Science of Logic (Hegel)

Inhalt
Christoph Binkelmann: Enthusiasmus und Skepsis. Das europäische Pendel
Burkhard Nonnenmacher: Kants Postulatenlehre als Prüfstein für Heideggers »These der neuzeitlichen Ontologie«?
Günter Zöller : Ex aliquo nihil. Fichtes Anti-Kreationismus
Kai U. Gregor: Eine Kritik innerhalb der Grenzen der Vernunft. Wilhelm Weischedels Grundlegungsversuch einer Philosophischen Theologie im Zeitalter des Nihilismus und ein Gedanke Fichtes
Marco Rampazzo Bazzan: Die Staatslehre Fichtes unter dem Aspekt der
politischen Theologie nach Carl Schmitt
Cristiana Senigaglia: Die Spur der Andersheit: Fichte und Levinas
Detlev Pätzold Hegels Philosophie der Religion: Die Stellung der Religion zwischen Kunst und Philosophie
Arthur Kok: Absoluter Geist und Schöpfung. Jan Hollaks neothomistische Hegelkritik
Kazimir Drilo: Kritik des religiösen Bewusstseins. Falk Wagners theologische Interpretation von Hegels »Wissenschaft der Logik«
Jakub Kloc-Konkołowicz: »Der Mensch lebt in zwei Welten […]«. Religion und Staat in Hegels Ansicht und in der heutigen Debatte
Elena Ficara: Der ontologische Gottesbeweis bei Hegel und in der analytischen Philosophie 
Robert Marszałek: Die Gegenwart der Religionslehre des mittleren Schelling
Mildred Galland-Szymkowiak Philosophie und Religion bei K.W.F. Solger.
Ein Beitrag zur nachkantischen Frage nach dem Prinzip der Philosophie
Patrick Grüneberg: Der transzendentale Gott
Wibke Rogge: Emmanuel Lévinas: Über die Beziehung des Unendlichen zum Seienden als Gemeinschaft in der Trennung
Ansgar Lyssy : Darwin, Gott und Neurotheologie. Was können uns die Biowissenschaften über die Religion sagen?

I argue that Hegel develops a formal and categorical concept of causality that is shown to be insufficient for objective explanations. Hegel then, in his chapter on objectivity, supplements this concept with a theory of causality that is much more comprehensive and counters the shortcomings of the categorical concept by providing the discoursive contexts in which it is to be used appropriately (namely mechanism, chemism, teleology).

See this paper for a much more comprehensive take on this issue: https://www.academia.edu/43525054/Kausalit%C3%A4t_und_Objektivit%C3%A4t_bei_Hegel

"Concebir la realidad efectiva", en Javier Balladares, Yared Elguera, Fernando Huesca y Zaida Olvera (Coordinadores). "Hegel: Ontología, estética y política", ed. Fides, México, 2017, pp. 47-74.  el artículo de Sergio Pérez Cortés “La realidad
efectiva en Hegel” explora La sección tercera de la Doctrina de la
esencia en la Lógica de Hegel, que lleva el nombre de Realidad
Efectiva (Wirklichkeit). A pesar del alto grado de abstracción que
caracteriza a la Ciencia de la lógica, en esta sección, sostiene Pérez,
Hegel afirma su convicción de que la tarea de la filosofía es pura
y simplemente pensar nuestra realidad presente. Y sin embargo, la
realidad efectiva no es cualquier realidad sino aquella parcela en la
que se unifican perfectamente el ser existente y la esencia reflexiva
que comprende esa existencia. La tesis de Sergio Pérez es que
Hegel le propone a los filósofos no perder nunca de vista la realidad
efectiva pero les exige que aprendan a verla de manera racional. El
lector encontrará allí una propuesta de lectura de esa sección.

In this paper, I discuss Karen Ng's reconstruction of Hegel's concept of life. On Ng's account, Hegel's conception of life has a remarkable double role to play: Life is both the proper object of judgment as well as a fundamental characterization of the activity of the judging subject. In a first step, I highlight the insight that Ng's account sheds on the internal connection
of life and self-consciousness and the peculiar normativity of life. In a second step, I raise three concerns about Ng's strong focus on the logical notion of life which she characterizes as non-empirical and a priori. I argue that in order to uncover the full significance of the notion of life for Hegel we have to turn to his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit.

