Robb Dunphy
University of Sussex, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Alexander von Humboldt Postdoc at the Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg 2022-2024 DAAD Postdoctoral Researcher at th... moreAlexander von Humboldt Postdoc at the Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg 2022-2024
DAAD Postdoctoral Researcher at the Goethe University Frankfurt, 2022
Lecturer in Philosophy at Northeastern University London, 2021-2022
IRC Postdoctoral Fellow at University College Dublin, 2020-2021
Junior Research Fellow at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, University of Hamburg, 2020
Teaching Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Sussex, 2019-2020
PhD Sussex 2014-2018
Homepage: https://robbdunphy.com/edit - Tanja Staehleredit
This volume is dedicated to questions about the nature and method of metaphysics in Classical German Philosophy. Its chapters offer original investigations into the metaphysical projects of many of the major figures in German philosophy... more
This volume is dedicated to questions about the nature and method of metaphysics in Classical German Philosophy. Its chapters offer original investigations into the metaphysical projects of many of the major figures in German philosophy between Wolff and Hegel.
The period of Classical German Philosophy was an extraordinarily rich one in the history of philosophy, especially for metaphysics. It includes some of the highest achievements of early modern rationalism, Kant’s critical revolution, and the various significant works of German Idealism that followed in Kant’s wake. The contributions to this volume critically examine certain common themes among metaphysical projects across this period, for example, the demand that metaphysics amount to a science, that it should be presented in the form of a system, or that it should proceed by means of demonstration from certain key first principles. This volume also includes material on influential criticisms of metaphysical projects of this kind.
Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy is a useful resource for contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy interested in engaging with the history of the methodology and epistemology of metaphysics.
The period of Classical German Philosophy was an extraordinarily rich one in the history of philosophy, especially for metaphysics. It includes some of the highest achievements of early modern rationalism, Kant’s critical revolution, and the various significant works of German Idealism that followed in Kant’s wake. The contributions to this volume critically examine certain common themes among metaphysical projects across this period, for example, the demand that metaphysics amount to a science, that it should be presented in the form of a system, or that it should proceed by means of demonstration from certain key first principles. This volume also includes material on influential criticisms of metaphysical projects of this kind.
Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy is a useful resource for contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy interested in engaging with the history of the methodology and epistemology of metaphysics.
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Hegel, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Immanuel Kant, and 15 moreG.W.F. Hegel, Christian Wolff, 19th-century German philosophy, Schelling, Fichte, 18th-century German philosophy, Philosophical Methodology, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Metametaphysics, German Philosophy, K L Reinhold, Theoretical Philosophy, Gottlob Ernst Schulze, Classical German Philosophy, and History of Philosophy
Hegel opens the first book of his Science of Logic with the statement of a problem: “The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the... more
Hegel opens the first book of his Science of Logic with the statement of a problem: “The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other, so either way of beginning finds its rebuttal.” Despite its significant placement, exactly what Hegel means in his expression of this problem and exactly what his solution to it is, remain unclear.
In this book, Robb Dunphy provides a detailed engagement with Hegel’s “problem of beginning”, locating it within Hegel’s account of significant approaches to the topic of beginning in the history of Western philosophy, as well as making an extended case for the influence of Pyrrhonian Scepticism on the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. Dunphy’s discussion of the various putative solutions that Hegel might be thought to put forward contributes to debates concerning Hegel’s views on the methodology of logic, the relation between his Logic and his Phenomenology of Spirit, and differences between his Encyclopaedia presentation of logic and that of his greater Science of Logic.
Hegel and the Problem of Beginning also functions as a critical commentary on Hegel’s essay, “With what must the beginning of the science be made?” which should be of interest to both researchers and students working on the opening of Hegel’s Logic.
In this book, Robb Dunphy provides a detailed engagement with Hegel’s “problem of beginning”, locating it within Hegel’s account of significant approaches to the topic of beginning in the history of Western philosophy, as well as making an extended case for the influence of Pyrrhonian Scepticism on the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. Dunphy’s discussion of the various putative solutions that Hegel might be thought to put forward contributes to debates concerning Hegel’s views on the methodology of logic, the relation between his Logic and his Phenomenology of Spirit, and differences between his Encyclopaedia presentation of logic and that of his greater Science of Logic.
Hegel and the Problem of Beginning also functions as a critical commentary on Hegel’s essay, “With what must the beginning of the science be made?” which should be of interest to both researchers and students working on the opening of Hegel’s Logic.
