Ba'athism

Irak Türkmenleri denildiği zaman hafızamızda ilk olarak Kerkük ve Musul canlanır. Fakat Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun dağılmasından sonra maalesef Türkler için hüznün ve acının adeta merkezi haline gelmiştir. Bu acılar dokunaklı bir şekilde halk edebiyatına ve o bölgenin türkülerine de yansımıştır;

“Yıktılar kal’amızı
Sürdüler balamızı
Daha can boğazdayken
Çektiler sâlamızı
Ah Kerkük yüz ah Kerkük
Her zaman yüz ak Kerkük
Ölseydim düşmeseydim
Men senden uzak Kerkük...”
 
Türkünün dizelerinden de anlaşılacağı gibi Türkmenler maalesef kaderine terkedilmiş ve geçen yıllar boyunca adeta bir mum gibi yavaş yavaş bölgede asimile politikaları ile erimektedirler. Bu konuya değinmeden önce bölgedeki Türk varlığını incelemekte fayda vardır. Türklerin Irak’a ilk girişleri H. 54 / M. 674 tarihlerine kadar uzanmaktadır. Emevi Halifesi Muaviye tarafından Horasan’a gönderilen Ubeydullah bin Ziyad ile Buhara prensesi Hatun emrindeki Türk kuvvetleri arasında yapılan çarpışmadan sonra bir barış yapılmıştır. Bu barıştan sonra Ubeydullah yanına aldığı Türk askerlerini Irak’a götürüp, Basra’ya yerleştirmiştir. Türklerin Irak’a gelişleri Abbasi döneminde, Halife Memun ve Halife Mutasım’ın iktidarı sırasında meydana gelen siyasi gelişmelerden dolayı daha da sıklaşmıştır. Emevi ordularında olduğu gibi Abbasi ordularında da yer alan Türkler, üstün savaşçı yetenekleri ile maharetlerinden dolayı üst mevkilere getirilmişlerdir. Ayrıca H. 211 / M. 836 ’da Halife Mutasım’ın emriyle Türk kumandanı Türk hassa askeri için Somerna şehri kurulmuştu. 25 Aralık 1055’te Bağdat’a giren Selçuklu hükümdarı Tuğrul Bey Büveyhoğulları’nın Irak’taki hakimiyetine son verilmiştir. Tuğrul Bey Bağdat ve Oğuzların yayıldığı Irak’ı Selçuklu Ülkesine katmıştır. Bu tarihten sonra Oğuz boylarına mensup birçok Türk, bu bölgeye yerleştirilmiştir. Böylece bölgede Büyük Selçuklular ile Türk hakimiyeti başlamıştır. Türklere daha önce yalnızca Etrak (Türkler) diyen Araplar, “Etrak-u Bağdat” (Bağdat Türkleri) demeye başlamışlardır.  1258 Moğol istilası ile Abbasi hilafeti son bulmuş, bölge Moğolların eline geçmiştir. Ayrıca bu bölgede Moğollarla birlikte çok sayıda Türk askeri gelmiştir. 1258 – 1336 İlhanlılar, 1338 – 1360 Celayirliler, 1360 – 1469 Karakoyunlular ve 1470 tarihinden itibaren de Akkoyunlular hakimiyetinde kalan bölge 1508 yılında Safevilerin eline geçmiştir. Safeviler’in Çaldıran’da (1515) Yavuz Sultan Selim Han’a yenilmesi ve Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Han’ın da 1534’te Bağdat’ı almasıyla bugün Irak olarak anılan bölge Osmanlı hakimiyetine geçmiştir. Osmanlılar Irak’ı, Bağdat, Basra, Musul, Şehrizor ve el-Ahsa olmak üzere beş bölgeye ayırarak idare ettirmişlerdir. 1623’te bölge tekrar Safeviler’in eline geçmiş ve Safeviler binlerce kişiyi katletmişlerdir. Sultan IV. Murad Han’ın 1638’de Bağdat’ı tekrar geri almasıyla Kasr-ı Şirin Antlaşması yapılmış ve kesin sınır çizilmişti. Böylece Musul-Kerkük bölgesi de dahil olarak I. Dünya Savaşı sonuna kadar bölge Osmanlı hakimiyetinde kalmıştır. Sonuç olarak Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Han ve Sultan IV. Murad Han zamanında Anadolu’dan getirilen çok sayıda Türk de bölgeye yerleştirilmiştir. I. Dünya Savaşından itibaren Irak’ın işgal edilmesi ve 1926 Musul Meselesi görüşmeleri sonucu Musul ve Kerkük’ün Irak’a bırakılmasıyla Musul ve Kerkük Irak’la birlikte İngiliz sömürgesi haline gelmiştir. 1920 – 1932 yılları arasında Irak’ın İngiliz Mandası altında bulunduğu dönemde Türkler baskı ve zulüm dolu bir devre yaşamışlardır. Irak’ın 1932 ’de Milletler Cemiyeti’ne kabul edilip bağımsızlığına kavuşmasından sonra da Irak Türkleri rahat yüzü görmemiş, baskı ve şiddet daha da artmıştır. Bütün bu baskı ve sindirme politikalarının Irak’ta bulunan Türk varlığını yok edemediği 1937 Sadâbâd Paktı’yla ortaya çıkmıştır. 27 Haziran 1937’de imzalanan Sadâbâd Paktı için bölgedeki Türkler büyük bir sevinç yaşasalar da pakttan sonra polis tarafından yapılan işkence ve zulme maruz kalmışlardır. II. Dünya Savaşı’nın sıkıntıları sebebiyle savaşı sakin geçiren Türkler savaştan sonra yeni bir katliamla karşılaştılar. 1946 yılında Gavurbağı’nda Kerküklü işçiler polis kuvvetleri tarafından yaylım ateşine tutulmuşlardır. Yine Bağdat Paktı’nın imzalanacağını duyan Türkler, bölgelerinde büyük bir sevinç yaşamışlardır. Fakat yine paktın imzalanmasından sonra Türklere yapılan baskılar artmıştır. Irak’ta 14 Temmuz 1959 Cumhuriyet’in birinci yılı kutlamalarında sokağa dökülen Kerkük Türkleri komünistler tarafından katliama uğramışlardır. 3 gün süren bu katliamda soydaşlarımız inanılmaz derecede zulüm ve işkenceye maruz kalmışlardır. Yaklaşık 1500 yıl kadar bu topraklarda varlığını gösteren Türkler I. Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra batılı devletlerin bölgedeki çıkarlarından dolayı sistematik olarak çeşitli haksızlık, baskı ve katliama uğramışlardır. Emperyalist güçlerin özellikle yer altı bakımından zengin olan kuzey Irak’taki emellerinden dolayı bölgede yaşayan Türkler birçok zorlukla karşılaştıysa da bunlar karşısında Türk hükümeti ise maalesef hiç bir etkinlik göstermemiştir.

