Page1 Irish Journal of Family Law 2012 *101 Same-Sex Marriage in Ireland: The Rocky Road to Recognition Brian Tobin* Subject: Family law. Other related subjects: Constitutional law Keywords: Civil partners; Constitutional rights; Ireland; Right to marry; Same sex partners; Introduction In May 2012, it was announced in the Irish Times that the long-awaited appeal of Ireland's same-sex marriage case, Zappone and Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners, was due to be heard by the Supreme Court in June 2012.1However, despite waiting almost six years for their case to go before the Supreme Court, a few weeks before the hearing the plaintiffs decided to drop their appeal and instead proceed with a fresh High Court challenge. 2In the new High Court proceedings, the plaintiffs are seeking to impugn s.2(2)(e) of the Civil Registration Act 2004 (the “2004 Act”), the first Irish statutory provision to define marriage as between a man and a woman. This provision went unchallenged in the original High Court proceedings in 2006. The plaintiffs also claimed that they would mount a challenge to the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”). This article will examine the necessity for a fresh legal action incorporating s.2(2)(e) of the 2004 Act and aspects of the 2010 Act. It will then assess the likelihood of success for Zappone and Gilligan this time around. The Supreme Court and Section 2(2)(e) The fact that s.2(2)(e) of the 2004 Act was not challenged before the High Court proved costly for the plaintiffs when they later sought to challenge that provision in their Supreme Court appeal, as a motion to do so was dismissed by Macken J. in that court in October 2011.3Macken J. observed that arguments in relation to the constitutionality of s.2(2)(e) were not fully raised before the High Court and not considered in Dunne J.'s judgment in 2006, although the issue was “touched upon”. 4Macken J. said the matter involved “a piece of constitutional and legislative history” and before such an issue could come before the Supreme Court, it had to be “fully ventilated” at High Court level. In this regard, the learned judge noted that an application to amend the pleadings could have been made when the provision was enacted. This is correct, as the original High Court proceedings were commenced on November 9, 2004 and s.2(2)(e) entered into force on December 5, 2005. However, the case did not come on for hearing before the High Court until October 3, 2006. Thus, counsel for the plaintiffs had almost 10 months to amend the pleadings so as to challenge s.2(2)(e). In any event, Macken J. held that it was now inappropriate to grant the application to amend the pleadings. 5Macken J.'s ruling was most likely a significant factor in the plaintiffs' decision to forego their Supreme Court appeal and instead initiate a new High Court challenge incorporating s.2(2)(e) of the 2004 Act. Section 2(2)(e) in the Original High Court Proceedings In Hyde v Hyde, Lord Penzance confirmed the common law exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage by stating that marriage is “the voluntary union of one man and one woman for life, to the exclusion of all others”.6Section 2(2)(e) of the 2004 Act essentially reiterates this common law definition of marriage in the following terms: “For the purposes of this Act there is an impediment to a marriage if … both parties are of the same sex.” In the original High Court proceedings, Dunne J. found it curious that the plaintiffs had not sought to challenge this provision. Page2 Nonetheless, Dunne J. alluded to it and found that “the Act of 2004 is in force, is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and is to my mind an expression of the prevailing view as to the basis for capacity to marry”. 7This author has stated elsewhere that: “[t]he explicit prohibition on gay marriage contained in section 2(2)(e) of the Civil Registration Act 2004 sealed its fate in the Zappone and Gilligan case because the Irish courts have … displayed a keen willingness to defer to the legislature where controversial constitutionally protected rights are at issue.”8 Indeed, Dunne J.'s deference towards the 2004 Act's exclusive notion of marriage was never more apparent than when she posed this question: “Is [section 2(2)(e)] not of itself an indication of the prevailing idea and concept in relation to what marriage is and how it should be defined? I think it is.”9 Therefore, Dunne J. actually viewed s.2(2)(e) as the expression of the prevailing view as to the basis for capacity to marry.10However, it is opined that Dunne J.'s strict adherence to the concept of marriage enshrined in s.2(2)(e) of the 2004 Act was somewhat unsatisfactory when one considers the manner in which this provision came about. The Legislative History of Section 2(2) of the Civil Registration Act 2004 Subsection (2)(a)–(e) of s.2 of the 2004 Act was an amendment to the legislation introduced at Committee Stage to clarify “what is an impediment to a marriage”,11as explained by the then Minister for Social and Family Affairs, Mary Coughlan. During the Committee Stage, revisions of this amendment based on changes in the law and modern social perceptions were suggested. Deputy Penrose suggested that subs.2(a) should be amended to take account of the availability of divorce law since 1996 so that there would no longer be an impediment to a marriage between a person and the divorced spouse of that person's sibling. 