Great Britain and the European Union

'Membership of the European Union changes the relationship between Parliament and the courts in the British constitution. Parliament is no longer sovereign and the courts are no longer bound to uphold the will of Parliament.' Can this possibly be true?

The views held by African Commonwealth leaders are absent from the historiography of the Britain’s first EEC application, despite their value for understanding why the Macmillan government experienced such difficulty in reorienting its foreign policy towards Europe. Between July 1961, when Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah established his opposition to the application, and January 1963, when it was vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle, the Anglo-Ghanaian relationship was characterized by tension and acrimony. This article seeks to understand the impact of Nkrumah’s objections to the application and Macmillan’s reaction to Nkrumah’s concerns. Though the Ghanaian President alone did not alter the course of Britain’s approach to the Community, he did add to the tense atmosphere in which London considered how to approach the Commonwealth. Furthermore, Macmillan’s efforts to maintain a positive relationship with Nkrumah, in the context of the Cold War, demonstrate the reluctance with which the prime minister loosened ties with the Commonwealth.

In 2016, the Brexit-Trump watershed resulted in two consecutive shocks for British foreign policy, which under the May governments has been rearticulated around the goal to forge 'Global Britain'. This article discusses how the 'Global Britain' strategy may play out in two broad international domains – trade and security – to elaborate on implications for the international order. The analysis especially elucidates the dubious feasibility of compensating 'hard Brexit' with free-trade agreements around the world, and the pitfalls of extrication from the EU as regards common foreign policy, data-sharing and sanctions policy. Trump's election is argued to bring about a more protectionist trade environment while facilitating the prospect of a UK-US trade deal, which however compels the British government to uneasy balancing acts. Finally, an interest-oriented Global Brit-ain about to face diplomatic overstretching and economic difficulties is suggested to have turned into a more precarious defender of the rules-based international order.

Si la recherche dans les domaines institutionnel, juridique ou économique de l'évolution des Communautés européennes est abondante, force est de constater que les "Europe que dessinent les partis politiques" ne sont que très peu étudiées. Cet ouvrage se veut donc une contribution à l'étude des acteurs politiques face à la Communauté européenne et à leurs jeux d'influences réciproques. L'analyse offre, dans une perspective historique, un tableau de l'évolution du mouvement socialiste en Europe occidentale depuis 1945 et des rapports complexes de la social-démocratie à la construction européenne. Tant il est vrai qu'au-delà de leur internationalisme proclamé, le champ d'action privilégié des partis socialistes, au cours du vingtième siècle, a été l'espace national. L'édification des différents modèles d'Etat-providence s'est réalisée à cette échelle et les rapports de forces sur lesquels se sont appuyés les partis socialistes étaient également nationaux. Dans ces conditions, l'édification de la Communauté européenne s'est posée comme un défi.



A partir d'un examen minutieux des partis socialistes belge, français et du parti travailliste britannique, l'auteur examine, dans une approche comparative, les différences d'attitudes des socialistes face à la construction européenne, l'évolution des points de vue et les enjeux contemporains du positionnement des socialistes face à l'Union européenne.

The outcome of the Brexit referendum is the apex of a long history of Euro-British relationships characterised by two opposing but coexisting stereotypes. On the one hand, England appears as the freedom-seeking nation resisting restrictive collective policies imposed by a totalitarian EU regime of faceless Brussels bureaucrats. On the other hand, England seems to resurrect its imperialistic superiority against the purported democracy and horizontality of European institutions. Adopting the notion of “cultural intimacy”—with which Michael Herzfeld analyzes the mutual engagement of contrasting positions in political and administrative practices—this paper addresses the equally stereotypical images of an indifferent, inhuman European bureaucracy and of an insular, cynical Great Britain in the works of Malcolm Bradbury and Tim Parks. Be it the allegedly liberal yet nationalistic stance of Thatcherist anti-Europeanism in Bradbury, or the British disaffection with the purported identitarian and cultural levelling within the common borders of the Schengen area and of the single currency, both authors’ symbolic constructions of European institutions and of British Euroscepticism are built as cultural entanglements of these two realities, and show the need to overcome the reductive conception of Europe as a failed super-state.