This text is a search to find the precise relationship between Philosophy and religion/theology in Hegel's philosophy. There has been a resurgence of interest in Hegel scholarship by both the secular and spiritual community and many high ranking and serious academic Hegel scholars are conflicted on whether Hegel’s system ends with religion and theology or if Philosophy is a domain of its own as the final and highest stage of Hegel’s philosophical system. This analysis has found that Hegel himself declares the result to be definitively the latter. Unlike atheistic claims however, this move from religion and theology to genuine philosophy is not an abstract negation but rather a sublation and fulfillment: a salute to the critical and necessary role in history that they played.

The analysis begins from Hegel's Lectures On The History Of Philosophy with an exploration of the oddity that Hegel as a self declared Christian praises the Neo-Platonists but not the 1000 years of Scholasticism. This is odd as Christian orthodox holds the reverse in that the Scholastics were seen as essential and the Neo-Platonists heretical.  This paper uncovers through a direct reading of Hegel himself why he deviates from Christian orthodoxy and explores the conclusion of what this means for the relation between genuine philosophy and religion/theology in being separate but essentially connected.

This reading may uncover a path to healing the fracturing around the world exposed by the pandemic. Hegel may indeed provide the wisdom to overcome the tension between religions, science and philosophy in all their diverse modes around the globe and sublate them into a much needed higher spirit of community. The sequel to this paper continues with the title "Continuing Hegel's Praise Of Purifying Christianity Into Genuine Philosophy Through Neo-Platonism And The Early Fathers Of The Church"

The analogy of being was introduced by Aristotle, and later thematised by Thomas Aquinas, as a special mode of grammar in which one term may signify two or more meanings, but in which each of the signified meanings derives its primary meaning by participating in one common meaning. The analogy of being thus decisively presupposes this metaphysic of participation. But this very pillar of participation is also the principal source of the aporia of analogy. In the Science of Logic, Hegel outlined how the quantitative ratio and the syllogism of analogy may be successively sublated into the Idea in what I call a ‘speculative analogy’. When Erich Przywara later re-formulated the analogy of being at the apogee of phenomenology, he implicitly opposed Schelling’s rhythmically oscillating opposition of contraries to Hegel’s sublation of contradictions. This conflict over contradiction has produced two competing models of analogy: Hegel’s analogical dialectics in which contradictory differences are meant to be sublated into the ‘absolute middle’ of the Idea; and Przywara’s dialectical analogy in which contrary opposites are meant to participate in the mysterious ‘suspended middle’ of God. Przywara criticizes Hegel for evacuating the mystery into concepts, but Hegel might respond by criticizing Przywara for withholding these mysteries beyond the concept. This comparison illustrates how Hegel’s Science of Logic cannot adequately resolve all contrary opposites in a speculative analogy unless the middle terms the syllogisms are re-read against the letter of Hegel’s text as the absolute middle of Christ in the Trinity.

This thesis demonstrates that Pleasure and Necessity, a section of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, both should and can be re-written, bringing the female reader out of the margins and into the texts of Hegel’s Absolute system. First, I demonstrate that the Phenomenology is a Bildungsroman that is both important for the reader’s philosophical education and Hegelian science itself. I provide an interpretation of Pleasure and Necessity, demonstrate that this section alienates the female reader, and discuss why Antigone is not a solution to this problem. Rather, I conclude that this stage should be re-written. Furthermore, I argue that Pleasure and Necessity can be re-written because the Phenomenology already contains the outline of its own re-writing insofar as it corresponds to the Logic. Finally, I re-write Pleasure and Necessity as Impulse and Ought, using new figures to re-stage the logical operation that occurs in the original text.
[Cette thèse démontre que le chapitre Plaisir et Nécessité dans la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit de Hegel, doit et peut être réécrit, faisant resurgir la lectrice hors des marges et dans le corps du texte du système hégélien Absolu. Premièrement, je démontre que la Phénoménologie est un Bildungsroman, important à la fois pour l’éducation philosophique des lecteurs et la science hégélienne. J’apporte une interprétation de la section Plaisir et Nécessité, je démontre que cette section force l’aliénation de la lectrice et j’explique qu’Antigone n’est pas une solution à ce problème. Je conclus qu’il doit être réécrit. De plus, je maintiens que Plaisir et Nécessité peut être réécrit car la Phénoménologie contient déjà le squelette de sa propre rédaction antérieure dans la mesure qu’il correspond à la Logique. Finalement, je réécris Plaisir et Nécessité en tant que Pulsion et Devoir, (re)créant de nouvelles figures pour remettre en scène l’opération logique du texte original.]

