon qtd. in Grigg 371). This conveys not only a strong sense of pride in the French language, which is seen as the voice of reason, but also a strong sense of hostility towards English, as it is seen as defiling the purity of French. At the same time this expression illustrates the profound seriousness and gravity of the attitudes towards English, which are characterised not only by fear or insecurity, but also by a sense of pride, hostility and Hofstee 15 condescension. Therefore, the main conception is that the French tongue is no longer truly and properly French if its characteristics are altered by foreign influences, but more urgently Anglo-American influences. This reasoning forms the basis for France’s linguistic purism, as language management is perceived as a necessity in order to preserve the cultural homogeneity or collective identity of France. All in all, the French language has come to function in two reciprocal ways. Firstly, it has been used by the Académie and later by the Revolutionaries as a unifying element in the establishment of the French Republic, in which it contributes to a collective sense of pride in the Republic and its language with its believed superior qualities. Secondly, by virtue of its capability to unite the French, both culturally into one nation but also linguistically into one monolingual group of people, the French tongue has become a fundamental part of the collective French identity, in which it functions as a defining component of being French. This notion is evidenced by the Loi Toubon, which will be discussed in section 3.2, which states in its opening sentence that “la langue française est un élément fondamental de la personnalité et du patrimoine de la France” (“Loi no 94-665”). The French tongue can be regarded as an artificial construct, as it was formed by language management measures into the unifying element that it is today. Similarly, the present-day French Republic itself is also an artificial product of radical revolutionary intervention, and as such the two elements of language and state have become inseparably intertwined. The linguistic culture of France is often frowned upon by foreign commentators, who are likely to be unaware of the cementing role of the French tongue. The English language, and in fact any other language other than French, is regarded with fear or insecurity as the government is afraid that these foreign influences pose a severely fundamental threat to both the linguistic as well as the cultural fabric of contemporary French society. Hofstee 16 3 POLICIES, ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS TOWARDS ENGLISH As set out in chapter 2, it is safe to say that language planning constitutes a core aspect of French society. As a result, the French have established over time an elaborate language policy consisting of an impressive number of official organisations whose role it is to carry out and maintain the protectionist language policy measures. This chapter focuses on how these measures are carried out and by whom. The main focus will be on government policies attempting to curb the dominant position of the English language. Since these policies affect the use of English in the public domain, the attitudes of the public need to be taken into account as well. Therefore, a media search will be conducted as to form an idea on the public opinion towards the dominant position of English. 3.1 Language policy versus language attitudes Up until this point in the discussion, the terms language attitudes, language management, language planning and language policy have not yet been explicitly defined. The terms language planning and language policy are often used interchangeably in practice, as both terms refer to “direct efforts to manipulate the language situation” (Spolsky 8), while in fact language planning, being a result of cultural ideology, is carried out by means of language policy, consisting of laws and governmental bodies. Therefore, the term language policy is adopted here because it refers to measures as carried out “by official bodies, such as ministries of education” (Tollefson 357). A second, though less important, distinction might be made between language management and language planning, both of which can be used interchangeably to refer to governmental linguistic intervention. Hofstee 17 More crucially, it is important to note that language policy, “often a short-term construct of the political community, is not the same as language attitudes, mainly the longterm beliefs of the speech community, although it derives from them” (Ager 215). In other words, the convictions of the political community are, ideally, derived from those of the speech community. The distinction between the political community and the speech community is crucial to the approach of this chapter, in which the compatibility of the views of the two communities will be compared to each other so as to examine to what extent the convictions of the political community are a reflection of the speech community. In turn, language policy can be divided into three subdomains: corpus policy, status policy and acquisition policy. Corpus policy “refers to efforts to affect the structure of language; it includes such processes as standardization, vocabulary development, graphization, purification” (Tollefson 359). For example, the role of the Académie is to influence both the corpus of French by creating neologisms, and to purify the French language by defining le bon usage (see section 2.1). Status policy “refers to efforts to affect the social position of language varieties” (359), of which the elimination of dialects by strengthening the social status of Parisian French is a prime example. Finally, acquisition policy refers to “second/ foreign language teaching” (359), which will be discussed in chapter 4. In other words, these are the three main domains to which the policies apply, and the corpus policy towards English will be discussed below. 