Wissenschaft der Logik

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https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2019.vol1.no2.07
This article argues that, given the historical and linguistic background of the terms involved, the study of theology can, in fact, be considered a scientific endeavor, but one must clearly note what is inferred by the term "scientific." Historically, the term "science" or "scientific" has dealt with the realm of knowledge of both the natural and supranatural world. The question of whether theology should be classified as a science arose during the formation of the medieval universities in the thirteenth century, as well as the formation of modern German universities in the nineteenth century. Theologians from Aquinas to Schleiermacher argued that theology should be considered a science and, therefore, a proper subject of study in the university. The affirmation of theology as a science in this article is based on this historical survey, as well as the broader linguistic understanding of the term "science."

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The soul, duly prepared by exhortation to the study of true philosophy, finds herself in gradually advancing to the greater from the less. It should be noted that the one-paragraph reference to Olympiodorus herein (p. 9), while perfectly congruous with the exposition, is strictly impossible as he was in fact much posterior in historical time to Iamblichus. This editorial interpolation was mistakenly left in the final draft years before it was subsequently uploaded, an error for which the editor apologizes. No reader has ever noticed or objected to this mistake, and so we are not going to correct it now. Undoubtedly, neither Iamblichus nor Olympiodorus would object in spirit, for they were not mere philologists, and both of them are quoted correctly herein. They are in fact spiritual brothers and work together in this presentation for the true benefit of souls. It is like the friendly table talk between Callimachus (d. 240 B.C.) and Heraclitus portrayed in a beautiful and philosophically accurate woodcut published in 'The Dial' just before it ceased publication about a century ago--it could never have happened but it should have and (at least in the mind of Callimachus) did indeed occur, or so the artist surmised.

Gabriel Rodrigues da Silva (UNESP), em Do finito ao (mau) infinito, e além: um estudo da contradição entre finitude e má infinitude e sua resolução como verdadeira infinitude na Ciência da Lógica de Hegel, apresenta, analisa e discute o conceito de finito e o conceito de infinito conforme desenvolvidos por Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) em sua obra "Ciência da Lógica", mais precisamente na seção “C. A infinitude”, pertencente ao segundo capítulo, nomeado “O ser aí”, da "A Doutrina do Ser". Primeiramente, expõe o conceito de finito. Na sequência, expõe o conceito de infinito e sua respectiva diferenciação em má infinitude, o infinito do entendimento, e verdadeira infinitude, o infinito da razão. Ao final do capítulo, foca na contradição entre a finitude e a má infinitude e sua subsequente resolução com o desdobramento da verdadeira infinitude. Reconstruindo a argumentação de Hegel e, auxiliando-se em uma bibliografia secundária, tanto clássica quanto contemporânea, contextualizando o debate filosófico em torno do conteúdo proposto, principalmente, no que concerne às referências aludidas pelo próprio Hegel.

Die Wissenschaft der Logik des Philosophen Hegel 1 ist bekanntlich eine der anspruchsvollsten Schriften der Philosophiegeschichte. Sie ist auch nicht immer freundlich behandelt worden, um es vorsichtig auszudrücken. So konstatierte der englische Philosoph Roger Scruton einmal im Zusam-menhang mit seiner These, die Logikkenntnisse der Philosophen hätten im 19. Jahrhundert abgenommen, folgendes: "The greatest nineteenth-century philosopher-Hegel-wrote a book called Logic which contains only invalid arguments." 2 Scruton greift damit im Grunde nur ein in der angelsächsi-schen Welt verbreitetes Interpretament auf, das paradigmatisch bei Ber-trand Russell artikuliert wurde, wonach alle Lehren Hegels falsch seien und es interessant sei zu beobachten, welche Konsequenzen sich aus einer feh-lerhaften Logik ergeben (S. 620). 3 Ein Verständnis Hegels ist aber ohne ein gründliches Studium des Werks nicht möglich, wenn auch Hegels Denkform "keineswegs immer leicht nach-zuvollziehen" ist (S. 370). Daher sind erläuternde und kommentierende An-1 Siehe jetzt Hegels Philosophie / Walter Jaeschke.-Hamburg : Meiner, 2020 [ersch. 2019].-431 S. ; 21 cm.-ISBN 978-3-7873-3704-0 : EUR 25.00 [#6757].-Rez.: IFB 20-1 http://informationsmittel-fuer-bibliotheken.de/showfile.php?id=10111-Zur Biogra-phie neuerdings Hegel : der Philosoph der Freiheit ; Biographie / Klaus Vieweg.-München : Beck, 2019.-824 S. : Ill. ; 23 cm.-ISBN 978-3-406-74235-4 : EUR 35.00 [#6727].-Eine Rezension in IFB ist vorgesehen. 2 Philosophy : principles and problems / Roger Scruton.-London [u.a.] : Continuum , 2005.-168 S.-ISBN 0-8264-7623-6.-S. 28-29. 3 Explizit in A short history of modern philosophy : from Descartes to Wittgen-stein / Roger Scruton.-London : Routledge, 1989, S. 166.

