Conventional Arms Transfers

O  presente  artigo  analisa  os impactos  das  relacoes  Brasil-Israel  no processo de aquisicao de capacidades  para a  producao  nacional  de  Aeronaves Remotamente Tripuladas (ARPs)  no contexto da Base Industrial de Defesa (BID) brasileira. Desde o lancamento da Estrategia Nacional de Defesa em 2008 a BID se encontra em um processo de  revitalizacao  orientado para o acesso e  desenvolvimento  de  tecnologias  de  ponta.  A cooperacao internacional se torna um instrumento necessario para o conhecimento e compreensao  da  tecnologia  (know why)  e  de  como  desenvolve-la  e  adapta-la  para  suas  especificidades  e necessidades  locais  (know-how) das  Forcas Armadas  brasileiras. Neste sentido, o artigo indaga como a cooperacao Brasil-Israel no setor de ARPs insere a BID noutro patamar da escala de producao militar.  A estrategia de investigacao adotada no artigo foca nas relacoes no  âmbito  de  cooperacao  interempresarial, como a criacao de joint-ventures e o seus spillove...

UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal. This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counter-terrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a ‘bottom-up’ and evidence-based approach. This series of WAM Country Insights will help promote knowledge, and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in the African States that have conducted WAM baseline assessments with support from UNIDIR. It aims to serve as a reference for donors and international partners providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country.

Outreach constitutes the normative dimension of efforts to enhance export control policies in third countries, while assistance is the practical dimension of such engagements. European Union (EU) Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP and Council Decision 2009/1012/CFSP provided funding for the Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) outreach and assistance activities to promote alignment with EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and to strengthen export controls in Eastern and South Eastern Europe during 2008–11. This paper considers the evolution of EU efforts to promote alignment with the EU Code and the EU Common Position and the assistance rendered to strengthen export controls in third countries. It assesses progress towards the stated objectives for COARM outreach and assistance and concludes with some thoughts for the next round of outreach and assistance activities in Eastern and South Eastern Europe and recommendations for improving the prospects for alignment. ABOUT TH...

Questo elaborato propone uno studio relativo al commercio internazionale di armi, al fine di coglierne le peculiarità che hanno preceduto e seguito l'adozione del primo Trattatato internazionale sul commecio delle armi (Arms Trade Treaty, ATT). Il volume del commercio di "armi convenzionali" continua a crescere rapidamente su scala nazionale e mondiale, rendendo così essenziale la costruzione di un quadro normativo anche a livello internazionale, che ne regolamenti le attività ad esso collegate.
Al fine di condurre un'attenta analisi sul commercio legato a queste armi, il primo capitolo illustrerà il volume dei trasferimenti delle armi convenzionali tra Stati a livello mondiale, focalizzando l'attenzione sulle leggi e controlli presenti in Italia in materia di "armi leggere e di piccolo calibro", e sull'effettiva mancanza, precedente all'adozione dell'ATT, di standard ed obblighi comuni a livello mondiale. Nel secondo capitolo, si cercherà di comprendere la volontà e la necessità da parte della comunità internazionale di regolamentare in modo esaustivo ed efficace questo commercio, con lpbiettivo di impedire, o quantomeno di attenuare il rischio che i trasferimenti delle armi convenzionali possano contribuire a commettere gravi abusi dei diritti umani e ad alimentare conflitti armati e violazioni gravi del diritto internazionale umanitario. A seguito di un attento esame delle disposizioni contenute nel testo dell’ATT, il secondo capitolo affronterà in particolare quelle relative agli obblighi, ai divieti, alle responsabilità ed alle misure di “trasparenza” contenute nel testo dell’ATT nei confronti degli Stati parti del Trattato.
Infine, nel terzo capitolo i lavori e le riflessioni che anticipano la Conferenza degli Stati parti del Trattato che si terrà nell’agosto 2015 a Città del Messico aiutano a cogliere le luci e le ombre del presente Trattato. Da un lato le innovazioni e le potenzialità che hanno permesso la sua entrata in vigore, il 24 dicembre 2014, in meno di due anni dall’apertura alla firma degli Stati. Dall’altro lato i limiti e le lacune che hanno accompagnato i lunghi compromessi alla sua redazione, tutt’ora presenti e che saranno affrontati nell’imminente Conferenza degli Stati parti dell’ATT.