During the onslaught of the Islamic caliphate on Kobanî, Syria, media outlets across the globe broadcast pictures of brave and often unveiled Kurdish women fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), a quintessentially male force of destruction. The images of women fighting Islamist male aggressors aroused outrage, admiration, and pity among observers. But had all Kurdish fighters been male or had women fought for ISIS, viewers might have reacted differently. To examine some of the most widely disseminated gendered pictures and videos of the Syrian uprising in the media, this article draws on Mohja Kahf’s three categories, which typify how Muslim women, Arab women, or both are perceived by the Anglophone reading and viewing public: the first is victims; the second, escapees; and the third, pawns of patriarchy and male power. While this typology helps in examining gendered images of the Syrian uprising, it also obscures the socioeconomic realities on the ground.

Iraq's databases make profiling and tracking of individuals a simple matter.

If you are named, or blacklisted, in any one of Iraq’s parallel sets of databases you are likely to be seized at this point or some time later depending on orders for continued surveillance. You are also likely to be known in Iran.

In Kurdistan, such ‘blacklists’ have been in operation since the 1991 uprising and have been greatly expanded upon since regime change in 2003. The region has also been extensively co-operating with Iran since the Iran-Iraq war, including against Iranian Kurdish political parties and activists and the Turkey-founded PKK. The elite families ruling the Kurdistan Regional Government pursue lucrative private businesses with both Turkey and Iran: Nationalist sentiments and aspirations do not get in the way…
The Iran Cables files – serious Iranian intelligence leaks – were translated and made public by the Intercept in 2019. The files detail Iranian infiltration in Iraq all the way to the Prime Minister’s office but also in terms of surveillance, also recording those coming through Baghdad airport: “…Iraqi officials, if necessary, are offered bribes. The archive even contains expense reports from intelligence ministry officers in Iraq, including one totaling 87.5 euros spent on gifts for a Kurdish commander.” It is made up of hundreds of reports and cables written mainly in 2014 and 2015 by officers of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or M.O.I.S., who were serving in the field in Iraq…”
The job of the MOIS agents was facilitated by their alliances with the pro-Iran Shi’a Iraqi leaders that had spent their years of exile in Iran when plotting to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The documents expose which of “Iraq’s foremost political, military, and security officials have had secret relationships with Tehran.”2