Gabriel Rodrigues da Silva e Pedro Geraldo Aparecido Novelli em “A contradição na lógica de Hegel”, discutem o significado e a função da contradição na lógica elaborada por Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Para isso, utilizam tanto da bibliografia primária, isto é, a própria "Ciência da Lógica" de Hegel, considerada umas das principais obras do filósofo alemão, quanto da bibliografia secundária, isto é, obras de estudiosos e comentadores da filosofia hegeliana. O presente capítulo será dividido em três seções, as quais são: introdução, desenvolvimento e considerações finais. Na primeira delas, apresentam as questões iniciais que envolvem a concepção hegeliana de contradição. Já na seção seguinte, a partir da obra de Bordignon (2015), apresentam algumas interpretações sobre a função e o significado da contradição na lógica de Hegel. Na terceira e última seção, abordam a exposição da contradição de acordo com a "Ciência da Lógica", visualizando-a lado a lado com as interpretações referidas anteriormente.

Die Stellung des ontologischen Gottesbeweises in der Hegelschen Philosophie ist rätselhaft. Die vorliegende Arbeit zeigt, warum Hegel guten Grund hat, die philosophische Theologie systematisch aufzugreifen: Kants Widerlegungsversuch vermag nicht zu überzeugen. Dennoch richtet sich Hegels Interesse auf Voraussetzungen und Hintergrundfragen des ontologischen Argumentes. Die Voraussetzungen zu begründen und das ontologische Argumente systematisch zu integrieren, ist einer der Hauptstränge der Wissenschaft der Logik, wie die Arbeit zeigt.

Readers are advised that an up-to-date discussion of the author's fundamental thesis (’The Idea’), on the origin, operation, and destiny of the World, is now found at the top of the main page under the rubric, Thematic Evolution and Prospect of 'The Idea.'

A substantial part of our work attempts to construct an adequate Theory of the Face. See 'The Soul of Life' (below) and other studies on the page, some of which remain in draft and others merely projected. (Five papers on this difficult subject are planned.)

Progressive and substantial concretion of the thesis has been recently demonstrated through focused studies (2018-2020), whose URLs are conveniently grouped below:

'The Spirit of War'
https://www.academia.edu/36536128/The_Spirit_of_War

'Carlyle and the Idea'
(https://www.academia.edu/37362600/Carlyle_and_the_Idea)

'The Last Day (Illustrated Essay)'
(https://www.academia.edu/41144933/The_Last_Day_Illustrated_Essay_)

'How the German Spirit Died (A History)'
(https://www.academia.edu/41745763/How_the_German_Spirit_Died_A_History_)

'How the Human Spirit Died (Meta-Analysis)'
(https://www.academia.edu/41985864/How_the_Human_Spirit_Died_Meta-Analysis_)

'Three Malefactors of the Communist Idea (Meta-Analytical Note)'
(https://www.academia.edu/42052811/Three_Malefactors_of_the_Communist_Idea_Meta-Analytical_Note_)

Our gradual (and still incomplete) conceptualization of absolute cosmogony, cosmology, and eschatology in its modern (often microphysical) aspects, which has arisen quite organically over several years of detailed study, may be briefly encapsulated and characterized (A-T) for the reader as follows:

A. The Idea is the fundamental reality of the World, whose existence was clearly intuited (as “hypodoche”) by Plato, operationally defined by Boehme (first as “das Rad Gottes” and subsequently as “Eternal Nature”), organically articulated by Hegel (as “the Idea”), and finally discovered to be the locus of proto-being and foundation of living motion by means of 20th century microphysics (and accurately named by it “the color vacuum”). The electron is its projection into the finite. Field theory is its "physical" basis.

B. This definition of “substance” as a completely immaterial and literally infinite, self-related, hebdomadic-triadic system of actuality within the Idea at the fundament or basis of reality constitutes the greatest discovery of the human mind which, before the end of the 21st century, upon full comprehension, will completely revolutionize religion and therefore geopolitics, as well as pedagogy, paleontology, and biophysics.  The seat of the animating principle in organisms can now be described and explained.

C. Briefly, the research for this book involves the cosmology, cosmogony, and eschatology (destiny) of the world as the finite projection of the Eternal Idea. The Idea itself was created by the Triune Absolute Spirit as a finite-infinite field to manifest, reward, and punish moral, aesthetic, and intellectual performances in a Living Matrix.

D. Through the vast and distributed powers of its microphysical basis, the Idea as the created conduit of Absolute Power has autonomously generated a pseudo-history in geology and astronomy. The powers of Light and Darkness guided by Eternal Life deep within the fundament sustain the finite living motion of which we are aware through biology and empower conscious awareness in animals. Biopsychological functioning and all positive intellectual achievement in Mankind have their roots in the Idea.

E. Moreover, though unseen, the silent workings of a vast cosmological Absolute Hebdomad (deduced through study of the Idea in the 17th century) mercifully overarch and limit the Inchoate Life of the Sinister Itself--a Cosmic Disruptor also previously unsuspected that is responsible for the nocturnal Dream Life of animals. Is this a conceptual solution to the mysterious phenomena of telepathy and clairvoyance?

F. Biological and psychic life thus have always been suspended between two great cosmological powers representing a generalized War Between Infinite and Finite Life that began with King Lucifer, and which in its present form continually tests, through Contention, War, and Worldly Contrariety, the whole of Living Being as it follows a tortured and fateful course between Life and Death according to the much-lamented plan chosen by the Mind ("Gemüt") of Adam.

G. Finally, the hidden existence of the Idea necessarily implies a universal negative unity as the ideal origin of all gravitational and inertial phenomena, offering to science a solution at last to storied and continuing, completely beguiling conundrums (e.g., "Dark Matter" and "Dark Energy") involving the ultimate structure of the cosmos.

H. By tracing the Idea's manifold determinations of physical, biological, and psychic being, then, the present study seeks to explicate the final, and heretofore unsuspected, links in the fabled Great Chain of Being for the edification of Mankind. Inherently opposing it, pathetically and even insanely, is guileless materialism.

