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2019 •
Divided into three sections: 1. Disavowal of American Hegemony (post-2016) 2. Comparing Theories of Hegemony 3. Squandering of American Hegemony (1979-2016)
How may we best understand the effects of the ongoing rise of China on the future of liberal democracy in East Asia? Scholars who stress hegemony tend to predict a less democratic region, while those who stress diffusion tend to predict more democracy. This paper does not attempt to resolve the question, but argues for the use of evolutionary logic to help us with general questions concerning the regional and global waxing and waning of domestic regime types. Evolution’s claims about the variety, selection, and retention of traits (in this case, democracy), rightly understood, can accommodate not only the standard international diffusion mechanisms of competition, learning, and emulation, but also that of coercion. The concepts of co-evolution and niche construction are crucial: an agent may modify its environment such that one or more traits of that agent enjoy a greater reproductive advantage. Agency, then, may be not an escape from evolution but a participation in co-evolution. Intentionally or not, rulers of states may construct niches that affect the longevity of the regime through which they rule. Intentional niche constructors may promote their domestic regime, or block the advance of a threatening regime, in their own state or their neighbors via various means. I consider phenomena to which evolutionary logic would direct us concerning China and Asia today, and suggest that China’s leaders are engaging in domestic and regional niche construction to preserve the power monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party.
2018 •
ABSTRACT The Squandering of American Hegemony is an exploratory piece making connections between different usages of hegemony and seeking answers to the following questions: First, how is hegemony used in the literature? Second, how is Gramscian hegemony reflected in the historical development of hegemony at the transnational level? Third, noting there is no transnational state that has a monopoly of political violence/coercion, how would one characterize the networks of influence and the ensemble of institutions that perform the functions of the state at the transnational level? Fourth, what functions does the hegemon (individual state or historic bloc) perform that deems it worthy of prestige? Fifth, what are salient examples of hegemonic failures? Sixth, looking specifically at the US, what periods do we see? Seventh, has the current administration and its more recent predecessors squandered American Hegemony? In addition, I offer a tentative framework for categorizing all of this in form of a chart or 4 x 3 table. On one axis are the 3 dimensions of the state – relative power vis-a-vis other states (called 'height'), organizational capacity (called 'depth' referring to institutional density more than secret cabals) and the extent and strength of domestic support (called 'breadth'). On the axis are the 4 aspects of hegemony: the politico-military, the poltico-economic and the poltico-cultural, plus the wildcard of technology. Here are the approaches I use to provide approximate answers to these related questions: First, expanding on William I Robinson (2005), who identifies 4 overlapping conceptions of hegemony, I add the original Greek conception and include both Hegemonic Stability Theory and Gramscian IPE frameworks. This results in 6 or maybe 7 ways in which the term is used, depending on how you count and categorize. Second, focusing on Gramsci's insight that the division between 'Civil Society' and 'State' is merely analytical, not organic and that is a methodological misstep to take this as a concrete aspect of reality, I begin to work towards a unified concept of hegemony. The ultimate aim: the GUT of Hegemony. Third, using Gramsci's idea of an extended state or integral state and applying the concept at the Transnational level. Fourth, drawing on Gramsci's definition of hegemony as“spontaneous” consent that is“historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production, I extend to security and other concerns which can also lead to a spontaneous consent. This thus leads back to unifying the concept of hegemony. Fifth, describing hegemonic failures from Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars to Europe in the early 1900s to the United States since the 1980s, I make a lot of half-bake suggestions that I hope will improve with a little bit more time in the oven. Sixth, suggesting 5 periods of American Hegemony: Reluctant Hegemon – 1915 to 1932; Retreat – 1930 to 1941; Leader of the Free World – 1939 to 1991; Leader of Free Markets– 1980 to 2008; The Essential and Overextended Country – 2001 to present, I argue that American hegemony is certainly diminished, but its end is hardly a foregone conclusion. Seventh, providing a simple answer – the current administration is not squandering but disavowing American Hegemony. As for previous administrations, they all have ways in which they have squandered this role and I explore this, hoping to glean lessons from the future, but focusing on what the British called the Great Game Finally, providing a framework to help pull this all together in the form of a 3 by 4 box, one axis devoted to a metaphor – the three dimensions of the state. Its 'height' ua the dimension by which we compare it to other states. Its 'depth' is its ability to build up its organizational apparatus. Its 'breadth' is the degree to which it has support among. The other axis is broken up by the functional areas of the state – politico-strategic, politico-economic, politico-educational and, lastly, its interactions with technology. Wish me luck.
