La deficiente regulación de la casación autonómica efectuada por el artículo 86.3 LJCA, la falta de medios personales para hacer efectiva la misma y la dificultad de admitir un recurso que tiene por finalidad «formar jurisprudencia»... more
La deficiente regulación de la casación autonómica efectuada por el artículo 86.3 LJCA, la falta de medios personales para hacer efectiva la misma y la dificultad de admitir un recurso que tiene por finalidad «formar jurisprudencia» frente a sentencias de los propios Tribunales Superiores de Justicia que establecen la misma en la instancia, ha llevado a muchos de ellos a inadmitir el recurso de casación autonómico en estos casos, mientras que otros reconocen la plena operatividad del mismo. Esta disparidad interpretativa será examinada a la vista de la jurisprudencia más actual del Tribunal Supremo acerca de la finalidad del recurso y desde una perspectiva constitucional, tras haber recaído recientes pronunciamientos que confirman la operatividad del recurso, aunque parecen relegarlo a Tribunales Superiores de Justicia de varias Salas o Secciones. / The deficient regulation of the regional cassation appeal made by article 86.3 LJCA, the lack of personal resources to make it effective, and the difficulty of admitting an appeal that has the purpose of «establishing jurisprudence» against the judgments of the Superior Courts of Justice that already establish it in the instance, has led many of them not to accept the regional cassation appeal in these cases, while others recognize its full operation. This interpretative disparity will be examined in view of the most current jurisprudence of the Supreme Court regarding the purpose of the cassation appeal and from a constitutional perspective, after recent pronouncements confirming the operation of this appeal, although they seem to relegate it to Superior Courts of Justice with several Chambers or Sections.
This paper will seek to uncover the assumptions underlying Art 2 TEU regards the EU’s engagement with the Member States [‘MS’] and with the third countries alike is based on values that have culminated in the Lisbon Treaty and the EU... more
This paper will seek to uncover the assumptions underlying Art 2 TEU regards the EU’s engagement with the Member States [‘MS’] and with the third countries alike is based on values that have culminated in the Lisbon Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights [‘EUCFR’].
We will try to address two questions.
i. The first is whether the assumption of the existence of an EU Teleology actually informs the EU’s engagement with Member States and third countries: a classic review of EU public law issues of conferral, subsidiarity [and inevitably] proportionality. The CJEU has used Art’s 2 and 19 TEU as a bridge for the application of rights in Member States. We will review the concern that Art 2 TEU’s use is as a mere “proclamation” rather than a conferrer of rights. Art 2 values underscoring rights have been concretized since the Lisbon Treaty through the EU Charter of Fundamental rights, [‘Charter’ or EUCFR]. We shall investigate the risk to stability of the CJEU’s interpretation of Art 2 TEU.
ii. The second is, how if at all, are private rights of citizens affected by the implementation in MS law by the EUCFR, especially the key Article 47 interpreted with reference to Art 2 TEU values? The most difficult issue we address is -whether Art 2 TEU renders operational effective judicial protection Charter rights? The significance for Art 47 of the Charter is that Art 2 TEU is extremely open to interpretation – especially with reference to the rule of law. In order to be directly effective and justiciable - Art 2 TEU Treaty provisions must be clear, precise and unconditional . We may question whether these rigid criteria only apply to directives, or secondary legislation ? We shall see that the values mentioned in Art 2 TEU are not directly linked with the competences and policy areas of the Union. What we hope to discover is whether the Charter applies only when implementing Union law [Art 51 of Charter] or whether with respect to the direct effect of Charter rights in EU law, a more nuanced approach may be perceived through the combined effect of Art 2 TEU, Art 19 TEU and Art 47 of the Charter? Namely a distinction between : first, a ‘mandatory effect’, meaning that a provision is sufficient in itself to entail a right or obligation; and second, the ‘unconditional nature’, meaning that a right does not need ‘to be given concrete expression by the provisions of EU or national law. In short, has Art 47 of the Charter become the link between the guarantee effective judicial protection of EU fundamental rights in Member States?
