Geocentrism

The paper focuses on the reception of Western cosmological models in the seventeenth-century Russia. The models include the classical scholastic adaptation of the geocentric model, the heliocentric model and the Hermetic tradition. In the seventeenth century, immigrants from Ruthenia (i.e. eastern parts of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth) played a significant part in the cultural development of Muscovy. Specifically, it was mainly scholars from Kiev who could be credited for bringing the notion of Western natural philosophy to Russia. Most of them, however, relied on scholastic models. The reception of the scholastic combination of natural philosophy with theology was problematic, while the first text which presented the heliocentric model did not cause any response or discussion. The criticism towards the Copernican universe would appear at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; interestingly enough, it again came from the Ruthenian scholars.

This book shows that the Copernican system advanced by Galileo and currently taught in modern academia, is flawed and inconsistent with the scientific data gathered over the last two hundred years. The book addresses all the major players, such as Newton, Mach, Lorentz, Einstein, Hubble, and many more, and shows that as each of them start their theories from the presumption of a moving Earth, this creates numerous contradictions in their respective theories, leading to models that simply don't work.

Enochian cosmology is often regarded as bewildering and unrelated to reality. The article explores the main features of the ancient Hebrew universe showing that the prophet's revelation was accurate; it is concluded that the heliocentric model is false.

Cyrano de Bergerac´s 17th century work of early modern science-fiction gives us a window into the transition from a pre-Copernican culture towards the meaning of  scientific values in the present day. The Copernican heliocentric model, empirical experiments, Giordano Bruno´s philosophy of the infinite, Picco della Mirandola´s thesis on human dignity; all these show us how the birth of early modern science-fiction is relevant to understand the context of scientific humanism.

For this paper, all these different currents of modern thought are compared to the origins of astronomy in Ptolemaic and Aristotelian philosophy.  Thomas Kuhn´s notion of a scientific paradigm is used here to begin to understand the relationship between science and the history of culture. The theme of alien contact and space flight in Bergerac´s novel is seen here as an example of the effect of cultural paradigms in modernity., as well as showing the effects of scientific discovery on the human imagination.

Geocentrism remained a fundamental characteristic of ancient astronomy , though there were moments in the history of this discipline when they argued for the orbital movement of the Earth around the Sun and even its rotation around its own axis. Practically, at the crossroads between physics and geometry, astronomy rejected a correct thesis in geometric terms, based on seemingly arguable physical theories. In this paper, my goal is to present from a synthetic and dia-chronic perspective several elements of the cosmologic model developed by the Greeks until the time of Aristarchus of Samos, thus highlighting several aspects of physics that made it impossible to accept heliocentrism, explainable in mathematical terms, which he promoted.

According to the traditional interpretation of the Copernican revolution, the old geocentric system was anthropocentric and the new heliocentric system anthropoperipheric. The double assimilation is what this article wants to call into question. Although a geocentric system can be seen to be theocentric, a heliocentric system can be interpreted as being diabolocentric and anthropofinalist, but also undeniably anthropoperipheric. The only way a heliocentric system can be seen as anthropocentric is as being anthropoconceptualist. Far from honouring man, this demonstrates an incapacity to see things from a point of view other than man’s own. Although a heliocentric system is opposed to the ancient anthropofinality and what was seen as anthropocentrality, it is not necessarily anthropoperipheric. This is firstly because the new system was far more preoccupied with the new centrality of the sun than with the new position of the earth, and secondly because the new system managed to incorporate many aspects of anthropocentrality in her new vision.

Selon l’interprétation traditionnelle de la révolution copernicienne, le géocentrisme est un anthropocentrisme et l’héliocentrisme, un anthropopériphérisme. C’est cette double assimilation que cet article entend remettre en question. En effet, le géocentrisme peut être appréhendé comme un théocentrisme, un héliocentrisme, un diablocentrisme et un anthropofinalisme, mais il n’en reste pas moins, indubitablement, un anthropopériphérisme. Le seul «anthropocentralisme» qui lui appartienne est un anthropoconceptualisme qui, hors de toute perspective valorisante, n’est qu’une incapacité à se décentrer. Quant à l’héliocentrisme proprement dit, s’il s’oppose à l’anthropofinalisme des Anciens et à ce qu’il croit être leur anthropocentralisme, il ne dégénère pas pour autant en un anthropopériphérisme, car, d’une part, il est davantage préoccupé par la centration du Soleil que par la décentration de la Terre et, d’autre part, il parvient même à s’accommoder de perspectives franchement anthropocentriques.

