A brief analysis of the impact of the war
in Ukraine on food security
Petra Berkhout, Ron Bergevoet, Siemen van Berkum
Wageningen Research Foundation have joined forces in contributing to finding
integrated approach to issues and the collaboration between different disciplines.
A brief analysis of the impact of the war
in Ukraine on food security
Petra Berkhout, Ron Bergevoet, Siemen van Berkum
This research was carried out by Wageningen Environmental Research and commissioned and subsidised by the
Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, in the context of the Policy Support research theme
‘Economy’
Wageningen Economic Research
Wageningen, March 2022
POLICY DOCUMENT
2022-033
Berkhout, Petra, Ron Bergevoet, Siemen van Berkum, 2022. A brief analysis of the impact of the war in
Ukraine on food security. Wageningen, Wageningen Economic Research, Policy Document 2022-033. 22 pp.;
13 fig.; 0 tab.; 16 ref.
This paper gives a first analysis of the possible consequences of the war in Ukraine for food security in the
short term. We do this by reviewing the different factors that influence the food situation. At the time of
writing (March 2022) the war is still going on and the outcome is still unclear. The analysis should therefore
be seen as preliminary.
Key words: food security, Netherlands, war, Ukraine
This policy document can be downloaded for free at https://doi.org/10.18174/568027 or at
www.wur.eu/economic-research (under Wageningen Economic Research publications).
© 2022 Wageningen Economic Research
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Wageningen Economic Research Policy Document 2022-033 | Project code 2282300554
Cover photo: Shutterstock
Contents
1
2
3
Appendix 1
Introduction
6
1.1
Food security – definition
6
1.2
Resilience of the EU food system
6
1.3
Share of Ukraine and Russia in the production of various products
7
1.4
Russia and Ukraine’s share in global trade
9
1.5
Energy and fertiliser
10
1.6
Price developments for agricultural raw materials
11
Short-term effects on food supply/food security (<6 months)
14
2.1
General - key problem
14
2.2
EU situation
15
2.3
Situation of countries highly dependent on imports from Russia and Ukraine
16
Medium to long-term effects on food supply
18
20
Summary of the initial conclusions
• With the exception of the areas currently affected by the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, there are no food
shortages as of yet: there is enough. This is true globally, both in the EU and in the Netherlands.
• The problems now mainly concern access to food, which is predominantly a consequence of rising food
prices. This particularly affects people in poorer countries, some of whom spend more than half their
incomes on food.
• For the time being, this first effect – limited access due to increased prices – is the most important. This
issue is most pressing in poorer countries, as mentioned, but people may still face difficulties in Europe/the
Netherlands because of the increased food prices. These increased food prices are the result of both more
expensive raw materials and rising energy costs.
• Energy and food prices were rising, even before Russia invaded Ukraine.
• In addition to the reduced availability and access to grains and oilseeds due to the war in Ukraine, the
availability of and access to fertiliser may also be affected by the trade embargoes with Russia and Belarus.
• Some products may become scarce in the Netherlands and/or the EU. However, this does not pose a threat
to food security since there are (generally) alternatives to the products in question.
• In the longer term, several factors will determine how food security develops. Further research will provide
(some) answers.
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1
Introduction
The war in Ukraine is causing a great deal of disquiet and concern about global food security. Wageningen
Economic Research was asked by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) to map
the effects of this conflict on agricultural production and food security in several reports. Consideration is
given to the short (<6 months), medium (6 months-2 years) and long term (>2 years).
The first report1 focused on trade between Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and the Netherlands. The current
memorandum attempts to provide initial insights into the possible short-term consequences of the war for
food security for the world, the EU-27 and the Netherlands. We do this by reviewing the various factors that
influence food availability and providing an initial analysis of them. At the time of writing (March 2022), the
war is still ongoing, and the outcome is still unclear. The analysis should therefore also be seen as
provisional.
Further reports will address key problems and consequences for chains and sectors that the war in Ukraine
presents in the short term, and subsequent disruptions in and of chains. Scenario analyses will also be
conducted in April to examine the possible effects on the food supply, production and economic
consequences in the medium and long term. Attention will be paid to:
• key problems for the EU and the Netherlands in the different agricultural value chains;
• the possible impact of the war in Ukraine on Ukraine’s production and export of agricultural goods;
• the possible consequences of the boycotts against Russia and Belarus;
• the possible changes of international markets and trade flows.
