EU accession of Western Balkans

The September 2021 edition of the IRMO Brief deals with energy security of the Balkans and the upcoming changes in the energy security of the region. Year 2023 could bring a dramatic overhaul on the energy map of the Western Balkans countries, as by then the derogation from EU environmental regulation for a number of thermal power plants expires while reliability of lignite mines and power plants deteriorates. As the region’s energy supply is to a large extent dependent on lignite-fired power plants, the 2023 will be a turning point for the Balkans in terms of energy supply. At the same time, the Western Balkan countries are aware of the importance of the EU Green Agenda and that the replacement of coal by other energy sources, is at the core of EU climate policy. The author also analyses the energy map Europe after the completion of the Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream gas pipeline projects as well as closures of nuclear and coal plants and phase out of Groningen gas field , and positions the role of the Balkans in the overall energy security of Europe. Paper address the risk that developments in Balkans affect credibility of the EU promotion of the rule of law, climate change awareness and human rights.  Findings are confirmed by recent failures in gas and power supply across the region and spike in wholesale prices.

The massive flow of asylum seekers, most of them from third countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea, led the EU institutions to recognize in April 2015 the exceptional nature of the situation, calling unsuccessfully for the adoption of solidarity measures to overcome the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the so-called "frontline Member States", such as the Hellenic Republic and the Italian Republic. In this context, the European Commission's Pact on Migration and Asylum of 23 September 2020 represents a package of proposals that incorporates previous measures advanced by the Commission after this migration crisis. Despite the expectations and premises of the new Pact, it retains an emergency and state-centered approach that has so far characterized the measures adopted by the Union. Therefore, article wants to show that the crisis is still ongoing and, for certain aspects, unresolved and unsolvable, because it is a deeper crisis that concerns the values of the Union which is intended differently by the EU Member States.

Në këtë dokument politikash u krye një analizë e krahasuar midis fuksioneve dhe rolit të GNP-ve që prej krijimit të tyre, veçanërisht të përformancës së tyre gjatë plotësimit së pyetësorit të KE-së, dhe
të rishikimit të rolit dhe funksioneve, sikurse parashikohet në kuadrin e përgatitjeve për statusin kandidat. Analiza bazohet në intervista ballë për
ballë me drejtues të nivelit të lartë të Ministrisë së Integrimit Evropian (MIE), anëtarë të GNP-ve gjatë procesit të plotësimit së pyetësorit të KE-së, dhe anëtarë aktual të GNP-ve. Për më tepër, janë marrë gjithashtu në konsideratë gjetjet dhe rekomandimet e raporteve të progresit të KE-së
mbi performancën e GNP-ve.

On 17 May 1990, the World Health Organization removed homosexuality from its list of diseases and mental disorders. This historical fact inspired Saša Gavrić and Jasmina Čaušević to collect all reference works in one place and give an overview of the development of the contemporary LGBT history in the last thirty years in the Western Balkans. How has the contemporary gay and trans history developed in the Western Balkan countries? What influenced the demedicalisation and decriminalisation of homosexuality? How did LGBTI activism develop in the region in this period? How did legal protection develop, and which areas did it include? How have the processes of democratisation and Europeanisation affected the lives of LGBTI people? These are just some of the questions the answers to which the authors have been pursuing during their work on this book.

Balkan Studies Center (BSC) is pleased to announce the proceedings of the Western Balkans Youth Conference: We Share the European Goals and Values (WBYS’21). This is the second volume in the series of conference proceedings launched by BSC. The conference, held on May 31, 2021, promoted the mission of BSC for improving scholarship and research among young researchers worldwide. The WBYS’21 attempted to seek authors and papers primarily contributing towards the promotion of peace, individual well-being, freedom, justice, social inclusion, sustainable development, scientific and technological progress, economic cooperation and trade, and the respect for the EU common values and principles.

