Legislative History

O direito autoral, embora tenha impactos diretos ou indiretos nas vidas de uma grande parcela da população brasileira, é um campo do direito que pouco ultrapassa o âmbito das discussões de “especialistas” ou é compreendido como inscrito em disputas sociais mais amplas. A Lei de Direitos Autorais (Lei n. 9.610/98), que em 2018 completa 20 anos de vigência, é ponto de partida para apaixonadas polarizações. Esta tese reconstrói os debates em torno da aprovação da lei, circunscritos no período entre 1989 e 1998, a partir de um campo interdisciplinar entre a sociologia jurídica e a história crítica do direito. Embora a Lei de Direitos Autorais tenha nascido de um projeto do Senado Federal em 1989, o Projeto Luiz Viana, os debates revolveram em torno não apenas dele, mas também de um projeto imediatamente anterior, o Projeto Genoíno. Os dois projetos expressavam os modelos de direito autoral que se encontravam em disputa naquele momento, e que chamo de modelo de exploração econômica e modelo do autor como criador. Não se identificava, no período, discussão em torno do que viria a ser o maior conflito das décadas seguintes, com a entrada em cena do modelo do acesso ao conhecimento. Os debates entre aqueles dois modelos deram-se em torno de disputas por institutos específicos entre autores, artistas e suas associações representativas, de um lado, e agentes da indústria baseada no direito autoral, de outro, e também de uma complexa trama envolvendo posições defendidas pelo Brasil em política externa, conjuntura geopolítica, distintas concepções sobre a incorporações de tratados no ordenamento jurídico nacional, e pressões do Executivo pelo cumprimento de compromissos assumidos internacionalmente – processos esses que também limitaram o espaço disponível de deliberação. Com a explicitação e análise crítica das posições em disputa naquele momento, pretende-se contribuir para a compreensão do direito autoral como inscrito na política, e para discussões sobre a transformação do direito brasileiro na redemocratização e na virada do século, processo legislativo, direito e transformação tecnológica, e a dinâmica de construção de institutos jurídicos a partir de valores e interesses localizáveis.

This is the story of Judge Bernard S. Meyer’s exhilarating, exhausting, and highly productive first year on the New York Court of Appeals.  Based on a reputation for integrity and a record of professional accomplishment, Judge Meyer was chosen to the New York Court of Appeals in 1979, and the following seven-and-a-half years he spent there were highly productive.  While on the Court of Appeals, Judge Meyer was a progressive reformer, and it was clear he intended to use his office to make the world a better place and, whenever possible, remedy injustice.  He looked for ways in which the law could be improved and sought to identify important legal questions that had not yet been settled.  He was eager to resolve unanswered legal issues in ways that were consistent with progressive approaches to public policy and a liberal view of important constitutional principles.  Judge Meyer was not afraid to use the law to aid those who needed help most, and he did so often.  He was meticulous and precise in all things legal, and fully measured up to the best standards of the Anglo-American judicial tradition.  His performance was exactly what responsible citizens would have hoped for from the first merit appointee to the New York Court of Appeals.

Maare Paloheimo & Merja Uotila

JOHDANTO Suomalaisen elinkeinotoiminnan monipuolistumisen ja modernisoitumisen aikana on yleensä pidetty 1800-luvun loppupuolta, mutta toisinaan kehityksen on katsottu alkaneen vasta 1900-luvulla. Esimerkiksi teollisen tuotannon kasvu, kaupallisen toiminnan monipuolistuminen ja volyymin kasvu sekä uusien työpaikkojen synnyttämä muuttoliike maaseutualueilta kaupunkeihin ajoittuvat vuoden 1850 jälkeiselle ajalle. Myös monet suuret yhteiskunnalliset muutokset, kuten valtiopäivien säännölliset kokoontumiset vuodesta 1863 alkaen ja elinkeinovapaus (1879), ovat vahvistaneet käsitystä ajanjakson merkittävyydestä. Vastaavasti vuosisadan alkupuolta on usein pidetty virkavaltaisuuden ja pysähtyneisyyden aikana. Taloudellisiin kysymyksiin liittyvien anomus- ja valituskirjelmien systemaattinen tutkimus kuitenkin osoittaa, että tilanne ei ollut näin yksiselitteinen, vaan elinkeinotoiminta alkoi monipuolistua ja jopa modernisoitua aikaisemmin. Voidaankin perustellusti sanoa, että 1800-luvun jälkipuoliskolla tapahtuneiden muutosten perusta luotiin aikaisemmilla vuosikymmenillä. Tämä näkyy esimerkiksi uusien toimialojen edustajien elinkeinolupahakemusten lisääntymisenä, kaupan alan toimijoiden ja perinteisten käsityöammattien harjoittajien lukumäärän kasvuna sekä osin myös elinkeinonharjoittajien sosiaalisen taustan monipuolistumisena. Arkipäiväisten kulutushyödykkeiden kasvava kysyntä ja yleisen vaatimustason nousu niin maaseudulla kuin kaupungissa kertovat omalta osaltaan kulutuskulttuurin voimistumisesta. Kulutustavaratuotantoon liittyvien innovaatioiden leviäminen oli osa tätä kehitystä. Tämänkaltaisella kehityksellä on yhtymäkohtia Jan de Vriesin luomaan uutteruuden vallankumous (industrious revolution) -teoriaan. Siinä de Vries analysoi kotitalouksien kulutuskulttuurissa tapahtuneita muutoksia, joissa siirryttiin lähemmäs markkinapohjaista tuotantoa. Samanaikaisesti kotitalouksissa ryhdyttiin käyttämään enemmän ja laaja-alaisemmin markkinoiden tuottamia kulutushyödykkeitä. Teoriaa on pidetty yhtenä viime vuosikymmenien stimuloivimmista varhaismodernin ajan taloudellisesta kehitystä kuvaavista teorioista, vaikka sitä on kritisoitu muun muassa keskittymisestä vain nopeasti teollistuneisiin maihin.