12Deputy Neville, obviously aware of the *102 contemporary social perception of persons with impaired mental abilities, felt that the wording of subs.2(d) was not appropriate for a modern piece of legislation because it rendered void the marriage of “lunatics”. 13At no point during the Committee's debate was the impediment to same-sex marriage contained in subs.2(e) discussed. This is disappointing and ironic because, akin to the above amendments that were tabled, socio-legal changes had taken place which arguably necessitated debate as to whether it was justifiable to continue to ban same-sex marriage. Such developments were indicative of an increasing acceptance of the normality of the sexual identity of homosexual persons. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association dropped homosexuality from the classification of mental illness in its diagnostic and statistical manual. 14In 1993, in this jurisdiction, private consensual sexual activity between homosexual males was decriminalised by legislative enactment “and legislative protections for gay and lesbian persons were subsequently imposed in the fields of insurance, employment, and goods and services”. 15 In light of this, one might ask why the Oireachtas did not see fit to debate the ban on same-sex marriage, possibly one of the greatest obstacles to the full assimilation of homosexual citizens into Irish society? It must be remembered that, when s.2(2) was being debated on February 3, 2004, the global recognition of same-sex marriage rights was little more than embryonic. Merely two countries in the world had come to recognise same-sex marriage rights, in 2001 and 2003 respectively.16Hence, even if the deputies had sought to contest the contemporary meaning of marriage, “it is not the case that the meaning of marriage has unequivocally shifted”. 17In addition, when the 2004 Act was being debated, the deputies did not have the benefit of the judgment in Zappone, which seems to accord the Oireachtas primacy in determining any amendments to the meaning of marriage. 18In fact, the deputies had quite the opposite. In 2003, in his judgment in DT v CT, Murray J. proffered the understanding that “marriage itself remains a solemn contract of partnership entered into between man and woman with a special status recognised by the Constitution”. 19Thus, the deputies may not have felt the need to address s.2(2)(e) because they were aware of the role of the Oireachtas in enacting legislation in compliance with the Constitution, which such provision clearly is. Nonetheless, given the abovementioned progressive developments in law and psychology that are respectful of the plight of the homosexual citizen, and the fact that a right to same-sex marriage was slowly gaining impetus globally, it is rather disappointing that the deputies did not engage in any reasoned debate whatsoever on s.2(2)(e) before passing it through. On this basis, Page3 Zappone and Gilligan's new High Court challenge to s.2(2)(e) is to be welcomed because, when enacting this provision, the Oireachtas failed to duly consider “the extent to which ideas and values prevailing at one period have been conditioned by the passage of time”.20 The European Convention on Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage in Ireland The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is unlikely to be of any real assistance to Zappone and Gilligan in their legal challenge to s.2(2)(e) of the 2004 Act. In the aftermath of Schalk and Kopf v Austria, it is clear that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) “would no longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex”.21Hence art.12 would seem applicable to any complaint made by Zappone and Gilligan against s.2(2)(e) of the 2004 Act. However, the ECtHR went on to state that “the question whether or not to allow samesex marriage is left to regulation by the national law of the Contracting State”. 22Consequently, “Article 12 of the Convention does not impose an obligation on [contracting States] to grant a same-sex couple … access to marriage”. 23In March 2012, the ECtHR reaffirmed this decision in Gas and Dubois v France. 