History of Ancient Macedonia

The article has hypothesized the city of Demetrias in Thessaly to have been founded in the late 290s BC by Demetrius Poliorcetes together with his son and heir, Antigonus Gonatas. This hypothesis is grounded on the basis of the fact that inscriptions from the city refer to its heroized founders-ktistai in plural, although without specifying their names (however, in literary sources just Demetrius Poliorcetes acts as the sole founder of Demetrias named so after him). The common cult of Poliorcetes and Gonatas as the ktistai could have been established either by the latter or by the citizens of Demetrias.

Although the ancient Macedonians had no independent dramatic tradition of their own, from the late fifth century onwards successive Macedonian kings began to sponsor Greek theater productions and professionals with real enthusiasm. Indeed, their patronage was crucial to the post-classical development of the ancient theater into a more international performance.

This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach combining research methods in history and political science to propose that the fundamental cause of Rome’s entry into and later domination of the Greek world was its reaction to a series of geopolitical developments in the Mediterranean region around the years 219 – 188 BCE. The thesis contends that the dominant paradigm in current scholarship on Roman imperialism assigns too much value to the internal structures of Roman society and consequently overlooks the importance of developments in the interstate system, in which the Roman state was a participant.

Following Alexander’s unexpected death in 323, his subordinates waged constant warfare for the next four decades to divide the spoils of his vast empire. By the 280s, these wars subsided, and an unstable balance of power emerged in the east Mediterranean, between the Antigonid, Ptolemaic and Seleucid dynasties.

This balance of power shattered seventy years later due to a sudden decline in Ptolemaic power, caused by a massive native uprising in Egypt, chronic domestic maladministration and a series of unfortunate coincidences. Ptolemaic collapse triggered what political scientists term a power-transition crisis, as it motivated the Antigonid and Seleucid rulers to launch aggressive wars with the aim of capturing Ptolemaic territory. Their aggression threatened the independence of minor Greek states, which attempted to recreate a tripolar balance of power in the region by appealing to Rome for intervention in the crisis.

With the Roman defeat of the two great dynasties and the collapse of the third, a new interstate system emerged in the Mediterranean: hegemony under the government of the Romans.

Despite Daniel Ogden’s and Alex McAuley’s work in collecting, organizing, and rationalizing the often contradictory information delivered by the ancient sources, the Seleukid genealogy still appears to be the most complex and chaotic maze of marital relations in the Hellenistic world. This chapter offers a fresh look at the matter by approaching the royal dynasty holistically as an ensemble of familial forces, which fluidly interacted with diverse geographical and chronological contexts, rather than as a line of rulers hypothetically matched with concurrent consorts. In so doing, I will use the term dynastic politics as embracing the alliances— and ruptures— created through marriage and all that royal marriage implies: inheritance, legitimation, regency, interdynastic blood relationships, and dynastic continuity.

This brief chapter looks at the way Alexander deployed his forces for the battle of Gaugamela, with particular attention to the way Alexander marched his army obliquely across the battlefield, and the significance of that action.
This is quite a brief chapter but includes a number of diagrams to illustrate the Macedonian deployment.

The increasing influence in the governmental matters of the Macedonian and Epirote Royal Women during the 4th centyry BC is obvious acccording to the ancient sources. Most of the examples are found in the authors' written testimony. However, we have some archeological evidence that complement the words of Diodorus, Plutarch, Arrian or Curtius. In the present paper we want to show one of the epigraphical documents in wich those women appear and demonstrate from it how the increasing presence of Royal Women in the documents is explained by a bigger power in the Macedonian and Epirote Court. For that purpose we focus our attention on the examples of two women: Olympias and Cleopatra, Alexander the Great's mother and sister, doing a preliminary review about the Royal Women's role before them.

copyright : Alexandros TZIOLAS
Ο Μέγας ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΣ στην πορεία του προς την Σογδιανή !
Διηγήματα των Ουζμπέκων : (Σογδιανή - Βακτριανή) για τον Μέγα Αλέξανδρο -
Τασκένδη 1974 : Έκδοση στα Ρώσικα
1η ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΑ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ στα Ελληνικά, copyright.

