Graham Priest

There is an aporia to finitude: if I am limited as a finite being, I cannot know what the limits of my finitude are, because if I knew what those limits are, then I would have transcended them. I refer to this aporia as the "hard problem of finitude," interpreted through Graham Priest's work on inclosure paradoxes. Here I offer an interpretation of François Laruelle's theory of the Philosophical Decision in terms of his attempt to resolve this aporia through his suspension of standard philosophy's form of ontological dualism. Next, I apply non-standard philosophy to the problem of religious pluralism, presenting a novel theory of "standard religion" and the "Hierophanic Decision" through a non-standard reading of Mircea Eliade's philosophy of religion, and end by pointing towards what a consistently performative and finite form of religious pluralism might look like from within the "democracy-of-thought," here rendered as the "parliament of religions."

Questa tesi intende presentare l’implicazione connessiva da due punti di vista: uno logico (parte I) e uno storico (parte II). Nell’introduzione si darà un rapido sguardo ai paradossi dell’implicazione materiale e si indicheranno alcuni tentativi di soluzione: in particolare, si presenteranno i vari approcci connessivi, con particolare attenzione per quello di Graham Priest. Nel capitolo 1 della parte I, si presenterà sintassi e semantica della logica connessiva PrC, così come è esposta in Priest [47], servendosi dei modelli kripkeani. Si mostreranno anche alcune proprietà peculiari della nozione di conseguenza logica connessiva: essa è transitiva e chiusa sotto modus ponens ma non è riflessiva, né monotona né chiusa sotto sostituzione uniforme. I principi connessivi sono validi in tale semantica, però delle tesi di Boezio sono valide solo le versioni deboli, ovvero quelle che hanno per connettivo principale un’implicazione materiale. Verrà poi definita una nuova semantica per PrC, equivalente alla precedente, ma la cui relazione di accessibilità è esplicitata ed è una relazione di equivalenza. Inoltre, si mostrerà come sia possibile, tramite una funzione di traduzione e la sua inversa, tradurre, salva veritate, formule di PrC in formule della logica modale S5 e viceversa. Nel capitolo 2, verrà rapidamente descritto un calcolo di sequenti etichettati per S5 e si accennerà alle proprietà del suddetto calcolo. In seguito, si definirà un calcolo etichettato per PrC (rispetto alla semantica con relazione di equivalenza), chiamato G3.PrC: se ne presenteranno le regole e si dimostreranno i due risultati fondamentali di validità e completezza per G3.PrC. Nella parte II, analizzeremo il passo degli Analitici Primi nel quale alcuni logici rintracciano alcune delle più famose formule connessive. Dopo un commento del passo e una rapida panoramica su alcune delle più autorevoli esegesi del brano, si esporrà una nuova interpretazione del testo, che si basa sui capitoli degli Analitici che fanno da contesto al passaggio in questione: lo Stagirita vorrebbe dimostrare che una conclusione vera non può seguire per necessità da premesse false. Si motiveranno, sulla base della filosofia aristotelica, le due tesi che fungono da base alla nuova interpretazione proposta: (i) le regole logiche cui Aristotele fa riferimento sono semantiche (in termini moderni: lo Stagirita starebbe parlando della nozione di conseguenza logica); (ii) con le due lettere A e B, Aristotele intende le due premesse di un sillogismo (A) e la conclusione (B) e non due enunciati qualsiasi (non sarebbero, dunque, variabili enunciative tout court). Infine, si analizzeranno le tre figure sillogistiche per saggiare la validità del ragionamento aristotelico nella nuova esegesi data, mostrando come, sebbene insorgano alcune difficoltà, sia possibile affermare che la nuova interpretazione valida l’argomento dello Stagirita.

French philosopher Gilles Deleuze wrote two 'logic' books: Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation and The Logic of Sense. However, in neither of these books nor in any other works does Deleuze articulate in a formal way the features of the logic he employs. He certainly does not use classical logic. And the best options for the non-classical logic that he may be implementing are: fuzzy, intuitionist, and many-valued. These are applicable to his concepts of heterogeneous composition and becoming, affirmative synthetic disjunction, and powers of the false.

