Catharine Cockburn

Ruth Boeker offers a new perspective on Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Her interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. By taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity, Boeker shows that we should consider his account of personhood separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, she argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. In contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, Boeker argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume.

This course considers the historical period of European philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This period constitutes a break with ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophies and inaugurates a new philosophical approach that emphasizes foundations of knowledge and method. The two primary traditions of modern philosophy, rationalism and empiricism, will be studied in detail in this historical survey course. We will primarily consider issues of epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and metaphysics (the nature of reality and first principles) that arise in the modern period alongside advances in science and technology. Questions considered will include: Can I know anything for certain? How do I receive knowledge? How does change occur? What is the nature of personal identity? Is there a split between mind and matter? The course will be focused around three units: 1. Rationalism: in this unit, we will study themes of certainty, reason, imagination, substance, and God in René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Anne Conway. We'll also draw on critiques by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and Margaret Cavendish, questioning the place of rationalist method in the history of philosophy. 2. Empiricism: this unit will situate empiricism as a response to rationalism and delve into themes of sense-perception, personal identity, knowledge, and causation in the works of Locke, Hume, and Cockburn. 3. Kant and Rousseau: the final section of the course will address responses to empiricism and rationalism offered by Kant and Rousseau. The unit will go out of chronological order, first taking up Kant's accounts of knowledge, space and time, and freedom. We will then finish with Rousseau's Reveries, a lyrical summary of issues considered throughout the course, particularly those of personal identity, freedom, and reason. Course Objectives: By the end of the course, students will be able to identify and distinguish the theories of the thinkers studied in the course. In particular, they will be able to remark on various modern theories of knowledge, causation, substance, personal identity, perception, and imagination. Students will be able to situate these concerns in their historical context.

John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what ‘I’ refers to. While we often do not distinguish the concept of a person from that of a human being in ordinary language, Locke emphasizes that this distinction is important if we want to engage with questions of identity over time. According to Locke, persons are thinking intelligent beings who can consider themselves as extended into the past and future and who are concerned for their happiness and accountable for their actions. Moreover, for Locke a self is a person, considered from a first-personal point of view. I show that the concept of self that he develops in the context of his discussion of persons and personal identity is richer and more complex than the I-concept that he invokes in his version of the cogito. I further argue that Locke’s moral and religious views explain why he emphasizes the need for a conceptual distinction between persons and human beings. In the final section I turn to the reception of Locke’s view by some of his early critics and defenders, including Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, an anonymous author, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn.

This paper examines Catharine Trotter Cockburn's moral philosophy, focusing on her accounts of virtuous conduct, conscience, obligation, and moral character. I argue that Cockburn's account of virtue has two interlocking parts: a view of what virtue requires of us, and a view of how we come to see this requirement as authoritative. I then argue that while the two parts are ultimately in tension with one another, the tension is instructive. I use Cockburn's encounter with Shaftesbury's writings to help bring out this tension in her thought. I conclude that Cockburn's work marks a bridge in modern moral philosophy from 17th century natural law theory to the naturalism of the 18th century - that of Gay, Hume, and Bentham.

Although excluded from the standard account of the history of philosophy, Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679-1749)
avoided the 17th-century bias against female intellectual skills and was an active contributor to the early modern
philosophical discourse. In her Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay (1702), she defended Locke from several criticisms by
Thomas Burnet (1635-1715). By analysing three of Burnet’s main arguments, such as the theory of natural
conscience, his anti-voluntarism, and his belief in the immateriality of the soul, Trotter showed that he often
misinterpreted John Locke’s principles, especially those concerning his moral epistemology. Moreover, beyond her
apologetic aim, she also presented her own moral philosophy, arguing that the true ground of morality is the rational
and social nature of human beings. Although Trotter was clearly inspired by John Locke, her Defence was not
simply a vindication, and she was not his mere handmaiden, for her thought was original and independent in many
respects.

The study of John Locke’s theological thought has yet to be combined with emerging historical research, pioneered by Jean-Louis Quantin, into the apologetic uses of Christian antiquity in the Restoration Church of England. This article will address this historiographical lacuna by making two related arguments. First, I will contend that Locke’s Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul (1705–1707) marked a definitive shift in his critique of the appeal to Christian antiquity. Prior to 1700, Locke had largely contested these references to the precedent of the early Christian Church by making a narrowly philosophical case against arguments from authority in general. However, the controversial reception of Locke’s theological writings in the 1690s, compelled him to develop historical and methodological arguments in the Paraphrase against the witness of Christian antiquity. Secondly, I will argue that Locke’s repudiation of the witness of Christian antiquity was the primary motivation for the diverse responses to the Paraphrase by early eighteenth-century Anglican writers, such as Robert Jenkin, Daniel Whitby, William Whiston, Winch Holdsworth and Catharine Cockburn.