3.2 The political community: the role of the government France does not have a language policy that is specifically directed at the influence of the English language. Rather, the policies are only formulated and presented in relation to the French language. In public discourse and the media the threat of English is explicitly Hofstee 18 mentioned, whereas the policies and laws remain implicit about which languages pose a threat to French. Consequently, the government measures carried out to curb the influence of English are in effect measures not to prevent the usage of one specific language, but rather measures in general to protect the French language from foreign linguistic influences – regardless of whether these are English, Spanish, German, regional languages or dialects. However, this perspective does not imply that all of the non-Francophone influences are equally important or urgent: the threat of the French regional languages has ceased whereas the English language has emerged as the top priority. From the 1930s onwards the concern for the native tongue has resulted in a number of organisations whose task it is to watch over the French language, of which the first was the Office National de la Langue Française. The period after the Second World War, with the United States increasingly becoming a dominant super-power, saw the establishment of the Comité d’Étude des Termes Techniques Français (1954) to ensure that technological terminology could remain available in French, and a more general Office du Vocabulaire Français was founded shortly afterwards in 1957. As the perceived threat of linguistic colonisation mounted, the governmental bodies became more targeted. The Défense de la Langue Française (1959) and the Haut Comité pour la Défense et l’Expansion de la Langue Française (1966) indicated that the language issue was now seen in more and more serious terms. The influences entering French became a battle, in that they evolved into a force that should be fought against. Indeed, in 1986 former president François Mitterand stated that “France is engaged in a war with Anglo-Saxon” (qtd. in Grigg 368). Language policy had become a measure resulting from what is perceived by the political community as a conflict that needs to be fought out. Hofstee 19 Further, the usage of French in the public domain was enforced by the Loi BasLauriol of 1975, which “established that French must be used in commerce, in public places, in the media and in public service” (Spolsky 66-7). This law was replaced in 1994 by the more elaborate Loi Toubon, named after the then minister of culture and Francophonie Jacques Toubon. The perceived seriousness of the language conflict is illustrated by Toubon’s statement that the “[u]se of a foreign language is not always innocent . . . it can become an instrument of domination” (Toubon qtd. in Grigg 373). As the main legislative measure of France’s corpus policy, this law made French usage obligatory in the public domain, including all advertising, colloquia, seminars and public services (“Loi no 94-665”). Even today, advertising slogans which are not in French need to be accompanied by a translation into French (Appendix B, Influence of the Loi Toubon). In case of recurrent or severe failure to comply to the law’s provisions, a fine is imposed. Interestingly, the Loi Toubon is explained by the Académie as a measure to assure “le droit dont dispose chaque Français de pouvoir utiliser sa langue dans les divers domaines de la vie quotidienne” (“Terminologie et néologie”). In other words, French citizens have the fundamental right to use their mother tongue, and according to the Académie, the French are effectively denied the right to do so if the national language is affected by non-Francophone influences. This reasoning implicitly refers back to the the equalising and homogenising role of language as initiated by the Revolution. All in all, the mission of these language policies is to fight foreign linguistic influences, so as to preserve the purity of French and therefore to protect the French identity and culture. Of these influences, the perceived threat of the Anglo-American invasion is seen as the most urgent and most important. More specifically, the elaborate French institutionalisation and legislation indicate that the main focus of the political community is Hofstee 20 not so much on socio-cultural influences, but rather on what is known as Franglais, namely “English words and expressions, used in French” (Ager 98). For example, the Académie française continues to create neologisms as proper French alternatives for their English counterparts (“Terminologie et néologie”). Therefore, modifying Mitterand’s original claim above, France is not so much engaged in a war with Anglo-Saxon, but rather is the French political community engaged in a war with Franglais. 3.3 The speech community: discord among the public The public opinion towards the dominant position of English and its increasing influence on the French language through Franglais is not easy to gauge. Indeed, Ager observes that, whether “the French public, as apart from such members of the intelligentsia, really support condemnations of American language and culture . . . is difficult to tell” (108). Similarly, Flaitz noted as early as 1988 that there might be a “schism that appears to exist between the power elite and the general public regarding attitudes toward the ideological encumberedness of English” (203). Apart from the cultural and political elite, there is little recent documentation regarding the opinions and beliefs of the speech community. A SOFRES poll conducted in March 1994 concluded that the public was evenly divided over the usage of English or Anglicisms in French by public utilities. One half of the respondents labelled it as “shocking” and “bad” while the other half labelled it as “not shocking” and “good” (SOFRES qtd. in Ager 110). Moreover, the majority of respondents viewed the use of Franglais “modern” and “useful” (110-1). The motives of fear and insecurity, as felt by the political community, were thus not shared as such by the speech community. Since 1994 many new originally Anglo-American terms have spread all over the globe. Many people gained access to high-speed Internet, were able to buy a smartphone, or Hofstee 21 ordiphone, and the first decade of the 21st century saw the rise of social media, or reseaux sociaux. As a result, Anglicisms are proliferating in French. The Commission générale de terminologie et de néologie, created by decree in 1996, consists of eighteen specialised terminology commissions (“Enrichissement de la langue”), and it has the task of attempting to reverse the flood of Anglicisms by creating neologisms. An online poll of 2010 shows that 67 per cent of the respondents agree to the question whether Anglicisms should be excluded from the French language, while 24,3 per cent of the respondents disagreed (“Faut-il se séparer des anglicismes dans la langue française ?”). The opinion of the speech community thus appears to indicate a considerable overlap with the convictions of the