Conventional Arms Control

UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal. This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counter-terrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a ‘bottom-up’ and evidence-based approach. This series of WAM Country Insights will help promote knowledge, and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in the African States that have conducted WAM baseline assessments with support from UNIDIR. It aims to serve as a reference for donors and international partners providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country.

Armament Research Services (ARES) Special Report 4, Munitions Employing Sensor-fuzed Submunitions: Do they Comply with the Convention on Cluster Munitions?, critically evaluates the definition of "cluster munition" established by the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), in order to assess the convention's applicability to cargo munitions carrying sensor-fuzed submunitions. The report explores the operational rationale behind sensor-fuzed submunitions as well as briefly addressing the unexploded ordnance (UXO) hazard posed by such munitions. It then explains the technical characteristics which distinguish sensor-fuzed submunitions from their conventional counterparts.

Drawing on a range of primary sources, confidential interviews with industry and military personnel, secondary literature, and the perspectives of several prominent ordnance experts, Special Report 4 establishes a methodology for assessing weapons which carry sensor-fuzed submunitions. It then applies the nine-step test described in that methodology to five of the most common weapons which employ sensor-fuzed submunitions that remain in inventory or use today. Special Report 4 finds that only two of the five selected munitions are banned under the CCM, and that the factors which determined CCW compliance are not always directly connected to the stated principles of minimising harm to civilians and civilian objects. The report concludes by considering sometimes overlooked hazards of sensor-fuzed submunitions, as well as the potential for unintended consequences which may arise from an outright ban of these weapons.

After all these years, it is frustrating to know that still, there exist no binding international standards to regulate, control and monitor the massive activities that fall within the boundaries of conventional arms transfers. The void left by the non-existence of any international binding standards engenders many consequences. They range from distressing global scenarios such as increasing armed conflicts and casualties, human rights violations to undesired arms transfers e.g., illicit trafficking in arms, arms transfers to conflict regions, to non-state actors as well as arms transfers even to countries undergoing arms embargoes. One of the main objectives of the paper, therefore, is to provide an analysis of the multifaceted need for a legally binding international arms trade treaty (ATT). While providing an overview of the content of the treaty, the paper also discusses the various challenges that the ATT process is experiencing especially due to the international community's unrelenting efforts to incorporate some crucial yet contentious provisions within the treaty framework. The paper also probes into the relevance of the treaty for Bangladesh. It is argued that since small arms proliferation constitutes serious socio-political and security concerns in Bangladesh, an ATT would yield handful benefits for the country. Nevertheless, as revealed in the paper it will also create new hurdles for Bangladesh in terms of fulfilling the treaty commitments.

This research paper illuminates on the numerous impediments in the process of regulating conventional armaments trade. It also addresses the grave ramifications of an unregulated trade in weaponry. Further the paper makes recommendations for more transparency and accountability in the the industry. This recommendations are appreciative of the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for conventional arms trade.

Text of Presentation to Einstein Forum, Berlin, 15 Nov 2005. Changes in the nature of warfare, military technology, and the global strategic environment pose new challenges for arms control. The article critically examines new forms of strategic warfare, cyber-war, so-called “precision” conventional warfare, global conventional strike weapons, and less-lethal weaponry.

The regime for conventional arms control in Europe has been in crisis for several years. A modernization that would adapt conventional arms control to the military realities of the 21st century is planned within the framework of the OSCE. This is also an issue for the Swiss OSCE chairmanship in 2014.

The Conventional Arms Control system in Europe is characterised by three complementary agreements, negotiated, and implemented during the Cold War: The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, the Vienna Document, and the Open Skies Treaty (OST). These three instruments were designed to reduce the risk of war and CFE in 2007 and de facto withdrew in 2015; the CFE adapted version was never ratified by all participating states. The Vienna Document seems no longer adequate to address current security challenges and modernisation attempts have constantly failed. Lastly, the Trump administration formally withdrew from the OST in November 2020 and Russia provide a higher level of predictability and confidence in European security through cooperation and exchange of military information.

Nach acht Jahren George W. Bush war es schlecht bestellt um Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung. Präsident Obama ist es mit einer wesentlich rüstungskontrollfreundlicheren Politik gelungen, das Schiff vor dem Kentern zu bewahren und sogar eine Reihe neuer Akzente zu setzen. Dieser Beitrag beleuchtet den Stand von Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung in den Bereichen Massenvernichtungswaffen, konventionelle Rüstung (KSE, ATT und Streubomben) und thematisiert bislang ungeregelte Felder (Weltraum, Cyber, Drohnen) zu Beginn der zweiten Amtszeit Obamas. Er formuliert den Anspruch an die deutsche Außenpolitik, in allen Bereichen proaktive Positionen einzunehmen, den amerikanischen Präsidenten dort zu unterstützen, wo rüstungskontrollpolitische Ideen konvergieren, und stärkere eigene Akzente zu setzen, wo sich in den vergangenen Jahren zu wenig getan hat.