1.1
Food security – definition
The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) defines food security as the situation where people have
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and
preferences for an active and healthy life at all times; in other words, people are free from hunger and
malnutrition (FAO, 2000).
Food security has a number of pillars: it is about availability of, access to, use and stability of the food
supply. In the 1970s, the focus of definitions of food security was mainly on food availability. Over time, the
definition has been expanded to include aspects such as quality, nutritional value and access.
When analysing food security, it is important to distinguish between the availability of food and access to it.
After all, a great deal of food insecurity comes not as the result of food shortages, but as a consequence of
lack of access. Poverty is the main cause of limited access to food: people simply do not have the money to
buy it. The quality of food can also be a major obstacle to achieving food security; people may have access
to sufficient calories, but the nutritional value – in terms of micro and macronutrients – is lacking.
1.2
Resilience of the EU food system
One of the EU’s objectives is to guarantee the food security of its citizens. The policy for this is contained in
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). One of the CAP’s aims is to secure Member States’ food supplies. A
key tool for this is the common market for agricultural products, with there being no trade barriers at
internal borders. Over time, the CAP’s policy objectives have widened and deepened.
1
Bergevoet, R., Jukema, G., en Verhoog, D. (2022). Impactanalyse oorlog in Oekraïne: eerste rapportage van 10 maart 2022
(Impact analysis of the war in Ukraine: first report dated 10 March 2022). (Policy document / Wageningen Economic Research;
No. 2022-031). Wageningen Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.18174/566232
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Based on a review of a number of scenario studies, Bindraban et al. (2008) concluded that the EU’s food
system is robust in term of food supply: in addition to there being a high level of domestic agricultural
production, there is enough purchasing power to buy food on the international market. This also applies in
the event of crises, such as the drought in 2003, the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 and the outbreak of animal
diseases. Consumers can adjust their diets if needs be, and any shortages can be made up for by purchases
on the international market. There would only be a significant impact on the meat industry and meat
consumption if soya imports for the animal feed industry were to disappear completely, according to the
report. The food supply is not in danger, but dietary adjustments would be necessary.
A study by Van der Weijden et al. (2011) reached similar conclusions: the various crises would lead to
substantial economic damage, but the food supply would not be endangered.
Cockx et al. (2015) confirmed that food availability in the EU is not a problem currently, but there are
vulnerable groups within the EU that do not always have enough money for a healthy and varied diet.
There are no more available recent studies, but there is no reason to assume that the situation in 2022 is
very different (also see section on EU Situation). Similarly, the COVID-19 pandemic, while considered a
shock to the food system, did not result in food insecurity in the EU.
Food safety
In addition to guaranteeing food security, the EU plays an important role in ensuring food safety, within the
EU and globally. For example, there are strict standards on residues of pesticides or antibiotics, mycotoxins
and requirements for production (e.g. organic production and GMO free). Products produced within and
imported into the EU have to comply with these requirements. The safety of these products is guaranteed by
checks and certificates. This system ensures food safety, but can limit market flexibility. In some cases, this
can limit the choice and availability of alternatives, in both the short and medium term.
1.3
Share of Ukraine and Russia in the production of various
products
Ukraine and Russia are major producers and exporters of grains and oilseeds, so the analysis focuses on
these two product categories.
Grains
In 2020, 2,996 million tonnes of grain (including rice) were produced worldwide. Of this, 4% was produced in
Russia and 2% in Ukraine (Figure 1). Annual fluctuation due to climatic conditions (drought and the like) in
grain production can vary from 0.5 to 5%.
The pie charts below show the share of different countries in global grain and oilseed production (Appendix 1
contains the figures).
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4%
9%
2%
84%
EU
Figure 1
Russian Federation
Ukraine
Rest of world
Share of different countries in global grain production (all grains, including rice)
Source: FAOSTAT.
17%
11%
3%
69%
EU
Figure 2
Russian Federation
Ukraine
Rest of world
Share of different countries in global wheat production (this includes both wheat for human
consumption and wheat for animal feed); the statistics do not distinguish between the two)
Source: FAOSTAT.