Aqui será exposto o caminho que faz o pensamento lógico na linguagem hegeliana para se configurar como silogismo racional. Silogismo que é significado por Hegel como o conceito completamente posto, objetivo e racional, e que só aparece mediante as determinações do “Silogismo da necessidade – c. O silogismo disjuntivo”. Nessas determinações estão presentes as relações produzidas na suprassunção da mediação (Aufheben der Vermittlung) de elementos proposicionais na qual cada termo ou elemento está em mediação interna com os outros. O resultado conceitual desta mediação é necessariamente um conceito imediato mediado.

La reciente discusión en torno a las interpretaciones intersubjetivistas de la Ciencia de la lógica de Hegel representa un modo particular de actualidad de su contenido. Las propuestas son pocas, pero diversas, aunque parece recibir mayor atención la «lógica del concepto» como contexto oportuno para determinar estructuras lógicas, que faciliten la comprensión de las condiciones de realización del «espíritu objetivo» (escenario de la ética, la política y el derecho). Partiendo de ello, este volumen ensaya un análisis, por una parte, crítico, en lo referente a tal contextualización y, por otra parte, reconstructivo, procurando con ello indicar el carácter de «condición» de algunos conceptos – operativos en toda la Lógica – que puedan ofrecer bases para una lógica intersubjetiva fundamental. Hasta qué punto puede hablarse de intersubjetividad a partir de la Ciencia de la lógica, constituye la clave de lectura que sigue este volumen.

Bajar extracto (introducción): http://www.peterlang.com/download/extract/13792/extract_11244.pdf

Accepted Manuscript. For the final revised version of this review see:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.29

Citation: Tripaldi, E. (2020). Giorgi Lebanidze. Hegel's Transcendental Ontology. Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2003. ISBN 9781498561341 (e-book). ISBN 9781498561334 (pbk). Pp. 150 90.00 $. Hegel Bulletin, 1-5. doi:10.1017/hgl.2020.29

Classical German philosophy is accused of exaggerating the subject without considering the finiteness of man. It is accused of a paternalism of reason that exaggerates totality without appreciating the right to difference and diversity. It is rebuked for conducting metaphysics from mere concepts without making a critique of language. It is rebuked for not being able to know the absolute without being guilty of self-aggrandizement. The book does not attempt a defense, but a description of Classical German Philosophy as a departure
of modernity. The problems negotiated there belong
not to a foreign world, but are our own.

Esiste un’analogia tra la concezione hegeliana dell’essenza e l’essenza aristotelica? E qual è l’impatto di quest’analogia nella generale economia della Scienza della logica? Attraverso alcuni luoghi significativi della Dottrina dell’essenza, e servendosi dell’interpretazione che Hegel stesso ha dato della filosofia dello Stagirita nelle Lezioni sulla storia della filosofia, l’autrice invita a ripensare questa parentela, una parentela finora ritenuta più lessicale che veramente speculativa. L’essenza come potenza, il senso di passato necessario che essa evoca, il suo ruolo fondativo in quanto riflessione, la problematica determinazione finale come Wirklichkeit: a partire dall’indagine di questi snodi teoretici fondamentali, il concetto hegeliano di Wesen si delinea gradualmente come un’originale rielaborazione del ti ên einai di Aristotele, nella paradossalità di un costitutivo, necessario tendere dalla potenza all’atto senza mai poter davvero diventare quest’ultimo.

In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan problems”, where this category includes both the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Finally, I suggest that there is a distinctive Agrippan problem present at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic.