24 In Schalk and Kopf v Austria, the ECtHR also recognised a same-sex couple's right to respect for “family life” under art.8.25However, an attempt by Zappone and Gilligan to argue that s.2(2)(e) stands contrary to their respect for “family life” by denying them the right to marry under Irish law solely on the grounds of their sexual orientation contrary to art.14, seems futile. This is because in Schalk and Kopf, the ECtHR stated that the ECHR “is to be read as a whole and its Articles should therefore be construed in harmony with one another”, and, accordingly, because: “Article 12 does not impose an obligation on Contracting States to grant same-sex couples access to marriage, Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, a provision of more general purpose and scope, cannot be interpreted as imposing such an obligation either.”26 Therefore, since a same-sex couple's right to marry is not encompassed by art.8, art.14 simply cannot be engaged by that provision in this instance.27By recognising only opposite-sex marriage, s.2(2)(e) would surely survive a challenge based on the provisions of the ECHR because it is not incompatible with the State's obligations under arts 8, 12 and 14. The Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010: Sounding the Death Knell for Same-Sex Marriage? Although it will be interesting to discover what arguments counsel for Zappone and Gilligan purport to advance to try to rebut the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to *103 s.2(2)(e) in the new High Court proceedings, it is uncertain whether these will be sufficient, as the Irish courts continue to remain deferential to the Oireachtas on matters of social policy.28Indeed, it is submitted that judicial deference towards a most recent Act of the Oireachtas in the highly sensitive area of same-sex relationship recognition could cause Zappone and Gilligan's latest High Court action to flounder. In 2008, for better or for worse (no pun intended), the Fianna Fáil/Green Party Coalition Government proceeded to sanction civil partnership coupled with a redress scheme as the appropriate models of relationship recognition for Irish same-sex couples.29In 2011, the 2010 Act acquired the force of law in this jurisdiction. 30As suggested by its title, it enables same-sex couples to enter into a civil partnership or acquire certain rights and obligations in respect of one another when the relationship ends if they were cohabiting for a certain period of time and one party was financially dependent. However, it is opined that the enactment of such legislation could sound the death knell for the recognition of a right to same-sex marriage under Art.41 of the Constitution. This is because the High Court could display the same legislative deference as Dunne J. in 2006 and consequently refuse to expand the current constitutional understanding that marriage is heterosexual in nature by finding that the 2010 Act represents the prevailing social consensus on the appropriate form of legal recognition for same-sex relationships. The High Court could further conclude that, in any event, this recent legislative initiative has, in practice, enabled same-sex couples to enjoy most of the benefits associated with marriage. 31 A Challenge to Section 5(1) of the 2010 Act? Page4 Despite the potentially negative impact that judicial deference towards the 2010 Act could have on their challenge to s.2(2)(e) of the 2004 Act, Zappone and Gilligan have stated that they also intend to challenge its provisions in their new legal action. One imagines that they will mount a challenge to s.5(1) of the 2010 Act. This provision enables the Minister for Justice and Law Reform to designate certain classes of foreign legal relationships between same-sex couples as civil partnerships in Ireland. Such relationships must be “exclusive”, “permanent” and subject to dissolution by a court. As a result of this provision, Zappone and Gilligan's Canadian same-sex marriage has been declared a civil partnership under Irish law. Zappone and Gilligan could argue that, by downgrading their Canadian same-sex marriage, s.5(1) of the 2010 Act breaches their right to marry under Art.41.3.1°. However, while there appears to be a slightly greater international consensus on the issue of same-sex marriage since Dunne J.'s High Court judgment was issued in 2006,32the Irish courts continue to view marriage as an opposite-sex institution. In 2009, in JMcD v PL and BM, Denham J. (as she then was) remarked obiter in the Supreme Court that, “arising from the terms of the Constitution, ‘family’ means a family based on marriage, the marriage of a man and a woman”. 33In 2010, in HAH v SAA, Dunne J. reiterated that the constitutional notion of marriage remains concerned with parties of the opposite sex. 34Thus, the High Court could conclude that marriage “as understood by the Constitution, by statute and by case law” 35is an opposite-sex union and “persons cannot be or be treated as married to each other or live together as husband and wife unless they are of the opposite sex”. 