6%
1%
3%
90%
EU
Figure 3
Russian Federation
Ukraine
Share of different countries in global (feed) maize production
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Rest of world
Wageningen Economic Research Policy Document 2022-033
Based on FAOSTAT data, it appears that Ukraine’s share of global grain production is relatively limited. A
drop or total loss of grain production in Ukraine would be a setback in global terms, but it would not directly
lead to any major shortages. However, there are currently significant effects on prices. Factors such as
hoarding and market disturbance are playing a role.
Generally speaking, agricultural markets are rarely entirely stable and can become unbalanced easily. This
translates into high price volatility. Small shortages and surpluses can lead to significant effects in prices.
This imbalance is due to the fact that demand for food is relatively stable, increasing primarily due to
population growth and rising incomes, while supply can vary a great deal more; it takes time for supply to
adjust to changing demand. Finally, the share of global trade in production is relatively small (Banse et al.,
2008). The majority of trade takes place within regions (geographic blocks such as NAFTA and the EU).
However, a number of particularly low-income countries with high rates of population growth - such as
Nigeria and Bangladesh - are highly dependent on the international market for their grain supplies. Price
increases due to shortages – expected or otherwise – therefore have a major impact on these countries’ food
supply.
The experience of the international market price spikes in 2007 and 2012 (see below) also shows that when
prices rise rapidly, exporters tend to announce export restrictions to safeguard their own food security and
stable prices on the domestic market. However, as a consequence, international prices continue to rise, and
the market remains volatile.
Sunflower seeds
The total global production of sunflower seeds in 2020 was 50 million tonnes. Russia and Ukraine’s combined
share in this is more than 50% (Figure 4).
14%
4%
18%
5%
6%
27%
26%
EU
Argentina
other countries
Figure 4
Russian Federation
China
Ukraine
Romania
Shares of different countries in global sunflower seed production
Source: FAOSTAT.
The loss of sunflower seed production from Ukraine and Russia may cause more issues than the loss of
grains. Sunflower oil is used in a great many products, both directly and in manufacturing processes.
Substitution with other oils – such as palm, rapeseed and soybean oil – is possible, but not for every product
that uses sunflower oil.
1.4
Russia and Ukraine’s share in global trade
Only a limited part of all grain production is traded between countries; about a quarter of wheat and
sunflower oil, and 15-20% of maize. While Ukraine’s shares in global grain production are limited, those in
trade are much more substantial.
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Ukraine is a major exporter of wheat (18 million tonnes), maize (27.9 million tonnes), sunflower oil
(6.8 million tonnes) and rapeseed (2.4 million tonnes; 2020 UNComtrade), and has a substantial share of
international trade for these crops (Figure 5). These shares indicate that Ukraine is a major supplier for these
products on the world market and that disruption of that supply could have significant consequences for
prices on the international market. Russia is also a major exporter of wheat and sunflower seed and oil. As
such, unilateral and bilateral trade embargoes on Russia may affect the availability of these products on the
international market.
rapeseed
3
10
sunflower oil
21
44
sunflower seed
20
3
maize
15
wheat
19
9
0
1
10
20
Ukraine
30
40
50
60
70
Russia
Figure 5
Russia and Ukraine’s shares in global trade of wheat, maize, sunflower seeds and oil, and
rapeseed
Source: UN Comtrade, numbers 2020.
1.5
Energy and fertiliser
Russia is a major exporter of nitrogen and potassium fertilisers. Figures 6 and 7 below show the share of
imports of these fertilisers from Russia and Belarus.
Figure 6
Share of Russia and Belarus in countries’ imports of potassium fertiliser
Source: IFPRI (2022).
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Figure 7
Share of Russia and Belarus in countries’ imports of nitrogen fertiliser
Source: IFPRI (2022).
The prices of energy and fertilisers were rising before the outbreak of war in Ukraine and the subsequent
sanctions. Prices for crude oil and oil products on the international markets had been rising since April 2020
(www.iea.org), and the same is true of gas prices (businessinsider.com). Prices for fertilisers had been rising
since January 2021 (Fertilizers Price Index (ycharts.com)). The war is driving these prices even higher.
Several fertiliser exporters have already imposed restrictions on their exports (Schmidhuber, 2022). Russia’s
intention to stop exporting fertilisers will put additional pressure on fertiliser availability. Prices of fertilisers
are already high due to increased energy and transport costs, as mentioned, and they will rise further if
there is an actual export ban. If fertilisers are more expensive, this could result in lower use and thus lower
production, possibly leading to changes in the crop plan. However, this outcome is questionable for this
season in the northern hemisphere as crop plans are largely fixed already, and the seed/propagation
materials have been ordered. How much the level of use can or will be reduced depends on other factors too,
such as the expected yield price of the crops the fertiliser is being applied to and the availability of
alternatives, such as animal manure.