Parmenides plays an important role in the first section of Hegel’s Science of Logic due to his definition of being as a pure thought-determination. This article investigates, first, how Hegel conceives the Parmenidean being. Secondly, by discussing Hegel's logical analysis of pure being and pure nothing, it aims to show why and how such conception of being, according to Hegel, provides a crucial insight into the function of the understanding.

A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel's dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. In this essay, I argue that the Modification View is incorrect. Hegel's insight, I show, is that one can only explain the objective validity of a form of cognition through employing that very form. Consequently, the dialectical method cannot relate to its subject matter as something given to it, and so cannot involve advancing and then correcting errors in one's account. A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel's dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. As an example: many think that in the Phenomenology of Spirit we begin with the thought that cognition consists solely in sensible-certainty, realize that that is incoherent, and then advance to a more sophisticated account of cognition. If we gather up proponents of the Modification View, we find scholars who disagree on nearly everything of significance in Hegel. But they all agree that the dialectical method is one by which we correct erroneous accounts of its subject matter. 1 In this essay, I point to some textual evidence from 1

William Desmond has, beginning in Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness (1987), and continuing in his metaxu trilogy Being and The Between (1995), Ethics and The Between (2001), and God and the Between (2008), developed an influential ‘metaxological critique’ of Hegel’s dialectic.  Metaxology is, for Desmond, the logic of the ‘in-between’ (metaxu) that mediates the ‘positive plurality’ of ‘given being’ on the side, not of the self, but of the other.  He has proposed four potencies of being with which to reduce dialectic to the equivocal, suspend the equivocal from the analogical, and supercede dialectic through this other-mediation of metaxology.  And he has argued, against Hegel, that where dialectic merely mediates ‘on the side of the self’, metaxology also mediates on the ‘side of the other’.  Desmond’s metaxological critique thus pivots around this radical otherness of mediation on the side of the other.  And the viability of his metaxological critique, no less than Schelling’s Hegelkritik, rests on such an extra-systematic possibility of radical otherness.  I propose to make the following three arguments against Desmond’s metaxological critique.  First, since metaxology pivots around mediation on the side of the other, and such a distinction between self-mediation and other-mediation does not appear anywhere in Hegel’s system, Desmond’s metaxological critique appears to amount to an extra-systematic and extrinsic critique, begs the question of radical otherness, and thereby remains uncritical.  Second, since such radical otherness amounts to a dogmatic presupposition, and nothing that is dogmatically presupposed can prove to be presuppositionless in any alternative system of science, Desmond cannot construct an alternative system of science with which to sublate dialectic into metaxology.  And, third, if, for these reasons, Desmond’s metaxological critique can be shown to be both uncritical and dogmatic, and the difference of the other in the radical otherness of other-mediation can always be dialectically reversed as difference is reflected into identity, then Hegel could, especially in the Doctrine of Essence, also have anticipated a counter-critique with which to dialectically reverse, annul, and sublate metaxology into dialectic.  Desmond’s metaxological critique appears on these arguments to be uncritical, dogmatic, and imminently reversible through this dialectical destruction of the otherness of otherness as the difference of otherness is reflected in and for the reflective identity of the ground of essence.  Desmond has recently responded to this suggestion of such a dialectical reversal of other-mediation into self-mediation by radically reaffirming the difference of the other of metaxological mediation on the side of the other.  Such a radical reaffirmation of the difference of the other can, at best, beg the question of radical otherness, and, at worst, reinstate this radical otherness in an endless equivocity of oppositive otherness.  I propose, for the purpose of developing a Hegelian counter-critique of Desmond’s metaxological critique of dialectic, that Hegel can, especially in the Doctrine of Essence, successfully sublate every such externality of otherness, difference, and, finally, of any 'positive plurality' of mediation on the side of the other into the self-reflective identity of the idea of essence.