36Hence s.5(1), by recognising a foreign same-sex marriage as a civil partnership that carries most of the rights and obligations of marriage, might not be declared unconstitutional. Should the High Court find that the Constitution does not recognise same-sex marriage, it could conclude that the 2010 Act is a proportionate remedial measure as it arguably pays committed same-sex couples “the respect to which they are entitled by treating them as conceptually different but entitled to equality of treatment”. 37 Zappone and Gilligan could further argue that by downgrading their Canadian same-sex marriage, s.5(1) breaches their right to marry under art.12 of the ECHR. In the aftermath of Schalk and Kopf, art.12 would seem applicable to a challenge to a domestic statute that prohibits the recognition of foreign same-sex marriages. Some guidance as to whether the State's failure to place foreign same-sex marriages on a par with domestic opposite-sex marriages amounts to a failure to secure the right to marry contained in art.12 may be found in the judgment of Potter P. in Wilkinson v Kitzinger.38The applicants were impugning s.215 of the UK's Civil Partnership Act 2004, which allows a foreign same-sex marriage to be downgraded in status to a civil partnership. At the time of this judgment, it was unclear as to whether art.12 could even be engaged by this scenario given its application by the ECtHR only to cases involving a difference of gender by virtue of either birth or gender re-assignment surgery. 39Nonetheless, Potter P. adopted a broad approach to this provision and held that such a situation could fall within its ambit because it represented a limitation on the right of an individual to marry the partner of his or her choice. 40Potter P. felt that the non-discrimination provision contained in art.14 of the ECHR was also engaged, as this difference in treatment was based on sexual orientation, and thus: “The question is whether it can withstand scrutiny and this depends on whether it has a legitimate aim and whether the means chosen to achieve that aim are appropriate and not disproportionate in their adverse impact.”41 Potter P. held that the downgrading of foreign same-sex marriages to civil partnerships in the UK had a legitimate aim, i.e. protection of the traditional marital family. He held *104 that the means chosen to achieve that aim were reasonable and proportionate because the UK Parliament had taken steps “by enacting the Civil Partnership Act to accord to same-sex relationships effectively all the rights, responsibilities, benefits and advantages of civil marriage save the name”.42The High Court might simply come to the same conclusion as Potter P. did, upholding s.5(1) because it not only supports the marital family which has the added advantage of constitutional protection in Ireland, but, in any event, the 2010 Act grants same-sex couples rights largely akin to marriage. The ECtHR has not yet had an opportunity to pronounce on the application of art.12 to a case where the applicants are seeking to have their same-sex marriage—which has been contracted outside of the 47 jurisdictions party to the Council of Europe—recognised by law in one of those States that permit same-sex couples to enter into civil partnerships, yet forbid them from Page5 marrying. Many such States usually provide by statute for the foreign same-sex marriage to be downgraded in status to a civil partnership.43The ECtHR might not find s.5(1) of the 2010 Act in breach of the ECHR should the matter ultimately reach Strasbourg because, in Schalk and Kopf, it not only held that States are not obligated to provide for same-sex marriage as matters currently stand, but it recognised that civil partnership provides same-sex partners with “a possibility to obtain a legal status equal or similar to marriage in many respects”. 44Although the ECtHR observed that there can be some substantial differences between the two institutions in respect of parental rights, “this corresponds on the whole to the trend in … Member States” 45of the Council of Europe. Thus, the ECtHR might view the 2010 Act's downgrading of a same-sex marriage to civil partnership status as being in sync with similar legislation in other contracting States and, consequently, within Ireland's margin of appreciation. In Schalk and Kopf, the ECtHR stated that due to a lack of European consensus, the area of same-sex relationship recognition “must therefore still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no established consensus”. 