Cela fait plusieurs décennies que l’on mesure mieux le mal qu’a fait à l’astronomie de la Renaissance l’expression consacrée de « Révolution copernicienne ». Celle-ci, réduite au passage à l’héliocentrisme, contribue encore trop souvent à laisser dans l’ombre les autres aspects de l’astronomie renaissante (y compris ceux développés par Copernic lui-même), qu’il s’agisse de ses transformations, nombreuses, ou de ses points de stabilité. Même Thomas Kuhn, dont le propos n’a pourtant rien de téléologique, voit dans la théorie copernicienne l’élément déclencheur des autres transformations et le moteur initial du changement de paradigme . La théorie copernicienne est cependant, au moins dans un premier temps, plus le révélateur d’une crise que son initiateur. En 1997, la publication des deux volumes du Monde des sphères de Michel-Pierre Lerner a par ailleurs permis de mesurer combien le débat sur la nature et la matière des cieux était aussi sinon plus important que la question de l’hypothèse héliocentrique, et surtout à quel point il était impossible de séparer la question mathématique de la question physique . Examinée sous ce nouvel angle, l’histoire de l’astronomie traditionnelle semble subir une étrange anamorphose : la place de Copernic, sans être négligeable, y devient bien moindre que celle de Tycho Brahe, qui n’est pourtant crédité d’aucune révolution, et c’est tout le visage du débat astronomique qui s’en trouve transformé. Or l’on peut faire subir à cette histoire d’autres anamorphoses, et, dans le cadre de cet ouvrage sur les systèmes du monde, nous voudrions insister sur deux points qui lient, à la Renaissance, le ciel à la terre. Le premier est le rôle de la physique comme l’un des moteurs de la transformation des cieux, l’autre est la question de la persistance et de la vitalité du géocentrisme. Celui-ci en effet, bien que généralement négligé par l’histoire des sciences qui voit en lui un phénomène résiduel, une survivance, constitue pourtant un aspect bien vivant de l’astronomie du XVIe siècle, d’abord parce qu’il continue d’être le système du monde dominant, malgré des insuffisances qui commencent à devenir criantes . Il fait donc partie de l’histoire de l’astronomie renaissante au même titre que ses dits « progrès ». La terre, par ailleurs, est aussi nécessairement, un point de départ ; elle ordonne le regard scientifique vers le ciel et, pour une partie, le conditionne étroitement. La question que s’est posée Galilée, en effet, n’était pas tant de savoir si la terre était une planète comme les autres que de savoir si la lune était une terre céleste. Or le fait de penser le ciel sans solution de continuité avec le monde terrestre est l’un des prolongements d’une activité intellectuelle qui consiste également à repenser la matière sublunaire. S’il n’est pas question de minimiser l’importance des mathématiques et plus tard de l’observation pour les transformations des théories astronomiques, nous voudrions souligner que, parallèlement aux mouvements liés aux insuffisances propres de l’astronomie géocentrique, les interrogations sur la terre, comme univers matériel autant que comme globe, ont joué un double rôle pour l’histoire des systèmes du monde. D’une part, en effet, les interrogations sur la physique aristotélicienne et sur la pertinence ou non de la rupture entre monde sublunaire et monde supralunaire sont une condition indispensable à la possibilité de repenser le système céleste ; d’autre part, l’importance croissante de nouvelles sciences de la terre, cosmographie et géographie, est un facteur d’explication (autre que la résistance au changement ou le conservatisme intellectuel facilement invoqués) de la persistance d’un géocentrisme vivant.

During the 17th century, the debate over the true world system (sistema mundi) was essentially between the heliocentric and geo-heliocentric models. Comparisons were made between tables that recorded more and more celestial observations in various printed astronomical works. Giovanni Battista Riccioli’s Almagestum novum (1651) provides an excellent example of how tables were used. Riccioli wanted to find the best hypothesis (hypothesis absoluta) with the help of a rigorous database from which he could proceed to make mathematical deductions. Tables in early modern astronomical books were important because they showed the results of observations. Presented in a clear way they became persuasive visual arguments.

i) The Pleasing Theory of Panpsychism
ii) Geocentrism?
iii) Unobservable Consciousness
iv) Absence of Evidence
v) Are Panpsychists Closet Theists?