I. The war of materialism against idealism eventually culminated in the death of the German Spirit (1918). The main intellectual cause of German spiritual morbidity, however, is traceable to events within the Reformation (1517-1546). This did not prevent a period of optimism within Prussian education and science (1800-1840).

J. The theft of Silesia (1946) was an intentionally demoralizing spiritual crime against Germany with major consequences for the spiritual life of the world. The German Spirit's whole turbulent career constituted a vacillation on renunciation of self-will, and this latter always was the essential content of the Absolute Mind in Germany.

K. Germany's fatal spiritual debility can be considered to be a world "contagion" that spread centrifugally from the center of Europe to the whole Human Race which, therefore, is itself now in the throes of an analogous spiritual death, self-contemplation, and deliverance from the finite. The Zero-Hour is imminent.

L. Each of the Six Days (in Moses) is now fundamentally understood to mean a thousand-year period. Thus, Creation has all along been continuous and--after 6,000 years--will soon be completed (the argument proposes a means to confirm or deny the asserted beginning of 3,970 B.C.). Thus, the Day of Rest (for the Community of Heaven) will soon arrive for the self-elect of Mankind.

M. This tortured path was, of course, divinely foreseen but nevertheless represents an accommodative posture which was not at first understood. The Creator's response achieves a wise and just outcome despite the wreck and pain arising from myopic creatural assertion and pathetic gratification, as recounted in the mosaic story of old.

N. In fact, Talmudic commentators reached this conclusion in the 2nd or 3rd century A.D.--amending (in 'Sanhedrin 97a') the original mosaic interpretation of once-and-for-all Creation in favor of Continuous Creation with a clear Limit or End, specified as 6,000 years (each "day of creation," as mentioned above, being 1,000 years).

O. Thus, Moses (properly cogitated) was right but his dicta were for a long period taken wrongly--perforce leading the Christians astray through an accident of church history that remains a stumbling block up to the present day. See the author's 'The Last Day (Illustrated Essay).'

P. We know from modern physics that the "physical" world at the fundament is sustained by completely immaterial field relations that never cease, or else creation-in-process would not maintain itself. The creative motion is mathematically and physically infinite but disguises its own infinity--the chief insight, credited to Dirac, supporting Absolute Physics.

Q. Hence, it is now clear that the Creation--continuous since the beginning--is approaching its End and Goal. The Last Day is thus imminent and will arrive within the present decade, according to the wisest Christian view, this actually having been announced four centuries ago in German idealism.

R. The Eternal Word's role has always been to Shine Divinely (inwardly) in the gloom and darkness of the outward finite (the "Field of the Reprehensible") for salvation's sake (see 'Carlyle and the Idea'). It is this that Jesus of Nazareth spoke of, and it is this his followers embody, when they speak of the "true bread from heaven," etc..

S. This is why Christians can claim that the finalized ("Third") Temple of God is already in existence and is composed of living stones (minus the winnowed Condemned and Damned) whose essence will endure forever in God.

T. Our thesis is only now emerging in its final form. This is because the horizon of knowledge keeps receding as the true depth is revealed--the world is a set of nested dolls and the innermost doll is God, who is unknowably deep (but friendly, since we are Him in disguise when we abandon our finite wills).