The leaked documents are also useful when it comes to assessing what information may be held by Iran on Iraqis viewed as opponents to Tehran and/or overtly pro-Western. In compiling blacklists of Iran’s enemies in Iraq and maintaining databases such influences are still very much at work. Indeed, Iran’s influence in the run-up to the May 2018 elections and composition of the new government ever since has been extensive. It has also made itself felt in a wholly detrimental manner in the deaths of the protestors since last October, many thousands killed in live fire by security forces that have included Iranian armed snipers.

With the deadly ISIS advance, the sudden rousing of Shia militias and the threat of Kurdish secession, Iraq faces a host of deep-seated and intractable problems. Together, these events raise a number of serious questions, not just for Iraq and its future but also for the broader
Middle East, the United States and its Coalition partners and the international community. While these challenges and questions will drive much academic debate, political analysis and media discussion in the months and years ahead, they are not the central purpose of this chapter. While there is always a risk in commenting on unfolding events, including the potential to overstate their significance and likely long-term impact, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the deadly ISIS advance and all that has happened since. This chapter argues that key to understanding these events is coming to terms with the three varied and complex legacies of the 2003 Iraq War. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led Coalition before, during and immediately after the 2003 intervention. The second legacy addressed here is the fact that the 2003 war shattered – perhaps irreversibly - Iraqis fragile cultural mosaic and its rich and complex history of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies and narratives. The third and final legacy of the 2003 Iraq War detailed in this chapter is its significant regional and global consequences – from spiralling sectarianism across the Middle East to a profound challenge to America’s status as the last remaining superpower and its use of military power for ‘humanitarian’ ends. The argument here is that these three important legacies set in train a sequence of events that have served as the collective catalyst for the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ from mid-2014.

Since the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in 2003, the Iraqi people have not only suffered a devastating death toll and witnessed the erosion of every aspect of their civil infrastructure, they have also endured an extraordinary period of cultural and historical destruction. This began during the battle phase of the war, which saw untold degrees of “collateral damage” done to sensitive historic and cultural sites across the nation. This was followed, in the very earliest days of the now more than seven year occupation, by a period of looting and arson in which many cultural and historical sites were destroyed. Key institutions such as the Iraq National Museum (INM) and the Iraq National Library and Archive (INLA) were targeted, as well as other sites like the Bayt Al-Hikma and the Al-Awfaq libraries, Iraq’s Museum of Modern Art, an Abbasid-era palace, an Ottoman-era mosque and the Hashemite Parliament House. In addition, many Iraqi civilians and foreigners have become involved in highly co-ordinated black market operations that systematically loot sensitive archaeological sites across Iraq and smuggle the antiquities out of the country and on to the highly lucrative international black market. The ongoing hostility between varying factions within Iraq has also had ruinous consequences for Iraq’s cultural heritage with artefacts, symbols and monuments so often caught in the crossfire or deliberately targeted by opposing ethno-religious sectarian groups. None of this tragic tale will come as a surprise to members of TAARII and regular readers of this publication, many of whom are involved in documenting and analysing the ongoing cultural and historical destruction of Iraq. By now a whole host of scholarly studies exists on this topic including the work of leading Iraqi and international scholars, archaeologists, historians, cultural and heritage workers, diplomats, government officials and military officers.  What is curiously absent from the existing literature on the cultural and historical destruction of Iraq, however, is the contemporaneous program to symbolically De-Baathify the nation in which key monuments, state buildings, murals and statues have been decimated or destroyed. Indeed, while the consequences of what might be called the “bureaucratic” or “militaristic” dimensions of Iraq’s De-Baathification have been discussed in much of the literature, the symbolic dimension of De-Baathification and its consequences for national identity and social cohesion has remained an under studied and underappreciated factor.