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In this article, evidence is briefly presented for three facts that together point to something puzzling. 1) That major continental philosophers of the nineteenth century tended to engage in some detail, as part of a broader preoccupation... more
In this article, evidence is briefly presented for three facts that together point to something puzzling. 1) That major continental philosophers of the nineteenth century tended to engage in some detail, as part of a broader preoccupation with ancient Greek thought, with Pyrrhonian Scepticism. 2) That major continental philosophers of the twentieth century tended to engage in some depth with their nineteenth century forebears and maintain their tendency to engage significantly with ancient Greek thought. 3) That twentieth century continental philosophers tend to demonstrate little to no interest in Pyrrhonian Scepticism. This raises the question: why does engagement with Pyrrhonism disappear from continental philosophy? The article then proceeds to discuss two hypotheses that might explain this disappearance.
Research Interests: Continental Philosophy, Hegel, Gilles Deleuze, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and 12 moreDeleuze, Nietzsche, Georg Friedrich Wilhem Hegel, Kierkegaard, G.W.F. Hegel, Heidegger, Sextus Empiricus, Soren Kierkegaard, Pyrrhonism, Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Søren Kierkegaard, and Philosophy of Martin Heidegger
In this chapter, Robb Dunphy is concerned with the nature of G.E. Schulze's scepticism as he presents it in his 1792 work Aenesidemus, and with its relation to the metaphysical projects of Kant, Reinhold, and later German Idealists. After... more
In this chapter, Robb Dunphy is concerned with the nature of G.E. Schulze's scepticism as he presents it in his 1792 work Aenesidemus, and with its relation to the metaphysical projects of Kant, Reinhold, and later German Idealists. After introducing Schulze's text, Dunphy turns to a recent interpretation offered by Jessica Berry, who claims that the extent to which Schulze endorsed a genuinely Pyrrhonian Scepticism has gone unacknowledged, both by his idealist contemporaries and by the majority of the secondary literature on the period. Berry suggests that this unacknowledged Pyrrhonism in Aenesidemus provides the resources for a more radical criticism of the German Idealists' scientific, systematic metaphysical ambitions, to which they remain fundamentally vulnerable. Despite agreeing that an exploration of Schulze's debt to Pyrrhonism represents a valuable addition to our understanding of his scepticism, in the latter parts of the chapter Dunphy suggests that the Berry's attribution of a Pyrrhonian Scepticism to Schulze should to some extent be rejected, and that such a scepticism is perhaps not quite as problematic for the projects of Kant and the German Idealists as she suggests.
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This article is an investigation of the nature of suspension of judgement as it is conceived by Sextus Empiricus. I carry out this investigation by examining what I take to be Sextus' most pertinent remarks on the topic and by considering... more
This article is an investigation of the nature of suspension of judgement as it is conceived by Sextus Empiricus. I carry out this investigation by examining what I take to be Sextus' most pertinent remarks on the topic and by considering them in the context of contemporary philosophical work on the nature of suspension. Against the more frequently encountered idea that Sextus is operating with a privative conception of suspension, I argue that Sextus instead has a metacognitive account of suspension, whereby suspending constitutively involves acknowledging that one is not in a position to tell whether or not p.
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This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label "the beginning of Hegel's Logic": (1) Hegel's justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of "pure being". (2)... more
This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label "the beginning of Hegel's Logic": (1) Hegel's justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of "pure being". (2) Hegel's account of the concepts "being, "nothing", and "becoming" in the first chapter of his Logic. Discussing recent work on both of these topics, two primary claims are defended: Regarding (1): the strongest interpretations of Hegel's case for beginning a science of logic with the concept of pure being are those which take him to argue that this concept must be necessarily both "immediate" and "mediated" at the same time. Regarding (2): The widespread tendency to take Hegel's treatment of the concepts of being, nothing, and becoming as an example with which to illustrate his "dialectical method" should be replaced with an interpretation of that chapter which understands it to rather make possible the kind of dialectical transitions which make up the rest of Hegel's Science of Logic.
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This is an account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented by Sextus Empiricus. I focus attention on the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from... more
This is an account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented by Sextus Empiricus. I focus attention on the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. I offer an alternative account which turns on the suggestion that the Sceptic accepts that justification is the norm of belief.
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This article is concerned with some of the criteria which Hegel believes apply to a scientific treatment of logic. I briefly address criteria which I take Hegel to inherit from traditional rationalism before focusing on two fairly... more
This article is concerned with some of the criteria which Hegel believes apply to a scientific treatment of logic. I briefly address criteria which I take Hegel to inherit from traditional rationalism before focusing on two fairly idiosyncratic criteria: the requirement that a science of logic exhibit a circular structure and that it begin with the concept of pure being. I offer an explanation of these criteria which understands them as motivated by anti-sceptical concerns, before arguing that Hegel's mature treatment of the latter criterion is problematically ambiguous.