Sia se analizzato sul piano della riflessione logico-speculativa sia se colto nell’orizzonte del pensiero etico-politico il concetto di libertà, nella trattazione hegeliana, si presenta come essenzialmente relato alla dimensione della necessità. Muovendo da questa constatazione, autentica peculiarità della filosofia hegeliana, la presente indagine rintraccia la relazione traFreiheit e Notwendigkeit all’interno dei Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto, per poi declinarne le occorrenze e specificità teoretiche in stretta connessione con la Scienza della logica.La natura di tale connessione è assunta ad oggetto del primo capitolo, che prende le mosse dalle difficoltà di natura epistemica e ontologica che contraddistinguono la comprensione dell’oggettivarsi della libertà in un orizzonte non speculativo. Con una costante attenzione ai nessi sistematici vengono quindi seguiti ed evidenziati i movimenti tramite i qualile triadi logiche si convertono nelle determinazioni dello spirito oggettivo, conversioni che cadenzano la relazione tra un concetto fondamentale, di natura logico-ontologica, e uno pratico, di natura etico-giuridica, di libertà. L’analisi culmina nell’individuazione del principio ordinatore dell’architettura del sistema hegeliano nel concetto di libertà, colto in tensione tra la dimensione speculativa e il decidersi soggettivo per il cominciamento. Infine, all’interno del nesso costitutivo tra libertà e razionalità, si tratteggia la specificità logica della relazione tra libertà e necessità, a partire dal confronto con la tradizione filosofica moderna (Spinoza, Leibniz e Kant) e dal procedimento confutatorio al quale quest’ultima è sottoposta da Hegel.
Il secondo capitolo si concentra sul processo di sviluppo e oggettivazione della libertà – sulla sua logica e sulle sue figure –, cogliendolo, in particolar modo, nella trattazione che ne viene offerta nell’Introduzione ai Lineamenti. Attenzione specifica viene posta alle condizioni sistematiche che permettono alla libertà di esprimersi come idea, ovvero ai concetti di spirito e di volontà libera assunti come portato dell’evoluzione dello spirito soggettivo. Caratterizzata la volontà libera come il punto di partenza e il soggetto dello sviluppo della libertà ne vengono analizzate le Grundbestimmungen, nel tentativo di individuare – già nelle determinazioni di universale, particolare e individuale – tre differenti topiche della relazione tra libertà e necessità – costruite in particolar modo sui posizionamenti di esteriorità e interiorità. Da ultimo, nella triade evolutiva di concetto-realizzazione-idea e nel ribaltamento della relazione di risultato-fondamento si coglie l’omologia strutturale tra la verità speculativa e la libertà, per come questa si suggella all’altezza dell’eticità.
Sulla critica hegeliana alla moralità – per come declinata dalla filosofia trascendentale – e sul suo necessario superamento nella sfera dell’eticità si sofferma il terzo capitolo. Si mette qui in evidenza, infatti, come solo nel passaggio all’eticità si superino i limiti inscritti in tutti i tentativi volti a dettare una dottrina dei doveri a partire da una prospettiva che consideri l’oggettività della libertà come vuoto dover essere e che identifichi la soggettività dell’agire libero con le azioni del singolo. Riprendendo tali difficoltà nella stessa cerchia dell’eticità, ovvero nella relazione tra società civile e stato, si coglie, infine, come la liberazione insita nel “pensare la necessità”, per come dettato dalla logica, si converta in un rapporto di riconoscimento tra singolo e sostanza etica in forza del quale tale sostanza assicuri l’oggettività alla rivendicazione della libertà del singolo e alla sua particolarizzazione.
Le conclusioni si concentrano su alcuni passaggi della sezione dei Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto dedicata allo stato, nel tentativo di dimostrare, muovendo dall’analisi della logica e della morfologia della relazione tra universale e particolare e tra oggettivo e soggettivo che lì si delinea, la necessità di riconsiderare alcune problematiche posizioni hegeliane – come la critica al contrattualismo o alla democrazia – alla luce delle loro coordinate sistematiche. In questo tentativo risulta dirimente il rimando al ruolo della filosofia (a partire dalla sua declinazione etica come Bildung).Il lavoro della filosofia non solo chiude la sezione sullo spirito oggettivo, ma obbliga anche al suo superamento in quella dello spirito assoluto. Solo lì, infatti, l’idea di libertà dimostra pienamente la sua natura spirituale, dismette la forma a lei impressa dalla volontà e raggiunge la sua ultima verità. Questa convinzione riposa sull’assunto ermeneutico di mantenere in tensione costante spirito assoluto e logica del finito, seguendo così fino in fondo lo sviluppo hegeliano, nella consapevolezza che solo da quella prospettiva sia possibile dare un senso alla totalità e nella totalità allo sviluppo della libertà.Il riferimento alla totalità, all’intero, è quindi riferimento necessario per cogliere la portata dialettica e ricorsiva della concezione hegeliana di libertà, anche laddove, in forza dell’azione dello spirito del mondo, pare essere messa in crisi la sua ipostasi “più reale”, lo stato.La filosofia, unica in grado di cogliere l’azione di libera auto alienazione dello spirito, diviene quindi il culmine insuperabile della verità e della libertà, che non cancella i momenti che l’hanno preceduta, ma li fonda e, da loro, “vien fuori”.

Surprisingly, perhaps, it turns out that the face is not only a finite object of art but also an infinite art object, yielding three inimitable standards of facial beauty, but what these really entail remains essentially unexplored. Surprising new research indicates a fundamental restriction on achievable aesthetic meaning within portraiture.

Readers interested in the latest findings on the face are advised that the present paper is part of a series of writings on this page attempting a total integration of the Visage of Man through theoretical comprehension, scientific investigation, and sensual appreciation of its place in actual life and within artistic conventions as ordinarily practiced.

Three other papers on this page should be read for an integrated and particularized approach to the context, the form (or plan), the neurophysiological underpinnings, and the exhibition of the Trifurcated Face of Man (namely, 'Prospectus of the Society for Faces,' 'The Soul of Life and the Spirit of War,' and 'Desiderata for Primary Exhibition of the Face').

A planned fifth paper ('The Human Face in Life and Death') in due course will, it is hoped, summarize, clarify, and strengthen the contributions to the theory of the face by the present author and form the basis for substantial new research on the idealist theory of the Visage of Man in the 21st century. The depth of the human face remains essentially unknown within idealism and is totally masked by the delusions of materialism.

Integral study of individual facial conformation at first maturity with the face in death (the Totenmask) in volunteers across the globe soon will be proposed, more or less as first envisioned in the 'Prospectus of the Society for Faces,' but with concrete reference to true (idealist) anthropology and its newfound insight into the profound psychophysical separation constituting Trifurcated Man.