In The Logic of Gilles Deleuze: Basic Principles, Corry Shores examines the applicability of three non-classical logics to Deleuze's philosophy, by building from the philosophical and logical writings of Graham Priest, the world's leading proponent of dialetheism. Through so doing, Shores argues that Deleuze's logic is best understood as a dialetheic, paraconsistent, many-valued logic.

[Winner of the 2022 Hegel PD Prize and Awarded a Special Mention by the Metaphysical Society of America for the 2024 Findlay Prize]

Contemporary philosophical discourse has deeply problematized the possibility of absolute existence. Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics demonstrates that by reading Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept in his Science of Logic as a form of Absolute Dialetheism, Hegel’s logic of the concept can account for the possibility of absolute existence. Through a close examination of Hegel’s concept of self-referential universality in his Science of Logic, Moss demonstrates how Hegel’s concept of singularity is designed to solve a host of metaphysical and epistemic paradoxes central to this problematic. He illustrates how Hegel’s revolutionary account of universality, particularity, and singularity offers solutions to six problems that have plagued the history of Western philosophy: the problem of nihilism, the problem of instantiation, the problem of the missing difference, the problem of absolute empiricism, the problem of onto-theology, and the third man regress. What is more, Moss reconstructs how Hegel’s affirmation and development of a revised ontological argument for God’s existence is designed to establish the necessity of absolute existence. By adopting a metaphysical reading of Richard Dien Winfield’s foundation free epistemology, Moss critically engages dominant readings and contemporary debates in Hegel scholarship. Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics will appeal to scholars interested in Hegel, German Idealism, 19th-20th century European philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, and contemporary European thought.

This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one can be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.

Contradiction or not-contradiction? Brandom’s Interpretation of Hegelian Dialectic

According to Horstmann, Hegel thinks of his new logic as being in part incompatible with traditional logic. The strongest expression of this new conception of logic is the first thesis of the work Hegel discussed in 1801 in order to get his teaching habilitation: contradictio est regula veri, non contradiction falsi. Hegel seems to claim that contradictions are true. If so, his logic is inconsistent and it seems to be condemned to absurdity.
Nevertheless, this is not the only way to look at Hegel’s philosophical picture. Robert Brandom, in Tales of the Mighty Dead, claims that far from rejecting the law of noncontradiction […] Hegel radicalizes it, and places it at the very center of his thought. In Brandom’s view, Hegelian dialectic is perfectly consistent: contradiction is nothing other than the relation of modally robust exclusion through which a conceptual meaning determines itself as the determinate negation of other incompatible conceptual meanings. The aim of my paper is to show how Brandom’s reading fails to grasp the true nature of contradiction in Hegel’s thought. In order to do that, I will try to explain how Brandom misses the self-reflective character of Hegel’s notion of determinate negation, and how this gap prevents him to understand the truth contradictory nature of logical determinations in Hegel’s system. This very removal of the thesis of the truth of contradiction entails Brandom’s subscription to a project that is wholly different from Hegel’s one. Brandom’s effort to actualize Hegel’s thought fails, insofar as his account does not involve the essential core of this thought. If we want to endorse an actualizing approach with respect to Hegel’s philosophy, the research on paraconsistent logical systems and especially on dialetheism represents a more promising choice. In dialetheism, as well as in Hegel’s philosophy, the challenge of thinking the truth of contradiction is accepted. In both cases this challenge gives rise to a logical revolution with respect to the standard logic paradigm.

Plato’s contest for the early Academy was to answer Parmenides’ criticisms of the Theory of the Universal Forms through an interpretation of the dialectical exercises presented in the Parmenides (§I).  Plato’s Theory of the Universal Forms and the objections of the Parmenides may now be more precisely formulated in predicate logic using the notational convention developed by Edward Zalta (§II).  The two principal objections to Plato’s Theory of the Universal Forms are the Third Man Argument and the Greatest Difficulty Argument: the Third Man Argument can be answered by Constance Meinwald’s distinction of Self-Predication and Gail Fine’s distinction of Non-Identity (§III); and the Greatest Difficulty Argument implies the inconsistent set of Russell's Paradox, yet may be answered through the construction of a hierarchical set theoretical model that subsumes and restricts the semantic scope of each subordinate hypothesis (§IV).  The rejection of the external predication of the Third Man Argument and the two-world ontology of the Greatest Difficulty Argument suggests a monistic ontology of internal relations in the Concrete Universal form of all forms (§V).