political community. However, a large number of these proposed alternatives appear to be only scarcely adopted amongst the general public, for a number of reasons. Firstly, certain English words are already widely adopted by the general public before the Commission publishes an equivalent. This is the case with clavardage as a translation for the English chat (“La chasse aux anglicismes est rouverte”), and with ordiphone for the English smartphone (Appendix B, Influence of the Loi Toubon). Therefore, many of the Francophone alternatives are simply redundant since the English word has been widely adopted prior to translation. Secondly, because most recommendations are literal translations, of which some are very lengthy, they are prone to cause misunderstandings and lead to semantic difficulties (Auffray). Finally, many of the proposals seem to be considered as laughable and ridiculous, as commentators acknowledge that they are very unlikely to gain wide acceptance by the general public (“‘Mot-dièse’ pour ‘hashtag’, ‘ordiphone’ pour ‘smartphone’ : ces mots que vous n'utiliserez jamais”). “The most ludicrous recommendation, because of its length, is perhaps the official alternative to ‘cashflow’, which unsurprisingly is unpopular: la marge brute Hofstee 22 d’autofinancement” (Grigg 380). In other words, there appears to be a problem of supply and demand: for roughly half of the inhabitants of France, these recommended alternatives are not what the public is calling for. The Commission might therefore run the risk of becoming the object of ridicule of France’s language policy in the future. Having moved with the times, the Ministry of Culture and Communication has created a website called FranceTerme, which gathers all of the official French alternatives for Anglicisms published by the French government. The terms are categorised according to 82 different semantic fields, and the five domains containing the most terms are, from small to large: telecommunication; information technology; chemistry; biology; and space science and engineering. These semantic domains hint at the fact that the far majority of the French recommendations are highly specialised and technical in nature, and can therefore not be compared to a dictionary of language in general. In addition to the website’s extensive terminology database, there is also a more general section – though considerably smaller in size – called Recommandations d’usage, aimed at the usage of French alternatives in everyday language usage: for example, the recommendation for street basketball is basket de rue (“Street / Recommandations d’usage”). However, a search on Google.fr for both exact terms returned 943 000 results for street basketball and 70 400 for basket de rue, which indicates that a large proportion of the speech community appears to favour the Anglicism over the proposed alternative. The apparent ineffectiveness of the Commission indicates that the usage of English in contemporary France is becoming more and more widespread. The writer and philosopher Yves Paccalet distinguishes five kinds of people who impose their “flemmardise orale ou écrite”: economists, marketing professionals, sports journalists, news presenters and users of the Internet, or as Paccalet somewhat condescending calls them, “les adorateurs d’internet.” Hofstee 23 His argument against the people who use Anglicisms is strongly worded: he declares war to Anglicisms, of which the users are murderers of the French language, and enemies of Molière and Voltaire. His writing thus bears strong resemblance to the fierce rhetoric employed by the political community. By referring to France’s literary heritage, Paccalet implicitly acknowledges the defining role of French as a fundamental part of the French identity. Interestingly, he is unable to pinpoint why he is so vehemently against the “franglophones.” Instead, he merely expresses his frustration with the large diversity of English words which, in his view, could have easily been French words, e.g. the name of French supermarket chain Carrefour Market instead of Carrefour Marché. If the attitudes of the general public are to be categorised, “l’opinion se divise entre puristes et modernistes” (Journet). With Paccalet belonging to the first group, the purists focus on the historical, cultural and literary significance of proper French, as traceable to the cultural ideology originating from the Académie and the Revolution (see chapter 2.1). Maurice Druon, Secretary of the Académie française, implicitly acknowledged this division by saying that on the one hand the use of English needs to be fought against, while on the other hand France may need to “bow to reality and include a wave of Anglo-American words” (qtd. in Grigg 371). Recurring arguments in the discussion are the importance of tradition and cultural heritage, as opposed to being tolerant to modernism and open to societal changes, both linguistically and culturally. In addition, it is tempting to distinguish the public opinion according to age. In general, young people and adolescents are more prone than older generations to AngloAmerican culture, its music and films, its slang, and therefore also its language. In addition, younger generations are likely to carry a more neutral and less serious or combative attitude towards English, because English constitutes a large part of their youth culture. According to Hofstee 24 Oakes, they have less “national consciousness [and do not identify with] the prescriptive and purist attitudes normally associated with linguistic consciousness in France” (qtd. in Bakke 51). Indeed, usage of “cool” and “fun” are commonplace, and expressions such as “J’peux pas te parler, je suis dans le rush. Je suis hyper speed, là!” (Cziffra) indicate that the English language is undoubtedly gaining ground amongst the younger generations. However, as tempting as generalisations of this kind might be, the public opinion towards English across various generations needs to be better documented as hard data are lacking. All in all, Flaitz’s claim of a possible schism between the power elite and the general public needs to be modified, albeit with caution. The distribution of attitudes among the general public of France is far more complex than a simple dichotomy between the political community on the one hand and the speech community on the other hand. That is to say, the speech community clearly shows disunity in its opinions and attitudes, as the general public is divided between on the one hand a traditionalist or purist