With this volume, BSC continues the already established tradition, to focus each year on an issue with a special interest for the wider public and the youth in the Western Balkans, and give feedback to the academic community and decision-makers with a published volume of its proceedings. The Western Balkans Youth Conference: We Share the European Goals and Values aimed to explore the prospects of the Western Balkans countries in the EU, the Western Balkans compliance with Copenhagen political, economic and legal criteria, the EU as instruments for the Western Balkans reconstruction, development and stabilization, the Berlin Process, democratization and the system of governance in the Western Balkans, the EU politics towards the Western Balkans, the Great Power politics in the Western Balkans, the EU values of the human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights,  and so forth. One small step has been made to deconstruct the Western Balkans and to turn the discourse and attention to the youth perspective to the EU goals and values within the Western Balkans context.

The claim I defend in this letter is that the recent Southeast European post-communist experience changed our understanding of state capture. We are now able to observe and identify a new variant of state capture. To understand it, we have to take into account the relevant practices of this region and its peculiarities. The main novelty is that state capture is not anymore merely about economic agents getting policy and regulatory advantage. It is neither about politicians getting rich. It is primarily about political parties as political machinery to collect votes. Party patronage becomes the main element of state capture.

This paper aims to accomplish two goals. First, to present recent empirical evidence to the claim that Serbia is on the path towards embracing a more radical version of electoral authoritarianism. This is accomplished by examining most recent illiberal politics aimed at controlling electoral processes and the media sphere, and extracting public funds for partisan purposes. I claim that the incomplete design of democratic institutions in Serbia set up between 2001 and 2012 is primarily responsible for the democratic decline. The second goal is more general and aims to emphasise the importance of extracting public funds for hybrid regimes. Extractive institutions matter because they directly impact other critical segments of electoral authoritarianism (notably, elections and media freedom), but also because they explain the type of leadership they promote in politics. If public resources remain without proper institutional oversight and are simply 'up for grabs,' this will attract leaders more willing to dismantle democratic institutions and violate democratic procedures. Serbia serves as a good and current example of this linkage.

This study seeks to bring a new understanding of Serbia’s European integration and the implications for its external policy in the context of the current geopolitical decisions taken in the region. The aim is to emphasize the complexity of the enlargement process, as well as the difficulties created by Kosovo’s decision to declare independence (2008). The first section focuses on the analysis of the consequences of ethnic and / or interstate conflicts from the ‘90s, in order to underline the importance of the wars for the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the accession process and their role in determining the further institutional steps of Serbia. The second section is dedicated to describing Serbia’s rapprochement with the EU and its future steps towards joining the organization. The main hypothesis is that Serbia’s accession process is no different from that of former candidates. Nevertheless, the weight of the wars for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Kosovo’s decision will play an important role in the negotiation process. The last section is dedicated to a case study on Kosovo, the decision of declaring its independence still representing a source of diplomatic disputes between Serbia and the EU. In order to give a better understanding of the implications of this decision, an analysis of the main challenges is conducted within this section. The analysis focuses on several topics: the reaction of the five EU opponents to the decision, the future of the Albania-Kosovo relation, the reaction of the main EU institutions and the development of a “Kosovo precedent”.

У раду је представљена Зелена агенда за Западни Балкан, установљена потписивањем Софијске Декларације на Самиту земаља Западног Балкана 10. новембра 2020. године. Након уводних напомена, аутор детаљно представља сваки од пет стубова Зелене агенде. Анализира се актуелно стање у свакој од ових области, приказују активности предвиђене Смерницама Европске комисије за примену Зелене агенде, али и нуди шира перспектива зелене транзиције у Србији. Понуђени су одговори на питања како обезбедити неопходна средства за реализацију циљева Зелене агенде и да ли би економија заиста морала да трпи. Скренута је пажња и на значај регионалне сарадње, те приказана могућност да се кроз зелену транзицију креирају нова радна места, подстакну инвестиције и оствари одржив економски развој земље. Аутор закључује да је остварење циљева Зелене агенде од виталног значаја првенствено за грађане Србије и региона, али и да ће тиме Западни Балкан дати сопствени допринос глобалној борби против климатских промена. Поред званичних докумената, аутор се позива и на најрелевантније академске чланке, публикације међународних организација и цивилног друштва, као и на новинске чланке и онлајн изворе.