Philosopher Philip Goff and science writer/journalist John Horgan disagree about panpsychism.

In a blog post ('The New Copernican Revolution: A Response to John Horgan'), Philip Goff lays out the philosophical problems he has with John Horgan's stance on panpsychism. It mainly concerns what Horgan sees as panpsychism's “geocentrism”; though it does touch on the nature of evidence (i.e., when it comes to both metaphysical and scientific theories).

Firstly, John Horgan accuses panpsychists of “neo-geocentrism”. And then Philip Goff accuses John Horgan of geocentrism. According to both Goff and Horgan, geocentrism is

“the attempt to drag us back to the pre-Copernican view that reality revolves us human beings”.

I note the distinction between the following:

i) Seeing consciousness as being “fundamental” to our own conceptions of the universe/reality.

and

ii) Seeing consciousness as being fundamental to the universe/reality simpliciter.

Goff also goes into greater detail about what he thinks “non-panpsychists” believe. He writes:

“For non-panpsychists, consciousness – the source of all that is of value in existence – is to be found on the planet alone, and only in its very recent history. In the immensity of the cosmos, we are uniquely special and privileged.”

Goff then puts the panpsychist position:

“Panpsychists, in contrast, propose a new Copernican revolution, according to which there’s nothing special about human consciousness...”

Even if someone accepts that phenomenal properties exist all the way down (i.e., to rocks and atoms), it may still be the case that human consciousness is indeed special. However, the word “special” is loaded because everything in the universe – from a type of rock to an ant - is special and unique in some (or even many) ways.

ABSTRACT
The internationalization of the firm: an analysis of a Brazilian eucalyptus pulp exporter in 2018 based on Uppsala and Bartlett & Ghoshal models
The present research had compared how Uppsala and Bartlett & Ghoshal (B&G) models explain the internationalization process of the Brazilian pulp producer Fibria.
The Uppsala model describes the developments of capabilities that enable the firm to move towards higher commitments abroad. Despite its sine-qua-non dependence on foreign markets, it is unlikely that Fibria will internationalize its production to another country, given the country-specific advantages that the company has in Brazil. Nevertheless, Fibria set its structure abroad even when the direct exports would suffice to reach the markets without any foreign direct investment.
B&G deals with the aspects of the organizational structure and described the Transnational type as the evolution of the international firm. In their typology, Fibria was a Global and Ethnocentric type, but interestingly, elements of Transnational and Geocentric models were also observed in the company.
Both theories overlap or complement each other in many aspects. However, they could not explain the peculiarities of the internationalization of Fibria. One reason is the lack of country-related elements in these models.
Eventually, comparisons between theories such as those presented enable decision-makers to align the corporate strategy using suitable models, bearing in mind the limitations that each method entails.

Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential theories of Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland in information-theoretic terms. Dennett makes much of the fact that the morphological shorthand which emerges before a witness as she looks upon cohesive aggregates of matter commands some measure of predictive power. This, for him, speaks against eliminating recourse to an intentional vocabulary. By contrast, the eliminative materialism defended by Churchland does not gloss such informational compressibility as an explanatory desideratum, and thus regards the informational noise which accrues at higher levels of description as patently unacceptable. Yet, since it is unlikely, as Ross et al. (2007) have recently suggested, that anything remains once we subtract the appeal to patterns, I argue that the ubiquity of informational compression in scientific explanation seriously undermines the claim that talk of the mental could be eliminated.

One way the alleged conflict between science and religion is often presented is the claim that Western religions represent human beings as the pinnacle of creation. Science, however, has progressively shown this perspective to be false, specifically through the discoveries that we are not at the universe’s center, that the universe is much larger than we once thought, and that we evolved from “lower” life forms. While these discoveries are valid, the interpretation that they mortify vain human pretensions to significance is not. In this essay we assess this claim of
mortification and argue that it is a myth.

One way the alleged conflict between science and religion is often presented is the claim that Western religions represent human beings as the pinnacle of creation. Science, however, has progressively shown this perspective to be false, specifically through the discoveries that we are not at the universe’s center, that the universe is much larger than we once thought, and that we evolved from “lower” life forms. While these discoveries are valid, the interpretation that they mortify vain human pretensions to significance is not. In this essay we assess this claim of mortification and argue that it is a myth.