view, emphasising the destruction of the French language in general, especially by English and its perceived invasion of Anglicisms, and on the other hand a more acceptant, modernist view, in which English usage is seen as enriching and exciting. Furthermore, the factor of age complicates this picture even more, and future research is needed to investigate and describe the current dissension of the general public more precisely and accurately. Hofstee 25 4 THE INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE POLICY ON ENGLISH ACQUISITION AND PROFICIENCY So far we have seen that the current language situation in metropolitan France, as increasingly influenced by ELF, has given rise to various tensions. In politics there is fear or insecurity about the threat of English to the French nation-state. Among the general public there is on the one hand concern for the French language, while on the other hand there is a degree of acceptance towards the idea that English is gaining ground. Within the context of foreign or second language learning and teaching, a similarly complex picture has emerged. This chapter attempts to investigate the influence of France’s language policy on English L2 acquisition and proficiency. Taking into consideration Krashen’s Input Hypothesis and Affective Filter Hypothesis (see chapter 1), this chapter postulates that France’s language policy might operate as an affective factor in L2 acquisition, in that it may problematise the learning process in certain respects, e.g. limiting English input and exposure. Finally, the language policy of the French Republic can then be evaluated in terms of its effectiveness. 4.1 Languages in the French educational system In France’s acquisition policy, a tripartite distinction is made for all languages other than French: “languages have been called either ‘foreign’ (English, Spanish, German, etc.), ‘regional’ (Breton, Basque, Creole, Catalan, Occitan, Corsican, etc.) or ‘of origin’ (Arabic, Turkish, Polish, Portuguese, etc.)” (Héliot 257). As mentioned at the end of section 2.1, the regional languages of metropolitan France such as Occitan or Breton have gradually gained a more prominent status in the French educational system since the 1950s. Unfortunately, the Hofstee 26 teaching of such languages was extracurricular and based on voluntarily demand, thus successful and effective acquisition largely depended on the motivation of both pupils and teachers. As a consequence, the current role of regional languages has remained marginal on a national level, but is still very much alive and supported on a regional level. Of all the foreign and regional languages and languages of origin available in school today, “English is by far the most popular foreign language in education everywhere. As a proportion of enrolments, it regularly exceeds 95 percent” (Ager 201). Moreover, not just within the borders of metropolitan France, but “of all the major countries of Western Europe, France has the highest percentage of secondary school students enrolled in English classes” (Flaitz 9). Interestingly, “78.5% of students chose to study English in primary school [as it] is seen by students and their parents as a way to access information in English, and to ensure better career and job opportunities” (Uysal et al. 201). In order to keep up with other Western European countries, “many French see English as a tool necessary for success in the age of globalisation” (200) and therefore English is widely favoured over other languages offered within the French educational system. Due to its dominant position, there are clear advantages and benefits in the learning of English, while at the same time, the language will consequently become more dominant as the number of L2 speakers continues to increase since mastering English is gradually becoming more of a necessity rather than a choice. This increased demand is evidenced by “the tendency for business schools in France, not just to use Anglicisms, but to give whole classes in English” (Grigg 380). All in all, the global status of ELF thus provides the instrumental motivation, i.e. “language learning for more immediate or practical goals” (Lightbown and Spada 64), for the French to choose English as an L2, as not doing so is considered to be a limitation in terms of success and one risks of falling behind. Hofstee 27 In order to counter the popularity of the English language in education, a “general reform for the teaching of foreign languages” (Héliot 255) was initiated since 2002 by the former Ministry of Education. The main policy aim was that of “diversification of language choice” (Ager 202) in order “to avoid domination by English” (202). Yet, despite being seen as a threat to France, English L2 acquisition was given a more prominent role, too: “starting from 2004/05, the teaching of English will start one year earlier. Consequently, the French, who used to start learning English at the age of 10 or 11, will in 3 years time start at the age of 6 or 7” (Bakke 44). The problem facing the acquisition policy makers was the fact that this strategy of diversification, which pertains to all languages other than French, necessarily also included the arch-enemy, the English language. A radically different approach consisting of simply excluding English from French education in its entirety has been attempted in the 1970s. Unsurprisingly, however, this strategy has met with fierce opposition and was abandoned quickly (Ager 202). Instead, the government expects that, as the range of languages has been broadened, more pupils will choose foreign and/or regional languages. As for English, learning an L2 at an earlier age should – ideally and theoretically – increase the speaker’s proficiency. However, the contrary appears to be the case according to the English Proficiency Index by Education First, which “ranks 60 countries and territories by adult English proficiency” (EPI 5) using two types of online tests.5 According to the report, English proficiency is declining rather than increasing, although it should be noted that in relative terms the decline is small. France is currently ranked 35th place, “according to data gathered on over 150,000 French adults between 2007 and 2012” (EPI 22). By way of 5 One of which is open to anyone, the other is a placement test used when students enrol for an English course. “Both [tests] include grammar, vocabulary, reading, and listening sections. The open online test is a 30-question adaptive exam, so each test-taker’s questions are adjusted in