Russia is also a major supplier of oil and gas. Around 40% of the gas and 25% of oil used in the EU comes
from Russia. Energy prices have been high for a long time and have risen even higher due to the war. Energy
is needed in both the primary production of crops and in the processing of raw materials: for example,
heating greenhouses, diesel and heavy oil for tractors and fishing boats, and for transport. The production of
artificial fertilisers also requires energy, as does the processing of dairy products and the production of food,
both at large and small scales.
1.6
Price developments for agricultural raw materials
The long-term trend in the development of agricultural prices is that they are falling in real terms. This is
mainly due to improvements in productivity, which reduce cost prices. This effect is greater than the price
raising effect caused by increased demand for food due to population and income growth. This means the
growing demand for agricultural products can be met without huge increases in prices. Figure 8 shows this
long-term development for a number of products.
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In the 2007-2008 period, prices on the international markets spiked for a variety of products, including
grains, oilseeds, sugar and dairy products. This was caused by a combination of unprecedentedly low stocks
of grains, severe supply disruptions, very high oil prices and a relatively steep change in demand for grains
for biofuel production. In the 2007-2008 period, the development of prices for agricultural products kept
pace with the price of oil. The higher energy prices led to increasing costs of food production and thus to
rising food prices (Berkhout and van Bruchem, 2009). After a decline in prices in 2009, they peaked again in
2010-2011. Again, the explanation was to be found within a combination of substantially diminished
inventories, disappointing harvests (pursuant to which export restrictions were often imposed, raising prices
even further) and the growing demand for biofuels (Berkhout en Roza, 2012). At the time, while there was
discussion about whether speculation had contributed to the rising prices, no substantial evidence of this
could be found (Meijerink et al., 2012).
Soybeans
Maize
Beef
Pork
Index (2019=100)
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2024 2028
Long-term development of real prices for a number of products, 1960-2019, and expected
Figure 8
price development 2020-2030
Source: OECD/FAO, 2020.
Figure 9 shows the real development of some product prices since 2001. The figures are indexed (20142016=100).
200,0
180,0
160,0
140,0
Dairy
120,0
Meat
100,0
80,0
Cereals
60,0
Oils
40,0
Sugar
20,0
2022
2021
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0,0
Figure 9
Development of the FAO price index, 2014-2016=100, for a number of products on an annual
basis, real prices, 2001-2022
Source: FAO.
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Figure 9 shows that, after the previous high peak in international market prices in 2007-2008 and 2010-2011,
food prices have been rising again since the summer of 2020. The price increases are due to disruptions to
trade caused by COVID-19 and product specific causes (e.g. the large-scale outbreak of African swine fever in
China), among other things. The previously mentioned increased energy costs also played a part. Figure 10
shows the development of prices on a monthly basis for the period from 1 January 2020.
250,0
200,0
150,0
100,0
50,0
2022-02
jan 2022
dec 2021
okt 2021
nov 2021
sep 2021
juli 2021
aug 2021
mei 2021
juni 2021
april 2021
feb 2021
mrt 2021
jan 2021
dec 2020
okt 2020
nov 2020
sep 2020
juli 2020
aug 2020
mei 2020
juni 2020
april 2020
feb 2020
Figure 10
mrt 2020
jan 2020
0,0
Development of the FAO price index, 2014-2016=100, for a number of products on a monthly
basis, January 2020-January 2022
Source: FAO.
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2
Short-term effects on food supply/food
security (<6 months)
2.1
General - key problem
The most obvious effect of the war is now increased prices for various goods (wheat, raw materials for
animal feed, sunflower oil), energy and fertilisers. This is the consequence of:
• Logistical problems. The war in Ukraine is currently causing problems with the supply of raw materials, as
transport supply chains to and from Ukraine have been disrupted or are no longer possible. Companies are
therefore looking for alternative suppliers, which puts additional pressure on prices;
• Unrest and panic, which result in sharply increased yet highly volatile prices for grains and vegetable oils.
Energy and fertiliser prices are also rising as a result.