Wenn man die vielen Ausdrucksformen des Selbstverständnisses berücksichtigt, die das zeitgenössische philosophische Denken auf verschiedene Weise und in weitläufigen Bereichen zeigt, scheint es nicht unangebracht, die zentrale Rolle, die das Thema der Andersheit in der aktuellen Debatte spielt, zu unterstreichen. Und bei dieser Bedeutung ist es ebenso offensichtlich, welche die kritische Absicht und das polemische Hauptziel der heutigen Diskussionen über die Andersheit sind (ich beziehe mich dabei, zum Beispiel, auf Ricoeur und Levinas, aber in gewisser Hinsicht auch auf Foucault, Deleuze und Adorno). Die Figur Hegels wird von diesen Autoren programmatisch zur Veranschaulichung jenes philosophischen Standpunktes angenommen, der sich auf vollständigste Weise als totaler „Übergriff“ des Selbst auf das Andere bildet und denkt, d.h., mit den Worten von Levinas ausgedrückt, als „Tätigkeit des Denkens, das die Oberhand über jede Andersheit behält“.
Von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus wird eine kritische Untersuchung des „Anderen“ im Hegelschen Denken von einem Interesse herausgefordert, das alles andere als müßig oder „veraltet“ oder rein philologischer Natur ist. Sie ist, ganz im Gegenteil, eine starke Frage nicht nur nach der typischen Hegelschen Art, die Andersheit zu denken, sondern zugleich auch nach der „Konsistenz“ selbst des zeitgenössischen Verständnisses des „Anderen“, da das Hegelsche Denken wie eine Gedankenbewegung erscheint, die dazu zwingt, die Plausibilität und den Sinn selbst jeglicher Kategorisierung der Andersheit in Bezug auf Ungreifbarkeit, Unsagbarkeit und Transzendenz abzuwägen.
Das Werk von A. Bellan reiht sich in diese hermeneutische Ordnung ein und füllt so – mit Ausnahme einiger weniger schon existierender Abhandlungen über dieses Thema – eine einzigartige Lücke über diesen problematischen Kernpunkt in den Hegelstudien.
[...] Der erste Teil ist dem Verhältnis zwischen Logik und Andersheit gewidmet. Zur Debatte stehen, auf der einen Seite, die Möglichkeit der Logik, eine „Darstellung“ der Andersheit zu liefern, und, auf der anderen Seite, die Rolle der letzteren in der selbstdarstellenden Bewegung der Logik selbst. [...]
Der zweite Teil erforscht das Problem dessen, was die „Semantik“ der Andersheit genannt werden könnte, d.h. die Arten und die Ausführbarkeit einer Diskussion des Anderen. Gegenstand der Untersuchung des vorliegenden Essays ist, wie ausdrücklich von Bellan in der Einleitung erklärt, die Thematisierung der „Sagbarkeit“ der Andersheit, ausgehend von der logischen Dimension in Hegel und nur innerhalb ihrer wesentlichen Koordinaten. Es wird also nicht absichtlich das Problem, beispielsweise, des Anderen in der Naturphilosophie gestellt, die selbstverständlich eine enge Bindung zur Logik unterhält. Diesem Zweck gemäß werden die drei wesentlichen „metakategorischen“ Dimensionen der Logik bestimmt und untersucht, die die innere Bewegung der entsprechenden Lehren leiten, d.h. die Transitivität, die Reflexivität und die Entwicklung.
Im dritten Abschnitt wird ein Themenbereich entworfen, der, unter Rücksichtnahme auf den aktuellsten Stand der Hegel-Forschung und von der inneren Verbindung zwischen Logik und Andersheit ausgehend, nach Möglichkeitsbedingungen für eine „logische“ Anerkennungsform sucht, die so die Hegelsche Logik selbst zu einer „spekulativen Theorie der Freiheit“ macht. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt wird die Bedeutung gezeigt, die das „logische“ Problem der Andersheit in Bezug auf die ethisch-sozialen Entwicklungen der spekulativen Dialektik einnimmt.
Das wesentliche Problem [...] kann man in der Frage zusammenfassen, um welche Andersheit es in der Hegelschen Logik geht, und, vor allem, welches Verhältnis zwischen der Andersheit und dem sie denkenden logisch-spekulativen Wissen besteht. Mit anderen Worten besteht das Problem aus dem Resultat, zu dem der spekulative Gedanke des Anderen führt: ob also die Andersheit dazu bestimmt ist, im Begriff aufgelöst zu werden – d.h. ob sie im logischen Ablauf nur aufgrund einer Notwendigkeit aufgenommen wird, die dem Selbstentfaltungsprozeß des absoluten Subjektes eigen ist, das wiederum strategisch für seine Selbstbestimmung eine konstante Bindung zur Andersheit unterhält (deren einziger Zweck im Ausdruck der Struktur selbst liegt, aus der die absolute Idee besteht) –, oder ob, im Gegenteil, die Andersheit am Ende des logischen Prozesses in ihrer Unterschiedlichkeit erhalten wird: in anderen Worten, ob man interpretativ die noch radikalere Meinung vertreten kann, daß die Andersheit sich nur innerhalb und dank der Logik authentisch geben kann.