The paper argues that while the Serbian society and political elite are known for treating their country's accession to the EU in terms of pragmatic utility maximisation, they generally conceive of Serbian relations with Russia, contrariwise, as an identity-laden issue. To prove it, the author analyses Serbia's behaviour toward Russia along the features of emotion-driven cooperation, found in the literature on identity and emotions in foreign policy. In particular, the paper focuses on Serbians' especially strong friendliness vis-à-vis Russia, the parallel existence of the Other (the West) in their identity and the particularly strong intensity of their attraction to Russia during Serbia-West conflicts, the reinforcement of their affection to Russia by national traumas, the endurance of the affection's strength despite conflicting rational interests and negative experiences in bilateral interaction, the frequent occurrence of references to Russia in Serbia's domestic discourse and decisional justifications and a large use of historical analogies concerning Russia. Finally, the author ponders over the implications of the existent configuration of emotional and pragmatic forces in Serbian politics for the country's current and future conduct toward Russia and the EU

Abstract: While EU policy towards the Western Balkans has been scrutinized intensely, the position of the Nordic EU member states has been more obscure. While all three countries were once quite involved in the peacekeeping and rebuilding efforts, a closer examination shows that while Denmark and Finland have largely withdrawn from the region, Sweden continues an active policy across several fields. Public debate on future EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans is largely absent in all three countries, and public opinion, although far from solid, is not very enthusiastic, either. However, there is also little to suggest any active hostility in the three Nordic states. Instead, in the absence of strong, direct interests – whether in terms of the economy or hard security – the Nordic countries seem content to let EU institutions and other member states push the integration of the region forward. Most initiatives are, by and large, passively supported, while close attention is paid to the formal criteria for membership.

The article argues that Bulgaria's approach since 1989 was based on three key constant principles: first, support for the independence and for the statehood of the new Republic of Macedonia; second, the countering and dismantling of Macedonianism (in its 'Yugoslav' and 'antiquated' versions alike) both as a provocative construct of history and as Skopje's foreign policy practice; third, seeking of solutions within the wider EU and NATO framework and support for the Republic of (North) Macedonia's integration into NATO and EU structures.

This volume explores how the process of European integration has influenced collective memory in the countries of the Western Balkans. In the region, there is still no shared understanding of the causes (and consequences) of the Yugoslav wars. The conflicts of the 1990s but also of WWII and its aftermath have created “ethnically confined” memory cultures. As such, divergent interpretations of history continue to trigger confrontations between neighboring countries and hinder the creation of a joint EU perspective. In this volume, the authors examine how these “memory wars” impact the European dimension - by becoming a tool to either support or oppose Europeanisation. The contributors focus on how and why memory is renegotiated, exhibited, adjusted, or ignored in the Europeanisation process.

In the Western Balkans, dealing with the past remains a formal-informal condition for EU membership. However, divergent interpretations of history, including the Second World War and the Yugoslav wars, continue to trigger confrontations between neighbouring countries and hinder their EU perspective. Regional “memory wars” also
have a European dimension and have become a tool to either support or oppose Europeanisation. Politics of memory is thus used not only to foster an EU identity and endorse so-called EU values, but also to support nation- and state-building agendas. The tensions that derive from the past, however, continue to persist even after
achieving the strategic goal of entering the European Union, making the Europeanisation of memory politics more performative than fundamentally progressive. In the following chapter, we present an overview of the interaction between Europeanization processes and memory politics in the Western Balkan states. We first introduce the idea of European memory and the European Memory Framework and how they interact with candidate and member countries. Second, we examine the proces of Europeanization of memory politics in more detail, by examining the processes through which candidate countries download and upload European memory politics, and how timing (i.e. the stage of EU integration) affects this interaction. In the third section, we examine the effects of Europeanization of memory politics, highlighting both positive effects and unintended consequences.
Europeanised memory politics in itself is a slippery slope. Symbolic politics is actively used by all interested parties – EU, member states, candidate and potential candidate countries, to communicate stances, viewpoints and expectations – beyond legally prescribed rules and conditions. As such, Europeanised memory can be actively manipulated for the sake of appearances, and attainment of symbolic and political gains to underpin and even undermine broader Europeanisation processes.

