G E M Anscombe
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Recent papers in G E M Anscombe
How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with... more
Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’). To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet... more
Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need. This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'. I suggest that, with certain relatively minor... more
This paper looks at philosophical accusations of talking nonsense from the perspective of argumentation theory. An accusation of this sort, when seriously meant, amounts to the claim that someone believes there is something she means by... more
There are passages in Wittgenstein where he compares his method to psychotherapy and one or two where he seems to suggest that the ‘patient’ has the last word on his ‘illness’ and ‘cure’. This paper tries to take these seriously,... more
Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little... more
Ongoing discussion of this paper here: https://www.academia.edu/s/cf13d33860?source=link Philosophy – whether traditional or contemporary – has nothing to say about the human metaphysical predicament, and cannot even offer a basic... more
espanolEste articulo argumenta que habia considerablemente mas filosofia de accion en teoria moral antes de 1958 (cuando Anscombe se quejo de su falta bajo el lema «filosofia de la psicologia») que la que ha habido desde entonces. Esto se... more
I suggest that, although the nonsensicalist challenge (obviously) matters, it has, at least in its Wittgensteinian form, been widely ignored. On the other hand, those who still adhere to nonsensicalism (mainly Wittgensteinians) have been... more
How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with... more
In an earlier paper, 'Peter Geach on nonsense, confusion and sin' 1 , I suggested that what one can say in explanation of one's own actions suffers from a severe limitation: one can shed little light on the question why one acted on one's... more
I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense. How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense? It is generally agreed that the... more
Just what positions or actions the Argument From Reason (AFR) justifies one to adopt or perform remains hotly disputed. In this paper I introduce the argument and note some concerns, using the second edition of Lewis’s Miracles and Victor... more
Mackie’s claim that in general courage benefits its possessor seems inconsistent with his ‘error theory’ of value. But how plausible is it in itself? I suggest that his arguments for the claim fail in the same way as the arguments of... more
Si on axiomatise le discours sur la sexualité, comment ses problèmes y sont-ils posés, avec les conditions supplémentaires de la religion et les issues libératrices de la littérature ?
I argue that Mackie's thesis about courage and self-interest is neither consistent with his 'error theory' of value nor convincing in itself. The question of the objectivity of value needs to be distinguished from that of whether one... more
In John Perry's wide-ranging "A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality", the classical Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection is simply ignored. Indeed, even those sympathetic to the doctrine sometimes seem to be revising rather... more
Supplément à "On the Grammar of 'Enjoy'" de miss Anscombe.