My aim in this paper is to make the implications of the antifoundationalist
position more comprehensible by showing that antifoundationalist
ontological theories can be clearly and precisely
articulated, and that they need to imply neither nihilistic conclusions nor
inconsistency. To this end I will look at two groups of antifoundationalist
ontologies, one due to Nelson Goodman, and one
developed by Randall Dipert and Graham Priest.

Felsefe tarihine baktığımızda Aristoteles’in ortaya koyduğu haliyle çelişmezlik ilkesinin, düşüncenin ve hatta varlığın temel ilkesi olarak kabul edilip bu anlamda ortodoksiyi oluşturduğunu görürüz. Aristoteles, varlığın en temel ilkesi olarak gördüğü çelişmezlik ilkesinden hareketle kuvve-fiil, fiil-tamamlanmış fiil gibi ayrımlar yaparak değişim içerisindeki nesnenin varoluşunu incelemiştir. Çelişmezlik ilkesi de nesnenin belirleniminin temel ilkesi olmuştur. Ancak bu ilkeye bağlı olarak zaman, özellikle de zamanın kesiti olarak ân düşünülmeye çalışıldığında çelişkilerle karşılaşıldığı görülür. Çelişmezlik ilkesine bağlı kalınan çerçevede zamanın kavramsal düzeyde açıklanamadığı tespit edilmiştir.
20. yüzyılda ortaya çıkmaya başlayan –klasik olmayan mantıklardan olan– tutarlı-ötesi mantıklar çelişmezlik ilkesinin belirli durumlarda geçerli olmadığını iddia etmektedir. Tutarlı-ötesi mantıklardan en radikal olanı ise düşüncenin sınır durumlarında ortaya çıkan bazı çelişkilerin doğru ve gerçek olduğunu savunan dialetik mantıktır. 1970’lerde Graham Priest ve Richard Routley’in ortaya koyduğu, Priest tarafından geliştirilen dialetik mantık son yıllarda akademide hem mantık düzeyinde hem de metafiziksel imaları itibariyle etkisini göstermektedir.
Çelişmezlik ilkesine bağlı kalındığı için klasik mantıkta kavramsallaştırılamayan zamanın dialetik mantık içerisinde kavram düzeyinde açıklanıp açıklanamadığı tezin ana konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Bu konu incelenirken öncelikle Aristoteles düşüncesinden hareketle klasik mantıkta zaman konusunda karşılaşılan güçlükler ortaya konulmuş, ardından dialetik mantığın gerekçelendirilmesine ve temellendirilmesine yer verilmiştir. Nihayetinde ise dialetik mantığın zaman metafiziğini nasıl ele aldığı aktarılmıştır. Yapılan incelemeler sonucunda, dialetik mantığın önemli imkânlar barındırdığı ama zaman metafiziği konusunda henüz bu imkânları kullanmadığı, dialetik mantıktan metafiziğe geçiş sürecinin Priest’te yeterince hazırlanmadığını ve dialetik mantıktan metafiziğe geçişin transandantal bir bakış açısı gerektirdiği tespit edilmiştir.

The goals of this paper are two-fold: I wish to clarify the Aristotelian conception of the law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical rather than a semantic or logical principle, and to defend the truth of the principle in this sense. First I will explain what it in fact means that the law of non-contradiction is a metaphysical principle. The core idea is that the law of non-contradiction is a general principle derived from how things are in the world. For example, there are certain constraints as to what kind of properties an object can have, and especially: some of these properties are mutually exclusive. Given this characterisation, I will advance to examine what kind of challenges the law of noncontradiction faces—the main opponent here is Graham Priest. I will consider these challenges and conclude that they do not threaten the truth of the law of noncontradiction understood as a metaphysical principle.