Bei dem Versuch, auf diese Frage zu antworten, führt der Autor nacheinander eine Reihe einleitender [...] Fragen ein und zeichnet gleichzeitig ein historisch-kritisches Bild der diskutierten Problematik. Er verweilt zu allererst bei der Vielfältigkeit der Bedeutungen und der Verwendungen des Wortes „Andere“ in der Wissenschaft der Logik. Er zeigt die fruchtbare und unbeugsame Mehrdeutigkeit des Begriffs des „Anderen“ auf, der seine radikale Unumgehbarkeit und zentrale Stellung im Inneren der Logik selbst demonstriert, indem er hinter einer Reihe Begriffsbestimmungen auftaucht, in denen sich die Logik entfaltet. Die Logik wird wie der Bereich betrachtet, in dem alle Formen und Arten, in denen es möglich ist, die Andersheit zu denken, eine vollständige und systematische Form finden: im Übergang des Seins, in der Reflexion des Wesens und in der (Selbst)Entwicklung des Begriffs wird im Wesentlichen, je nach erreichter Vermittlungsart, das Verhältnis zwischen dem Selbst und dem Anderen gedacht, d.h. die verschiedenen Ausdrucksformen vom spekulativen „Verständnis“ des Anderen, nicht als Anderes eines Anderen, sondern als Anderes seiner selbst.
Ebenfalls in der Einleitung überdenkt und diskutiert der Autor kurz in einem angebrachten Exkursus die interessantesten Standpunkte in der kritischen Debatte über die Wissenschaft der Logik und, im Allgemeinen, in Bezug auf die Rolle und die Bedeutung der Dialektik im Hegelschen Denken. In einer weitläufigen und aktuellen Analyse der Sekundärliteratur und mit einem immer wachsamen kritischen Auge behandelt Bellan die „klassischen“ Kritiken an Hegel und die neuesten Standpunkte der Interpreten der Hegelschen Logik, in dem Versuch, gleichzeitig die theoretischen Voraussetzungen jener Standpunkte und die Bedeutsamkeit des Themas der Andersheit aufzuzeigen, und sie dabei kritisch zu diskutieren und die Verbindung zwischen Andersheit und Anerkennungstheorie zu umreißen. Auf diese Weise überdenkt er, wenn auch nur in kurzen Andeutungen, die Betrachtungen Adornos über die Dialektik, die Standpunkte von Interpreten wie Theunissen und Schnädelbach, den hermeneutischen Vorschlag von Apel und Habermas, bis hin zur Interpretation der Logik als „écriture de l'autre“ von Seiten G. Jarczyks.
Der Hauptteil des Bandes, quantitativ am umfangreichsten und theoretisch am reichhaltigsten, nimmt direkt die Knotenpunkte der internen Architektur der Logik in Angriff und zeigt anhand genauer und passender Bezüge auf den Hegelschen Text – worüber hier nur rasch und kursorisch Rechenschaft abgelegt werden kann – das Vorhandensein des unausweichlichen begrifflichen Problems, das auf jeder Höhe des logischen Ablaufs mit der Andersheit verbunden ist. Zwei Aspekte sind besonders interessant: die Diskussion der Verbindung zwischen Andersheit und Negativität der Grenze, bei der sich der Autor auf die Jenaer Ausarbeitung der Dialektik der Grenze bezieht, und der große Teil, der der Bewegung im Inneren der reflexiven Negativität des Wesens und, allgemeiner, der Vielfalt an Konnotationen des Begriffs selbst der Reflexion gewidmet ist [...].
Es lohnt sich, noch auf einen anderen der vielen interessanten Punkte hinzuweisen. Die Thematisierung der „Unruhe“ des Anderen, d.h. dessen unüberwindliche Bestimmtheit, ermöglicht es, selbst den Hegelschen Begriff des Absoluten in neuem Licht zu betrachten und die so viel diskutierte Frage der Subjektivität neu zu überdenken. Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, d.h. der Grenze, der Verschiedenheit, der Bestimmtheit, ins Innere der Logik selbst macht es unmöglich, die absolute Idee weiterhin als abstrakte Identität, als intellektualistische Sichselbstgleichheit, zu denken. Die „Präsenz“ des Anderen im Inneren der Logik hervorzuheben entspricht der Annahme einer dezentralisierenden Perspektive, die dazu zwingt, das Andere wie eine nicht zu entfernende Bedingung zu denken, damit das Absolute wirklich das sein kann, d.h. ungebunden und frei von jeglicher Form von Anhängigkeit. Nur ein komplett negativer Prozeß, in dem die Andersheit einer unumgehbaren und nicht zerstreuenden Negativität entspricht, garantiert das Erreichen der Selbstdurchsichtigkeit des absoluten Wissens, das schließlich nichts anderes als Selbstbewußtsein der Bewegung ist.
Gleichzeitig wird die Andersheit nur im Inneren der Logik vor den verschiedenen Formen der Verdinglichung geschützt, die vor oder außerhalb der Logik handeln. Diese "schlechten" Verständnisformen können die Andersheit nur als Gegebenheit, Vorhandensein oder Darstellung denken. Anhand der Akzentuierung dieses Knotenpunktes zeigt Bellan die Verbindung zwischen Andersheit und Logik und, nachfolgend, die im Wesentlichen praktische Dimension des Logischen. Von hier ausgehend baut der Autor das Thema der Logik der Anerkennung und der Andersheit als Intersubjektivität auf. Die theoretische Voraussetzung für diese thematische Entwicklung liegt vor allem in der Idee, daß das Spekulative eine polyzentrische Dimension öffnet, die dank einer „logischen Umstrukturierung des Anders-sein“ die Rolle des Anderen in der sozialen Interaktion ausdrückt."

