Alief

***NB: The published version of this paper concludes after Part IV. Part V will be incorporated into a separate article (now in progress).***

Despite its enduring popularity, theatrical magic remains all but ignored by art critics, art historians, and philosophers. This longstanding critical inattention is unfortunate, since magic seems to offer a unique and distinctively intellectual aesthetic experience, and reflection on magic raises a host of interesting philosophical and psychological questions. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to initiate a philosophical investigation of the experience of magic. The paper has five parts. Part one dispels two misconceptions about the nature of magic and discusses the special sort of depiction it requires. Parts two and three lay the groundwork for an account of the experience of magic in terms of Tamar Szabó Gendler's notion of “belief-discordant alief.” On this basis, part four presents an account of the experience of magic and connects it to both the Kantian mathematical sublime and Socratic aporia. Finally, part five introduces two new aesthetic paradoxes and resolves them by appeal, first, to Alison Gopnik’s work on the psychology of explanation, and second, to parallels between magic and horror and humor. The result is a philosophically rich account of the experience of magic that opens new avenues for inquiry with direct relevance to core issues in contemporary aesthetics.

In two very influential papers from 2008, Tamar Gendler introduced the concept of “alief” to describe the mental state one is in when acting in ways contrary to their consciously professed beliefs. For example, if asked to eat what they know is fudge, but shaped into the form of dog feces, they will hesitate, and behave in a manner that would be consistent with the belief that the fudge is really poop. They alieve that it is disgusting, while they believe it is not. This paper investigates laughter from self-proclaimed egalitarian, tolerant folk, in response to oppressive jokes that might fit the alief-model. If I merely alieve the content of a joke at which I laugh, will that constitute morally exculpating reasons for such laughter? And what else might it imply? This paper will provide insights at the intersections of humor studies, ethics, epistemology, phenomenology, and the philosophy of mind, all while being moderately and appropriately amusing.

This paper aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the claim of eliminative materialism (EM), espoused by Paul and Patricia Churchland. It will identify and clarify alternative understandings of that view, and assess which version is the most plausible interpretation in the light of the Churchlands' writings and contemporary discussions. The result of the analysis is that eliminativism is best understood as a methodological thesis regarding the scope and depth of the possible revision of (scientific and folk) usage of FP terms and principles. The problem is important not only, and nor primarily, for exegetical purposes. EM functions in contemporary metaphysics of mind mainly as a point of negative reference: for this reason it is important to carefully formulate the main claim of EM so that the theorists taking part in the debate know what they actually disagree with. The careful formulation provided by this paper could show other philosophers that their position is not, in fact, as far from EM as they might have thought.

This paper examines the puzzling phenomenon of self-directed implicit bias in the form of gender “stereotype threat” (ST). Bringing to light the empirical undecidability of which account of this phenomenon is best, whether a rational or an associationist explanation, the paper aims to strengthen the associationist approach by appeal to a new account of seeing-as experiences. I critically examine “alief” accounts of reason- recalcitrant ST by bringing to bear arguments from the philosophy of emotion. The new account builds on the insights and overcomes the weaknesses of “aliefs” by (a) employing associations that are imaginative and unreliable; and (b) proposing non-conceptual seeing-as experiences.

Art and magic are often associated with one another in people’s
minds, when people talk about, for example, the power that art has to ‘conjure’ our emotions, or of being put under the ‘spell’ of an artwork. By examining the way in which we regularly emotionally respond to images of people we love, I will explore in this paper one way in which art and magic can be understood as sharing an important connection. First, I will introduce the notion of sympathetic magic and the ‘law of similarity’, according to which, “the image equals the object itself”. Second, drawing on psychological studies conducted by Paul Rozin and his colleagues, I will show how the way we regularly respond to images of loved ones is consistent with the law of similarity. Third, I will use Tamar Szabó Gendler’s recent account of ‘alief’ in order to help understand the mental processes involved in this ‘magical-affective’ (as I call it) level of response. And finally, with reference to Wittgenstein, I will draw out some implications of this in terms of our understanding both of the magical practices of tradition cultures, and of the function of images in contemporary Western societies, drawing
parallels between the two.

Many psychiatric disorders are characterized by problems with emotion regulation. Well-known therapeutic interventions include discursive therapies, like psychoanalysis, and non-cognitive therapies, like psycho-pharmaceuticals. These forms of therapy are compatible with different theories of emotion: discursive therapy is a natural ally of cognitive theories, like Nussbaum’s (2009), according to which emotions are forms of judgment, while psychopharmacological intervention is a natural ally of non-cognitive theories, like Prinz’s (2006), according to which emotions are forms of stimulus-dependent perception. I explore a third alternative: the therapeutic regulation of emotion as the development of metacognitive skills. This is a natural characterization of newer forms of therapy that are increasingly prescribed, like Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, and various mindfulness-based interventions. I argue that these newer forms of therapy make sense if we conceive of emotion as neither a form of judgment nor a form of perception, but, rather, as a variety of what Gendler calls “alief” (2008). As Gendler notes, although aliefs do not succumb to direct rational regulation, they can be trained. Thus, if we conceive of emotions as aliefs, we can make sense of their therapeutic regulation through the development of metacognitive skills. Drawing on recent philosophical analyses of skill, as well as empirical paradigms in emotion regulation, and Buddhist characterizations of meditative practice, I sketch a characterization of metacognitive skill, and conclude with some reflections on the advantages of conceiving of psychotherapy as the development of metacognitive skills.