New York Political Science Association Conference, New York
THE SQUANDERING OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY: A Framework for the Analysis of the Current President's Russian Roulette and the Actions of Many of his Predecessors (First Version)2018 •
ABSTRACT The Squandering of American Hegemony is an exploratory piece making connections between different usages of hegemony and seeking answers to the following questions: First, how is hegemony used in the literature? Second, how is Gramscian hegemony reflected in the historical development of hegemony at the transnational level? Third, noting there is no transnational state that has a monopoly of political violence/coercion, how would one characterize the networks of influence and the ensemble of institutions that perform the functions of the state at the transnational level? Fourth, what functions does the hegemon (individual state or historic bloc) perform that deems it worthy of prestige? Fifth, what are salient examples of hegemonic failures? Sixth, looking specifically at the US, what periods do we see? Seventh, has the current administration and its more recent predecessors squandered American Hegemony? In addition, I offer a tentative framework for categorizing all of this in form of a chart or 4 x 3 table. On one axis are the 3 dimensions of the state – relative power vis-a-vis other states (called 'height'), organizational capacity (called 'depth' referring to institutional density more than secret cabals) and the extent and strength of domestic support (called 'breadth'). On the axis are the 4 aspects of hegemony: the politico-military, the poltico-economic and the poltico-cultural, plus the wildcard of technology. Here are the approaches I use to provide approximate answers to these related questions: First, expanding on William I Robinson (2005), who identifies 4 overlapping conceptions of hegemony, I add the original Greek conception and include both Hegemonic Stability Theory and Gramscian IPE frameworks. This results in 6 or maybe 7 ways in which the term is used, depending on how you count and categorize. Second, focusing on Gramsci's insight that the division between 'Civil Society' and 'State' is merely analytical, not organic and that is a methodological misstep to take this as a concrete aspect of reality, I begin to work towards a unified concept of hegemony. The ultimate aim: the GUT of Hegemony. Third, using Gramsci's idea of an extended state or integral state and applying the concept at the Transnational level. Fourth, drawing on Gramsci's definition of hegemony as“spontaneous” consent that is“historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production, I extend to security and other concerns which can also lead to a spontaneous consent. This thus leads back to unifying the concept of hegemony. Fifth, describing hegemonic failures from Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars to Europe in the early 1900s to the United States since the 1980s, I make a lot of half-bake suggestions that I hope will improve with a little bit more time in the oven. Sixth, suggesting 5 periods of American Hegemony: Reluctant Hegemon – 1915 to 1932; Retreat – 1930 to 1941; Leader of the Free World – 1939 to 1991; Leader of Free Markets– 1980 to 2008; The Essential and Overextended Country – 2001 to present, I argue that American hegemony is certainly diminished, but its end is hardly a foregone conclusion. Seventh, providing a simple answer – the current administration is not squandering but disavowing American Hegemony. As for previous administrations, they all have ways in which they have squandered this role and I explore this, hoping to glean lessons from the future, but focusing on what the British called the Great Game Finally, providing a framework to help pull this all together in the form of a 3 by 4 box, one axis devoted to a metaphor – the three dimensions of the state. Its 'height' ua the dimension by which we compare it to other states. Its 'depth' is its ability to build up its organizational apparatus. Its 'breadth' is the degree to which it has support among. The other axis is broken up by the functional areas of the state – politico-strategic, politico-economic, politico-educational and, lastly, its interactions with technology. Wish me luck.
