Likud

In 1997 lanceerde Fareed Zakaria het concept ‘illiberale democratie’ in Foreign Affairs. Hij maakte hierin onderscheid tussen liberalisme enerzijds en democratie anderzijds. Volgens Zakaria was dit onderscheid nodig omdat de termen democratie en liberale democratie vaak door elkaar heen worden gebruikt, terwijl liberale democratie een systeem is dat niet alleen wordt gekenmerkt door vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen, maar ook door een rechtsstaat, scheiding der machten en de bescherming van basisrechten als vrijheid van meningsuiting, vereniging, religie en bezit.
De theorie is nauwelijks toegepast op Israël, terwijl zich daar het afgelopen decennium wel degelijk een illiberalisering heeft voltrokken. Die lacune wordt in dit onderzoek opgevuld. Centraal in dit onderzoek staat de vraag wat de implicaties zijn van de illiberalisering van de democratie in Israël tussen 2009 en 2018, onderverdeeld in respectievelijk de rechtsstaat, het maatschappelijk middenveld en rechten van minderheden. Naast geschreven bronnen is daarbij gebruik gemaakt van semigestructureerde interviews. Gesprekken met experts zijn bepalend geweest voor de opbouw van het onderzoek en hebben bijgedragen aan de diepgang van de analyse, wat gezien de gevoeligheid van het onderwerp en het feit dat het over een zeer recente periode gaat belangrijk is geweest. Ook dwongen de gesprekken om tussentijds te reflecteren op de methodologie.
Gebaseerd op de theorie en de historische ontwikkeling die Israël heeft doorgemaakt, kunnen de ontwikkelingen op de deelgebieden rechtsstaat, maatschappelijk middenveld en rechten van minderheden op waarde worden geschat. Het leidt tot de conclusie dat illiberalisering in een kwetsbare democratie als Israël vergaande implicaties heeft. Nog een kabinetsperiode illiberaal beleid kan ertoe leiden dat de democratie in Israël verwordt tot nauwelijks meer dan een lege huls.

The path for the Likud's establishment in the fall of 1973 was a weighty reference point for right-wing emergence in the State of Israel. The initiative to expand Gahal originated from different sources from within the Israeli political establishment, of both Liberal party and Herut's internal opposition party lines. Menachem Begin however was reserved from 1966-1973 to establish a broad right-of-center party. The paper showcases the various initiatives and examines the reasons behind Begin's indifferent response to them and illustrates the course that Ariel Sharon took in order to expand Gahal, with full awareness of the objection that Begin and his party had and the strenuous negotiations that eventually and laboriously gave rise to the Likud.
The establishment of the Likud party is portrayed on the one hand as an attempt to build on the possibility of a regime change in Israel while on the other hand narrow down the Menachem Begin's and the Herut movement's impact on the joint-ticket party. The paper lays out the internal processes from within the Herut movement that kept its dominance on the Likud, in contrast with the intentions of its partners. Turning  Herut into a thriving politically-engaging platform made it a dominant force in the newly-created party and played a significant contributory role in drawing up similar definitions for the "Likud" and the "Herut movement" for the next years to come.
המאמר מנתח את הדרך להקמת הליכוד בסתיו 1973 כנקודת ציון משמעותית בתהליך צבירת הכוח של הימין במדינת ישראל. היוזמה להרחיב את גח"ל הגיעה מגורמים שונים במערכת הפוליטית בישראל, משורות המפלגה הליברלית ומהאופוזיציה הפנימית בתנועת החרות. דווקא מנחם בגין הוא שהסתייג לאורך השנים 1966-1973 מהקמת מפלגת מרכז-ימין רחבה. המאמר מציג את היוזמות השונות ומנתח את הסיבות לתגובה האדישה של בגין להן. מוצגת הדרך בה אריאל שרון בחר לקדם את הרחבת גח"ל, מתוך מודעות להתנגדות של בגין ושל תנועתו ואת המשא ומתן הקשה, רצוף המשברים, שבסופו, בקושי רב, הוקם הליכוד.
הקמת הליכוד מוצגת במאמר כניסיון מצד אחד לחזק את האפשרות של חילופי שלטון בישראל ומצד שני לצמצם את השפעתם של מנחם בגין ותנועת החרות על המפלגה המשותפת. נפרסים התהליכים הפנימיים בתוך תנועת החרות שהביאו לכך שהיא הצליחה לשמור על מעמדה הדומיננטי ב'ליכוד', בניגוד לכוונת השותפות שלה. הפיכת 'חרות' לזירת מעורבות ופעילות פוליטית תוססת היא שהפכו אותה לגורם הדומיננטי במפלגה החדשה ותרמו ליצירת מידה רבה של זהות בין 'חרות' לבין המושג 'ליכוד' בשנים הבאות.