From the early 1970s until 2011, the Syrian shrine town of Sayyida Zaynab flourished as a minor centre of Shiʿi learning. It predominantly served Iraqi Shiʿi refugees, but also temporary visitors from Iran and the Gulf countries. The seminaries viewed it as their responsibility to draw in transient Shiʿa and turn them into students and loyal followers of important marājiʿ al-taqlīd or Shiʿi legal scholars who mainly reside in major centres of Shiʿi learning, such as Najaf, Karbala and Qom. While the seminaries in Sayyida Zaynab aimed at strengthening institutional affiliation among lay Shiʿa, they concurrently aided the questioning of authoritative religious edicts and opinions emanating from Iranian and Iraqi centres of learning and produced local religious authorities. This article examines two spheres in which central authority was challenged in the shrine town of Sayyida Zaynab. First, it was contested in seminaries where students and teachers debated legal rulings, and second, in contested public Muharram practices such as self-flagellation processions and the showing and selling of recorded laṭmiyyāt, which are chants performed during ritual mourning gatherings.

By 2011, the White House, the Maliki government, and the revanchist opponents of the Shia regime had all effectively accepted the failure of multiple national reconciliation and reconstruction programs in order to move forward with their respective plans to withdraw foreign troops and crackdown on dissent. The failure of the U.S. and its Iraqi collaborators to develop a secure environment for reconstruction and political participation in the face of massive opposition by former national elites goes back to the weak institutional legacies and intergroup conflicts that characterized the modern Iraqi state under Saddam Hussein and his predecessors.

This chapter offers a bold critique of the notion that Baathist rule in Iraq was a product of a culture of authoritarianism in Iraq. It is important to acknowledge from the start that while this chapter does offer a more nuanced view of the Post-Colonial period, it is no way a defence of the tyranny of the Baath and the brutal megalomania of Saddam. Specifically, the first section examines the quashing of Iraq’s civil society and the tight restraints exerted over the nation’s media throughout the period. It also addresses the ways in which various Post-Colonial regimes, but especially the Baath, were adept at manipulating the discourses of democracy in order to mask their tyranny and coerce people into patriotism. Moving beyond this, however, the second section documents the various clandestine opposition groups that began to emerge across Iraq’s divergent ethno-religious and political divides who resisted Baathist oppression and agitated for democratic change. They produced their own media outlets which proved effective in voicing the various frustrations and grievances of Iraqis of all backgrounds and shades of opinion, giving way to a renewed public sphere. The Post-Colonial era, therefore, alternative history of Iraq from the mid-twentieth through to the early twenty-first century in which one finds a sophisticated political culture deeply concerned with the issue of democratic governance.

PREVIEW ONLY - READ THE FULL ARTICLE HERE:
https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2020.vol2.no2.06
This article re-examines the dominant scholarly perception that Christian support for Arab Nationalist regimes is primarily a product of fear of Islamism. After a brief examination of the Christian origins of Ba’athism—a form of Arab Nationalism—the author argues that a more granular understanding of the current Christian politics of Syria and Iraq reveals that while some Christians have supported regimes out of fear, there is also significant strain of active, positive support, though to what extent this is a product of Christian identification with Arab identity requires further research. The study employs an examination of posts from pro-Assad Syrian Christian Facebook pages.

Scholarly literature highlights the systematic actions taken in the modern Middle East to destroy the Kurdish language. With a primary focus on Turkey, scholars have described this process as a policy of linguicide, or language genocide, which is “the extermination of languages, an analogous concept to (physical) genocide.”2 In contrast, similar processes at work in southern Kurdistan (Kurdistan of northern Iraq) have often been described as “linguistic suppression.”3 This paper argues that linguistic suppression does not adequately describe the Iraqi Kurds’ experiences. Rather, linguicide better captures the practices of cultural genocide that have targeted this group. This paper focuses on how the Kurds in modern-day Iraq were subjected to linguicide under the Language Education Policy (LEP) from 1932 to 1991. This policy was established during the monarchy (1921–1958), and advanced through the time of Saddam Hussein’s regime (1979–1991).4 While much scholarly work has associated the process of linguicide with the birth of a nation-state,5 this article further argues that linguicide in the Iraqi Kurdish case predates the formation of the Iraqi nation-state.

Black-clad fighters, suffering refugees and Western warplanes overhead – these are the mainstays of Iraq and Syria coverage as the Islamic State (IS) continues its campaign. Notably absent from debates is how today’s Iraq and Syria emerged from their own national histories, and not just out of foreign meddling – from Sykes-Picot to Bush and Blair.