For instance, Europeanising memory by advocating for a multifocal interpretation of the past can be used to pacify tensions and gain a deeper understanding of what the past was, inducing hence some sort of reconciliation. On the other hand, historical legacies can be used as a tool to undermine Europeanisation, obstruct and sabotage EU Integration process, as bilateral disputes show. The EU memory framework can be manipulated by elites and political parties in their endeavour to co-opt those aspects
of Europeanisation process that fit their needs, as way to challenge, reframe, reinterpret, support, oppose or rehabilitate certain views, narratives, values and meanings projected onto the past. The application of European memorial norms in the Western Balkans suggests that the past can serve as a useful commodity and effective tool to attain symbolic capital, political advantages and benefits on both national and transnational level. However, on the ground, historical narratives about the past remain fundamentally unchallenged by the process of Europeanisation.

In recent years, the rule of law and, especially, its “proper” implementation has become one of the most debated topics in Europe in recent years. The “Big Bang Enlargement” marked the beginning of dilemmas whether the new EU Member States fulfil the necessary rule of law criteria and opened the way for divergent views on how to implement TEU Article 2 values in practice. Furthermore, constant problems and difficulty of the candidate countries to fulfil the necessary rule of law criteria added to the complexity of the problem. In turn, the European institutions have tried to introduce a series of mechanisms and procedures to improve the over- sight and make the states follow the rules - starting from the famous Treaty on the European Union (TEU) Article 7, the Rule of Law Mechanism, annual reports on the rule of law and the most recent Conditionality Regulation.
The Conditionality Regulation was finally adopted in December 2020 after much discussion and opposition from certain EU Member States. It calls for the suspension of payments, com- mitments and disbursement of instalments, and a reduction of funding in the cases of general deficiencies with the rule of law. On the other hand, similar provisions were laid out in the February 2020 enlargement negotiation methodology specifying that in the cases of no progress, imbalance of the overall negotiations or regression, the scope and intensity of pre-accession as- sistance can be adjusted downward thus descaling financial assistance to candidate countries.
The similarities between the two mechanisms, one for the Member States, the other for can- didate countries shows an increased sharing of experiences and approaches to dealing with possible deficiencies or breaches of the rule of law through economic sanctioning, in order to resolve challenges to the unity of the European union. The Covid-19 pandemic and the crisis it has provoked on many fronts has turned the attention of the Member States (i.e. the Council) away from the long running problematic issues. Consequently, the procedures against Poland and Hungary based on the Rule of Law Mechanism have slowed down or become fully stalled, while certain measures taken up by some European states have created concerns about the limitations of human rights and liberties.
This paper, therefore, analyses the efforts the EU is making in protecting the rule of law in its Member States and the candidate countries. It also analyses the new focus of the EU in the financial area where it has started to develop novel mechanisms that would affect one of the most influential EU tools – the funding of member and candidate countries through its struc- tural and enlargement policy. Finally, it attempts to determine and provide conclusions on the efficiency of new instruments with better regulated criteria and timing of activities will be and how much they would affect the EU and its current and future member states.
Keywords: rule of law, financial interests, Western Balkans, EU, Covid-19

The district of Novi Pazar in southwestern Serbia offers an ideal case study to explore heritage and diplomacy. By analyzing processes of Europeanization and perceptions of Neo-Ottomanism in heritage practices, the article demonstrates how past, present, and future plans for South East Europe are embroiled in development trajectories that encompass partners from not only Europe and Turkey but also the United States, Asia, and the Middle East. The World Heritage Center at UNESCO and its partner organization, International Council on Monuments and Sites, hold firm commitments to the Christian identities of Stari Ras and Sopocani Sopocani and legacies of medieval Raška as well as the legacies of Imperial Rome. Yet, they operate in a vacuum, neglecting to consider the hyper-connectivity that is transforming not only the physical landscapes of the region and the revitalization of Sandžak and Islamic identities but also the corporate and diplomatic spheres of transnational and multidimensional interests.