difficulty according to his or her previous correct and incorrect answers. The non-adaptive test is 70 questions in length” (EPI 42). Hofstee 28 comparison, Belgium is ranked 13th, Germany 14th, and Spain 23rd place. The findings are far from positive: France currently has the weakest English skills in Europe. . . . To date, there are no signs of progress. In 2012, for the first time, the European Commission published the results of foreign language tests given to 15-year-olds in 12 European countries. They found that French teens had weaker results than students of any other country tested. These children started studying English at the age of seven. Yet, after eight years of instruction, over 70% of them were at a beginner or pre-beginner level (A1 or preA1). (EPI 22) In higher education, too, English L2 proficiency appears to be on an unsatisfactory level: “Faculty members of the English Department continually complain that our students in Licence and Maîtrise function in the language on a level far below expectations” (Nathan 374). These rather disappointing claims therefore indicate that more improvements regarding the level of proficiency clearly still need to be made. Klein and Perdue argue that the successfulness of L2 acquisition is in part “dependent both on ‘propensity’ factors such as attitudes and motivation, and on ‘environmental’ factors such as extent and nature of learners’ exposure to L2. The everyday environment has more influence on progress at this level than does classroom learning” (Saville-Troike 64-5). However, it remains unclear as to what extent the level of exposure affects L2 acquisition, but Van Patten points out that “input is somehow central to SLA, that without it successful SLA is not possible” (qtd. in Rast 4). It follows that the main environmental factor involved in the explanation for the relatively low command of English, as postulated in chapter 1, is a structural lack of exposure to anglophone input: “French students report lower levels of exposure to English in everyday life than any other Europeans polled. . . . When polled by the Hofstee 29 European Commission, French students reported little or no exposure to TV, movies, newspapers, magazines, and web content in English” (EPI 23). As indicated in chapter 3, the Loi Toubon has effectively kept the usage of English in the public domain reduced to a bare minimum. If English L2 students are exposed to input at all, the majority of that input should then ideally occur within the context of the classroom. However, the level of exposure in classroom settings appears to be problematic as well, although evidence remains anecdotal. For example, in the case of the Université du Havre, “[m]ost of the faculty members are native French speakers whose English is primarily of the British variety. . . . Many of their courses, under the present directorship of the department, are taught in French. Students have few opportunities to use the English language in class or elsewhere” (Nathan 368). Moreover, “89% of French students said in 2012 that a language lab was not available at their school, a higher percentage than in any other European country” (EPI 23). The fact that not only in class, but perhaps more importantly elsewhere there are very little opportunities to speak English in practice, in addition to little exposure, provides for another explanation for the relatively low level of English L2 proficiency. Krashen’s Input Hypothesis postulates that the acquisition of an L2 is complicated or problematised if there is a lack of comprehensible input. So far it has become clear that this indeed applies to the learning of English as an L2 in France. Mainly due to legislative measures, principally the Loi Toubon, French learners are deprived of input, which has resulted in a relatively low proficiency rating. Moreover, English L2 acquisition can be seen in terms of the Affective Filter Hypothesis, according to which language acquisition is prevented when the affective filter is raised (see chapter 1). In other words, the affective filter is a barrier that prevents acquisition from taking place. In France, the feelings, motives and views of the government and intelligentsia interfere with the acquisition process of English as Hofstee 30 an L2. This interference is clearly revealed in the discrepancy between the negative stance of the government on the one hand and the popularity of the English language in education on the other hand. The sum totality of measurements that comprise France’s language policy have come to act as a suppressive environmental factor in English L2 acquisition. As such, this provides for the metaphorical barrier that is in effect raised by the government and its policies. All in all, in a broader sense the language policy of France, together with its linguistic culture, can be said to function as an affective factor in English L2 acquisition. 4.2 The effectiveness of France’s language policy As an affective factor, France’s language policy clearly influences the acquisition of English in a disadvantageous way. However, despite the negative effects on acquisition and proficiency, France’s language policy cannot be regarded as a discouraging or demotivating factor in English L2 acquisition, as English is by far the most popular foreign language in both primary and secondary schools. The fact that many of the French still feel inclined to learn English, or want their children to learn English, regardless of discouraging government measures, brings us to the evaluation of France’s language policy. Do the measures accomplish that which the French government wants to achieve? Recall that language policy can be subdivided into three domains: acquisition policy, corpus policy and status policy. The acquisition policy, even though having incorporated the 2002 educational reform in which children start to learn English at an earlier age, has had little success as the proficiency of French teenagers is still at a beginner or pre-beginner level due to a structural lack of exposure. As a consequence, France is falling behind on other European countries, while one of the main reasons to choose English as an L2 in the first place is to increase one’s job opportunities and to prevent falling behind. Furthermore, while Hofstee 31 the government adopted a strategy of diversification of language choice in order to counter the dominant position of English, this strategy “has remained rhetorical because . . . most parents will continue to choose English. So far, the teaching of English