NY State Political Science Associaton Conference
THEORIES OF HEGEMONY COMPARED: An Attempt to Find Common Ground among the Greeks, Gramsci, Hegemonic Stability Theory and World-Systems Theory2019 •
What follows is an exploratory piece making connections between different usages of hegemony and seeking answers to the following questions: First, how is hegemony used in the literature? Second, how is Gramscian hegemony reflected in the historical development of hegemony at the transnational level? Third, noting there is no transnational state that has a monopoly of political violence/coercion, how would one characterize the networks of influence and the ensemble of institutions that perform the functions of the state at the transnational level? Fourth, what functions does the hegemon (individual state or historic bloc) perform that deems it worthy of prestige? Fifth, what are salient examples of hegemonic failures? Sixth, looking specifically at the US, what periods do we see? Seventh, has the current administration and its more recent predecessors squandered American Hegemony? In addition, I offer a tentative framework for categorizing all of this in form of a chart or 4 x 3 table. On one axis are the 3 dimensions of the state – relative power vis-a-vis other states (called 'height'), organizational capacity (called 'depth' referring to institutional density more than secret cabals) and the extent and strength of domestic support (called 'breadth'). On the axis are the 4 aspects of hegemony: the politico-military, the poltico-economic and the poltico-cultural, plus the wild card of technology. Here are the approaches I use to provide approximate answers to these related questions: First, expanding on William I Robinson (2005), who identifies 4 overlapping conceptions of hegemony, I add the original Greek conception and include both Hegemonic Stability Theory and Gramscian IPE frameworks. This results in 6 or maybe 7 ways in which the term is used, depending on how you count and categorize. Second, focusing on Gramsci's insight that the division between 'Civil Society' and 'State' is merely analytical, not organic and that is a methodological misstep to take this as a concrete aspect of reality, I begin to work towards a unified concept of hegemony. The ultimate aim: the GUT of Hegemony. Third, using Gramsci's idea of an extended state or integral state and applying the concept at the Transnational level. Fourth, drawing on Gramsci's definition of hegemony as“spontaneous” consent that is“historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group Brian Ford; bpford1@gmail.com / NYSPSA 2019 – “Comparing Theories of Hegemony from the Greeks to Gramsci and Beyond: Towards a Grand Unified Theory” / Page 4 of 95 enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production, I extend to security and other concerns which can also lead to a spontaneous consent. This thus leads back to unifying the concept of hegemony. Fifth, describing hegemonic failures from Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars to Europe in the early 1900s to the United States since the 1980s, I make a lot of half-bake suggestions that I hope will improve with a little bit more time in the oven. Sixth, suggesting 5 periods of American Hegemony: Reluctant Hegemon – 1915 to 1932; Retreat – 1930 to 1941; Leader of the Free World – 1939 to 1991; Leader of Free Markets– 1980 to 2008; The Essential and Overextended Country – 2001 to present, I argue that American hegemony is certainly diminished, but its end is hardly a foregone conclusion. Seventh, providing a simple answer – the current administration is not squandering but disavowing American Hegemony. As for previous administrations, they all have ways in which they have squandered this role and I explore this, hoping to glean lessons from the future, but focusing on what the British called the Great Game Finally, providing a framework to help pull this all together in the form of a 3 by 4 box, one axis devoted to a metaphor – the three dimensions of the state. Its 'height' ua the dimension by which we compare it to other states. Its 'depth' is its ability to build up its organizational apparatus. Its 'breadth' is the degree to which it has support among. The other axis is broken up by the functional areas of the state – politico-strategic, politico-economic, politico-educational and, lastly, its interactions with technology. Wish me luck.
Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies
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