Should we understand implicit attitudes on the model of belief?  I argue that implicit attitudes are (probably) members of a different psychological kind altogether, because they seem to be insensitive to the logical form of an agent’s thoughts and perceptions.  A state is sensitive to logical form only if it is sensitive to the logical constituents of the content of other states (e.g., operators like negation and conditional).  I explain sensitivity to logical form and argue that it is a necessary condition for belief.  I appeal to two areas of research that seem to show that implicit attitudes fail spectacularly to satisfy this condition—although persistent gaps in the empirical literature leave matters inconclusive.  I sketch an alternative account, according to which implicit attitudes are sensitive merely to spatiotemporal relations in thought and perception, i.e., the spatial and temporal orders in which people think, see, or hear things.

Graham Harman describes the allure of art as the tension and fusion of a real object to sensual qualities so that it makes it seem that the inwardness of reality is opened to us. Yet real objects are withdrawn; how are we aware of their fusion? Since Harman’s ontology mandates that contact between real objects occurs only through sensual objects, this essay explores the idea that art’s allure must be a tension between sensual objects that draw the experiencer to believe, or alieve, they are in contact with the withdrawn real. By looking at the examples in representational painting and sleight of hand magic, we see that ontographic art objects use at least four, carefully separated sensual objects to produce their aesthetic effect. The conclusion summarises allure as a sensual object process, speculates on art’s dialetheic confusion of sensual and real objects giving an enduring allure to idealism, and notes potential motifs of an infrarealist resistance.

Graham Harman describes the allure of art as the tension and fusion of a real object to sensual qualities so that it makes it seem that the inwardness of reality is opened to us. Yet real objects are withdrawn; how are we aware of their fusion? Since Harman’s ontology mandates that contact between real objects occurs only through sensual objects, this essay explores the idea that art’s allure must be a tension between sensual objects that draw the experiencer to believe, or alieve, they are in contact with the withdrawn real. By looking at the examples in representational painting and sleight of hand magic, we see that ontographic art objects use at least four, carefully separated sensual objects to produce their aesthetic effect. The conclusion summarises allure as a sensual object process, speculates on art’s dialetheic confusion of sensual and real objects giving an enduring allure to idealism, and notes potential motifs of an infra-realist resistance.

In this paper we aim to analyze some ethical dilemmas that people may face when they deal with their alien attitudes. In particular, we will ask what might follow if alien attitudes are treated as a part of “reality”, and what kinds of ethical problems can arise when a person wishes to identify with his alien attitudes. People do not always really believe what they take themselves to believe. A person may sincerely say that a certain racist belief is definitively false, but still have such a belief. When asked what he believes about something, it is likely that he simply expresses his opinion about the issue in question, and this reveals what he takes himself to believe, but not necessarily what he really believes. In some cases, however, a person may adopt a kind of a third-person point of view. Instead of expressing his opinion, he may report the attitude he has in light of convincing evidence concerning his behavior and other attitudes. It follows that sometimes a person may report having an attitude which conflicts with his better judgment – his opinion. “Many people have completely unjustified racially biased beliefs, and judging from my behavior I must admit that I have them myself.” In these cases the person’s (evidential) beliefs are not apparent to the person in the normal way, and are not judgment-sensitive (or reason-responsive) in a way that they are supposed to be. Beliefs of this kind can be called alien attitudes (or more narrowly alien beliefs).
Authors: Juha Räikkä and Saul Smilansky

Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that— according to Buddhaghosa—should be evoked by meditating on death. What kind of mental state it is exactly, and how it is morally motivating is unclear, however. This article presents a theory of saṃvega—what it is and how it works—based on recent insights in psychology. According to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental processes organized in two "systems" : the experiential, automatic system 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. In normal circumstances, system 1 does not believe in its own mortality. Saṃvega occurs when system 1 suddenly realizes that the "subjective self" will inevitably die (while system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject's mortality). This results in a state of shock that is morally motivating under certain conditions. Saṃvega increases mortality salience and produces insight in suffering, and in combination with a strengthened sense of loving-kindness or empathic concern both mortality salience and insight in suffering produce moral motivation.

A recent distinction in the philosophy of action suggests that a dual-process model of moral cognition can make sense of a great deal of phenomena involving “belief-behavior mismatch”. In a series of articles, Tamar Szabó Gendler suggests that alongside beliefs there is a mental state called “aliefs” that can motivate an individual’s behavior. Although aliefs and beliefs often align with one another, under certain circumstances, an individual’s beliefs can conflict with her aliefs. In such cases it turns out that the aliefs are the trumping motivational force. This interesting psychological observation allows us to explain how it is possible for an individual to exhibit behavior that conflicts with her beliefs.  In what follows I will show that if “aliefs” do appropriately refer to occurrent or dispositional mental states, then it becomes an especially noteworthy mental category in situations of moral import.  It allows us to make ascriptions of moral responsibility even when, or especially when, an individual’s morally appropriate or inappropriate behavior conflicts with her settled moral beliefs. Yet, a worry immediately surfaces. Some might object that an individual cannot be morally responsible for her alief-motivated behavior insofar as, and as we shall see, it is automatic, implicit, and not subject to an individual’s direct and voluntary control. I reject this claim in two steps: first, I show that aliefs are in various ways closely connected to what an individual cares about. Second, I show that regarding their cares, individuals can have the appropriate kind of control necessary for ascriptions of moral responsibility. It follows from these conclusions that an individual’s behavior that is motivated by her aliefs and cares may be more telling about her moral character than her moral beliefs. Consequently, it may be more morally significant what a person cares about and alieves than believes.