This paper is divided in two parts. In the first, I sketch the debate between Priest and Severino on the principle of non-contradiction (henceforth PNC) and its defence. I explain what the challenge to PNC amounts to, by distinguishing paraconsistency from dialetheism. Later I will dwell on Severino's broad conception of PNC integrating the laws of identity and of non-contradiction into a more basic law that can be dubbed the principle of ontic determinacy. A crucial point in the dispute is the conception of negation, that is, whether or not the PNC denier, while claiming a dialetheia, must avail herself of the exclusive negation, despite her intentions. If so, the charge is not so much of inconsistency but of holding a self-undermining position as any proposition affirming a dialetheia would be grounded on PNC itself. In the second part, I propose a mild interpretation of dialetheisms. By considering some reasons supporting it, I suggest that it is motivated by the view that reality is over-determinate, rather than indeterminate (as it would happen, according to Aristotle and Severino, if PNC turned out to be false), and by the fact that the conceptual, linguistic expression of this over-determination leads to contradictions. A dialetheia is, as it were, a two-footed creature whose being simultaneously both true and false is grounded upon two (or more) different facts. These are mutually conflicting and thus play the roles of, respectively, verifying and falsifying the very same proposition. The existence of these facts, however, must be an univo-cal datum also for a dialetheia. If so, dialetheism does not jeopardize the view that reality, at least at its most fundamental level, is absolutely determined-just as Aristotle and Severino claim.

The philosophical question of nothingness has often been controversial. The main core of the question is the use of ‘nothing’ or ‘nothingness’ as a noun phrase rather than a quantifier phrase. This work deals with the question of nothingness and metaphysical nihilism in analytic philosophy. After evaluating an account of nothingness based on the notion of an empty possible world, the present work proposes two original arguments for metaphysical nihilism. With a preface by Graham Priest.

<<Simionato’s book delivers a welcome deepening of our understanding of nothing.”>> Graham Priest

My MA ("Magister") thesis, written in German. Critically evaluates the Quinean  "existentialist" apporach to ontology, according to which everything exists, and Meinongian theories, according to which some objects do not exist. Includes a detailed discussion of Alexius Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie, which culminates in the dilemma of being-so, and of Graham Priest's 2005 noneism (nowadays usually referred to as "Modal Meinongianism").

Noneism a is form of Meinongianism, proposed by Richard Routley and developed and improved by Graham Priest in his widely discussed book Towards Non-Being. Priest's noneism is based upon the double move of (a) building a worlds semantics including impossible worlds, besides possible ones, and (b) admitting a new comprehension principle for objects, differerent from the ones proposed in other kinds of neo-Meinongian theories, such as Parsons' and Zalta's. The new principle has no restrictions on the sets of properties that can deliver objects, but parameterizes the having of properties by objects to worlds. Modality is therefore explicitly built in - so the approach can be conveniently labeled as "modal noneism". In this paper, I put modal noneism to work by testing it against classical issues in modal logic and semantics. It turns out that - perhaps surprisingly - the theory (1) performs well in problems of transworld identity, which are frequently considered to be the difficult ones in the literature; (2) faces a limitation, albeit not a severe one, when one comes to transworld individuation, which is often taken (especially after Kripke's notorious 'stipulation' solution) as an easy issue, if not a pseudo-problem; and (3) may stumble upon a real trouble when dealing with what I shall call 'extensionally indiscernible entities' - particular nonexistent objects modal noneism is committed to.

In Deleuze’s treatments of Nietzsche’s amor fati and of Stoic fatalism, we find a temporal structure that couples logically incompatible elements, namely, chance and destiny in the first case and will and fate in the second. In Deleuze’s accounts, it is by means of a particular sort of affirmational activity that allows our immediate, present temporality – during which chance and willful action reign – to intersect with an eternal sort of temporality that houses our fate and destiny and that thus lies outside our immediate grasp. To understand this combination of incompatible temporalities in Deleuze’s philosophy, we will employ paraconsistent reasoning, which allows us to affirm both the truth and falsity of some proposition, or, construed another way, it allows us to dually affirm both a proposition and its paraconsistent negation. We thereby will consider these temporal structures as involving “dialetheias” (true contradictions). Under this view, we will also explore a dialetheic interpretation of Deleuze’s notions of the powers of the false, from his writings on Nietzsche, and of prohairesis (“volition”) and Aiôn and Chronos, from his writings on the Stoics.
It is important to emphasize in a Deleuzian context that paraconsistent negation in such contradictory formulations bears a critically different logical property from classical negation, namely, it does not cancel, “destroy,” or exclude what it negates. This is because negation is distinct from denial in paraconsistent reasoning: we do not both affirm and deny the same proposition; rather, we affirm both its truth and falsity. Thus by means of this paraconsistent mode of reasoning, we can implement a logical structure that is suitable to the sorts of affirmative synthetic disjunctions involved in Deleuze’s logically complex temporal structures. This in the end enables us to understand how for Deleuze we may affirm our fate while also influencing the directions that the present develops toward.