This article aims at pointing out the presence of the alterity in Hegel’s philosophy. The first part outlines the importance of the recovery of the alterity nowadays. The second part analyses the relation between Fenomenology and Science of Logic, showing the importance of alterity which can be understood as common thread of both works. The third part argues that alterity (as “logic of the fourth”) is the basis of intersubjectivity. Finally the article contains some reflections on the link between alterity-intersubjectivity: if the alterity is intrinsic to the concept, the intersubjectivity then is intrinsic to the subject.

The section on objectivity began from a " mechanical " system of independent objects that could be manipulated at least by combining and dividing them in various manners. Even if the objects themselves were not in any manner intrinsically connected, at least the capacities for manipulating these objects were: at least the " central capacity " for activating all the subcapacities was connected to the system of various subcapacities. We could so construct examples of objects intrinsically connected, although still separate. This new set of " chemical " objects could then be also combined and the combinations could be analysed or divided: in effect, we could construct a cycle that went through various stages of separation and combination. The capacity to construct such a cycle could be taken as a self-modifying/replicating process that used the other objects as a material for its own purposes. The final chapter of objectivity is then dedicated to the investigation of such " purposeful " or teleological structures. Although the paradigmatic example constructed in the previous chapter was already in a sense organic – its purpose was to maintain certain cycle of processes – at the beginning of the new chapter we do not make such an assumption. Indeed, it is the task of this chapter to show how we could construct examples of such " organic " or self-sustaining processes when examples of " purposive " structure are given. The chapter develops through three aspects following the process of actualising purposes rather nicely: we begin from the " choice of what to do " , continue by taking up some means and end by actualising the chosen purpose through the means. 1./1479. When we see objects fit for some purpose, we usually insist there is some purposive agent behind these objects: the assumption of purposive agent is often opposed to mere external or mechanic determination of objects – we ask whether world is ruled by mere blind mechanism or by purposive intelligence and whether everything is determined by fate or whether freedom is possible. The first sentence of the paragraph belies Hegel's Aristotelian thoughts: the first instinct of everyone who observes some purposive phenomenon is to assume that there is some conscious agent giving a purpose to this phenomenon. The only alternative that is usually considered is that there is no purpose at all behind the phenomenon, that is, that it is caused by some external causes. With the same opposition begins Aristotle's Physics, and almost immediately Aristotle notices that this is actually not an opposition, because a third option is forgotten: the purpose may be part of the phenomenon itself, if it is a self-determining process like life. At this stage Hegel retains the silence and does not mention this third option. Instead, he at once raises the seeming dilemma of whether

We began our study of objectivity from a system of objects reflecting one another and the whole system, somewhat like the system of Leibnizian monads. We then saw that we could model some " mechanical " processes within such a system: at least we could use the capacities to interpret these objects as mere aspects of the system or as separate from it for modelling processes of integrating objects and separating them. Then again, in any system of objects with such mechanical processes we could choose one object as embodying all these possible processes and capacities of controlling the system: that is, if we were given a system of interrelated objects, we could embody it in one " central object ". On the other hand, if we were given one object embodying all the processes for controlling any set of objects, we could construct a new system of interrelated methods for controlling various aspects of the set of objects: in other words, from a " central object " we could construct a system of " lawfully " interrelated objects. All in all, within any set of objects, we could thus construct an example of an individual object and a system of objects separable from one another, but also constructible from one another: more generally, this is an example of two entities embodying two different, but necessarily related " forces " (here, separation of one object and integration of objects into a system). The aim of this chapter is then to study such structures, which Hegel calls " chemical " : an obvious reference to a unification of bases with acids. The attempt is to show how such " chemical " relations can be used in constructing examples of " concepts " or self-modifying processes: in effect, Hegel is showing that e.g. living entities can be based on chemical and generally material ground – although life as such is not to be identified with a mere set of chemical processes. The trivision of the chapter is rather artificial and obviously follows the example of the previous chapter: we begin with an investigation of chemical objects, then study chemical processes and finally construct self-modifications. Indeed, a more natural trivision would have been available: Hegel goes through three different forms of " chemical processes ". 1./1464. We are now studying structure where objects exhibit similar properties as relations of general capacities and individual objects: we begin already from naturally classified objects and thus can move on quite easily. Although Hegel apparently notes a resemblance between the relation of concept and judgement and the relation of mechanism and chemism, the two relations are actually in a sense contrasts of one another. In chapter on concept, we began from a single self-modification and we then continued by " dividing " this self-modification by constructing several aspects of this self-modification – we moved from unity to multiplicity of related situations. The movement from mechanism to chemism

The topic of this division has been a process of self-modification and structures that can be modelled by its means. We have seen that we can differentiate between self-modification as an object in a particular state of development from the very structure of development itself. At first this structure appeared as a mere contextual characterisation or state of object, but we quickly noted that the object might have many contextual characterisations and that instead of any such we should look at its dispositions that last from one context to another. We then noted that because of its dispositions to modify and even copy itself, we could interpret this object as a paradigmatic model for constructing different modifications or versions of some general structure. Through this capacity we could then construct a whole classification of possible " lifelines " and modifications of objects of this general structure. We could then separate this general structure with its capacities of construction and self-modification from a particular modification or version of this structure. We could then determine how well this version had fulfilled the potential within the general structure. Because it was only one version among many others and occupied a particular position in the division of modifications, it might not have been the best. Still, because it occupied particular position we could determine whether it was a good specimen and how it might be made even better. This dual viewpoint of " occupying a particular position and being connectible to a general structure " could then be taken as a third component, and in fact, as a viewpoint for unification of the other two components: it represented the very process by which general structure of self-modification could be modified into individual versions and how these versions could be incorporated into an evaluative classification of these versions. The task of this chapter is then to investigate this new sort of structure or " syllogism/deduction " , and indeed, like in case of judgements, to note that these structures can model what is usually referred to by that name. While in case of judgements Hegel had the example of Kant's classification to model, in case of deductions the case is not so clear. Hegel's actual division of paradigmatic examples of syllogism resembles Kant's logic, where syllogisms of understanding, judgement and reason are introduced. Thus, Hegel's syllogisms of necessity correspond to Kant's syllogisms of reason and Hegel's syllogisms of reflection contain Kant's syllogisms of understanding plus a " syllogism of universality " , which would be in Kant a mere instance of categorical syllogism (a similar differentiation of e.g. affirmative and categorical judgements was introduced by Hegel in case of judgements). Only Kant's syllogisms of understanding have been replaced with traditional division of three Aristotelian syllogisms (plus the so-called mathematical syllogism). Like in case of judgements, a more important issue of division involves the modelling of previous stages of Logic: similar phases as in previous chapter