For the time being - Ukraine excluded - there are no problems with the availability of food. The spike in grain
prices is going to be the biggest issue for countries most dependent on imports from Ukraine (such as Egypt
and Turkey, see below); these are predominantly poorer countries where a large part of the household
income - as much as 40% or more - is spent on food.
The biggest key problems for the EU and the Netherlands are now:
• the availability of grains, particularly for animal feed;
• the availability of specific import flows, such as GMO free or organic;
• the availability of sunflower oil;
• the sharp increase in the cost of energy and fertilisers.
Companies will look for alternatives, which may lead to the problem that these alternatives do not meet
desired product specifications (e.g. being GMO free) or EU legislation on the maximum residue limit (MRL)
for crop protection agents. Agents that are not permitted in the EU also may have been used. Replacement is
thus not always quick or possible.
Harvest estimates and stockpiling
There are several sources that provide insights into harvest estimates and stockpiling; two important ones
are the FAO and the USDA.
According to USDA figures, current grain stocks (including rice) are similar to or higher than the previous two
seasons (situation in spring 2022). For wheat, stocks are estimated to decrease by 4 million tonnes to
263.74 million tonnes in the 2021/2022 season; for feed grains, stocks are similar to previous years
(286.93 million tonnes). The USDA’s figures already anticipate the drop in production in Russia and Ukraine.
The mobilisation of strategic stocks is an important tool for countries to buffer spikes in commodity prices.
Stock-to-use ratios reflect the relative size of strategic stockpiles: they indicate the level of stock for a given
commodity as a percentage of the total use of the commodity in a given season. The FAO’s latest estimate of
these stock-to-use ratios is 37.1% for wheat and 22.6% for feed grains (FAO, 2022). In the study by
Meijerink et al. (2011), a stock-to-use ratio of 20% is regarded as a minimum for stocks to play their roles
as buffers. During the previous peak in 2007-2008, stock-to-use ratios for grain and maize were around
15-18%, so current stocks are ample.
There is always a margin of uncertainty in estimates of the expected size of strategic stockpiles: harvests
may turn out better or worse than expected. Expectations are therefore adjusted regularly. Grain comes to
market at different times too (difference between northern and southern hemisphere). For example, in early
February, the harvest forecast for Egypt was revised from 9.2 million tonnes of wheat to 10.5 million tonnes
of wheat (ahramonline, 2022).
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Wageningen Economic Research Policy Document 2022-033
The current unrest in the markets, with its impact on price formation, is partly due to panic and unrest about
potential shortages. In view of the above analysis of the stocks, this concern does not appear to be justified.
Barriers to trade
Several countries have announced their intention to restrict exports (Hungary: grains; Serbia: grains,
vegetable oil; Indonesia: palm oil). Trade-restrictive measures can exacerbate price volatility (the same
applies to import subsidies), as shown by an analysis of a number of restrictive measures in 2007-2008. a
period when grain prices also rose sharply (Meijerink et al., 2011). This period was ultimately short-lived as
the high prices led to additional production through acreage expansion and intensification (Banse et al.,
2011). This effect could occur again.
2.2
EU situation
The EU is self-sufficient in most products, with the exception of tropical products (e.g. fruit, coffee and tea),
oilseeds (including soya) and natural fats and oils (including palm oil). This is proven by the self-sufficiency
rates published by the EU in the forecast (European Union, 2021) and the EU’s trade position (Figure 11).
The loss of imports from Ukraine puts pressure on certain chains, as mentioned earlier, but there are often
alternatives.
This is not to say that individual companies or chains may not experience problems in obtaining sufficient
raw materials. These signs are already present at the processors of raw materials for animal feed and
sunflower oil. Replacing raw materials from Ukraine and/or Russia with raw materials is not always easy.
Products from these countries are not always interchangeable with local raw materials. In the case of
detailed products specifications, the use of alternative raw materials may require renegotiations with
customers. Companies may therefore encounter uncertainties surrounding deliveries and obligations –
administrative and otherwise – such as import certificates and the like.
In the short term, the combined effect of higher costs for energy, raw materials and fertilisers raises the cost
of food: the loss of part of Ukraine’s production reinforces this effect for raw materials. So far, these higher
production costs for primary agriculture have only been reflected in the price consumers pay to a limited
extent. This is also true of processing links to a greater or lesser extent. It can be expected that current cost
increases will have a greater impact on consumer costs in the near future.