This paper will look at Kant's views of the aesthetic experience, in relationship to Buddhist philosophical and political discussions of art and social organization. The primary focus in Kantian literature explores the relationship between free and dependent beauty, as well as Kant's paradox of taste. The central argument of the Kantian portion is going to navigate the paradox of taste via Graham Priest's epistemic and conceptual distinction pertaining to the limits of thought. Secondly, I shall contextualize the debate with similar argumentation found in medieval Tibetan literature, by thinkers such as Tsongkhapa and Drakpa Gyaltsen. Lastly, I shall look at the political and artistic state of affairs in Yuan and Ming Dynasties and assert the applicability of both Kantian and Tibetan discussions of effibility in the context of Tibetan poetry and Thangkas.

During the past few decades, Graham Priest has advocated for Dialetheism, the controversial position that some contradictions are true. Dialetheism entails that the Law of Non-Contradiction fails. In recent decades the philosophical community has begun to recognize the significant challenge posed by Priest's arguments. Priest has primarily appealed to paradoxes of self-reference, such as the Liar Paradox, to support his position. Following Priest's approach, I offer another argument for Dialetheism, which appeals to a self-referential paradox that has been more or less ignored in the philosophical literature on the subject: the paradox of the missing difference. When we reflect on the question 'what is a concept?' from the perspective of a classical model of conceptual analysis, we arrive at the paradox of the missing difference. Although contradictions may be improbable, when we reflect on the question 'how is the domain of concepts possible?' we are led to a startling principle: without dialetheia any theory concerning concept formation (from a classical perspective on concepts) would be impossible. Dialetheism is a necessary condition for the existence of a domain of concepts in general. As a result, Dialetheism may even be more central to philosophical reflection than even dialetheists themselves have recognized.

The subject of my article is the principle of characterization – the most controversial principle of Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, I would like to show that Russell’s well-known objection to Meinong’s Theory of Objects can be reformulated against a new modal interpretation of Meinongianism that is presented mostly by Graham Priest. Secondly, I would like to propose a strategy which gives uncontroversial restriction to the principle of characterization and which allows to avoid Russell’s argument. The strategy is based on the distinction between object- and metalanguage, and it applies to modal Meinongianism as well as to other so-called Meinongian theories.

The paper deals with Priest's interpretation of Kant, and it focuses primarily on the argument displayed in Kant's second antinomy, which concerns the determination of the atomic parts of material composite substances. The paper recostructs how Priest refers to Kant, firstly with regards to the question of the limits of thought, then with regards to the problem of the one and the many, and finally concerning the ontological dependence of an object on its parts. In the concluding remarks, I argue that the main problem Priest detects in Kant's arguments lies in the incompatibility of his positions with Kant's idealism, and I point to some further potential  work on this topic.

Anti-exceptionalists about logic claim that logical methodology is not different from scientific methodology when it comes to theory choice. Two anti-exceptionalist accounts of theory choice in logic are abductivism (defended by Priest and Williamson) and predictivism (recently proposed by Martin and Hjortland). These accounts have in common reliance on pre-theoretical logical intuitions for the assessment of candidate logical theories. In this paper, I investigate whether intuitions can provide what abductivism and predictivism want from them and conclude that they do not. As an alternative to these approaches, I propose a Carnapian view on logical theorizing according to which logical theories do not simply account for pre-theoretical intuitions, but rather improve on them. In this account, logical theories are ameliorative, rather than representational.