46 Constitutional Convention It is possible that same-sex marriage could be put to the people in a referendum prior to the hearing of Zappone and Gilligan's new legal challenge to existing Irish marriage law. This is because the current Fine Gael/Labour Government has proposed the establishment of a Constitutional Convention to consider comprehensive constitutional reform. The Convention will comprise of a Chairman, 33 Oireachtas members and 66 citizens selected from the electoral register. The Convention will have to consider a number of specific issues and report back on them within 12 months. One such issue involves making provision for same-sex marriage in the Constitution. However, the date on which the Convention will commence its work has yet to be announced by the coalition Government, and it has even been referred to as the “‘garden shed’, a dumping ground for any issue likely to cause Coalition grief until it's safe to resurrect it—ideally, sometime in the next term”.47Hence, one should not be overly optimistic about the Convention's efficacy in recommending constitutional provision for same-sex marriage. In any event, if the Convention does eventually recommend that same-sex marriage be given constitutional protection, then there will have to be a referendum on the matter. While a number of recent opinion polls indicate that the Irish people are now in favour of same-sex marriage, 48the Gay and Lesbian Equality Network (GLEN) has noted that no referendum anywhere in the world has passed same-sex marriage. 49Thus, as this author has observed elsewhere, “it is uncertain as to whether a same-sex marriage referendum would be successful, even though opinion polls might indicate that we live in a far more enlightened Ireland in 2012”. 50 Conclusion A successful outcome to Zappone and Gilligan's fresh High Court challenge to Irish marriage law appears dubious for a variety of reasons. Recent case law indicates that the Constitution and the ECHR both continue to recognise marriage as an opposite-sex institution. Although the ECtHR has indicated that the latter instrument can embrace same-sex marriage, there is no obligation on the contracting States to do so in order to comply with the ECHR. It is frustrating that the 2010 Act, introduced to improve the legal situation of committed same-sex couples, could nonetheless prevent them from attaining true equality in the form of same-sex marriage because of judicial deference to legislative enactments. In light of the difficulties associated with another legal challenge by Zappone and Gilligan, the consideration of constitutional protection for same-sex marriage by a Constitutional Convention certainly seems like a novel idea. However, whether any substantive work will be done on this issue by this body in the lifetime of the current Government remains to be seen, and in any event, a same-sex marriage referendum would carry its own trepidations. In Ireland, the road to legal recognition for same-sex marriage is most definitely a rocky one. *106 This journal may be cited as e.g. [2005] 2 I.J.F.L. 1 [[year] (Volume number) I.J.F.L. (page number)] Irish Journal of Family Law 2012, 4, 102-108 Page6 *. PhD Candidate, Trinity College Dublin. 1. “Gay Couple in Supreme Court over Right to Wed”, Irish Times, May 9, 2012, p.4. 2. Charlie Taylor, “Couple to Issue Renewed Legal Challenge to Civil Registration Act in Bid for Marriage”, Irish Times, June 7, 2012, p.8. 3. “Lesbian Couple Weigh Up Whether to Continue Appeal”, Irish Times, October 22, 2011, p.4. 4. “Lesbian Couple Weigh Up Whether to Continue Appeal”, Irish Times, *105 October 22, 2011, p.4. 5. “Lesbian Couple Weigh Up Whether to Continue Appeal”, Irish Times, October 22, 2011, p.4. 6. Hyde v Hyde (1866) L.R. 1 P and D 130 at 133 per Lord Penzance. 7. Zappone and Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners and Others [2008] 2 I.R. 417 at 506. 8. Brian Tobin, “Gay Marriage – A Bridge Too Far?” (2007) 15 Irish Student Law Review 175 at 179. 9. Zappone and Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners and Others [2008] 2 I.R. 417 at 506. Emphasis added. 10. This author has argued elsewhere that by regarding the legislative concept of marriage as solely representing the prevailing social understanding of the revered institution, Dunne J. was also indicating that any future statute introducing same-sex marriage could pass constitutional muster. See Brian Tobin, “Law, Politics and the Child-Centric Approach to Marriage in Ireland” (2012) 47 (1) Irish Jurist 210 at 219–220. 11. Committee Debates, Select Committee on Social and Family Affairs (Civil Registration Bill 2003: Committee Stage, February 3, 2004). Available at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/FAS/2004/02/03/00004.asp [Last accessed August 12, 2012]. 12. Committee Debates, Select Committee on Social and Family Affairs (Civil Registration Bill 2003: Committee Stage, February 3, 2004). Available at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/FAS/2004/02/03/00004.asp [Last accessed August 12, 2012]. 13. Committee Debates, Select Committee on Social and Family Affairs (Civil Registration Bill 2003: Committee Stage, February 3, 2004). Available at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/FAS/2004/02/03/00004.asp [Last accessed August 12, 2012]. 14. Zappone and Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners and Others [2008] 2 I.R. 417 at 429. 