Woran liegt es, dass sowohl Theisten als auch Atheisten in Hegel einen Verbündeten gefunden zu haben glauben? Wollte Hegel mit seiner Behauptung, die Logik sei »die Darstellung Gottes […] in seinem ewigen Wesen«, die christliche Trinitätslehre philosophisch würdigen, oder handelt es sich dabei vielmehr um eine groteske Selbstapotheose des menschlichen Geistes? Ermylos Plevrakis versucht allen Stellen der Logik , an denen ‚Gott‘ oder ‚das Absolute‘ vorkommen, Rechnung zu tragen und zeigt, dass dieses Werk in der Lage ist, autonom Absolutheitskonzeptionen zu entwickeln, die anderen metaphysischen Auffassungen logisch zugrunde liegen. Demnach liefert die Logik keinen weiteren Theismus oder Atheismus, sondern eine Grundlagenforschung zur Begrifflichkeit, die diesem Dilemma vorausgeht; und schließlich mündet sie ausdrücklich in keine Ontotheologie, sondern in die Feststellung ihrer eigenen Methode: die Epistemologie begreifenden Denkens.

In this article, I offer a critical interpretation of Hegel’s claims regarding the presuppositionless status of the Logic. Commentators have been divided as to whether the Logic actually achieves the status of presuppositionless science, disagreeing as to whether the Logic succeeds in making an unmediated beginning. I argue, however, that this understanding of presuppositionless science is misguided, as it reflects a spurious conception of immediacy that Hegel criticizes as false. Contextualizing Hegel’s remarks in light of his broader approach to the problem of beginning, I contend that Hegel’s Logic is presuppositionless not in the sense that it satisfies a formal epistemological demand to begin free from all mediation, but in that its self-mediating structure facilitates an immanent deduction of the categories.

Readers are advised that an up-to-date discussion of the author's fundamental thesis (’The Idea’), on the origin, operation, and destiny of the World, is now found at the top of the main page under the rubric, Thematic Evolution and Prospect of 'The Idea.'

A substantial part of our work attempts to construct an adequate Theory of the Face. See 'The Soul of Life' (below) and other studies on the page, some of which remain in draft and others merely projected. (Five papers on this difficult subject are planned.)

Progressive and substantial concretion of the thesis has been recently demonstrated through focused studies (2018-2020), whose URLs are conveniently grouped below:

'The Spirit of War'
https://www.academia.edu/36536128/The_Spirit_of_War

'Carlyle and the Idea'
(https://www.academia.edu/37362600/Carlyle_and_the_Idea)

'The Last Day (Illustrated Essay)'
(https://www.academia.edu/41144933/The_Last_Day_Illustrated_Essay_)

'How the German Spirit Died (A History)'
(https://www.academia.edu/41745763/How_the_German_Spirit_Died_A_History_)

'How the Human Spirit Died (Meta-Analysis)'
(https://www.academia.edu/41985864/How_the_Human_Spirit_Died_Meta-Analysis_)

'Three Malefactors of the Communist Idea (Meta-Analytical Note)'
(https://www.academia.edu/42052811/Three_Malefactors_of_the_Communist_Idea_Meta-Analytical_Note_)

Our gradual (and still incomplete) conceptualization of absolute cosmogony, cosmology, and eschatology in its modern (often microphysical) aspects, which has arisen quite organically over several years of detailed study, may be briefly encapsulated and characterized (A-T) for the reader as follows:

A. The Idea is the fundamental reality of the World, whose existence was clearly intuited (as “hypodoche”) by Plato, operationally defined by Boehme (first as “das Rad Gottes” and subsequently as “Eternal Nature”), organically articulated by Hegel (as “the Idea”), and finally discovered to be the locus of proto-being and foundation of living motion by means of 20th century microphysics (and accurately named by it “the color vacuum”). The electron is its projection into the finite. Field theory is its "physical" basis.

B. This definition of “substance” as a completely immaterial and literally infinite, self-related, hebdomadic-triadic system of actuality within the Idea at the fundament or basis of reality constitutes the greatest discovery of the human mind which, before the end of the 21st century, upon full comprehension, will completely revolutionize religion and therefore geopolitics, as well as pedagogy, paleontology, and biophysics.  The seat of the animating principle in organisms can now be described and explained.

C. Briefly, the research for this book involves the cosmology, cosmogony, and eschatology (destiny) of the world as the finite projection of the Eternal Idea. The Idea itself was created by the Triune Absolute Spirit as a finite-infinite field to manifest, reward, and punish moral, aesthetic, and intellectual performances in a Living Matrix.