Abile stratega, condottiero e potente sovrano, Alessandro Magno di Macedonia, eroe che percepiva se stesso alla stregua di un nuovo Eracle o di un nuovo Achille, fu, prima di tutto, un “viaggiatore”. E chi si approcci alle pagine del presente lavoro, nel quale viene ripercorsa l’intera vicenda del grande macedone ,si prepari, di fatto, a compiere un lungo e affascinante viaggio...Un’esplorazione attraverso quei luoghi in cui l’uomo Alessandro compì il luminoso percorso che lo avrebbe portato a divenire mito; aspirando costantemente, come racconta la storica Lynette Mitchell nella prefazione al libro,“...a divenire il più grande tra tutti gli eroi...”.Con pieno rigore storico, e senza concessioni alla fabula, a farla da padrone, in un racconto sostenuto da una poderosa mole bibliografica, sono i fatti “così come si svolsero”. Fatti la cui rievocazione, spogliata di facili orpelli, saprà coinvolgere e trascinare ogni lettore dentro l’antica e immortale storia (o viaggio) dell’ultimo eroe.

There is a popular view, supported by Oxford historian Robin Lane Fox and others, that Alexander the Great's personal motivation and public persona were heavily influenced by the myth of Achilles. However, skeptics of this view raise many legitimate doubts about its historical accuracy.  This article takes a broad look at the evidence linking Alexander the Great to Achilles.

The Antigonid dynasty, one of the four Hellenistic kingdoms that emerged after the death of the Alexander the Great, was established in 306 BC by its eponymous founder Antigonus I Monophthalmus (‘the One-Eyed’) and his son Demetrius Poliorcetes ('the Besieger'). Originally based in Asia Minor and Syria, the family later gained control over the territory of Macedonia in 275 BC under the aegis of Antigonus II Gonatas (277-74, 272-239 BC). The kingdom subsequently came to prominence, reaching its peak during the reign of Philip V (221-179 BC), before coming to an end following successive conflicts with Rome and the defeat of its final ruler, Perseus, in 168 BC.
While the Antigonids were an important part of the political scene in the Hellenistic period, study of them has been largely overshadowed by that of the Ptolemies, Seleucids and Attalids, which (other than the Attalids) were longer-lasting and saw a greater engagement with non-Greek peoples. This lack of attention has obscured the significance of this dynasty in the politics and culture of the ancient Mediterranean. It is the aim of this conference, therefore, to pave the way to rectifying this situation as the first event of a new international Antigonid Network. Alongside conference papers touching on a range of different aspects, discussion sessions will help build relationships between individuals and institutions, as well as offer the space to develop collaborative projects and resources.

""En Filipo II y el Arte de la Guerra tendremos la oportunidad de conocer en profundidad a uno de los más grandes reyes de la antigua Macedonia. Gracias a su habilidad como estratega, diplomático, político y soldado, heredó un reino pobre, débil y acosado por innumerables enemigos y lo transformó en el más poderoso de toda Grecia.

A lo largo de sus páginas podremos conocer la historia del reino Macedonio, desde sus orígenes míticos hasta la formación de un imperio, de la mano del que, a la postre, se convertiría en el padre del mítico Alejandro Magno y en el forjador de un nuevo ejército que cambiaria el devenir de la guerra en la Antigüedad. Filipo II fue el creador de la falange macedonia, formación que se demostraría como inigualable en el campo de batalla y que reportaría incontables victorias sobre poderosos enemigos, como los ilirios, los tesalios, los tracios, los beocios o los atenienses. Pero no sólo eso, logró integrar en el campo de batalla a la infantería y a la caballería para emplearlos en nuevas formaciones tácticas: armó a sus soldados con las míticas sarissas y apreció como pocos las posibilidades militares que la maquinaria de guerra podía proporcionarle, siendo el mecenas de numerosos avances en este campo. Soñó con conquistar el Imperio persa, cuando ya había logrado lo que nadie antes fue capaz: el control de Grecia.