Statutes of limitations provide manufacturers and their insurers with certainty regarding potential product liabilities and relieve the courts and defendants of the burden and prejudice of stale claims. But what happens when your client is defending a suit and moves for summary judgment in a civil action on grounds that the plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, and “emergency” legislation is subsequently enacted that purports to extend the limitations period at issue?

This Comment examines real and potential constitutional conflicts arising when historic preservation is confronted by the powerful land use provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).

The development of historic preservation in the United States is summarized, as is the federal jurisprudence and legislative history leading to the enactment of RLUIPA.  Specific clauses within the Act are individually examined and critiqued from the perspective of existing Supreme Court jurisprudence and the Congressional Record at the time of passage.  New methods for interpreting RLUIPA provisions are then proposed to reconcile case law and the Congressional Record with the “plain” language of the Act.

These new synthesized interpretations are applied to typical historic preservation issues, as they pertain to religious institutions.  The hypothetical results are analyzed to predict how religious institutions, locally protected historic districts and landmark laws might be affected and/or clarified to avoid future conflicts between these worthy causes.

Finally, because future conflicts between RLUIPA and protected historic districts and/or landmark buildings seem unavoidable, the Author proposes five specific amendments to the RLUIPA to mitigate the potentially devastating and irreversible effects on society that the current Act may entail.

""""""In 1989, The National Museum of the American Indian Act (NMAIA) was successfully passed after a long and intense struggle. One year later, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) followed. These federal repatriation statutes—arguably some of the most important laws in the history of anthropology, museology, and American Indian rights—enabled Native Americans to reclaim human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony.

Twenty years later, the controversy instigated by the creation of NMAIA and NAGPRA continues to simmer. In the Smaller Scope of Conscience is a thoughtful and detailed study of the ins and outs of the four-year process behind these laws. It is a singular contribution to the history of these issues, with the potential to help mediate the ongoing debate by encouraging all sides to retrace the steps of the legislators responsible for the acts.

Few works are as detailed as McKeown’s account, which looks into bills that came prior to NMAIA and NAGPRA and combs the legislative history for relevant reports and correspondence. Testimonies, documents, and interviews from the primary players of this legislative process are cited to offer insights into the drafting and political processes that shaped NMAIA and NAGPRA.

Above all else, this landmark work distinguishes itself from earlier legislative histories with the quality of its analysis. Invested and yet evenhanded in his narrative, McKeown ensures that this journey through history—through the strategies and struggles of different actors to effect change through federal legislation—is not only accurate but eminently intriguing.""""""

The Road to Sesame Street features government documents tracing the development of the Public Broadcast Act of 1967, the landmark legislation that established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, PBS, and NPR. Using materials from the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, this project provides a behind-the-scenes view of the power players, interest groups, and decisions that laid the groundwork for American public media. Not only did the Act lead to influential programs like Sesame Street, it also promoted a utopian ideal for television and radio in American society.

"This Comment examines real and potential constitutional conflicts arising when historic preservation is confronted by the powerful land use provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). The development of historic preservation in the United States is summarized, as is the federal jurisprudence and legislative history leading to the enactment of RLUIPA. Specific clauses within the Act are individually examined and critiqued from the perspective of existing Supreme Court jurisprudence and the Congressional Record at the time of passage. New methods for interpreting RLUIPA provisions are then proposed to reconcile case law and the Congressional Record with the “plain” language of the Act. These new synthesized interpretations are applied to typical historic preservation issues, as they pertain to religious institutions. The hypothetical results are analyzed to predict how religious institutions, locally protected historic districts and landmark laws might be affected and/or clarified to avoid future conflicts between these worthy causes. Finally, because future conflicts between RLUIPA and protected historic districts and/or landmark buildings seem unavoidable, the Author proposes five specific amendments to the RLUIPA to mitigate the potentially devastating and irreversible effects on society that the current Act may entail."

Justice Antonin Scalia was a transformational jurist for many reasons: his skills as a writer and rhetorician, his charisma, and his bold attacks on the conventional interpretive methodologies of his day. Many of his ideas and arguments have brought lasting change in the way courts behave, particularly in the field of statutory construction. Today there is far less judicial reliance on legislative history than there was when Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court, and fewer facile invocations of “legislative intent.” But it also seems fair to say that Justice Scalia’s impact was less transformative in the field of constitutional law. While text and structure have become paramount in resolving disputed questions of statutory meaning, Obergefell v. Hodges shows that a majority of the Supreme Court still subscribes to the living-constitution philosophy that Justice Scalia so vigorously denounced.

This essay considers why Justice Scalia—who so profoundly changed the way the Supreme Court interprets statutes—was less successful in changing the Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation. And it contends that Justice Scalia’s most powerful critique of modern constitutional interpretation was not his attack on the idea of a living Constitution, but his challenge to the assumption that the judiciary (of all institutions) should hold the prerogative to impose its preferred interpretations of an evolving Constitution on the rest of us.