GET ALL YOUR PROBLEMS SOLVE WITHIN 48 HOURS GET IN TOUCH WITH THE GREATEST ONLINE SPELLS CASTER DR USMAN +2347054605662
Dr USMAN, 2021
DR USMAN is a high
voodoo priest master. he is a spell caster, native
doctor, spiritual herbalist, powerful sickle cell
healer, spiritual Astrologer, psychic reader, multi
guru, witch
doctor, priest of africa wealth secret.
DR USMAN is recognized
all over the world of marine kingdom, As one of
the top fortunate and most powerful native
doctor of charms casts from the beginning of his
ancestors ship until now
DR USMAN lives strong
among all other native doctors, there have never
been any form of impossibility beyond the
control of DR USMAN. it
doesn’t matter the distance of the person with
the problems or situation, all you have to do is
believe in the native doctor
DR USMAN charms cast
that works, he always warns never to get his
charms cast if you do not believe or unable to
follow his instruction.
It is the assignment of the native doctor DR USMAN to offer services to
those in need of spiritual assistance not minding
the gravity of your situations or distance as long
as water, sea
ocean, lake, river, sand, etc. are near you, then
your problems of life would be controlled under
your foot.
If you need any spiritual help on any of these: Revenge spell,
♦Get Your Love Back ♦ Fruit Of The Womb ♦
Fibroid ♦ Business Boom ♦ Financial Break
though ♦ Get Rich Without Ritual ♦ Do As I
Say ♦ Bad Dream ♦ Promise And Fail ♦
Epilepsy ♦ Land/Court Case C Mental Disorder
♦
Contact on WhatsApp +2347054605662
Email:doctorusman24@gmail.com

This article seeks to establish whether the British and Swiss objections to the new European external governance reveal an increasing intransigence on the part of the EU. The question arises because, almost for the first time in history, the EU schemes to manage its neighbourhood are facing serious setbacks.
This analysis shows, however, that the failures of the EU proposals for a “deal” with the United Kingdom and for an institutional agreement with Switzerland are not the result of an increase in the EU intransigence.
The detailed study of the two agreements with London and Bern demonstrates that they do not contain any real new requirements compared to the previous agreements concluded by the EU.
Thus, the British and Swiss reluctances stem mainly from the specificities of these two countries and the perception by a large part of their populations that they can resist pressure from the EU.

Bakı Slavyan Universitetinin Beynəlxalq münasibətlər və Avropaşünaslıq kafedraları, “Ölkəşünaslıq” Elmi-tədqiqat Laboratoriyası tərəfindən təşkil olunan “Müasir Avropa və ABŞ: İdeologiya, siyasət və mədəniyyət” mövzusunda Tələbə Elmi-Praktik Konfransının Materialları (20-21 may 2004-cü il). Bakı: BSU, “Kitab Aləmi” nəşriyyat-poliqrafiya mərkəzi, 66 səh.

В статье исследуется история взаимоотношений между Великобританией и Европейским союзом с 1950-х годов по настоящее время. Акцент сделан на анализе влияния, которое европейский вопрос оказывал на партийную политику (взаимоотношения консерваторов и лейбористов, взаимодействие внутри основных партий) и британское общество.
На основе исторического анализа сделан вывод о том, что на протяжении всего рассматриваемого периода отсутствовал сколь-либо устойчивый консенсус по поводу членства в ЕС. Позиции различались как по вопросам текущей политики, так и по стратегическому позиционированию Великобритании в Европе. Все без исключения правительства Великобритании были евроскептичными в том смысле, что возражали против расширения полномочий ЕС. Чем более углублялась интеграция в ЕС, тем сильнее становились евроскептичные настроения в британском обществе и политической элите. Евроскептицизм становился все более «жестким», все чаще евроскептики возражали против status quo и требовали «ослабления» ЕС, либо выхода Великобритании из ЕС. Между Лондоном и континентальной Европой неуклонно расширялась политическая, и даже идеологическая пропасть по вопросам функционирования и развития ЕС.

The article examines the history of relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union from the 1950s till the present. The analysis emphasizes the impact of the European issue on national party politics (the relationship between the conservatives and labours, the interactions within major parties) and the British society. On the basis of historical analysis, the paper concludes that there was no stable consensus on membership in the EU throughout the whole period under review. Positions differed both on current policy issues and on the UK's strategic place in Europe. All UK governments were Eurosceptic in the sense that they objected to the increase of EU powers. The deeper was integration into the EU, the stronger Eurosceptic views were in the British society and political elite. Euroscepticism became more and more “tough”; Eurosceptics objected to the status quo and claimed weakening of the EU or the UK's exit from the EU. The political and even ideological gap about the functioning and development of the EU between London and continental Europe has steadily widened.