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In this article I develop an interpretation of the opening passages of Hegel’s essay “With what must the beginning of science be made?” I suggest firstly that Hegel is engaging there with a distinctive problem, the overcoming of which he... more
In this article I develop an interpretation of the opening passages of Hegel’s essay “With what must the beginning of science be made?” I suggest firstly that Hegel is engaging there with a distinctive problem, the overcoming of which he understands to be necessary in order to guarantee the scientific character of the derivation of the fundamental categories of thought which he undertakes in the Science of Logic. I refer to this as “the problem of beginning”. I proceed to clarify the nature of the problem, which I understand to be motivated by a concern to avoid arbitrariness, and then to detail the nature of Hegel’s proposed solution, which turns on understanding how the concept of “pure being”, understood in a specific sense to be both mediated and immediate, avoids the concerns about arbitrariness which accompany attempts to begin merely with something mediated, or merely with something immediate. On this basis, I offer a number criticisms of alternative approaches to the beginning of Hegel’s Logic.
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In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan... more
In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan problems”, where this category includes both the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Finally, I suggest that there is a distinctive Agrippan problem present at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic.
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This paper argues firstly that the argument of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is necessary for the justification of the beginning of his logical project, and secondly that Hegel's attempt to secure the beginning of his Science of Logic... more
This paper argues firstly that the argument of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is necessary for the justification of the beginning of his logical project, and secondly that Hegel's attempt to secure the beginning of his Science of Logic by relying upon the argument of the Phenomenology fails. I argue firstly that the position taken up at the beginning of Hegel's Logic is constructed in such a fashion that it relies upon the argument of the Phenomenology to justify it. I then offer some support for the view of the relationship between the two texts defended by Maker in order to see how the two might be thought to be compatible. Finally, in the longest part of the paper, I offer a number of reasons for thinking that attempts to render the two compatible in this fashion fail. I therefore conclude that, as it stands, the beginning of Hegel's Logic is not secured against objection in the way that Hegel wants it to be.
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Review of Ivan Boldyrev and Sebastian Stein's Interpreting Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: Expositions and Critique of Contemporary Readings.
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Review of George di Giovanni's Hegel and the Challenge of Spinoza: A Study in German Idealism, 1801-1831
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Philosophy Of Religion, German Idealism, Hegel, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, and 10 moreJohann Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Friedrich Wilhem Hegel, G.W.F. Hegel, 19th-century German philosophy, Schelling, Monism, Fichte, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Post-Kantian Philosophy, and History of Philosophy
Review of Stephen Houlgate's 'Hegel on Being'
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Review of the Palgrave Hegel Handbook. Although the coverage of the volume is wide-ranging, this review focuses mostly on material relevant to Hegel's logic, epistemology, and metaphysics.
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This is a draft translation of the fourth letter in G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus.
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This is a translation of the short, third letter in G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, without its lengthy appendix. Excerpts of the appendix which follows this letter have been translated into English by George di Giovanni in Between Kant and... more
This is a translation of the short, third letter in G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, without its lengthy appendix.
Excerpts of the appendix which follows this letter have been translated into English by George di Giovanni in Between Kant and Hegel, eds. G. di Giovanni and H.S. Harris, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2000).
Excerpts of the appendix which follows this letter have been translated into English by George di Giovanni in Between Kant and Hegel, eds. G. di Giovanni and H.S. Harris, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2000).
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This is a draft translation of the first letter of G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus. Comments and corrections welcome.
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G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, despite its importance for the development of post-Kantian idealism, has not been fully translated into English. Now and then, when I have time, I will upload draft translations of parts of the text here, with... more
G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, despite its importance for the development of post-Kantian idealism, has not been fully translated into English. Now and then, when I have time, I will upload draft translations of parts of the text here, with the goal of, at some point, providing a complete translation. These drafts will be rough and I welcome feedback!
This document contains only the Title page, Schulze's indication of the contents of the work, and the preface.
This document contains only the Title page, Schulze's indication of the contents of the work, and the preface.
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Online conference on "Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy
Co-organized with Dr Toby Lovat (University of Brighton)
Co-organized with Dr Toby Lovat (University of Brighton)
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Online conference on "Hegel on Empirical Judgment"
Co-organised with Dr Eliza Starbuck Little (Chicago)
Co-organised with Dr Eliza Starbuck Little (Chicago)