Sólo la muerte le arrebató esa hazaña, pero sentó las bases de lo que más tarde conseguiría su propio hijo. Su figura levantó tanto odios como pasiones; se le conocía como mujeriego y bebedor, pero también por su habilidad para la oratoria, por sus astucia, determinación y valor. Siempre luchó en primera línea junto a sus soldados y nunca permitió que éstos le llamaran rey, sino solo "General".

After defeating Darius III at Gaugamela in 331, Alexander took Babylon and Susa before entering Persepolis. According to the literary sources, Alexander burned the palace complex before resuming his pursuit of Darius. The reasoning behind this act of vandalism is difficult to establish since the sources do not paint a clear picture of the event; consequently, modern scholars have been unable to determine the cause of the fire. Since there is ambiguity within the literary evidence, this paper also draws on the archaeological evidence, and also analyses the merits and weaknesses of the explanations for the conflagration within modern scholarship.

In spite of clear tendencies of Alexander III the Great to build an empire that would unite number of nations, it is not quite clear how far he practiced the “brotherhood of nations”, i.e. homonoia. (See below Tarn, and de Mauriac). His empire and later Diadochi states were apparently not quite compatible with the idea “of being of one mind together”, what the word “homonoia” probably should mean. Was the reality quite opposite?

Were the political and administrative structure of the Macedonian states, the empire of Alexander of Macedonia, Egypt of Ptolemy’s and the Hellenistic Diadochi states, while its citizens were of mixed national origins, prominently “nationalistic states”?

What kind of state was the empire of the Alexander of Macedonia? Was it a Macedonian nationalistic state, where all high administrative and military positions as well as core military units were occupied by the Macedonians; or did its political structures mirrored the mixed multi-national population that constituted the empire? How many of Alexander’s generals and high officials were Greek and how many Macedonian? Did Alexander chose for satraps in the occupied territories some Geeks or exclusively Macedonians and local dignitaries? What was the national structure of the core military units that were left in the occupied regions?

I am also interested in the political system of the Ancient Egypt at the end of the 4th century BC. Was the Egyptian Ptolemy dynasty an Egyptian, Macedonian or Greek dynasty? Did the Ptolemy family mix with the Greek families or with local Egyptian families or it remained “racially clean” Macedonian?

What kind of states were Hellenistic states? Were they by their political and national structure Macedonian or Greek? Did they rely exclusively on high military or state officials that were Greeks or they were mostly Macedonians; did “nationalism” lose its power with time and when? How many generals in those states were Greeks and how many still Macedonians?
____________________________________________

Tarn, WW: Alexander the Grat, Vol II, Sources and Studies, Chapter 25, Cambridge University Press, 2002 (1948).

Henry M. de Mauriac: Alexander the Great and the Politics of "Homonoia", Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan., 1949), pp. 104-114, Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707202

Ancient authors such as Aelian, Asclepiodotus, and Polybius all mention the Macedonian phalanx adopting a formation called the synaspismos in which the files of soldiers are so close together that their shields would overlap. Modern authors such as Walbank, English and Matthew argue that such a formation was impossible to assume in a battle scenario and that the ancient writers were mistaken, in its use in combat. Their argument is based on the fact that the manner of bearing the shield (peltē) and pike (sarissa) does not allow for such a tight formation. Through the use of experimental archaeology, this article however argues that the synaspismos formation was indeed a possibility , and that we are mistaken in the modern view of how the phalangite wielded the sarissa pike.