This research, commissioned and published by the Balkan Forum, looks into the progress made by the Western Balkans (WB) countries towards implementing their commitments since the WB Summits in London and Poznań held in 2018 and 2019, as part of the Berlin Process launched in 2014. It is divided into three thematic units: the first is an overview of the Berlin Process, focusing on the London and Poznań Summits and the specific pledges made by the governments on several topics within the respective declarations and chairs’ conclusions. The second part follows the progress made on the particular pledges, based on i) recent findings from research and analysis conducted on behalf of various organisations and/or governmental institutions; ii) the results of interviews; iii) the perspective of regional, local, and international media. The third part consists of recommendations, stemming from the findings of both primary and secondary research.

This policy brief aims to provide a critical assessment to the programming and implementation of IPA I funds in Albania, identifying key achievements, challenges and potential discrepancies experienced during the implementation of IPA programmes in Albania. Also, it will assess the preparation level of Albania’s public administration in managing IPA funds, analysing the central and local administration absorption capacity, and provide for feasible alternatives to its enhancement, including here the involvement of the CSOs in the process of programming and implementation of IPA funds.

This essay argues that there are (at least) three paradigms of governance and especially public administration: Chinese, Western, and Islamic – paradigms understood here as potentiality and theory rather than reality and practice as observed today. It then discusses classical Chinese, i.e. Confucian, and Islamic, specifically Ottoman, public administration, from this perspective. The guiding question is whether we arrive more easily at good public administration if we realize that there are different contexts and thus, potentially at least, different ways thither, as well as legitimately different goals.

The future of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans is now more unclear than ever. In spite of a couple of new enlargement methodologies presented in the last nine years and the fact that the region is in the process of joining the EU for almost two decades, there are no signs that it would come to a conclusion any time soon. The feeling that there is more form than substance in the process is becoming ever stronger. Disparities among the countries or groups of countries are also becoming more profound. Enlargement actually does not work like it used to-bringing transformation to both the candidates and the Union. The paper offers several scenarios on the possible development of the enlargement process for the next decade or so. These scenarios depend on the Western Balkan countries readiness and ability to commit and perform reforms; but also, on the EU's openness and willingness to overcome the fatigue and anxiety of admitting new Member States. These scenarios have to be seen against the backdrop of permanent crisis environment that can affect the process both negatively and positively. Third actors' activities and influence need also to be factored in. This paper, finally, tries to inform on the repercussions of no-enlargement for the wider region of SouthEast Europe and the EU.

Materijalni uslovi u oblasti energetike kod pristupanja Srbije Evropskoj uniji ključna su odrednica procesa pristupanja. Oni povezuju proces pristupanja Evropskoj uniji, poboljšanje životnih uslova i ostvarivanje osnovnih prava stanovništva. Ispunjavanje materijalnih uslova u oblasti energetike pokazuje spremnost i sposobnost državne uprave da deluje u javnom interesu. Naime, što brže i što potpunije ispunjavanje ovih materijalnih uslova u najboljem je interesu većine
stanovništva Srbije, kao i stanovništva susednih država, od kojih su neke članice Evropske unije. Ove uslove bi trebalo ispuniti čak i ako ne bi bili predviđeni samim procesom pristupanja Srbije Uniji. U tekstu se opisuju materijalni uslovi čije je ispunjenje do sada ugovoreno, objašnjava se značaj ispunjenosti ovih uslova za proces pristupanja i za poboljšanje zaposlenosti i privrednog razvoja. Ispunjenost materijalnih uslova u oblasti energetike je merljiva kategorija, a može se meriti i uticaj ispunjenosti ovih uslova na kvalitet života i osnovna ljudska prava. Od načina
ispunjavanja ugovorenih materijalnih obaveza zavisi ekonomska i svaka druga budućnost stanovništva Srbije. U tekstu su date pregledne tabele  materijalnih obaveza i unakrsnih veza među
njima, kao i odgovarajuće preporuke u vezi sa ispunjavanjem ovih obaveza.