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Figure 11
2.3
EU imports and exports (in millions of euros) by product category, 2020
Situation of countries highly dependent on imports from
Russia and Ukraine
The largest importers of Ukrainian grain are Egypt, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Turkey and Yemen. Russia
exports its wheat mainly to Egypt and Turkey. The latter two countries are therefore heavily dependent on
both Ukraine and Russia together for their wheat imports. Egypt and Turkey also rely heavily on Ukraine and
Russia for maize and barley feed grains: about 30% of their maize imports come from Ukraine, while Turkey
also receives about 45% of its maize imports from Russia (Figure 12).
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Egypt, maize
19.4
45.2
Turkey, wheat
57.6
7.1
Egypt, maize
35.3
0.0
32.3
Egypt, wheat
67.7
69.0
20.7
0.0
20.0
40.0
Ukraine
Figure 12
35.5
60.0
Russia
10.3
80.0
100.0
120.0
Other
Import share of Ukraine and Russia in total imports of wheat and maize in Egypt and Turkey
Source: UN Comtrade, numbers 2020.
Both countries, Egypt and Turkey, are thus highly dependent on imports of wheat and maize from Ukraine
and Russia. An overview of the self-sufficiency rates of both countries shows that Egypt’s import dependence
is higher than Turkey’s (Figure 13). Egypt is less than half self-sufficient, and thus relies heavily on
international supplies of these two grains.
Turkey, maize
69.7
Egypt, maize
44.6
Turkey, wheat
89.8
Egypt, wheat
43.7
0.0
Figure 13
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
Self-sufficiency levels of wheat and maize in Turkey and Egypt (% of own production in terms
of consumption)
The impact that the conflict in Ukraine has on food security in countries that are major grain importers will
be determined by a combination of import dependency and self-sufficiency. To clarify this, two examples
follow. Pakistan imported around 2.5 million tonnes of wheat in 2020. Half was from Russia; the other half
from Ukraine. The country produces enough to cover 90% of its own needs. Comparatively, Nigeria imported
6.5 million tonnes of wheat whilst producing almost none. It did not import wheat from Ukraine, but from
Russia (1.1 million tonnes in 2020). Due to its high dependence on imports, the growing consumption of
wheat in Nigeria seems to be significantly affected by the disturbances in the international market caused by
the conflict in Ukraine. The ultimate effects on food security in countries – such as Pakistan, Nigeria and
other countries that are heavily dependent on grain imports – depend on their ability to purchase grains on
the international market and at what prices. In the short term, the alternatives to falling exports from
Ukraine and Russia seem limited. For example, according to the FAO, wheat and maize harvests in Canada
and the US have been disappointing, Argentina is applying export restrictions to combat domestic inflation,
and Australia can no longer deliver owing to logistical bottlenecks (FAO, 2022a).
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3
Medium to long-term effects on food
supply
For the medium (6 months-2 years) to long term (>2 years), there is a great deal of uncertainty about the
impact of the war on food security. This involves both the direct consequences of the war and the
consequences of sanctions being and yet to be imposed on Russia.
There are five determining and uncertain factors:
• production (decline) in Ukraine and possibly Russia too
• the length of the conflict
• the availability of fertilisers
• the availability of energy
• trade barriers (through protectionism of individual countries or sanctions).
In order to get a better idea of the possible consequences of these uncertainties for production and,
consequently, food security, different scenarios will be calculated with different assumptions for these five
factors. With regard to food security, both the impact on availability and access to food are calculated.
Access to food is heavily dependent on development in purchasing power (development of food prices in
relation to income development).
The scenarios start with an exploration of the effects of different assumptions on a macro/global level (e.g.
development of Gross Domestic Product, sectoral production, international trade, consumption, world food
prices). Subsequently, the results of these macro calculations at an international level are used to explore
the consequences at EU and Dutch level, including the impact on (food) chains in the Netherlands.