D. Through the vast and distributed powers of its microphysical basis, the Idea as the created conduit of Absolute Power has autonomously generated a pseudo-history in geology and astronomy. The powers of Light and Darkness guided by Eternal Life deep within the fundament sustain the finite living motion of which we are aware through biology and empower conscious awareness in animals. Biopsychological functioning and all positive intellectual achievement in Mankind have their roots in the Idea.

E. Moreover, though unseen, the silent workings of a vast cosmological Absolute Hebdomad (deduced through study of the Idea in the 17th century) mercifully overarch and limit the Inchoate Life of the Sinister Itself--a Cosmic Disruptor also previously unsuspected that is responsible for the nocturnal Dream Life of animals. Is this a conceptual solution to the mysterious phenomena of telepathy and clairvoyance?

F. Biological and psychic life thus have always been suspended between two great cosmological powers representing a generalized War Between Infinite and Finite Life that began with King Lucifer, and which in its present form continually tests, through Contention, War, and Worldly Contrariety, the whole of Living Being as it follows a tortured and fateful course between Life and Death according to the much-lamented plan chosen by the Mind ("Gemüt") of Adam.

G. Finally, the hidden existence of the Idea necessarily implies a universal negative unity as the ideal origin of all gravitational and inertial phenomena, offering to science a solution at last to storied and continuing, completely beguiling conundrums (e.g., "Dark Matter" and "Dark Energy") involving the ultimate structure of the cosmos.

H. By tracing the Idea's manifold determinations of physical, biological, and psychic being, then, the present study seeks to explicate the final, and heretofore unsuspected, links in the fabled Great Chain of Being for the edification of Mankind. Inherently opposing it, pathetically and even insanely, is guileless materialism.

I. The war of materialism against idealism eventually culminated in the death of the German Spirit (1918). The main intellectual cause of German spiritual morbidity, however, is traceable to events within the Reformation (1517-1546). This did not prevent a period of optimism within Prussian education and science (1800-1840).

J. The theft of Silesia (1946) was an intentionally demoralizing spiritual crime against Germany with major consequences for the spiritual life of the world. The German Spirit's whole turbulent career constituted a vacillation on renunciation of self-will, and this latter always was the essential content of the Absolute Mind in Germany.

K. Germany's fatal spiritual debility can be considered to be a world "contagion" that spread centrifugally from the center of Europe to the whole Human Race which, therefore, is itself now in the throes of an analogous spiritual death, self-contemplation, and deliverance from the finite. The Zero-Hour is imminent.

L. Each of the Six Days (in Moses) is now fundamentally understood to mean a thousand-year period. Thus, Creation has all along been continuous and--after 6,000 years--will soon be completed (the argument proposes a means to confirm or deny the asserted beginning of 3,970 B.C.). Thus, the Day of Rest (for the Community of Heaven) will soon arrive for the self-elect of Mankind.

M. This tortured path was, of course, divinely foreseen but nevertheless represents an accommodative posture which was not at first understood. The Creator's response achieves a wise and just outcome despite the wreck and pain arising from myopic creatural assertion and pathetic gratification, as recounted in the mosaic story of old.

N. In fact, Talmudic commentators reached this conclusion in the 2nd or 3rd century A.D.--amending (in 'Sanhedrin 97a') the original mosaic interpretation of once-and-for-all Creation in favor of Continuous Creation with a clear Limit or End, specified as 6,000 years (each "day of creation," as mentioned above, being 1,000 years).

O. Thus, Moses (properly cogitated) was right but his dicta were for a long period taken wrongly--perforce leading the Christians astray through an accident of church history that remains a stumbling block up to the present day. See the author's 'The Last Day (Illustrated Essay).'

P. We know from modern physics that the "physical" world at the fundament is sustained by completely immaterial field relations that never cease, or else creation-in-process would not maintain itself. The creative motion is mathematically and physically infinite but disguises its own infinity--the chief insight, credited to Dirac, supporting Absolute Physics.

Q. Hence, it is now clear that the Creation--continuous since the beginning--is approaching its End and Goal. The Last Day is thus imminent and will arrive within the present decade, according to the wisest Christian view, this actually having been announced four centuries ago in German idealism.

