Genocide Denial

Scholarship on states’ responses to international norms has focused on commitment, compliance, and noncompliance; paying insufficient attention to responses that fall outside these categories. Beyond simply complying with or violating a norm; states contest, resist, and respond to international norms in a range of ways. I identify rhetorical adaptation as a central form of resistance to international norms. Rather than simply rejecting a norm or charges of norm violation, such a strategy draws on a norm’s content to resist pressures for compliance or minimize perceptions of violation. Theorizing the relationship between norms’ content and states’ resistant rhetoric, I identify four types of rhetorical adaptation: norm disregard, norm avoidance, norm interpretation, and norm signaling. To probe the plausibility of these propositions, a case study of Turkey’s post-World War II narrative of the Armenian Genocide traces a sequence of rhetorical adaptations over the past six decades. Building on the case study, I then draw out generalizable insights into the uses and effects of rhetorical adaptation. Connecting theoretical concerns in political science with the interdisciplinary fields of genocide studies and memory studies, I delineate the ways in which actors instrumentally use norms and expand understandings of the forms and effects of so-called norm takers’ agency.

HOUSED IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ARCHIVE at Geneva is a collection of intake surveys from the Rescue Home in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo. These documents record the histories of some 2,000 Armenian girls, boys, and young women who were rescued—or, more often, rescued themselves—from Arab, Kurdish, and Turkish households into which they had been taken during and after the First World War and as a consequence of the Armenian Genocide of 1915.

To access the article: https://philpeople.org/profiles/imge-oranli/publications

Genocide denialism is an understudied topic in the epistemic injustice scholarship; so are epistemic relations outside of the Euro-American context. This article proposes to bring the literature into contact with an underexplored topic in a ‘distant’ setting: Turkey. Here, I explore the ethical and epistemological implications of the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide as a pervasive and systematic epistemic harm. Using an interdisciplinary methodology, I argue that a philosophical exploration of genocide denialism requires examining the role of institutions and ideology in relation to the epistemic harm done by individual perpetrators. More specifically, I suggest that the individual, ideological, and institutional roots of genocide denialism constitute a regime of epistemic injustice in Turkey.

To download click here : https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:9125

FRENCH VERSION FOLLOWS
The French National Assembly’s adoption of a bill penalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide (12 October 2006) stokes the vigorous national debate on the connection between genocide denial and law and, more generally, between history and law. The main criticism expressed by the detractors of laws against negationism – in particular historians – is the following: penalization of genocide denial constitutes a violation of freedom of expression and, as such, represents a threat to democracy. The thesis developed here is that, in France, anti denial laws and freedom of speech are not irreconcilable in view of three main elements that must be considered jointly: first, the relativity of the protection of free speech considering French as well as European human rights law; second, the legal limitations of the prohibition of genocide denial given the existing case law related to the 1990 Gayssot Law; third, the significance of genocide denial.
Sévane Garibian

L’adoption par l’Assemblée nationale d’une proposition de loi visant à pénaliser la négation du génocide des Arméniens sur le modèle de la loi Gayssot (le 12 octobre 2006) – suivie du programme de lutte contre le négationnisme, initié par l’Allemagne, au sein de l’Union européenne – relance le débat sur le rapport entre négationnisme et droit et, plus généralement, entre l’histoire et le droit. Il s’agit de démontrer ici que, d’un point de vue strictement juridique, la pénalisation du négationnisme peut être conciliable avec le respect de la liberté d’expression, et ce à la lumière de trois principaux éléments  analysés conjointement : premièrement, la relativité et les fondements philosophiques de la protection de la liberté d’expression aussi bien en droit français qu’en droit européen des droits de l’homme ; deuxièmement, les limites à une interprétation extensive de l’interdit posées par la jurisprudence nationale relative à l’application de la loi Gayssot ; troisièmement, la signification même du phénomène négationniste dans une société démocratique.
Sévane Garibian

To download click here : https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:23569

La promulgation de la loi du 23 février 2005 « portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés » donne lieu à un important débat public et à la diffusion d’une pétition d’historiens exigeant l’abrogation de toutes les lois dites mémorielles (loi de 2005 en cause, mais aussi loi Gayssot de 1990, loi reconnaissant le génocide arménien et loi Taubira de 2001). Cette pétition repose sur une dénonciation qui présuppose que lesdites lois, mises sur le même plan, auraient une fonction et un objet identiques. Or ce double présupposé est critiquable : d’une part, le fait d’appréhender ces textes comme ayant la même fonction, celle de sanctionner un comportement, est basé sur une confusion qu’il s’agit de clarifier ; d’autre part, considérer qu’ils ont le même objet, en l’occurrence l’établissement d’une vérité officielle par le Parlement ou les juges, relève d’un malentendu qu’il convient de dissiper s’agissant des lois de 1990 et de 2001. Ainsi le problème ne serait pas tant celui d’une inflation législative alarmante de lois scélérates, établissant une vérité d’Etat ; mais plutôt celui du sens, à peine caché, de l’adoption d’un texte tel que l’article 4 de la loi de 2005, qui impose une interprétation légitimement contestée par les historiens.
Sévane Garibian