This title brings together the proceedings of the international symposium held at the University of La Coruña (Galicia, Spain) in 2010, on the Age of the Successors of Alexander the Great (323-281 BCE). Apart from a general editorial introduction by Anson, the volume is prefaced by a few words of acknowledgement by Alonso Troncoso, and additionally includes a list of contributors plus a short index (7-pp.). Bibliographies and notes are provided separately at the end of each essay. The essays by eighteen contributors are divided into four unequal sections, viz. the sources and their use, the struggle for power, the role of the Iranians, and the propagation of ideology. The audience interested in this volume will mostly be students and scholars focusing on the (early) Hellenistic period. Depending on their specialization, some of these contributions may prove essential reading.

ΣΗΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΗ (ΙΑΝΟΥΑΡΙΟΣ 2017)
IMPORTANT NOTICE (JANUARY 2017)

Από πρόσφατες  έρευνες σε αρχεία του Υπουργείου Πολιτισμού προέκυψε ότι τα  ευρήματα από το αρχαίο ιερό που δημοσιεύονται εδώ και είχαν καταγραφεί κατά τη δεκαετία του 1960 ως προερχόμενα από την «Ανασκαφή Κοτζιά - Εκ  Μεσημερίου», στην πραγματικότητα βρέθηκαν στις ανασκαφές του ίδιου στο ιερό της Δήμητρας και Κόρης στο Δερβένι Θεσσαλονίκης (αρχαία Λητή). Τα νέα στοιχεία και οι αιτίες που οδήγησαν στη σύγχυση των σχετικών ενδείξεων θα παρουσιαστούν αναλυτικά από τις Π. Αδάμ-Βελένη και Α. Τουλουμτζίδου, «Νέα στοιχεία από το Ιερό της Δήμητρας και Κόρης στη Λητή», στο: Η αρχαία Λητή και η περιοχή της (Πρακτικά Ημερίδας, Αρχαιολογικό Μουσείο Θεσσαλονίκης, 16/12/2016), υπό έκδοση.


IMPORTANT NOTICE: Resent research in the Archives of the Greek Ministry of Culture revealed that the artefacts from the ancient sanctuary published here were wrongly catalogued in the 1960’s as finds from N. Kotzias’ excavations at Mesimeri; indeed, they have been found in the excavation that he conducted at the sanctuary of Demeter and Kore at Derveni (ancient Lete). The new evidence as well as the reasons that led to the confusion of their documentation will be presented by P. Adam-Veleni and A. Touloumtzidou, “New Evidence from the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore at Lete” in: Ancient Lete and its Surroundings (Conference Proceedings - Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki, 16-12-2016).

This paper extends one published in 2006 where I addressed the question: can we estimate the proportion of coined gold and silver in Hellenistic times out of the total amount of available precious metals? There a rather coherent answer emerged from different approaches to the problem: only a small proportion (not more than 25%) of all the available precious metals was monetized. In this paper, on the other hand, I try to estimate the amount of gold in ancient Greece that was not converted in coins. Such an enquiry clearly entails large uncertainties. My focus is on the weights of extant Greek gold jewellery, the total sum of which I estimate to be c. 70kg (+/- 30kg?). When compared with the total weight of the great treasures of the period (Vergina, Thracian royal tombs, Georgia [Vani]: c. 25kg), this estimate seems reasonable. Other avenues for research are presented (providing still other estimates) for what appears to be a stimulating new perspective on the problem of metal availability and coinage, which will further help us to build a better and narrower framework for our speculations.

The issue of Alexander the Great’s divinity has produced an enormous literature. Modern scholars are divided in their view of how Alexander understood his divinity. A. B. Bosworth argued that Alexander really believed that he had a divine nature and so demanded divine honours. For E. Badian Alexander thought he was merely worthy of receiving isotheoi timai (‘honours equal to those of the gods’) but understood that he was not actually divine. This seminar will closely analyse the modern debate on Alexander’s divinity and carefully trace each step by which he came to demand divine honours. It will show how on this important question Badian got closer to the truth than Bosworth.