El pasado 11 de diciembre la Knéset aprobaba –por segunda vez en 2019– su autodisolución. Ni las elecciones celebradas en abril, ni las celebradas en septiembre han servido para conformar una mayoría suficiente (61 diputados) sobre la que sustentar a un ejecutivo. Los dos grandes partidos –el Likud y la coalición Azul y Blanco– no han logrado aglutinar los apoyos necesarios para evitar la celebración de unas nuevas elecciones (el 2 de marzo de 2020) que serán las terceras en un período de sólo 11 meses. La extrema pluralidad de la sociedad israelí y su consiguiente fragmentación parlamentaria, han provocado que Israel viva en una interinidad nunca conocida.
Este análisis pretende dar a conocer la situación política actual de Israel y como ésta afecta tanto a la política exterior de Israel como a la estabilidad de toda la región. Para ello se dividirá el documento en las siguientes partes: (1) debido a sus particulares condiciones, se analizará sucintamente el sistema político israelí para entender mejor lo que está ocurriendo en Israel; (2) se revisarán los elementos que llevaron a la convocatoria electoral de abril, sus resultados y cuáles fueron las condiciones que provocaron la disolución de la Knéset; y (3) se evaluarán las elecciones de septiembre atendiendo a la campaña, a los resultados y, sobre todo, a las consecuencias que se derivan de este proceso. En este punto, se prestará atención especial a las divisiones sociopolíticas o cleavages que conforman la sociedad israelí ya que, bajo mi punto de vista, son el elemento clave de la inestabilidad política de Israel.

This article demonstrates how the process that eventually led to the founding of the Likud party in the fall of 1973, alongside the goal of creating an effective alternative to the Labor movement, was actually a failed attempt to diminish the influence of Begin and Herut within the Likud. Herut’s new and old partners wished to effect—through the creation of the Likud—a change in the identity and character of the alternative party. Contrary to expectations, Herut revealed itself to be an open and dynamic movement for an ever-growing sector of the public. The Herut movement became the key axis of the Likud, in light of demographic, cultural, social, and economic processes, which fashioned within Likud an alloy that symbolized the rise of a new Israeli identity. The article examines the internal processes within Herut that enabled it to retain its dominance even after the formation of the Likud.

This article seeks to add another dimension to the growing and extensive research on right-wing Zionism, by returning to an era when the Likud was first created. I will examine the major difference between processes that have led to the two key landmarks in the formative years of the Right in Israel: the establishment of Gahal in April 1965 and the founding of the Likud in August–September of 1973. While Gahal's establishment was a product of a prolonged, determined, patient and conscious effort on the part of Menachem Begin, the establishment of the Likud was, to a considerable degree, forced upon him. Those who were interested in expanding Gahal and creating an alignment of centre-right parties were actually the factors outside Herut, while Herut's more veteran leadership disapproved of these attempts. Within the Herut Movement, the voices that called for the creation of a broad political alignment were those that came from Herut's ‘internal opposition’, which revolved around Ezer Weizman. The article analyses the reasons behind Begin's reservations about a continued right-wing merger, examines the negotiation process and sheds light on the oscillation in Menachem Begin's ideology and politics between the fundamental and the pragmatic poles.

The current article develops an explanation for Likud’s success, which goes beyond the existing structural and circumstantial accounts. It argues that Likud’s success should be sought for in the utilization of Hobbesian logic by its leader, Benjamin Netanyahu. By revealing the commonalities between Hobbes’s political thinking and Rhetoric, and Netanyahu’s political conduct, this paper sheds new light on Netanyahu’s leadership and sources of legitimation and authority in Israel, which
are understudied. We demonstrate that Netanyahu’s Hobbesian dimension is best reflected in his understanding of the nature of civil and political rights in the context of an ongoing struggle for survival and self-determination.