"Heresy" is developed here as an analytical term for the criminalization of speech questioning the basic tenets of a belief system, such as internal criticisms of state socialism or denial of the applicability of the term genocide to some mass crimes in a European Union that purports to make central the protection of human rights. European legislation to criminalize "genocide denial" is critiqued through a close analysis of international legal decisions dealing with whether "genocide" took place in the Bosnian war of 1992—95. Although granting both the facts as these courts found them and the serious criminality of the actions involved, Robert M. Hayden argues that calling them "genocide" broadens the definition of that term to the extent of losing the possibility of uniform application. Criminalizing "genocide denial" is thus not only contrary to principles of free speech and intellectual inquiry but manifests the same problem that Amnesty International identified in its reports in the 1980s on the vagueness of the "verbal crimes" provisions of the criminal laws of the formerly socialist countries.

Postscript 2024: considering the censorship, and worse, of scholars who comment on Gaza after October 7 2023, this article seems prescient.

A century after the Armenian Genocide and its ongoing denial by the Turkish state, there has emerged a notable and unprecedented interest in the Armenian past and present both in civil society discourse and scholarship in Turkey, accompanied by various reconciliation iniatives at the state and society levels. Observers have suggested that this increased engagement with Turkey's suppressed past is an outcome of its EU candidacy, the democratization reforms of the early 2000s, and the shockwave among liberal segments of Turkish society caused by the 2007 assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. I argue that this shortsighted analysis, which completely ignores the Kurdish movement's transformative challenge to Turkish denialism since the 1980s, echoes the key fallacy of present discussions of Turkey's engagement with its past: compartmentalization and disjunction of interlinked state crimes.

Examining the concept of death can provide a new perspective on the question of why prominent sections of the Australian political and media establishment have resisted recognising the Stolen Generations as a genocide. This paper examines the role of death understood as definitional in genocide, and finality as the defining aspect of ‘death’ employed in this way. Genocide, in the popular imagination, is based on the Holocaust as paradigmatic case and invokes death as central symbol. Since mass death as a consequence of the state's actions toward its civilian subjects is posited as illegitimate, the legitimacy of a state which has committed genocide is in question. In the context of Australia's 'history wars,' the arguments of denialists are premised upon the position that if death did not occur then genocide did not occur, and if genocide did not occur, then the state is legitimate and national identity is secure. This argument relies on an implicit use of the metaphor of a collectivity as a human individual (subject to death). The argument that death (due to its finality) is necessary for genocide is itself used to ‘assassinate memory’ (Vidal-Naquet), to finalise the genocide that indigenous Australians have suffered. An emphatic response has and continues to be made by Aboriginal Australians’ assertion of survival.

Suzbijanje različitih manifesta govora mržnje neodvojivo je od utjecaja naci-onalnog bremena te europskih obveza koje pojedina zemlja preuzima. U tom kon-tekstu, imajući u vidu vrlo oskudnu nacionalnu sudsku praksu, ali i nedostatak preciznosti u određenjima glede predmetne tematike, pravni standardi Europskog suda za ljudska prava krucijalni su za promišljanje i zaključivanje o slučajevima govora mržnje radi stvaranja usmjerenja za nacionalne sustave. Prva kaznena osuda za negiranje armenskoga genocida povod je ovomu radu. Njezin snažan odjek i polemike laičke i stručne javnosti na međunarodnoj razini poticaj su istra-živanju ove pravne teme. Zato je svrha rada najprije istražiti slučajeve negiranja genocida pred ovim Sudom kako bismo ocijenili snalazi li ih sve ista sudbina, ima-jući u vidu da je riječ o teškim oblicima govora mržnje koji nisu (ili ne bi trebali biti) zaštićeni zajamčenom slobodom izražavanja. Nakon izlaganja nekih specifič-nih pitanja, analizom presuda, razmatranjem relevantnih odredaba i specifičnih pravnih mehanizama dolazimo do zaključaka značajnih i za nacionalni sustav te upućujemo na trendove koje je ovaj Sud postavio glede predmetne problematike.

This article analyses the amendments of January 2018 to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (INR) of 1998, which has raised doubts in light of international law and provoked diplomatic tensions between Poland on one side and Germany, Ukraine, United States of America and Israel on the other. The INR is a national institution whose role is, among others, to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes committed between 1917-1990. The article proves that the wording of the amendments is in consistent with international law, as it ignores the principles of international responsibility, definitions of international crimes, and disproportionately limits freedom of expression. In consequence, it cannot be expected that third states will cooperate
with Poland in the execution of responsibility for violation of the newly adopted norms.