How do states decide where to source arms? Drawing on theories of international relations, we consider the recent fighter aircraft competitions in Brazil and India, and analyze why the U.S.-made aircraft lost to their European rivals. Official statements offered by the Brazilian and Indian governments have cited inferior aircraft performance, technology-sharing issues, and prices. These explanations may be valid, but their main purpose is to direct attention away from the fact that military procurement is, above all, a matter of international politics and policy. Using analytical eclecticism as our guide, we selectively combine constructivist, liberal, and realist theoretical elements to provide a more comprehensive explanation of why Lockheed Martin and Boeing failed to sell fighters to Brazil and India. Related Articles Catalinac, Amy L. 2007. “Theory and Foreign Policy: Explaining Japan's Responses to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 U.S. War in Iraq.” Politics & Policy 35 (1): 58–100. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00049.x/abstract Quinn, Adam. 2007. “The Great Illusion: Chimeras of Isolationism and Realism in Post-Iraq U.S. Foreign Policy.” Politics & Policy 35 (3): 522–547. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00071.x/abstract Rosen, Amanda M. 2015. “The Wrong Solution at the Right Time: The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.” Politics & Policy 43 (1): 30–58. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12105/abstract Related Media So, Vishnu. 2012. “The Story of the Rafale.” NDTV. December 8. Duration: 16 min, 42 sec. http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/bigger-higher-faster/the-story-of-the-rafale/257581 Brazil. 2015. “F-X2 e Gripen NG (Tudo Sobre pt. 1).” Noticias Militares. January 10. Duration: 3 min, 38 sec (in Brazilian Portuguese). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8P12stwG1jA Como es que los estados deciden donde proveer armas? Teniendo en vista las teorias de relaciones internacionales, consideramos que los concursos recientes de aviones de guerra en Brasil y la India y analizamos por que los aviones hechos en los EEUU perdieron ante sus rivales europeos. Las posiciones oficiales ofrecidas por los gobiernos brazileno e indio han citado desempeno inferior de las aeronaves y asuntos de compartimiento de tecnologia asi como precios. Estas explicaciones pueden ser validas, pero su principal proposito es desviar la atencion del hecho que la procuracion militar es, sobre todo, un asunto de politica y politicas internacionales. Utilizando como guia al eclecticismo analitico, combinamos de manera selectiva elementos teoricos constructivistas liberales y realistas para proveer una explicacion mas comprensiva de por que Lockheed Martin y Boeing fracasaron en su intento de vender aeronaves de guerra a Brasil e India.

Trade in 'strategic goods' is subject to controls in order to combat illegal trade and to avoid undesirable use . Historically, national control regimes focused on controlling exports by their
own arms producers, so as to prevent the goods from being delivered to (from a national security perspective) undesirable destinations. Because national control regimes by definition
are jurisdictionally limited to their own territory, initiatives have also been taken at international level. These international control regimes mainly focus on the need for export controls, while more attention has been paid lately to brokering. Much less has been done in the field of transit and import controls. The importance of a good transit control regime became clear quite recently, in early 2012, when - despite the EU arms embargo on Syria - a Russian ship loaded with military equipment sailed to Syria through the national waters of various European countries to deliver this equipment to the regime.

The limited attention devoted to transit is striking, given that national control regimes exclusively regulating exports can only be effective if all countries worldwide would impose, apply and enforce uniform export conditions. Uniformity is of prime importance since any variation in terms of the personal and material scope of control, or in the conditions for permitting trade in arms and their interpretation and application, or in the capability of prosecution and imposition of penalties, creates lacunae that dishonest dealers can exploit.

Since control measures are not only aimed at private actors, but certain regimes are also among the forbidden destinations, any such complete and effective global network of national control regimes is utopic. This makes it important to look at the whole cycle of arms trade activities and consider what combination of control measures, for each of the separate activities, will enable the best possible control. Every chain is as strong as its weakest link, and the fact that the chain for foreign arms trade runs across different jurisdictions creates specific risks. In effect, national authorities lose their control over goods once these leave their own territory, they thus rely on information from elsewhere to check whether the requirements they have imposed are respected also after export. In these conditions, it is clear that control of transit is a vital link in achieving a sound and effective export control regime for strategic goods.

As transit is by definition a cross-border issue, it is worthwhile comparing the transit control regimes in different EU Member States. Despite progressive harmonization of EU Member States’ export control policy, policy on transit - mainly for military equipment - is still far from being harmonized. In this report we analyse transit policies in Europe concerning strategic goods. The report focuses on the transit of strategic goods and is thus not limited to transit regulations and policy practice on conventional military goods (such as combat vehicles, military vessels or firearms) and their components. Alongside conventional arms and weapons systems, we also analyse regulatory and policy practice on the transit of a wide range of dual use items. These are civil items that are not specifically designed, intended or as such suitable for military use, but which still have strategic importance due to their potential military
applicationi. The decision to explicitly address the control regimes for both categories of strategic goods in this report is in line with the current international, regional and national
control regimes which, generally speaking, cover approximately the same categories of strategic goods.

This publication contains a detailed description of regulations and administrative practices for controlling the transit of strategic goods in the Flemish Region of Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.ii For the five national regimes investigated, the description of the legal framework at national level is supplemented in each case with relevant aspects of administrative practice. Not all countries, in fact, take an equally formal legal approach. As will be shown in this report, the transit of strategic goods is a complex matter.
Some countries have completely separate systems with distinct competent authorities depending on whether military equipment or dual-use items are involved; in other countries there is a single legal framework and a single competent body.