R. The Eternal Word's role has always been to Shine Divinely (inwardly) in the gloom and darkness of the outward finite (the "Field of the Reprehensible") for salvation's sake (see 'Carlyle and the Idea'). It is this that Jesus of Nazareth spoke of, and it is this his followers embody, when they speak of the "true bread from heaven," etc..

S. This is why Christians can claim that the finalized ("Third") Temple of God is already in existence and is composed of living stones (minus the winnowed Condemned and Damned) whose essence will endure forever in God.

T. Our thesis is only now emerging in its final form. This is because the horizon of knowledge keeps receding as the true depth is revealed--the world is a set of nested dolls and the innermost doll is God, who is unknowably deep (but friendly, since we are Him in disguise when we abandon our finite wills).

Il capitolo sull’idea del bene rappresenta un passaggio essenziale della Logica di Hegel. In queste pagine, il filosofo tedesco analizza i fondamenti della razionalità pratica attraverso una riflessione che oggi diremmo di carattere “metaetico”: indagando la natura delle norme e dei fini che guidano la volontà e l’azione nel loro impatto con il reale, infatti, Hegel fornisce la “grammatica fondamentale” della sua filosofia pratica. Il volume si propone di ricostruire i testi hegeliani, mostrandone al contempo i possibili contributi al dibattito filosofico contemporaneo sui problemi del realismo e del cognitivismo in etica.

Este artículo busca responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué tipo de relación sostiene la Ciencia de la lógica con la tradición metafísica? Hay en ello un doble motivo de reflexión: por un lado, se trata de distinguir los sentidos de la crítica y los de la transformación científica de la metafísica tanto en Kant como en Hegel, y, por otro lado, de concebir el inicio [Anfang] y el principio [Prinzip] de la Lógica como dos modos de relación que permitirían hacer tal distinción aunque únicamente de manera introductoria. El inicio de esta Lógica es así el primer fin de un círculo que vuelve a abrirse; anverso del límite, o estudio lógico de reverso fenomenológico; unidad de un carácter genitivo doble ‒de la Ciencia de la conciencia y del Concepto de la Ciencia‒, que hace del saber puro el fin del inicio fenomenológico, y al mismo tiempo el inicio de su propia exposición. Inicio inmanente al desarrollo de la Ciencia y que es por lo tanto un momento de saber-puro-ser. Es, dicho en breve, el inicio de una Lógica pura, objetiva y subjetiva, ya liberada de la oposición en sí/concepto, y que al ser el desarrollo del pensar objetivo se constituye en el “sistema de la razón pura”.

This thesis explores the implications of Hegel’s remark in §31 of Encyclopedia Logic that the Greeks thought freely while moderns are bound to presuppositions. Plato is today generally regarded as the originator of the a priori, yet Hegel’s reading of Plato exempts him from what he sees as a distinctly modern tendency towards presupposition. Hegel sees Platonic presuppositions as self-mediating and ultimately self-canceling in the flow of thought. Modern philosophy, by contrast, aims to establish an unshakable first principle external to and exempt from thoughtful reflection. This radical disjunction between Greek and modern philosophy can be best seen in Plato’s aporetic moment. Plato opted to allow the bewilderment of aporia at the same crucial juncture of thought where we moderns buttress our challenged definitions upon an a priori presupposition. This aporetic moment arises when thought, still stuck in its first moment of abstraction, realizes that it cannot rigorously define crucial philosophical concepts. In the aporia Plato exposes the pretensions of those who believe that the good can be defined. Hegel likewise critiques the overreach of the modern understanding (Verstand) in attempting to directly predicate the highest philosophical concepts. This thesis draws out each thinker’s descriptions of the circumstances and presuppositions surrounding the aporetic moment and closely correlates them, ultimately showing why Hegel regarded Greek thought as so radically misunderstood by his contemporaries. Looking at the movement of his thought and not its static conclusions, Hegel reads Plato as a dialectical antidote to the hubris of recurring modern sophistry.