To download click here : https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:104681

The last decade witnessed the death of a number of notable war criminals, criminals against humanity, genocidaires, dictators or terrorists, amongst these Slobodan Milosevic, Augusto Pinochet, Saddam Hussein, Osama Ben Laden and Muammar Gaddafi. Though the circumstance of each death may differ greatly, the questions each death raises are the same: when and how did these criminals die? What should one do with their remains? How does one apprehend their legacy, the memory of their persona and their crimes?
Despite being of a timely and crucial nature, these questions have prompted little attention in the field of legal and social sciences to date. While there is a renewed interest in the perpetrator’s discourse as a source of information, studies that refer to his fate once he is dead are rare. This work intends to fill this gap.
The interdisciplinary reflection undertaken here puts in dialogue the contributions of law, history and anthropology, focusing on three main themes: the death of the perpetrator, the post-mortem treatment of his body, and the question of patrimonialization, faced with the demands of justice and reparation. This volume intends to shed light on the issues surrounding the end of mass criminals – a death never banal, even when it is natural.
Sévane GARIBIAN

In this article I argue that the notable memory boom in Turkey since the 2000s about the Armenian genocide has diverted the attention away from the importance of formal genocide acknowledgement; in addition, the responsibility of genocide denial is assigned to the Turkish State only. Looking at the memory frames in the current public discourse however, in qualitative terms there is more of a continuity than rupture in denialist discourse patterns. Most importantly, the public talk about the Armenian genocide serves as a key argument in the Turkish State’s denialist program, where it argues that the “Armenian issue” is not a taboo topic in Turkey anymore. Taking into consideration that the engagement of Turkish civil society has garnered much – if not most – attention in Turkey and internationally, I ultimately argue, to focus on the needs and the claims of the victims rather than making the emergence of a strong civil society in Turkey an end in itself.

This article examines the techniques used by Anne Frank in revising her diaries for what she intended to be a post war publication. The article begins by reviewing the scholarly and political contexts in which the Diaries are normally discussed. It then shows the extent to which Frank’s revisions of her diaries (from the “a” to “b” versions) were the result of a conscious rethinking of the work’s purpose and audience and begun only after several months’ deliberation. Finally, the article looks at the nature of the revisions Frank made to the content of her diaries, focussing primarily on the first few months. In these entries in particular Frank shows a willingness to alter the known facts of her history in order to improve the plot and emotional impact of her experiences. She shortens time-lines, reduces the number of characters, and deletes and adds events and dialogue all with an eye towards emphasizing the extraordinary nature of the events that had overfallen her and the degree to which they allowed for the development of her latent ability as an author. In rewriting the Diary as Het Achterhuis, Frank was not simply revising: her second version is an artistic reworking of the raw material in her daily journals, a reworking that reflects clear literary goals.
Key terms: Anne Frank; book history; authorial history; revision practices; authorial intention; diaries; Bildungsroman; children’s literature.

Laws regulating historical discourse, or “memory laws,” recognize past injustices, and, as in the case of legislation regarding the Holocaust, may punish denial. They also reflect the geopolitical interests of states or supranational institutions, especially in contested histories, such as the Ottoman Empire’s persecution of Armenian subjects during the First World War. Scholarship on such legislation examines its ethical legitimacy and political impact, debating its effect on free speech and democratic governance. This discourse considers whether memory laws should ever be adopted, whether they actually achieve their goals, and the extent to which they reinforce realpolitik in governing institutions. This article reveals a hitherto little-discussed dimension of laws regulating historical discourse: performativity. Laws have performative effects in the form of meanings, intentions, and interpretations that go beyond the letter of the law. By focusing on Armenian Genocide recognition in France and Germany, this article elucidates the performative aspects of memory laws, revealing thereby underlying ideological biases and political agendas.

To download click here : http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:75211

ENGLISH VERSION FOLLOWS
« El Estado turco ha cometido el delito de genocidio contra el Pueblo Armenio, en el periodo comprendido entre los años 1915 y 1923 ». Esta declaración realizada por un juez federal argentino el primero de abril de 2011 en Buenos Aires, se encuentra en el núcleo de una sentencia definitiva que constituye una primicia mundial y conlleva la consagración jurídica – el (re)conocimiento- de los testigos olvidados de un crimen negado por Turquía. La sentencia se inscribe en un marco singular y único en su género: la práctica judicial sui generis de los juicios por la verdad, auténtica especificidad nacional creada en Argentina en los años noventa para revertir la política del olvido de la época en lo relativo a los crímenes de la dictadura militar. Una práctica cuya existencia misma es el producto directo de una situación inicial de borrado e impunidad, que incita a la creación de mecanismos judiciales alternativos de certificación del hecho criminal y de consagración de sus víctimas/testigos.
Sévane Garibian


“The Turkish state perpetrated the crime of genocide against the Armenian people between 1915 and 1923.” This statement, made in Buenos Aires on 1 April 2011 by an Argentinian Federal Judge, constitutes the core of a court decision that is the first of its kind in the world and that offers a legal consecration – (re)cognition – of the forgotten witnesses of a crime denied by Turkey. The sentence takes its place in an altogether singular framework: the sui generis judicial practice of juicio por la verdad (trial for the truth), a national procedure created in Argentina in the 1990s in response to the politics of forgetting then related to the crimes committed during the military dictatorship. This practice is the direct product of an initial situation of effacement and impunity which calls for the creation of alternative judicial mechanisms of validation of the criminal fact and consecration of its victims / witnesses.
Sévane Garibian