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Wageningen Economic Research Policy Document 2022-033
Sources and literature
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Wageningen Economic Research Policy Document 2022-033
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Appendix 1
Table B1
Production of all grains (including rice), 2017-2020, in tonnes
2017
2018
2019
2020
EU
286.460.386
270.945.470
296.040.100
282.610.530
Russian Federation
131.300.767
109.848.095
117.889.170
130.037.708
Ukraine
60.696.191
69.118.012
74.449.698
64.342.357
Belarus
7.529.412
5.813.781
6.991.979
8.403.688
2.478.719.249
2.454.185.011
2.471.971.009
2.510.748.006
2.964.706.005
2.909.910.369
2.967.341.956
2.996.142.289
Rest of the world
Total
Table B2
Flour, 2017-2020, in tonnes
2017
2018
2019
2020
136.814.326
123.757.660
138.628.910
125.791.420
Russian Federation
86.002.542
72.136.149
74.452.692
85.896.326
Ukraine
26.208.980
24.652.840
28.370.280
24.912.350
Belarus
2.620.230
1.814.765
2.308.660
2.848.391
520.644.530
509.778.170
521.220.279
521.477.344
772.290.608
732.139.584
764.980.821
760.925.831
EU
Rest of the world
Total
Table B3
Maize production, 2017-2020, in tonnes
2017
2018
2019
2020
EU
63.587.342
66.857.530
67.800.980
65.413.450
Russian Federation
13.208.095
11.419.020
14.282.352
13.879.210
Ukraine
24.668.750
35.801.050
35.880.050
30.290.340
Belarus
Rest of the world
Total
Table B4
694.238
1.137.845
1.095.331
1.075.833
1.036.565.655
1.009.045.811
1.022.301.155
1.051.694.164
1.138.724.080
1.124.261.256
1.141.359.868
1.162.352.997
Sunflower oil production, in tonnes, 2015-2020
Russian Federation
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
9.280.296
11.015.109
10.480.958
12.755.725
15.379.287
13.314.418
11.181.120
13.626.890
12.235.520
14.165.170
15.254.120
13.110.430
Argentina
3.158.290
3.000.367
3.546.707
3.537.545
3.825.750
3.232.649
China
2.698.113
2.610.000
3.149.400
2.494.200
2.420.000
2.375.000
Romania
1.785.771
2.032.340
2.912.743
3.062.690
3.569.150
2.198.670
Turkey
1.680.700
1.670.716
1.964.385
1.949.229
2.100.000
2.067.004
Bulgaria
1.699.228
1.873.677
2.056.987
1.943.980
1.937.210
1.733.530
Hungary
1.556.976
1.875.412
2.022.332
1.830.280
1.706.850
1.697.960
France
1.186.913
1.172.411
1.598.972
1.239.080
1.298.140
1.607.080
United States of America
1.326.180
1.202.760
969.670
955.740
887.240
1.352.800
42.300.016
47.476.776
48.609.350
51,913,748
56.020.665
50.229.567
Ukraine
Global total
20 |
Wageningen Economic Research Policy Document 2022-033
Wageningen Economic Research Policy Document 2022-033
| 21
Wageningen Economic Research
The mission of Wageningen University & Research is “To explore the potential of
P.O. Box 29703
nature to improve the quality of life”. Under the banner Wageningen University &
2502 LS The Hague
Research, Wageningen University and the specialised research institutes of the
The Netherlands
Wageningen Research Foundation have joined forces in contributing to finding
T +31 (0)70 335 83 30
solutions to important questions in the domain of healthy food and living
E communications.ssg@wur.nl
environment. With its roughly 30 branches, 6,800 employees (6,000 fte) and
wur.eu/economic-research
12,900 students, Wageningen University & Research is one of the leading
organisations in its domain. The unique Wageningen approach lies in its integrated
POLICY DOCUMENT 2022-033
approach to issues and the collaboration between different disciplines.
Wageningen Economic Research
The mission of Wageningen University & Research is “To explore the potential of
P.O. Box 29703
nature to improve the quality of life”. Under the banner Wageningen University &
2502 LS Den Haag
Research, Wageningen University and the specialised research institutes of the
The Netherlands
Wageningen Research Foundation have joined forces in contributing to finding
T +31 (0) 70 335 83 30
solutions to important questions in the domain of healthy food and living
E communications.ssg@wur.nl
environment. With its roughly 30 branches, 6,800 employees (6,000 fte) and
wur.eu/economic-research
12,900 students, Wageningen University & Research is one of the leading
organisations in its domain. The unique Wageningen approach lies in its
Policy Document 2022-033
integrated approach to issues and the collaboration between different disciplines.