This article critically assesses the role of pro-reform and pro-EU civil society in the process of Serbia's accession to the European Union (EU). Civil society (the so-called non-government or third sector) has played a fundamental role in the democratisation of former Communist countries, including in the Western Balkans where the majority of aspirant EU members still reside. Serbia's democratic transformation began soon after its regime-change occurred on 5 October 2000. This country's process of democratic consolidation is ongoing and is strongly supported by pro-EU civil society actors who are key drivers of Europeanisation. Civil society organisations and actors have increased general knowledge about the quality of democratic reforms in Serbia and brought in technical expertise which has assisted Serbian society to align better with the EU's acquis. Specific examples of civil society's activism in this article will demonstrate some unique characteristics of Serbia's third sector. Its evolution from an anti-war movement and loosely connected individuals and citizens' associations in the 1990s to becoming a major advocate of EU membership in Serbia and a partner to the Serbian Government on EU accession is worthy of further academic research and analysis.
https://cesaa.org.au/anzjes_issue/volume-10-no-3/

EUPH members organized a study visit to Brussels on 28-30 November 2016, with the aim to inform MEPs and other EU officials - over the initiatives undertaken up-to-date at the domestic level, along with sharing evidence-based insights on the country’s prospects and challenges for the opening of the accession negotiation.
The study visit agenda started with a round table discussion with three MEPs, followed with meetings at the key European institutions, i.e. DG NEAR and EEAS, as well as at the Albanian Mission to the EU. Moreover, EUPH members attended the parliamentary debate at the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Draft Report on Albania.
The discussions focused on the relevance of implementing the judiciary reform and of a regular election process, so as to be credible vis-à-vis the opening of accession negotiations discussion. EUPH members asked the EU officials for a greater predictability of the process since at an earlier stage, along with the assurance of a greater coherence.

The authors analyse the changed landscape of the EU BIT policy following the Achmea decision and the 2020 Termination Agreement, in particular, their relevance for candidate countries such as Serbia. The perceived risks strongly suggest that some action must be taken before the accession to avoid becoming caught between conflicting obligations under EU law and the BITs, as happened to respondent countries in the cases of Micula and Magyar Farming Company. The potential for conflicts exists in the case of Serbia as well because it already has an obligation to comply with EU law in areas such as competition and state aid law, which may cause it to inadvertently breach investors’ rights under the BITs. Various options that a candidate country can pursue to adjust its bilateral investment treaties to EU law standards are considered in search of the best approach. Difficulties that may be encountered due to the premature termination of sunset clauses and the retroactive termination of arbitration clauses in pending arbitrations lead the authors to conclude that certain adjustments to the course of action adopted within the EU are called for. The proposed action in the case of Serbia consists of consensually amending the 22 Serbia-EU member state BITs following a two-step procedure so that the sunset clauses are terminated at once, whereas the remaining provisions of the BITs are designated by the contracting parties to be terminated on the date of accession. To prevent treaty shopping, these amendments need to be accompanied by comprehensive reform of Serbia’s other BITs that contain overly broad definitions of investors and investments. Some alternative approaches are also taken into consideration, such as the replacement of ISDS with other forms of dispute resolution and the replacement of the Serbia-EU member state BITs with other types of agreements. The candidate countries are advised to adjust their pre-accession commitments, both procedural and substantive, in a timely manner with the incoming EU obligations. These inevitable adjustments should be pursued cautiously by candidate countries to minimise risks and maximise their bargaining power.

