Aenesidemus

This book argues that Fichte’s philosophy is an investigation of the concept of philosophy leading to the replacement of the name φιλοσοφία by the name Wissenschaftslehre. Such a replacement is the result of his reception of Kant's transcendental approach as a revolution leading to a new conception of philosophy, not as much as the love of wisdom, but rather as the knowledge of knowledge. When conceived in those terms, philosophical knowledge is the grasping of the activities grounding the possibility of the distinction between subject and object. Now, this approach requires a new conception of the function of philosophical language, insofar as it should not represent objects, but rather manifest the operation of cognizing activities on which objectivity is to be grounded. As a result, the exposition of philosophy acquires a performative dimension, since it should not as much define its concepts, but rather show their operation. In face of this challenge, Fichte operates a variation of the conceptual languages within which philosophy is presented (one philosophy, multiple presentations - one spirit, multiple letters). The constant revitalization of this praxis depends on its turn on a pedagogical work aiming at: (i) bringing the scholarly language closer to the everyday language; (ii) building a historical consciousness among those that philosophize; and (iii) developing a collective space for the educational praxis. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre can thus be understood as an exploration and reevaluation of what philosophy is.

In this paper, I shall attempt a brief reconstruction of the epistemological
views of Pyrrho and Aenesidemus. For Pyrrho, I shall rely mainly on Aristocles’ testimony
(Aristocl. ap. Eus., PE XIV 18, 1-5), whereas for Aenesidemus, I shall take into account
the Sextan version of the ten and eight modes of suspension of judgment (PH, I, 35-163;
180-186). In this way, I intend to highlight some of the distinctive features of Pyrrhonian
scepticism.

G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, despite its importance for the development of post-Kantian idealism, has not been fully translated into English. Now and then, when I have time, I will upload draft translations of parts of the text here, with the goal of, at some point, providing a complete translation. These drafts will be rough and I welcome feedback!

This document contains only the Title page, Schulze's indication of the contents of the work, and the preface.

In 1792, Gottlob E. Schulze published one of the most important treatises in the era of the early critical reception of Kant’s transcendental philosophy: the skeptical treatise Aenesidemus. One of Schulze’s later students was the young Arthur Schopenhauer, whose examination of Kant’s philosophy was significantly influenced by Schulze. In this paper, it shall be established that this influence isn’t limited solely to the details of Schopenhauer’s critique of Kantian thinking, but rather extends to the systematic unfolding of Schopenhauer’s philosophy as a whole. In this respect, Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation can be understood as a direct, positive answer to the questions left open by Schulze’s debate on the internal problems of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

In my lecture, I will discuss the correlation between God and sceptical thought patterns in Philo’s philosophy. I will attempt to show that Philo utilises the sceptic notion of ἐποχή to account for the transcendence and unfathomableness of God’s being. I would also like to argue that the Alexandrian philosopher employs sceptic ideas to attain a more purified vision of God as the Absolute. Lastly, I will call attention to Philo’s image of Abraham as a sceptic.