Ein »Selbst« konstituiert sich durch eine Verlegenheit: dass es sich als ein Selbst identifzieren muss oder, noch tautologischer formuliert, dass es sich selbst identifziert. Die Verlegenheit besteht offensichtlich darin, dass das Selbst sich von sich trennen und zugleich auf sich zurückkommen muss, damit durch diese (Selbst-) Refexion das Selbst allererst eintritt.
Wie ist das möglich? Wie gerät dasjenige Selbst außer sich, das dadurch erst auf sich zurückkommen und allererst zum Selbst werden kann? Wie tritt das Selbst in dieses paradoxe Verhältnis-mit-sich? Diese paradoxe Konstitution soll mit Hegel und Marx an den drei großen Selbstverhältnissen schlechthin ausgewiesen werden, nämlich an der Subjektivität, am Sein der Objektivität und an der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft. Die Subjektivität entwickelt Hegel in der "Phänomenologie des Geistes" (PhdG), das Selbstverhältnis der Objektivität in der Seinslogik der "Wissenschaft der Logik" (WdL), das Selbstverhältnis der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft entwickelt Marx im "Kapital". Alle drei Selbstverhältnisse eint dieselbe Pointe: Sie treten durch ein ausge-schlossenes Drittes ein. Dieses ausgeschlossene Dritte ist das Maß: Hegel und Marx beginnen ihre drei großen Werke damit zu zeigen, dass, damit etwas mit sich selbst ins Verhältnis tritt, auf spekulative Weise immer schon ein ausgeschlossenes Drittes als Maß in Anspruch genommen werden muss. Dieses Maß ist im Fall der Subjektivität das Selbstbewusstsein, im Fall der Objektivität die Maßgeblichkeit des Seins für sich selbst und im Fall der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft das Geld als Maß des Werts.

Gabriel Rodrigues da Silva, em "'Reich des reinen Gedankens' e 'Reich der Schatten': lógica e metafísica na Introdução da Ciência da Lógica de Hegel”, discute a concepção de lógica, a concepção de metafísica e a relação entre ambas conforme expõe Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel na Introdução da "Ciência da Lógica".

In meinem Beitrag möchte ich zeigen, dass der Begriff der " zweiten Natur " mit Hegel gerade dann, wenn er eine Ent-Substantialisierung bzw. eine Ent-Wesentlichung des Wesens der " älteren Metaphysik " zeigt, nützlich ist, um die Freiheit als Wesen des Menschen zu begreifen. Die Freiheit als Wesen des Menschen zu begreifen, das heißt im Besonderen, das Wesen als Beziehung zu begreifen: sowohl eine Beziehung zum anderen Menschen, als auch zur natürlichen und kulturellen Wirklichkeit, der er angehört. Das Wesen als Freiheit oder als Beziehung zeigt die komplexeste und negativste Seite der Dialektik; d. h. die dialektischste Seite der Negation, ihre schwindelerregendste Eigenschaft. Die These meines Beitrages baut auf den folgenden zwei Überlegungen auf: a) die charakteristische Struktur dessen, was Hegel " zweite Natur " nennt, offenbart sich meiner Meinung nach in der Wirklichkeit, am Ende der Lehre vom Wesen in der Wissenschaft der Logik; und b) um zu begreifen, was Wirklichkeit ist, ist es notwendig aufzuzeigen, was " zweite Natur " ist. Meine Argumentation wird sich in drei Schritten entwickeln: 1. Ich beginne mit der Eigenschaft der Zweideutigkeit der zweiten Natur bei Hegel. Wie von zahlreichen Interpreten hervorgehoben, könnte man diese Eigenschaft in zwei Aspekten zusammenfassen: die zweite Natur scheint zum einen a) der Verlust des Geistes, dessen Verdinglichung, zum anderen b) die höchste Verwirklichung des Geistes zu sein. Was ich zeigen möchte, ist, dass diese Zweideutigkeit der zweiten Natur sich aus der Art und Weise ergibt, wie " Natur " verstanden wird. 2. Im Mittelteil der Argumentation werde ich – aufbauend auf die für die zweite Natur charakteristische dialektische Struktur, wie sie sich in der Gewohnheit und in der Sittlichkeit zeigt – zu erklären versuchen, dass die " zwei Gesichter " der zweiten Natur in ihrem wirklich-Sein begründet sind. Dazu werde ich einige Passagen zur Wirklichkeit in der Wissenschaft der Logik erörtern, um die strukturelle Verflechtung zwischen zweiter Natur und Wirklichkeit aufzuzeigen. 3. Ausgehend von Hegel werde ich schließlich im Lichte dieses Zusammenhanges vorschlagen, Freiheit als zweite Natur zu verstehen.

The Modernity in singular meaning has seen in the finitude of the thought at the same time its destiny and the difference that separates it from the modern metaphysics. But for modern metaphysics the infinity of the thought or even its absoluteness is an
“idealism’s” consequence, i.e., of the philosophical theory that claims the ideal condition, because abstract, of the finite. In this paper, we intend to show, on the basis of a late Hegel’s writing, in which way the notions of idealism and infinity are
correlates.

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A connected discussion of Absolute Physics and modern cosmology emphasizing gravitation and inertia, with concluding remarks on the rageful “spiritus mundi” that is said to stalk the World.