It was with high hopes that Prime Minister Edward Heath took the UK into the European Economic Community (EEC) on 1 January 1973. It was a moment that signalled an acceptance of Britain’s role as a European, rather than global power, and drastically altered the Community. However, within twelve months it was clear that the UK’s relationship with its European partners was in trouble. Most historians argue that the UK’s challenges during the first year of membership were caused by poor timing, as Britain’s entry coincided with the Year of Europe Affair and October Yom Kippur War. But, is this a sufficient explanation?

This paper will explore Britain’s adjustment to Community membership during the year 1973, with a specific focus on Britain’s budgetary contributions. It will examine attempts to reduce the impact of Britain’s budgetary contributions on the balance of payments through the modification of existing Community policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy. In doing so, this paper will evaluate the strategies that Britain’s politicians and diplomats adopted for negotiating in the Community. It will explore the perception of British diplomacy held by the French government and the European Commission. It will ask what impact Britain’s adversarial political culture had on the ability of its diplomats to adjust to the Community’s way of conducting political business.

Ultimately, this paper will argue that the combination of unsustainable terms of membership and a strong institutional attachment to the ‘Westminster model’ contributed to Britain’s difficult transition to Community membership. It will offer conclusions about the nature of the UK’s relationship with European integration, particularly in the context of Britain’s characterisation as the awkward partner. For entry did not settle Britain into Europe, and the high hopes for Community membership held by Britain’s political elite were left largely unfulfilled.

В статье исследуется история взаимоотношений Великобритании и Евро-пейского союза с 1950-х годов по настоящее время. Проанализировано, как системные фак-торы – специфическое отношение Великобритании к дизайну, предназначению и будущему ЕС, специфическое понимание базовых ценностей интеграции – определяли стратегию и тактику европейской политики Лондона. Показано, как нарастало неразрешимое противо-речие между стремлением Лондона обеспечить независимость от ЕС и желанием влиять на политику ЕС. Обосновано, что основные параметры политики Лондона в отношении ЕС определяются особенностями британской идентичности. Укоренённое в истории противо-стояние с континентальной Европой трансформировалось в противостояние “гегемонии Евросоюза”.

The article examines the history of relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union from the 1950s to the present. The paper examines how systemic factors – the specific attitude of the UK to the design, purposes and future of the EU, a specific understanding of the basic values of integration – determined the strategy and tactics of London's European policy. It demonstrates how the contradiction be-tween London's desires to ensure independence from the EU and to influence EU policies has been growing. The paper suggests that the main parameters of London's policy towards the EU were determined by the basic features of British identity. Rooted in history, the uneasy relationship with continental Europe had trans-formed into a struggle against ‘hegemony of the European Union’. UK as a member state tried to negotiate conditions that would allow to be both inside and outside Europe, and participate only in specific components of integration.

Contents 1-­ A summary of the main argument. 2-­ Two comparative tables of different (integration) regimes for third States. 3-­ A list of 12 common misconceptions on the Swiss-­EU agreement. 1-­ Summary Main argument : Swiss-­EU bilateral agreements are the worst form of EU agreement with (close) third countries, except for all the others.-­ This assertion is based on the assumption that the UK wants to maintain maximum access to the EU Single market, while preserving maximum formal sovereignty and independence. It is useful to adopt a comparative perspective to explain why the Swiss-­EU bilaterals compare well with other regimes (see also table 1 and 2 below): 1) The European Economic Area (EEA, also known as the " Norway model ") represents the best option for the UK to preserve its trade with the EU. Indeed, the EEA offers full access to the Single Market for EFTA states (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). However, EEA membership would come with significant loss of sovereignty for the UK. EFTA countries are not part of EU institutions and have no decision-­making rights. EFTA experts are only consulted in early EU legislation phases. The EEA institutional framework is cumbersome and possesses supranational dimensions (EFTA surveillance authority and EFTA court-­ which closely follow the ECJ's case law). Besides, EEA membership comes with important financial obligations. EFTA countries are obliged to pay substantial amounts for the reduction of socio-­economic disparities in the EU. Last but not least, EEA-­EFTA States would have to accept UK's application to join the EEA/EFTA pillar unanimously. It appears that the Norwegian government has strong reservations on the matter. 2) The association agreements that the EU concluded with Ukraine (the " DCFTA " being the trade part of the agreement) have also been cited as a potential blueprint for the UK. The text of the DCFTA offers gradual access to the 1 Authors are grateful to Angus Wallace (GSI-­University of Geneva) for his editing support.