"The problem of the linguistic position of Macedonian is usually posed in the form of ‘whether or not it belongs to the "Greek" linguistic unit’.* There are elements for and against, and each remains with his opinion. ... (For example) it is possible to argue endlessly whether a border dialect is French or not, in the absence of purely linguistic criteria. But even given the existence of the two types, the certain assignment of a dialect to one of them is not always possible. Between French and German, or between German and Polish, for example, the decision is clear because the two types are so divergent from each other that there can be no doubt or uncertainty; but the thing changes when we are faced with two closely related languages such as Italian and French. Do the so-called Gallo-Italian dialects go with the Gallo-Romance of France or with Italian? Such a question is usually answered by tracing the older patterns embracing the common characteristics, as a whole, to all the dialects that consider themselves Italian, and to all those that consider themselves Provencal or French, but it is clear that these schemes are based on the attribution, made before establishing them, of certain dialects to one group rather than another. And this attribution in turn rests not on purely glottological reasons, but on geographical-political and also cultural reasons: the latter includes the fact that the speakers of those dialects have adopted Italian as their national and literary language instead of French or the other way around. Indeed, Grober (in the systematic introduction to his Grundriss) had already observed that a strictly scientific grouping of the very varied range of novel dialects spoken in Iberia, Gaul and Italy is impossible, and ends up basing his distinction practice on the literary language used by relatives the various dialects. And anyone can see that, even if only one literary and national language continue to be used in Romania, the dialectal subdivisions of this (Romance) language would end up being as many as there are scholars who deal with the problem, due to continuous discussions between them. The importance of the national language, to which the speakers are recognized, for the distribution of dialects cannot be better shown than with the case of Dutch - this Low German dialect has risen to the dignity of language of a state that has had and still has great importance in world political and economic life, and all the dialects spoken by the subjects of that state, subjects who use Dutch outside the restricted circle of domestic and peasant interests, are therefore considered Dutch dialects; whereas the Low German dialects in the Germanic Empire are attributed to the German group, albeit more closely to Dutch than to literary German, for the simple reason that literary German is the language used in higher literature and in political relations, economic and cultural activities by the inhabitants of Lower Germany. 
      We want to conclude from this, if the Macedonians used the "Greek" as a literary language, their regional language is to be considered "Greek"? Not even in a dream. The conclusion and vice versa that the problem about the pertinence or not of Macedonian to "Greek" is, from a purely glottological point of view, false and useless.

      Thus, discarded the prejudice of the relevance or not to the whole of the "Greek dialects", we want to ask ourselves the question to which Indo-European languages the Macedonian have common isoglosses, and whether these isoglosses can illuminate us on the prehistory of the (Macedonian) language.

      The most well-known mark of Macedonian, the one on which the ancient grammarians had already fixed their attention, is the substitution of Middle Aspirated Indo-European..."

* - Why quotation marks? Because of the fabricated ethnogenesis of the so-called “ancient Greex” exonym, misleadingly based on the composition of the participants in the Trojan War (ca. 1180 BCE), such as the Dannans, Achaeans, Argaeads, etc., who were mentioned by Homer in his “Iliad”. The politically biased modern historiography misrepresents some of these peoples as “Greex” or “Hellenic”, but this is a blatant forgery – according to all the ancient sources “Hellenes” did not colonize the Peloponnesus until 80 years after the Trojan War.
    “The “Greex” were (and still are) ignorant of their origin. They neither knew whence their ancestors had come nor when they had established themselves in “Grease”, nor what they had done there. To preserve the exact memory of things as they occur, there is need of some means of fixing them; but the “Greex” did not know how to write; they did not employ writing until about the 8th century BCE. They had no way of calculating the number of years. Later they adopted the usage of counting the years according to the great feast which was celebrated every four years at Olympia; a period of four years was called an olympiad. But the 1st olympiad was placed in 776 BCE, and the chronology of the “Greex” does not rise beyond this date.” – ‘History of Ancient Civilization’ (1912) by Charles Seignobos, Doctor of Letters of the University of Paris, p.102.