The objective of this study is to compare these five transit control regimes at national level with a view to drawing lessons about their effectiveness . Only the general control regime for
transit of strategic goods falls within the scope of this investigation. Specific rules of control that apply beyond the general framework are not addressed, such as arms embargoes and other sanctions (for instance, directed against Iran), exceptional measures for transit of NATO forces’ military equipment, or weapons held by armed forces.

This study is based on information obtained on the basis of a literature review, legislation and administrative documents, and of a survey carried out among officials responsible for export control and customs employees. For the survey of competent authorities we worked in three phases corresponding to the Delphi method: an initial survey by telephone or in writing; a
second set of questions during an interview; and feedback to all respondents about the most important findings of the analysis

In the early 1980s, when Amnesty International began addressing new human rights violations in El Salvador, the organization naturally turned to the issue of US arms to the Salvadoran junta. Like other human rights NGOs, AI maintained that the Salvadoran junta and military were responsible for the lion’s share of human rights violations in the country, and that the United States should therefore withhold arms shipments to El Salvador until the government improved its human rights reputation. However, activists in Amnesty International USA (AIUSA) would find themselves in conflict not just with the Reagan administration, but also with their own organization, over the issue. This article examines the conflict within Amnesty International over the issue of US arms to the Salvadoran junta in the 1980s due to the NGO’s nonpartisan mandate.

"The present article pertains to the infamous Affair "Iran/Contra" (a.k.a Iranogate). Via the conclusion extracted from thorough investigation of the documents in dispose a mere thin line of facts and findings is to be seen rising though the mist of this political scandal. The following topics are to be reviewed into the paper in hand:
The U.S. involvement in Nicaragua, the supportance and assistance for Nicaraguan rebels, the supply of lethal assistance in total breach of the Boland Amendments, North's/Secord's/Hakim's "Enterpise", NEPL's/IBC's/IC's Private Fundraising Nexus, Arms Transaction between USA and Iran via Israel, The Lisboan Airport Crisis, The Direct Arms Sales between CIA and the iranian authorities, The Reagan's part of the story, E. Meese's Investigation, Walsh Independent Council, Congress Select Committees and the Judiciary Review of the Affair.  "

A relação entre Brasil e Argentina foi historicamente marcada por sua rivalidade, que ocasionalmente se manifestava em crises diplomático-militares. Uma destas ocorreu em agosto de 1937, quando o Brasil e os Estados Unidos negociaram a cessão de contratorpedeiros para a Marinha Brasileira. Desde meados da década, o governo Vargas se esforçava para cumprir um programa de renovação naval, com objetivo de reestruturar a obsoleta esquadra nacional. O cenário internacional oferecia grandes oportunidades para os brasileiros, pois a polarização acirrava a disputa pelo fornecimento de armamentos e pelo posicionamento do Brasil no quadro de alianças. Washington, sob orientação da política da boa vizinhança e alarmados com a influência do Eixo na América Latina, decidiram negociar com os brasileiros a despeito da resistência isolacionista em seu Congresso, oferecendo a cessão de seis contratorpedeiros para o Brasil. Entretanto, surgiram fortes críticas ao acordo tanto na opinião pública norte-americana como na comunidade internacional, especialmente na Argentina. Assustados com as reações contrárias internas e externas, Washington recuou, para desapontamento dos brasileiros. Partindo das noções clássicas de diplomacia naval e da teoria do equilíbrio de poder, nosso objetivo é entender as razões e motivações, sob perspectiva de política interna e externa, dos principais países envolvidos, bem como a repercussão internacional do acordo.


The relationship between Brazil and Argentina was historically known for its rivalry, which occasionally manifested in diplomat-military crisis. One crisis occurred in August 1937, when Brazil and United States negotiated the cession of destroyers to the Brazilian Navy. Since mid-1930s, Vargas government struggled to accomplish a naval renovation plan, to restructure the obsolete Brazilian fleet. The international scenario offered great opportunities to the Brazilian, as the polarization intensified the dispute to supply armaments and for the position of Brazil on the system of alliances. Washington, under the Good Neighbor Policy and alarmed with the growing Axis presence in Latin America, decided to negotiate with the Brazilians despite the isolationist Congress resistance, offering six destroyers to Brazil. However, a strong criticism arouse against the agreement both in the American public opinion as well in the international community, especially from Argentina. Alarmed by the negative internal and external reactions, Washington gave up, for Brazilian dismay. Proceeding from the classical notions of naval diplomacy, our goal is to understand the reasons and motivations, in view of domestic and foreign policy, of the main countries involved as well the international effects of the agreement.