as a foreign language from age 9 has not been easy to implement mainly through lack of trained teachers” (Héliot 260). Indeed, the far majority of pupils and their parents will prefer English because of its advantages over other, less dominant, foreign languages. All in all, France’s acquisition policy appears to be working counterproductive in terms of its aptitude as well as its implementation. The objective of France’s corpus policy is to attempt to restrict the usage of all languages other than French in the public domain, although, as we have seen in section 3.2, it is implicitly directed at preventing the use of Anglicisms. The principal measure, the 1994 Loi Toubon, resulted from both France’s linguistic culture as well as the more recent governmental stance towards ELF. While the act succeeds in preventing L2 learners of English from obtaining a higher level of proficiency in English, “the ineffectiveness of the system can be judged by the subsequent small number of prosecutions carried out whilst the intrusion of Anglicisms accelerated” (Grigg 372). More importantly, overturning the restrictive nature of the act is likely to contribute to a higher level of English L2 proficiency. For instance, if all dubbing on television is changed into subtitling, the difference in the level of exposure that exists between France and other countries will for a large part be neutralised, thus arguably increasing proficiency. Moreover, in advertising, foreign slogans need to be accompanied by a translation in French, a measure which simply leaves the dreaded Anglicisms in place. In Appendix B it can be observed that the French translations are often in such small print that the dominance of English usage is retained rather than effectively countered. Also, while “Toubon may have Hofstee 32 support from certain sections of the public, he is ‘being ridiculed by the young, whose favourite expressions include “cool” and “le fun”’ (Bremmer qtd. in Grigg 378). They do not identify with the protectionist or purist language attitudes and the French government appears to be incapable of reaching the younger generations, let alone persuade them to adopt their views. Similarly ineffective in limiting the usage of Anglicisms are the French alternatives for English terminology provided by the Commission générale de terminologie et de néologie. In section 3.3 it was noted that these proposed alternatives are unpopular and often deemed laughable and ridiculous because of their impracticality, length and occasional ambiguity. In addition, the Commission often publishes an equivalent French term after the English loanword has already been adopted by the general public. This means that in practice many of these neologisms are scarcely adopted, which is evidence of the powerlessness of France’s corpus policy. The successfulness of France’s status policy, which concerns the position of language varieties, is twofold. On the one hand did it succeed in earlier times in establishing the Parisian variety of French as the uniform standard language across metropolitan France. On the other hand, if one considers that the French government “has been fighting the regional varieties since before the Revolution, it is a wonder that they still survive at all. Two hundred years of active language management should surely have been enough to destroy them completely” (Spolsky 74). Admittedly, the position of regional dialects is clearly subordinate to standard French, but under pressure of the European Community they have been given greater recognition, and this demonstrates that despite having been completely banned from the educational system for a long time, many of the regional languages, such as Catalan and Breton, are still very much alive and in use to this day. Hofstee 33 All in all, in attempting to prescribe language use, France’s language policy does not appear to fully work as intended. Despite all the efforts, organisations and laws, the usage of English continues to accelerate. Grigg aptly notes that “despite attempts at language management, ultimately all an official organisation can do, no matter how prestigious, is monitor rather than dictate language use” (Grigg 371). Ultimately it is up to the people of metropolitan France to decide which language they want to use in which particular context. French language policy measures, which are centralised by nature, should be not only adapted to the attitudes of the general public rather than to the attitudes of a select group of people, but also adapted to their pragmatic effects. Since the founding of the Académie française in 1635, French language policy has had a major influence on language usage, but in recent times, the power and effect of France’s language policies has been reduced by factors such as individualism and freedom of speech. “French, like any other language, is a living entity and any attempt to regulate it, no matter how sincere the intention, must be questionable” (Grigg 383). If language management and regulation is increasingly disproved of, as can be observed from the attitudes and language usage of France’s younger generations, it can be concluded that its role, position and function in contemporary French society needs to be re-evaluated. Hofstee 34 5 CONCLUSION Since the Ordonnances de Villers-Cotterêts of 1539 and later the events of the French Revolution, the two elements of language and nation have become inseparably intertwined. The civilising and prescriptive Académie française attributed universality and superiority to standard French. As French had become the cement of the nation and a symbol of collective identity, English is seen with fear and insecurity as it is considered a threat to contemporary France by the government and cultural elite. Consequently, a language policy consisting of elaborate institutionalisation and legislation should protect the purity of French and preserve the culture of France. However, despite these attempts to limit the use of English in the public domain, ELF continues to become increasingly dominant, Anglicisms are proliferating, and French government alternatives for Anglicisms are scarcely adopted. The attitudes of the general public regarding the hegemony of English are divided between purists, who emphasise the importance of tradition and heritage, and modernists, who emphasise the importance of being open to societal and linguistic change. Furthermore, France’s younger generations do not seem to identify with prescriptivist views in that they are likely to be less nationally