In this article I develop an interpretation of the opening passages of Hegel’s essay “With what must the beginning of science be made?” I suggest firstly that Hegel is engaging there with a distinctive problem, the overcoming of which he understands to be necessary in order to guarantee the scientific character of the derivation of the fundamental categories of thought which he undertakes in the Science of Logic. I refer to this as “the problem of beginning”. I proceed to clarify the nature of the problem, which I understand to be motivated by a concern to avoid arbitrariness, and then to detail the nature of Hegel’s proposed solution, which turns on understanding how the concept of “pure being”, understood in a specific sense to be both mediated and immediate, avoids the concerns about arbitrariness which accompany attempts to begin merely with something mediated, or merely with something immediate. On this basis, I offer a number criticisms of alternative approaches to the beginning of Hegel’s Logic.

Hegel offers an original theory of life that does justice to both the purposive subjectivity and the self-organizing objectivity of living things, and demonstrates that the two are not incompatible. This dissertation provides a comprehensive and critical commentary on Hegel's theory of life, and hopes to show that it is not only an outstanding attempt at a philosophical comprehension of life but also a serious challenge to accounts that conflate life with what it enables or what it requires. The first part focuses on Hegel's logical categorization of life, which explicates the Idea of life as a logical category that is laid out irrespective of the kinds of living things there actually are. It first shows why the living individual is irreducible to mechanical and chemical processes, distinguishable from artifacts, and intelligible without bringing in any alien principle. Next, it elaborates on how the living individual as an internally purposive, self-sustaining, and self-driven process develops and sustains the collective unity of its objectivity, sustains and regenerates itself in the face of its other, and raises its universal identity beyond its particular existence through reproduction. Again the first part investigates the extent to which Hegel's characterization of the fundamental features of life allows for a distinction between merely organic unity and true subjective unity that exhibits inner determinacy. The second part of the dissertation explores Hegel's treatment of life in his Philosophy of Nature. In this work he explicates plant and animal life as the two universal forms of life, whose necessary and universal features are enabled by similarly universal structures and processes of nature. In parallel with the three moments of the logical categorization of life, this part compares and contrasts the organic unity, metabolism, and reproduction of the plant and the animal. It discusses the extent to which these forms reflect the logical

This paper shows that Hegel's ontology of living beings provides us with indispensable conceptual resources for making sense of his account of the ontology of human action. For Hegel, living bodies are ontologically distinct in that their objective presence is thoroughly permeated by the self-reflexivity characteristic of subjectivity, and as such they cannot be adequately conceived in terms of categories (mechanistic, chemical, or generally causal categories) that are appropriate to inanimate, " subject-less " objects. It is argued that actions are similar in this regard, and like organic bodies they need to be conceived as self-realizing, self-articulating, dynamic wholes whose various material parts cannot be thought independently of their internal relations and their place in the whole. It is argued, further, that the categories Hegel appeals to in conceiving how organisms develop through stages are useful for making sense of how the objective shape of an action unfolds over time.

The paper's main aims can be formulated as follows: a) Hegel has a strong notion of contingency. Contingency is for him not simple absence of necessity, and not simple under-determinedness either. Contingency is an original notion, having the same logical and metaphysical weight and dignity as the notion of necessity; b) this " strong " notion of contingency is decisive for Hegel's conception of subjectivity. Insofar it can be tracked up to his real philosophy. Other than assumed in many commonplace interpretations of Hegel, I will suggest that the power to go from necessity to contingency makes up an essential part of subjective freedom as much as the power to go from contingency to necessity. This has important consequences especially in the philosophy of history, which is shown to be not aprioristic and dogmatic, but open to contingency (though not to sceptical conclusions); and c) consistently with the recognition of the irreducibility of contingency to a priori concepts, Hegel also recognizes the need for a non-philosophical narration of contingency and gives us some interesting clues about it and its relationship to philosophy. Throughout my argumentation of these three theses, I hope to provide evidence for the thesis that dogmatic constructions on Hegel's philosophy of history (including, but not limited to the so-called thesis of the " end of history ") can be undermined by referring to Hegel's understanding of contingency. On a more general scale, this also shows that the logical groundwork of Hegel's real philosophy cannot be abandoned without jeopardizing the potential of Hegel's thought to contribute to current philosophical debates. My argument is structured as follows. I will, first of all, comment on some passages of Hegel's Science of Logic from the beginning of the " Subjective logic " regarding the logic of