Drones are becoming more important on the current battlefields, as we saw during the Turkish operation “spring shield” in Syria (Seufert, 2020 Le Monde) and the Chinese development of small swarm drones, which they sold to Saudi Arabia (Tucker, 2019). These drones are all hu-man guided and not autonomous, but the future will see autonomous acting drones in every size and on every battlefield. The OSCE is in the unique position of setting rules before this technol-ogy is fully functional. This paper will examine the danger of AI Warfare and the OSCE´s op-portunities to enclose the AI-Warfare. The author doubts the opportunity of a total restriction of this technology and therefore recommends a “softer” approach in restricting AI-technology us-age in warfare to a point where the process of inventing and using the AI for warfare could be held under or shortly above the danger of human guided warfare.

Executive Summary
1. Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes. These grey areas have resulted in uncertainties about the capabilities and
activities of irregular and stationed forces, produced unchecked risk perceptions and aggravated sub-regional instability and insecurity.
2. At the same time, disputes over the status of de facto regimes and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces in disputed territories have also obstructed the development of all-European arms control mechanisms and produced spillover effects detrimental to security and stability.
3. There is no unified opinion in international law about the position of de facto regimes. In ceasefire agreements and informal talks, de facto regimes are sometimes referred to as “parties to the conflict”, with limited rights and obligations. It is an incontrovertible fact that, in the absence of international recognition, only recognized
central governments are entitled to carry out state functions in international relations
and to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of States Parties to international agreements, such as arms control treaties and CSBMs. However, de facto regimes can
also be included in agreements if there is the political will to do so.
4. De facto regimes categorically reject central governments’ claims to implementing these rights in territories under their actual control, such as acting as the host state for observations of or collecting and distributing data on armaments, which are subject to international information exchanges or limitations and are held by
irregular forces. De facto regimes either want to exercise such rights themselves or deny that the disputed territories belong to the area of application of arms control and CSBM agreements.
5. Third states that have not recognized de facto regimes are not permitted by international law to neglect the positions of central governments seeking to implement such agreements in disputed territories, even if de facto regimes do not object to inspections on the spot. Thus, third states are not allowed to elevate their status by agreeing to procedures that would cede to their representatives' state functions, such as the rights of a “host state” (e.g. determining the points of
entry/exit, providing escort teams, signing inspection reports etc.).
6. Consequently, state-centric CSBMs can be implemented in disputed territories only if all sides involved are prepared to make compromises that value transparency and stability more highly than status-related positions. In practice, almost all attempts to bring about a compromise on mutually acceptable procedures have
failed.
7. The recognition by certain states of the independence of breakaway regions and
their claim that de facto regimes have provided “host nation consent” to the stationing
of forces in such territories have complicated the situation. By contrast, central
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governments of internationally recognized states categorically reject this
interpretation and regard stationing in disputed territories as unlawful occupation in
violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
8. Ceasefire agreements usually have only limited transparency and limitation
provisions, which are mainly confined to small, partially demilitarized, “security
zones” or “restricted weapon zones”. However, wider geographical areas, which are
relevant to transparency and the restraint of military capabilities and activities in the
sub-region, remain unrestricted and inaccessible. In the case of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has access only to areas controlled by
the Georgian government adjoining the two breakaway regions.
9. Against this background, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs aim at enhancing
sub-regional security in and around disputed territories and creating a peaceful and
stable environment for talks without detriment to status-related positions of
principle by parties involved and without pre-empting the outcome of conflict
settlement processes, which will ultimately define the eventual political status of
such territories.
10. To that end, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs avoid any procedures and
terms that could be interpreted as providing political status, such as references to
state functions or rights and obligations reserved for states (“inspecting”/“inspected
state”, “host state”, official titles of persons, “borders” or contested geographical
names of disputed territories, etc.).
11. Consequently, status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should be formulated
beyond the existing framework of state-related international agreements. This
requires facilitation by an impartial third party that is trusted by both sides, such as a
neutral state, an international organization or a private enterprise. In such a
framework, status-bound functions and personnel would be replaced by statusneutral
functions and personnel.
12. Status-neutral arms control and CSBMs should provide for information,
observation and, as far as possible, limitation of certain military capabilities and
activities, particularly in areas close to the Lines of Contact. In such areas, reciprocity
of rights and obligations may be an indispensable condition for an agreement,
provided it can be attained without compromising government positions that reject
equality vis-à-vis breakaway regions. At the same time, both sides may see the value
of increasing trust and stability and, thus, enhancing security in a fragile political
environment without relinquishing status-related positions of principle.
13. To ensure smooth implementation, avoid misunderstandings and prevent
escalation, the establishment of an impartial coordination and conflict resolution
mechanism is advisable. It can be linked to existing informal formats geared to
enhancing the implementation of ceasefire agreements or other relevant mechanisms
to prevent and respond to incidents.
14. This paper discusses the limitations of existing international arms control and
CSBM agreements and outlines, in considerable detail, a status-neutral approach
towards increasing security and stability in and around disputed territories. An
illustrative example of how such an approach could be modelled is given in the
annex.

In 2017, UNIDIR, in partnership with the Stimson Center, undertook a project entitled, “Exploring Synergies in Reporting under Multilateral Conventional Arms Treaties and Instruments”. This project sought to provide practical guidance to States on converging sources of information, methods and approaches that can be used to facilitate reporting under select multilateral conventional treaties and instruments. On 6 December 2017, UNIDIR convened a small, closed-door meeting with representatives of States, custodian organizations and expert NGOs on this issue. This document presents a summary of this meeting’s proceedings and findings.