conscious of the role and usage of language. Instead, they see English usage not only as exciting, but more importantly as a necessity rather than a choice. The dominant status of English worldwide entails the advantages of access to information and better career opportunities. In the increasingly globalised competitive society, English proficiency has become a fundamental advantage, but many Frenchmen are falling behind on other European countries due to a structural lack of exposure. France’s language policy, then, operates as an affective filter which problematises the English L2 acquisition as its measures have a counterproductive effect on the learning of English as an L2 in France. Hofstee 35 The issue of linguistic purism in the light of globalisation and the increasing influence and spread of English has become increasingly complex. The underlying assumptions and beliefs that came into play with the founding of the Académie française and the French Revolution continue to fuel the language policy today, and because they have changed very little, reflection and evaluation of these long-held beliefs have become inevitable. On an international level, the context in which the once-superior French language is currently used has changed dramatically. This new picture, with English as the dominant lingua franca, which I would like to call the new interlingual context, has effectively forced France to reconsider its traditional linguistic convictions. The French government and cultural elite needs to adapt their ideology of French superiority, that predates the Revolution, to more contemporary circumstances. In order to achieve this, a more pragmatic trajectory needs to be taken. However, the limitations of this thesis need to be addressed first.6 The primary focus has been on the usage of English within contemporary France, thus excluding, where possible, aspects such as the role of French in Francophone countries of the former colonial empire, the mission civilisatrice, which is the dissemination of French culture around the world, and the international language movement of la Francophonie. Further, the somewhat anecdotal nature of the evidence presented in this thesis might stimulate future research, especially regarding the distribution of attitudes towards the dominant position of English among the general public of metropolitan France, and the distribution among the younger generations. 6 It should be noted that Robin Adamson’s study The Defence of French - A Language in Crisis? (2007) has not been included in this thesis due to its lack of availability and, unfortunately, my personal last-minute discovery. Hofstee 36 If France continues to retain its approach of traditional purist attitudes, it runs the risk of getting themselves in a losing battle, due to a number of factors. Firstly, the ineffectiveness of the policy measures indicate that there is a clear discrepancy between the cultural ideology of the French government and cultural elite, and a large proportion of French citizens. The only way to neutralise this discrepancy is by adopting more modernist views and adjusting language policy accordingly. Secondly, the new interlingual context has created a situation in which English has become a language that is not only incredibly popular through its dissemination in film, TV, art, business and commerce, but also has become a necessary skill to possess. The educational system is slowly adapting to the necessity and popularity of English, but more pragmatic steps still need to be taken. Attempting to restrict the usage of such an influential language as English is equivalent to shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. Arguably, the losses that France then has to accept are lower English proficiency, and as a consequence, France as a nation-state may risk losing its image and status in business and commerce. The first step towards a more pragmatic trajectory, then, should consist of discarding the fierce war-like rhetoric and seriousness in which the government is still viewing current language changes. By contrast, France’s younger generations do not view the language issue as a phenomenon involving an attack on, or conspiracy against, the foundations of the French state by the Anglo-American enemy. There seems to be a lack of awareness of the changed global linguistic landscape, or new interlingual context, which shows that the dominant position of ELF affects the national languages and identities of many other Western European countries, too, and that these countries are now effectively in a similar position as France. Such a perspective implies that France has now become equal to other Western European countries, while the traditional sense of perceived superiority is still vividly present in the Hofstee 37 cultural ideology of politicians and the elite. Ideally, France should move towards a form of balance between on the one hand retaining the Republic’s national identity, while on the other hand a degree of acceptance towards the dominance of English should develop. This acceptance is already clearly visible in France’s youth, who appear to use their language in a more pragmatic and less ideologically charged manner. Indeed, it might be said that they are in fact using their language from a more contemporary, increasingly globalised context. While France has used language as a form of self-identification, the time has now come to adapt to new linguistic situations. If the French wait too long, they, as a nation, are likely to fall behind on ELF-dependent processes such as economic growth and innovation in art and sciences. To prevent this, new cultural and linguistic influences, principally Anglo-American, should no longer be seen as a threat but rather should be accepted, to a certain extent, as being part of a global 21st-century phenomenon that is clearly not unique to France. That way, France will be able to still retain its identity and image. Furthermore, underlying motives such as fear or insecurity (see section 2.2) are likely to become less strong if ELF will be perceived as – staying with war terminology once more – a common enemy in a war that involves many other countries. The French government and intelligentsia might then see what they were unable to see from their previous point of view, namely that, although they are not the only one opposing the increasing usage of English, many others do not perceive this phenomenon as seriously and fanatically as the French to speak of it in terms of war. Recall that superiority and status were two of the main notions in the spread of standard French. If a nation is truly superior, it inherently entails that once the nation’s status has ceased – or perhaps more accurately, changed – the nation can then accept that it has come to play a different role in the world, and that it will play its role as the French have always done, namely with dignity and with pride. Hofstee 38 WORKS CITED Ager, Dennis. Identity, Insecurity and Image. France and Language. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1999. Print. Auffray, Christophe. “En 2010, vous pourrez dire ordiphone plutôt que smartphone.” ZDNet.fr. CBS Interactive. 5 Jan 2010. Web. 22 Jan. 2014. <http://www.zdnet.fr/ actualites/en-2010-vous-pourrez-dire-ordiphone-plutot-quesmartphone-39711946.htm> Bakke, Anne Marie. Do The French Like English? A Study of French Attitudes to English. University of Bergen, May 2004. MA Thesis. Battye, Adrian and Marie-Anne Hintze. The French Language Today. London: Routledge, 1992. Print. Costa, James and Patricia Lambert. “France and language(s): Old policies, new challenges, towards a renewed framework?” Academia.edu. 2009. Web. September 2013. <http:// www.academia.edu/200588/ France_and_Language_s_Old_Policies_and_New_Challenges_in_Education._Toward s_a_Renewed_Framework> Crystal, David. English as a Global Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print. Cziffra, Micha. “Franglais et anglicismes: quand le français se met à parler anglais.” Slate.fr. 18 Mar. 2013. Web. 24 Jan. 2014. <http://www.slate.fr/story/69533/francais-anglaisangliscismes-franglais> Hofstee 39 English Proficiency Index. 3rd ed. Education First. 2013. Web. 2 Apr. 2014. <http:// www.ef.nl/__/~/media/efcom/epi/2014/full-reports/ef-epi-2013-report-masternew.pdf> “Enrichissement de la langue.” Culture.fr. Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication. n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2014. <http://www.culture.fr/Ressources/FranceTerme/ Enrichissement-de-la-langue> Flaitz, Jeffra. The Ideology of English: French Perceptions of English as a World Language. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1988. Print. Grigg, Peter. “Toubon Or Not Toubon: The Influence Of The English Language In Contemporary France.” English Studies 78.4 (1997): 368-84. Academic Search Premier. Web. 13 Nov. 2013. Hélot, Christine. “Language Policy and the Ideology of Bilingual Education in France”, Language Policy 2.3 (2003): 255-77. Print. Journet, Adeline. “Langue française: êtes-vous puriste ou moderniste?” L’Express. 17 Mar. 2011. Web. 21 Jan. 2014. Judge, Anne. “France: ‘One State, One Nation, One Language’?” Eds. Stephen Barbour and Cathie Carmichael. Language and Nationalism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 44-82. Print. Judge, Anne. “French: A Planned Language?” French Today. Language In Its Social Context. Ed. Carol Sanders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 7-26. Print. “Faut-il se séparer des anglicismes dans la langue française ?” L’Internaute. CCM Benchmark. 14 Apr. 2010. Web. 22 Jan. 2014. <http://www.linternaute.com/ questionnaire/fiche/12490/d/f/> Hofstee 40 “La chasse aux anglicismes est rouverte.” Challenges. Nouvel Observateur. 22 Jan. 2014. Web. 8 Apr. 2010. <http://www.youscribe.com/catalogue/tous/education/etudessuperieures/la-chasse-aux-anglicismes-est-rouverte-2123864> “Loi no 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l'emploi de la langue française.” Legifrance.gouv.fr. <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000349929> 22 Jun. 2000. Web. Dec 2013. “Vocabulaire de l'informatique et de l'internet.” Legifrance.gouv.fr. 6 Jun. 2010. Web. Sep. 2013. <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do? cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022309303> Lightbown, Patsy M. and Nina Spada. How Languages are Learned. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print. McArthur, Tom. “English World-wide in the Twentieth Century.” The Oxford History of English. Ed. Lynda Mugglestone. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 360-93. Print. “‘Mot-dièse’ pour ‘hashtag’, ‘ordiphone’ pour ‘smartphone’ : ces mots que vous n’utiliserez jamais” Francetv info. France Télévisions. 23 Jan. 2013. Web. 22 Feb. 2014. <http:// www.francetvinfo.fr/culture/le-journal-officiel-vous-prie-d-employer-mot-dieseplutot-que-hashtag_209327.html> Nathan, Lois. “Teaching American English in France.” Journal of English Linguistics 30.4 (December 2002): 366-75. Print. Paccalet, Yves. “Buzz, best-of, news, geek : mon ‘coming out’ contre les assassins de la langue française.” Le Plus (Le Nouvel Observateur). 25 October 2013. Web. 12 January 2014. Hofstee 41 Phillipson, Robert. English-Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy. London: Routledge, 2003. Print. Rast, Rebekah. Foreign Language Input: Initial Processing. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 2008. Print. Romaine, Suzanne. Language In Society: An Introduction to Sociolinguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. Saville-Troike, Muriel. Introducing Second Language Acquisition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Print. Schiffman, Harold. “Language Policy and Linguistic Culture.” An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method. Ed. Thomas Ricento. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. 111-25. Print. Spolsky, Bernard. Language Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Print. “Street / Recommandations d’usage.” Culture.fr / FranceTerme. 7 April 2013. 19 April 2014. <http://www.culture.fr/Ressources/FranceTerme/Recommandations-d-usage/ STREET> “Terminologie et néologie.” Académie française. n.d. Web. 22 January 2014. <http:// www.academie-francaise.fr/la-langue-francaise/terminologie-et-neologie>. Tollefson, James W. “Language Planning and Language Policy.” The Cambridge Handbook of Sociolinguistics. Ed. Mesthrie Rajend. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 357-76. Print. Uysal, Hacer Hande, Lia Plakans and Svetlana Dembovskaya. “English Language Spread in Local Contexts: Turkey, Latvia and France.” Current Issues in Language Planning 8:2 (2007). 192-20. Print. Hofstee 42 APPENDICES Appendix A: The linguistic regions of France Taken from Battye and Hintze 357. Hofstee 43 Appendix B: Influence of the Loi Toubon Advertisement for Air France. Taken from L’Express no 3275, 9 – 15 April 2014, p. 16. Hofstee 44 Advertisement for Renault. Taken from L’Express no 3275, 9 – 15 April 2014, Styles supplement, p. 23.