This article offers a novel understanding and theorization of humanitarian disarmament regimes and their related prohibition politics. In doing so, it utilizes a power-analytical framework and puts in use four conceptions of power: productive, structural, institutional, and compulsory. Empirically, two potent humanitarian prohibition regimes that have been formed during the last two decades are examined. The ban of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) in 1997 marked a significant shift in humanitarian disarmament. Consequently, a humanitarian disarmament model emerged, consisting in bypassing permanent arms-control fora (''The Ottawa Pro-cess''). The ascent of the model to the arena traditionally dominated by power interests of major powers and ossified lowest-common denominator consensus was confirmed in 2008 when cluster munitions (CMs) were prohibited in a very similar fashion (''The Oslo Process''). The main contribution to the topic is the application of the power-analytical framework specifically developed to suit an analysis of formation and workings of global prohibition regimes, including heterarchy-of-power discussion of the relationship between states and non-state actors. Then, instead of the usual—and flawed at best—heroic discussions of victories of global civil society in relation to the establishment of regimes, rise of moral International Relations, and supposed progressivist teleology, a more complex picture with many contradictions, artefacts, and their layering inside and about those regimes looms large.

O  presente  artigo  analisa  os impactos  das  relações  Brasil-Israel  no processo de aquisição de capacidades  para a  produção  nacional  de  Aeronaves Remotamente Tripuladas (ARPs)  no contexto da Base Industrial de Defesa (BID) brasileira. Desde o lançamento da Estratégia Nacional de Defesa em 2008 a BID se encontra em um processo de  revitalização  orientado para o acesso e  desenvolvimento  de  tecnologias  de  ponta.  A cooperação internacional se torna um instrumento necessário para o conhecimento e compreensão  da  tecnologia  (know why)  e  de  como  desenvolvê-la  e  adaptá-la  para  suas  especificidades  e necessidades  locais  (know-how) das  Forças Armadas  brasileiras. Neste sentido, o artigo indaga como a cooperação Brasil-Israel no setor de ARPs insere a BID noutro patamar da escala de produção militar.  A estratégia de investigação adotada no artigo foca nas relações no  âmbito  de  cooperação  interempresarial, como a criação de joint-ventures e o seus spillovers na dotação de capacidades nacionais em matéria de Defesa nos últimos anos.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) includes provisions for ‘legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity-building, and technical, material or financial assistance’ to help states fulfil treaty commitments after entry into force. However, many states will also need assistance before ratifying the ATT. The European Union (EU) funds separate assistance projects to tackle trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and to develop and implement controls on transfers of dual-use items and conventional arms. The EU is therefore uniquely placed to share lessons learned from these projects. The EU is willing to provide assistance to states that want to sign and ratify the ATT, and has established a dedicated ATT implementation support programme (Council Decision 2013/768/CFSP). If the EU’s existing transfer control assistance models are to form the basis for ATT assistance, partner states are expected to have some key elements of a transfer control system  already in place. Based on needs and expertise, the EU ATT assistance programme could address: (a) outreach to support parliamentary processes; (b) assessments of national legislation; (c) drafting national legislation; (e) training licensing officers, customs and border officials; (f) record keeping and reporting; (g) developing effective risk assessment mechanisms; (h) developing import, transit,trans-shipment and brokering controls; and (i) ) facilitating South–South cooperation and assistance.

Lors de la dernière décennie (2003-2012), les transferts d'armes vers l'Afrique du Nord ont considérablement augmenté. Afin de mieux comprendre cette dynamique, cette Note d'Analyse présente un panorama des transferts d'armes vers cette région – en particulier en provenance des États membres de l'UE – ainsi que le contexte dans lequel ceux-ci ont été menés. Ainsi, au sein des pays d'Afrique du Nord, les enjeux de stabilité interne et régionale, de même que les problématiques liées à la porosité des frontières nationales, ont orienté les décisions de ces pays à acquérir des armements conventionnels. De plus, les intérêts économiques des États européens, leur désir d'influencer les pays du sud de la Méditerranée, ainsi que les impératifs sécuritaires liés à la lutte contre l'islam radical et les trafics illicites des biens et des personnes, jouent manifestement un rôle dans les transferts d'armes vers cette région charnière.

Abstract (English)
In the past decade (2003-2012), arms transfers to North Africa have increased considerably. This Analysis Note aims at a better understanding of these dynamics and therefore presents a panorama of the last decade’s arms transfers towards North Africa – especially from EU Member states – and the context in which they took place. As a matter of fact, within North African countries, internal and regional stability challenges as well as issues related to the porosity of national borders have led those countries to acquire conventional arms. For EU member states, economic interests and the desire to influence North African countries as well as security imperatives related to the struggle against radical Islam, and illicit trafficking of arms and persons are the motives behind arms transfers towards North Africa.