Israel's party system has been characterized by the bipolar rivalry between the left-wing and right-wing blocks since the late 1970s. In recent years we could have seen at least two trends that seem to diverge from this model. For the last 9 years the Likud party has formed three successive governments which has made Benjamin Netanyahu the longest continuously serving prime minister in the history of Israel. Another new occurrence is the preservation of a significant representation of the center parties for four Knesset terms in the row. The aim of the paper is to verify whether Israel's party system has departed from the two-blocs bipolar model. Based on the empirical data (election results, government formation, party's political platforms) it examines whether the parties' rivalry in the years 2009-2018 differed qualitatively from the previous period. To answer this question the paper investigates three hypotheses. First-Likud has become a dominant party in Israel. Second a dominant and stable Israeli right-wing parties' bloc has formed. Third-an enduring and relevant center sector has emerged in Israel's party system.

This article seeks to add another dimension to the growing and extensive research on right-wing Zionism, by returning to an era when the Likud was first created. I will examine the major difference between processes that have led to the two key landmarks in the formative years of the Right in Israel: the establishment of Gahal in April 1965 and the founding of the Likud in August–September of 1973. While Gahal's establishment was a product of a prolonged, determined, patient and conscious effort on the part of Menachem Begin, the establishment of the Likud was, to a considerable degree, forced upon him. Those who were interested in expanding Gahal and creating an alignment of centre-right parties were actually the factors outside Herut, while Herut's more veteran leadership disapproved of these attempts. Within the Herut Movement, the voices that called for the creation of a broad political alignment were those that came from Herut's ‘internal opposition’, which revolved around Ezer Weizman. The article analyses the reasons behind Begin's reservations about a continued right-wing merger, examines the negotiation process and sheds light on the oscillation in Menachem Begin's ideology and politics between the fundamental and the pragmatic poles.

"Gazze Sonrası İsrail'de İç Dinamikler ve Barış Süreci", Ortadoğu Etütleri, Temmuz 2009, Cilt 1 Sayı 1, ss. 83-99.
Özet
İsrail'de 2001'de Ariel Şaron'la başlayan sertlik yanlısı politikalar İsrail'de sürekli sağın güçlenmesine yol açarken, Gazze saldırıları da milliyetçiliğin yükselişe geçmesinde ol-dukça etkili olmuştur. Özellikle 2000'li yılların büyük çoğunluğunda ABD'de sağcı par-tilerin işbaşında olması İsrail'deki sağcı partilerin işini kolaylaştırmıştı. Ancak ABD'de Obama'nın iktidarı devralması ile beraber Netanyahu ve sağ koalisyonun Amerikan po-litikalarıyla sorunlu bir döneme girmesine yol açmıştır. Bunda, Gazze olayları ile bera-ber Filistin'deki işgalin artık sürdürülemez hale gelmesinin ve ABD'nin bölgedeki askeri ve ekonomik çıkarlarının devamına zarar vermeye başlamasının da etkisi olmuştur. Bu durumun Washington hükümetini barış konusunda adım atmaya zorlamasıyla beraber, Ortadoğu politikalarında süreç yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır. Zira, Filistin sorununun bu haliyle sürmesi, hem Amerikan müttefiki olarak bilinen siyasi liderlerin konumunu sars-mış hem de ABD'nin bölgedeki varlığının meşruiyetinin sorgulanmasına yol açmıştır. Bu durum, şimdilik İsrail'de tepkiye yol açsa bile zaman içinde izlenen politikada değişimi zorunlu kılacağa benzemektedir. Çalışmada İsrail iç dinamikleri ve Obama faktörü bağ-lamında Filistin sorunu ve barış süreci analiz edilmektedir.

Abstract
While the harsh policies initiated by Ariel Sharon in 2001 strengthened the right wing, the Gaza attacks were also very important to the rise of nationalism. Especially, during most of the 2000's, the presence of rightists in the U.S. administration eased the task of the rightists in Israel. However, Obama's taking over the U.S. administration has led to a problematic period for Netanyahu and the rightist coalition in U.S. politics. The Gaza attacks, together with the fact that the occupation in Palestine is not sustainable, began to thwart U.S. military and political objectives in the region, and these factors added to this change. With these circumstances forcing the Washington administration to take steps towards peace settlement, Middle East politics took on a new dimension, because the unmitigated continuation of Palestinian problem both shook the positions of political leaders who were known to be the U.S. allies, and led to the questioning of the legitimacy of the presence of the U.S. in the region. This, although it leads to reaction in Israel for now, seems to indicate that policy change will be mandatory in the future. In this work, the Palestinian problem and the peace process are analyzed in context of the Obama factor and Israel's internal dynamics.