There are at least three reasons for disappointment about Francesco Berto’s discussion of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Gödel’s Theorems (Berto 2009).  The first is that he repeats, without any qualification, improvement or criticism so much of what Graham Priest was saying in 1971 (Priest 1973) with regard to elementary paradoxes like that supposed to exist with sentences such as ‘This sentence is false’.    The second is that he also repeats what Priest had to say then, and more prominently in his ‘The Logic of Paradox’ paper (Priest 1979) about the more technical and specialised difficulties supposed to exist with sentences like ‘This sentence is not provable’.  But the third and major disappointment concerns the attempted elucidation of Wittgenstein’s understanding of Gödel’s Theorems.  Seemingly Wittgenstein was some kind of proto-paraconsistentist.  Priest himself, in more recent times, has, in a different way, tried to tar Wittgenstein with the same brush (Priest 2004).  Let us get the paradoxes out of the way before we see whether Wittgenstein was taken in by the Gödelian one.

Dialetheism isn't a formal logic. Thus, it that respect, this piece may well be barking up the wrong tree most of the time. Dialetheism, instead, “is a thesis about truth”. It's this emphasis which leads dialetheists to construct a logic which deals with truth. (Or, at the least, with truth as it's thrown up primarily by various paradoxes in set theory and elsewhere.) Indeed Graham Priest himself said that "the whole point of the dialetheic solution to the semantic paradoxes is to get rid of the distinction between object language and meta-language". (Clearly, this is a Tarskian focus on the nature of truth.)

Nonetheless, in what follows I question what amounts to the truth-for-dialetheism problem by asking questions about dialetheism's relation to the world (or Priest's “reality”).

There's also a problem with the Liar Paradox as it's expressed by some dialetheists. Such formulations of the Liar Paradox are used to justify dialetheism; or, at the least, to justify a dialetheic logic.

This paper asks whether Priest’s Modal Meinongianism can be considered Un-Meinongian in any philosophically interesting sense as e.g. Kroon (2012) has claimed. It will focus on attributions of
properties to non-existents in Priest’s (2016) Modal Meinongianism, and compare it to Meinong’s
original Gegenstandstheorie . Despite Priest’s own claim that many predications in Modal
Meinongianism are not “literal” (in a sense to be clarified), it will be established that predications at
possible worlds can be just as literal as in Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie , so that contrary to Priest’s
own views on the matter, Modal Meinongianism turns out to be very much Meinongian in this sense.
However, Priest’s existence-entailing properties are not only incompatible with Meinong’s central
Independence Principle, but it will be shown that due to their postulation Modal Meinongianism
cannot uphold its claim that all of its non-actual worlds do not exist. In the course of this
argumentation, it will be established that Modal Meinongianism is committed to a Lewisian
concretism of possible worlds, once an undue restriction to the actual in Priest’s (2016) semantics is
removed. The ontology of Modal Meinongianism’s impossible worlds is then approached from the
vantage point of literal predications. It is argued that from an ontological perspective, literal
predications should be given up at such worlds, but that this abandonment of literalness leads to the
failure to provide a fully general Characterization Principle for non-existent objects. And in this sense,
Modal Meinongianism turns out to be even too Meinongian for its own good, rather than
Un-Meinongian.

My aim in this work is to defend the plausibility of a dialetheist approach to one of the dogmas of Christianity, the doctrine of the incarnation. I defend the idea that the doctrine of the incarnation - the theory that Jesus Christ, the second person of the Trinity, is truly divine and truly human - is indeed a contradictory or dialetheist theory and that, however, there is no problem in accepting such a contradiction. In order to do that, I respond to two objections to this idea. The first is the logical absurd objection, which says that in the event the doctrine of the incarnation was contradictory, it would be illogical or it would be possible to draw absurd conclusions from it. My response to this objection is based on Jc Beall’s work on a contradictory Christology. The second is the epistemological absurd objection, which says that, in the event the doctrine of the incarnation was contradictory, it would be irrational. In my response to this objection, I discuss James Anderson’s theory of the rationality of paradoxical doctrines. I oppose to Anderson’s idea that the doctrine of the incarnation is rational because it is merely apparently contradictory and defend the idea that this doctrine can be rational being genuinely contradictory.