This volume is an edited collection of the philosophical correspondences of three English women of the eighteenth century: Mary Astell, Elizabeth Thomas, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn. The selected correspondences include letters to and/or from John Norris, George Hickes, Mary Chudleigh, Richard Hemington, John Locke, Ann Hepburn Arbuthnot, and Edmund Law. Their epistolary exchanges range over a wide variety of philosophical subjects, from questions about the love of God and other people, to the causes of sensation in the mind, the metaphysical foundations of moral obligation, and the importance of independence of judgement in one’s moral choices and actions. The volume includes a main introduction by the editor, which explains some of the key themes and developments in the eighteenth-century letters, including an increased awareness of other women’s writings and of the concerns of women as a socio-political group. It is argued that if we look beyond printed treatises alone, to the content of these letters, it is possible to gain a fuller appreciation of women’s involvement in philosophical debates of the 1690s and early 1700s. To situate each woman’s thought in its historical-intellectual context, the volume includes original introductory essays for each principal figure, showing how her correspondences relate either to her contemporaries’ ideas or to her own published views. The text also provides detailed scholarly annotations, explaining obscure philosophical ideas and archaic words and phrases in the letters. Among its critical apparatus, the volume also includes a note on the texts, a bibliography, and an index.

In early modern England, anonymous voices joined the philosophical debate, proposing new interesting ideas of political authority, moral responsibility, and individual autonomy. Particularly, two women philosophers, i.e., Damaris Cudworth Masham (1659-1708), and Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679-1749), outlined a very interesting moral epistemology. Although their thoughts were independently developed, they shared the common idea that all human beings are naturally rational and social beings. By following the trajectory of this hypothesis, this paper aims to sketch both Lady Masham’s educational proposal and Trotter’s moral rationalism. According to the former, mothers, being the early educators of men, play a central role in human society, and consequently, far from being excluded from formal education, they should be educated for the sake of order in society. The latter, by challenging ancient authority and religious dogmatism, claims that a rational being should naturally act suitably to reason, and promote the good of others. Both Masham and Trotter were clearly inspired by John Locke; nevertheless, they presented original contributions, especially as regards the natural equality between woman and man. As a matter of fact, they argued that reason and sociality are natural characteristics common to all Mankind, and, accordingly, the disproportion between the social role of men and women has no natural and moral justification, and that women inferiority is morally impermissible. In this regard, these women philosophers were not merely handmaiden of their more famous correspondents, but were active contributors to the early modern philosophical discourse.

Although excluded from the standard account of the history of philosophy, Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679-1749) avoided the 17th-century bias against female intellectual skills and was an active contributor to the early modern philosophical discourse. In her Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay (1702), she defended Locke from several criticisms by Thomas Burnet (1635-1715). By analysing three of Burnet’s main arguments, such as the theory of natural conscience, his anti-voluntarism, and his belief in the immateriality of the soul, Trotter showed that he often misinterpreted John Locke’s principles, especially those concerning his moral epistemology. Moreover, beyond her apologetic aim, she also presented her own moral philosophy, arguing that the true ground of morality is the rational and social nature of human beings. Although Trotter was clearly inspired by John Locke, her Defence was not simply a vindication, and she was not his mere handmaiden, for her thought was original and indepen...

In her Remarks Upon Some Writers (1743), Catharine Trotter Cockburn takes a seemingly radical stance by asserting that it is possible for atheists to be virtuous. In this paper, I examine whether or not Cockburn's views concerning atheism commit her to a naturalistic ethics and a so-called radical enlightenment position on the independence of morality and religion. First, I examine her response to William Warburton's critique of Pierre Bayle's arguments concerning the possibility of a society of virtuous atheists. I argue that this response shows Cockburn vacillating between a moral naturalism, on the one hand, and a theistic morality, on the other. Second, I draw on Cockburn's letters to her niece Ann Arbuthnot, and her opinions concerning mystical ideas about "the will of God" in northeast Scotland in the mid-eighteenth century. I maintain that these letters give us a fuller appreciation of Cockburn's naturalistic position. My conclusion is that Cockburn's ideas concerning atheism prompt us to consider the close interplay between secular and religious principles in so-called radical ideas of the period.

Although excluded from the standard account of the history of philosophy,
Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679-1749) avoided the seventeenth-century bias
against female intellectual skills, and was an active contributor to the early modern
philosophical discourse. Extraordinarily, she learned Latin and French as a selftaught
and became a famous playwright soon in her life. In this paper, the author
focuses on Trotter’s moral philosophy, arguing that, since this was grounded on the
view that all human beings are naturally provided with reason and inclined towards
sociality, it can be regarded as an ethical rationalism. Furthermore, although Trotter
was clearly inspired both by John Locke and by Samuel Clarke, she was not a mere
handmaiden of these well-known philosophers, but her thought was original and
independent in many respects.