The chapter provides an assessment of the main Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions deployed to the region in the past decade. It was in the Western Balkans  that, in 2003, the EU launched its first peace support operations in an effort initially to restore stability, and later on in the reform process, to bring the region closer to – and eventually inside – the EU. The Western Balkans have therefore constituted fertile ground for the development of the CSDP and have provided ample opportunity for the EU to learn from experience and to evolve and adapt to its own and local needs. As a result, the CSDP has come to be one of the most potent tools that the EU has available for the transformation of conflict-afflicted areas into zones of stability and
order. This chapter demonstrates that, beyond boosting EU capabilities in external action, these missions have played a critical role in reforming security sector institutions and supporting statebuilding in the Western Balkans. However, the ongoing challenges and unresolved political tensions that exist both inside and between the countries of the region point to the limitations that CSDP missions face in consolidating peace."

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European Union (EU)'s policy in Eastern Europe experienced a radical change. In fact, these countries were not eligible neither to democracy nor full membership in the direction of the economy. However, on the one hand to compensate for the errors of the Second World War and to create a buffer zone between Russia, the EU countries adopted a political decisions to new coming members. By changing the meaning of integrity and taken a new step in the identification made Balkans become part of the EU.

Since early March 2020, the major political and, more broadly, societal developments in Serbia were strongly influenced by the COVID-19 outbreak. The parliamentary elections, initially planned for April 26,
2020, were finally held on June 21, 2020. The elections resulted in a less pluralistic political representation in the National Assembly (NA) due to the election boycott by a significant part of opposition political parties. The new legislature, like the previous one, was supposed to proceed with the adoption of constitutional amendments, mainly related to the judiciary and the relationship between the three branches of government. It is also important to point out that, while the process regarding the accession of Serbia to the European Union (EU) was dragging along, the newly adopted enlargement methodology issued by the European Commission on 5 February 20204 has the potential to bring about some important changes in Serbia’s path towards EU membership. Lastly, the overwhelming majority of all opinions adopted by the Constitutional Court of Serbia (CCS) concerned constitutional challenges, whereas other decisions mainly treated conflicts of constitutionality and/or legality of laws and other general acts. The CCS has also received 66 initiatives to review
the constitutionality of the emergency measures adopted by Serbia in order to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak.

This article will try to analyze the path of Albania towards the EU and its recent challenges in a multi-speed globalizing world and threat of security. As it is summarized in the title, this route will be analyzed in a twofold way: by analyzing the Albanian struggles to become part of the EU from the country's Foreign Policy perspective, but also as a sum of its efforts to realize this in a parallel way with a healthy regional cooperation with its neighbor countries in the Western Balkans. It will also deal with the question whether the EU has reflected any changing in its enlargement's approach to the potential candidate countries and if it's currently playing any role in the changing of the perception toward "the other Europe"-a term often coined for the Western Balkans' Region. The study will be based in a qualitative comparative methodology which consists in comparing different tracks of time through studies and reports on Albania published recently and by adopting a geopolitical and a geocultural point of view to the political and economic position of Albania in the Western Balkans' Region.

The matter of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans has become overshadowed by pressing issues such as Brexit, the rise of the radical right and international terrorism. Notwithstanding the pressure to address these issues accordingly, increasing tensions and ethnic outbursts across the Western Balkan region are reason enough for the European Union to devote significant attention to accession talks. This article addresses the Western Balkan countries' Europeanization process with consideration of Russia as an external actor. By assessing the candidate countries' progress amid EU negotiations, the article suggests that the countries' bilateral ties with Russia have an impact on the Europeanization process which is particularly visible in Chapter 31 Foreign, security, and defence policy of the acquis communautaire. The broader geopolitical framework that comprises the multifaceted relationship between the EU and Russia is crucial for understanding the dynamics of EU-Western Balkans-Russia triangle.

This policy brief examines the role of the Government of Albania in strategic planning, policy development and coordination capabilities with regard to the European Union accession process. The main tools for strategic planning and policy development in place are financial resources, human resources, timetable with settled goals and deadlines, a shared agenda of meetings, a monitoring system and a clear decision making method. The Albanian Government has included all these tools for strategically planning the Integration process but there are gaps in achieving commitments and the monitoring system appears yet unable to correct procedures, before the deadlines have expired.