In practice, phenomenology is an investigation of one's own consciousness by means of introspective awareness. Nonetheless, it can be considered a special sort of science, given that it obtains its data using a rigorous methodology. On the basis of these data, phenomenologists can devise "models" that describe the structures of consciousness. Husserl in fact thought that even the forms of logical judgments can be traced to more basic structures of consciousness. After examining the way that he locates the origin of negation in experiences of phenomenal "disappointment," which result in part from the layered structure of time-constituting consciousness, we turn to Barry Dainton's construction of models of the specious present. One type that is built upon Husserl's writings is a "retentional" model where the objective present is a simple instant, but all the while other recent moments have stacked up in retentional awareness to create the illusion of a present with a durational thickness. In Dainton's own rival "extensional" model, however, the present really does extend for a duration of about a second or so, and all the moments that seem present in fact are. At the end I propose a model of the specious present that is based on Graham Priest's spread hypothesis. It does not vindicate dialetheism; rather, it is merely built upon the assumption that we directly perceive dialetheias of motion. It is both retentional and extensional, since in it the actual present of our conscious activity has a very tiny extensive spread, all while recent prior spreads stack up in our retentional awareness to create the impression of an enduring present. This model has the advantages of explaining the continuity of phases in the specious present while also accounting for experiences of phenomenal disappointment.

Aim: to study the soundness of The Sorites and The Liar. The soundness of one of these paradoxes may serve as justification for the creation of Nonclassical Logic.
Study design:  The study was designed in a way to allow for those who have a logical background, but no specific formation, to understand all that is involved.
Place and Duration of Study: This study was conducted in Burwood, Sydney, NSW, Australia, from June of 2022 to February of 2023.
Methodology: Systematic creation following Bloom’s analysis and synthesis of the results of the scholastic application of logical tools to relevant data sets.
Results: With The Sorites, induction reasoning leads to no conflict, since the conclusion does not eventuate, and non-induction reasoning leads to no conflict because the premise does not eventuate. Yet, we need to describe the blurred region somehow. With The Liar, ‘this sentence is false’ = ‘this sentence’ or X=X is false and X is clearly different from X is false. Similar reasoning appeared when we discussed the Russell’s Paradox and we can see that the solutions to these paradoxes will also be similar. Yet, ~T and F are different things in language, since ~T may mean mainly false, but partially true, so that we need to find a logic that describes ~T as it is in language.
Conclusions: Both The Liar and The Sorites are valid but unsound arguments. X=X is false is not an acceptable sentence in Logic. Nonclassical Logicians have created alternative logical systems that may be used to deal with blurred regions and problems requiring more than two truth-values, but these systems are not good enough. Both The Liar and The Russell's are about breaching a tacit rule, which is using only what is available; a time issue.

This paper intends to offer a new assessment of the “Ontological Difference” (OD), one of Martin Heidegger’s mainstays, in the light of the metaphysical view called “dialetheism”. In the first paragraph I briefly summarize the main argument of Heidegger’s contradiction of Being, where OD is present as a premise. In the second paragraph I introduce dialetheism, indicate two kinds of dialetheic solutions to the paradox and explain why they face comeback troubles from OD. The third paragraph is devoted to a review of Heidegger’s uses of OD and underlines the crucial role of negation in it. In the fourth paragraph I investigate the philosopher’s account of negation and show similarities with the account provided by the paraconsistent logic called “Logic of Paradox”. The fifth paragraph puts forward two possible readings of OD, the first based on the classical notion of negation and the second on the notion of negation pointed out in the previous paragraph. The second reading is proved suitable for dialetheists and in accordance with the exegesis of some textual passages from Heidegger’s late works.

Because of the public, communicative function of propositions, Logic is a moral science about what ought to be said.  The association with morality derives from the intimate connection between Logic and Truth and the social value of speaking the truth.  Propositions are used sentences rather than mentioned sentences, and so are not the platonically abstract objects they have often been taken to be.  Instead they are social objects formed by a community’s employment of language.  So it is the public use of sentences that settles what they mean, and thereby their logic.  The matter has a particular relevance to Graham Priest’s non-classical views, but applies much more generally.