The author is trying to solve the chronological problems of Livy’s information on the war operations in the region around and north of Lake Lychnidus during the Third Macedonian War. The focus is on the period between 170-169 B.C., namely, the problems regarding Livy’s information on Perseus’ counterattack on Roman positions at the turn of 170/169 B.C., Roman control over the city of Uscana and one undocumented Perseus’ attack on Dardanians in 170 B.C. The author concludes the events in question have a mutual connection, proposes a new chronological course of events and emphasizes the importance of Livy’s 43rd book for the study of the consequences of the war operations north of Lake  Lychnidus during the Third Macedonian War.

La bataille d'Amphipolis (421 av. J.-C.) oppose les deux grands États-cité de Grèce continentale, Athènes et Sparte, en plein cœur de la guerre du Péloponnèse. Amphipolis est le théâtre de la lutte entre deux personnalités brillantes. Cléon est un brillant homme politique athénien à qui tout réussit jusque là. Brasidas, général spartiate audacieux et innovant, est devenu le chantre de la liberté des cités et peuples de Grèce du Nord, face à l'oppression athénienne.
La bataille d'Amphipolis est également un parfait exemple d'articulation des systèmes de l'ethnos et de l'État-cité à travers un cadre militaire. A la tête d'une armée hétéroclite, Brasidas a rendu possible la cohabitation et l'usage combiné de soldats de l'ethnos (infanterie légère et cavaliers) et de soldats de l'État-cité (hoplites), pratiquant des modes de combat différents. Ce compromis entre  hoplites, infanterie légère et cavaliers préfigure celui de Philippe II de Macédoine et d'Alexandre le Grand. Brasidas est ainsi parvenu à mettre à profit l'hétérogénéité de leur armée pour obtenir une victoire totale contre Athènes.
Enfin, la bataille d'Amphipolis est un événement « accélérateur de l'histoire », favorisant largement l'inversion des rapports de force entre la Grèce du Nord et la Grèce du Sud. Athènes perd progressivement toute prétention hégémonique en Grèce du Nord, puis son empire est démantelé en 404. Le recul d'Athènes en Grèce du Nord permet au royaume de Macédoine de s'affirmer. En 357 Philippe de Macédoine s'empare d'Amphipolis et opère l'unification politique de la Grèce du Nord.  Ainsi, l'ethnos macédonien est à la tête de cités et d'autres ethnê au sein d'un royaume ethnique). La victoire des armées de Philippe à Chéronée est l'acte de soumission de la Grèce du Sud au profit de la Grèce du Nord. Les petites entités politiques que sont les États-cités perdent leur indépendance au profit d'entités politiques plus vastes et englobantes que sont les royaumes.

The main aim of this research is the analysis of the Macedonian infantry discipline in the period of the great conquests of 4th century BC. The research objectives are the review of Philip’s II actions to improve the Macedonian army discipline, the determining their effectiveness, the identifying the essence of disciplinary problems which are connected with the phalangites of Phillips and Alexander’s times. A multi-faceted approach to the ancient narrative sources, methods of comparative historical analysis and content analysis have been used. It defends that traditionally for infantry militia of the Argead Kingdom as well as for a similar component of the neighboring barbarian societies’ armed forces the law discipline was typical. Through intensive training, the introduction of a system of rewards and penalties, Philip II managed to instill for the Macedonian infantry discipline which high level was demonstrated in wars of domination in Balkan Peninsula and confirmed during the Alexander's Asian expedition. The phalangites’ disciplinary motives were based on benefits of belonging to the royal army and an established corporate identity. However, the great military importance of the Macedonian infantry and their unity made possible mass demonstrations, during which the military protested against the military-strategic and political-administrative decisions of the monarch, which did not correspond to the interests of the army.