Between 2009 and 2015, three early parliamentary elections have been held in Israel, which have led Likud party with Binjamin Netanyahu as the leader to the power. The role of this article is to analyze the election campaigns in these years, paying particular attention to the context of relations with the European Union. The work aims to answer the research question, what were the main issues raised by public opinion during the elections in 2009, 2013 and in 2015, and whether European subjects were important for Israeli politicians and their voters. The work used a behavioral method combined with the descriptive and analytical method, which was conducted primarily through the use of press releases and the Internet’s most important Israeli newspapers.

Yoav Peled explains the second Israeli election that took place September 17th. It didn’t go according to plan, at least for Likud Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. Benny Gantz of Blue and White got 33 seats to Netanyahu’s 32, so everything now is about forming a governing coalition to get the 61 needed seats out of 120 to rule. Secular far right nationalist Avigdor Lieberman has refused to form a coalition with Netanyahu (unless he can be acting PM) and Netanyahu needs the immunity granted to the PM from the indictments he faces. We ask Yoav Peled to explain the election results and what will happen if Netanyahu can’t form a government. We also get Yoav's understanding of the ascendancy of the Israeli right.

המאמר מנתח את הדרך להקמת הליכוד בסתיו 1973 כנקודת ציון משמעותית בתהליך צבירת הכוח של הימין במדינת ישראל. היוזמה להרחיב את גח"ל הגיעה מגורמים שונים במערכת הפוליטית בישראל, משורות המפלגה הליברלית ומהאופוזיציה הפנימית בתנועת החרות. דווקא מנחם בגין הוא שהסתייג לאורך השנים 1966-1973 מהקמת מפלגת מרכז-ימין רחבה. המאמר מציג את היוזמות השונות ומנתח את הסיבות לתגובה האדישה של בגין להן. מוצגת הדרך בה אריאל שרון בחר לקדם את הרחבת גח"ל, מתוך מודעות להתנגדות של בגין ושל תנועתו ואת המשא ומתן הקשה, רצוף המשברים, שבסופו, בקושי רב, הוקם הליכוד.
הקמת הליכוד מוצגת במאמר כניסיון מצד אחד לחזק את האפשרות של חילופי שלטון בישראל ומצד שני לצמצם את השפעתם של מנחם בגין ותנועת החרות על המפלגה המשותפת. נפרסים התהליכים הפנימיים בתוך תנועת החרות שהביאו לכך שהיא הצליחה לשמור על מעמדה הדומיננטי ב'ליכוד', בניגוד לכוונת השותפות שלה. הפיכת 'חרות' לזירת מעורבות ופעילות פוליטית תוססת היא שהפכו אותה לגורם הדומיננטי במפלגה החדשה ותרמו ליצירת מידה רבה של זהות בין 'חרות' לבין המושג 'ליכוד' בשנים הבאות.
The path for the Likud's establishment in the fall of 1973 was a weighty reference point for right-wing emergence in the State of Israel. The initiative to expand Gahal originated from different sources from within the Israeli political establishment, of both Liberal party and Herut's internal opposition party lines. Menachem Begin however was reserved from 1966-1973 to establish a broad right-of-center party. The paper showcases the various initiatives and examines the reasons behind Begin's indifferent response to them and illustrates the course that Ariel Sharon took in order to expand Gahal, with full awareness of the objection that Begin and his party had and the strenuous negotiations that eventually and laboriously gave rise to the Likud.
The establishment of the Likud party is portrayed on the one hand as an attempt to build on the possibility of a regime change in Israel while on the other hand narrow down the Menachem Begin's and the Herut movement's impact on the joint-ticket party. The paper lays out the internal processes from within the Herut movement that kept its dominance on the Likud, in contrast with the intentions of its partners. Turning  Herut into a thriving politically-engaging platform made it a dominant force in the newly-created party and played a significant contributory role in drawing up similar definitions for the "Likud" and the "Herut movement" for the next years to come.