15. Brian Tobin, “EB v. France: Endorsing Un-”Convention”-al Families?” (2008) 11(4) Irish Journal of Family Law 78 at 79. 16. The Netherlands opened up marriage to same-sex couples in 2001 and was then followed by Belgium in 2003. 17. Oran Doyle, Constitutional Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Dublin: Clarus Press, 2008), p.234. 18. For a discussion of this hypothesis see Brian Tobin, “Law, Politics and the Child-Centric Approach to Marriage in Ireland” (2012) 47 (1) Irish Jurist 210 at 219–220. 19. [2003] 1 I.L.R.M. 321 at 374. Emphasis added. 20. TF v Ireland [1995] I.R. 321 at 335 per Murphy J. (High Court). Page7 21. Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application No.30141/04) (unreported), June 24, 2010, at para.61. 22. Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application No.30141/04) (unreported), June 24, 2010, at para.61. 23. Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application No.30141/04) (unreported), June 24, 2010, at para.63. 24. Gas and Dubois v France (Application No.25951/07) (unreported), March 15, 2012, at para.66. 25. Gas and Dubois v France (Application No.25951/07) (unreported), March 15, 2012, at para.93. 26. Gas and Dubois v France (Application No.25951/07) (unreported), March 15, 2012, at para.101. This reflects the ECtHR's finding in Parry v United Kingdom (Application No.42971/02) (unreported), November 28, 2006 that “Article 12 is the lex specialis for the right to marry”. 27. This is because the non-discrimination provision contained in art.14 has no independent existence in that there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the ECHR's substantive provisions or Protocols. 28. In this regard, see the judgment of Denham C.J. in the very recent case of D v Ireland [2012] IESC 10. 29. Mark Hennessy and Carl O'Brien, “Bill to Grant Legal Protection to Same-Sex Couples”, Irish Times, June 25,2008, p.3. 30. For an excellent analysis of this legislation, see Fergus Ryan, Annotated Legislation: Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (Dublin: Round Hall, 2011). 31. This author previously raised similar concerns about the detrimental impact of this legislation on Zappone and Gilligan's now-abandoned Supreme Court appeal: see Brian Tobin, “Recognition of Canadian Same-Sex Marriage: Zappone and Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners and Others” (2010) 1 Irish Human Rights Law Review 217 at 221. 32. Twelve countries now recognise same-sex marriage; whereas only five countries (and Massachusetts in the US) did so when Zappone was decided in December 2006. 33. JMcD v PL and BM [2010] 1 I.L.R.M. 461 at 488. 34. HAH v SAA, unreported, High Court, November 4, 2010. 35. Foy v An t-Árd Chláraitheoir & Ors, unreported, High Court, July 9, 2002, at para.175. 36. Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 A.C. 557 at 589 per Lord Millett (dissenting). 37. Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 A.C. 557 at 589 per Lord Millett (dissenting). 38. Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2007] 1 F.L.R. 295. 39. See Rees v United Kingdom (Application No.9532/81) (1986) 9 E.H.R.R. 56; Cossey v United Kingdom (Application No.10843/84) (1990) 13 E.H.R.R. 622; Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom (Application No.22985/93) (1998) 27 E.H.R.R. 163; Goodwin v United Kingdom (Application No.28957/95) (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18; Parry v United Kingdom (Application No.42971/02) (unreported), November 28, 2006. 40. Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2007] 1 F.L.R. 295 at para.110. 41. Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2007] 1 F.L.R. 295 at para.115. 42. Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2007] 1 F.L.R. 295 at para.122. 43. In Ireland, s.5(1) of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 provides for this. In the UK, s.215 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 provides for same. Page8 44. Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application No.30141/04) (unreported), June 24, 2010, at para.109. 45. Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application No.30141/04) (unreported), June 24, 2010, at para.109. 46. Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application No.30141/04) (unreported), June 24, 2010, at para.105. 47. Kathy Sheridan, “How Gay Marriage went Mainstream”, Irish Times, July 14, 2012, p.2. 48. Carl O' Brien, “Two-thirds Support Gay Marriage, Poll Finds”, Irish Times, September 15, 2010. In 2011, Red C, a research and marketing group based in Dublin, conducted another opinion poll on same-sex marriage, which found that 73 per cent of the population was in favour. 49. Kathy Sheridan, “How Gay Marriage went Mainstream”, Irish Times, July 14, 2012, p.2. 50. Brian Tobin, “Law, Politics and the Child-Centric Approach to Marriage in Ireland” (2012) 47 (1) Irish Jurist 210 at 225. © Thomson Reuters (Professional) Ireland Limited.