Logic, history of logic, theory of argumentation

This paper looks at philosophical accusations of talking nonsense from the perspective of argumentation theory.  An accusation of this sort, when seriously meant, amounts to the claim that someone believes there is something she means by her utterance when in fact she means nothing whatsoever by it.  Such accusations may indeed be peculiar to philosophy.  They also involve the claim that there can be ILLUSIONS OF ARGUMENTATION, both inter- and intra-personal.  The problem of how one could possibly diagnose such illusions is raised and I suggest that, if there is a way, it will require a therapeutic rather than a polemical approach.  This suggestion is of course made by Wittgenstein and some of his followers but, in my view, it has remained undeveloped.  It often takes the form of a comparison with psychoanalysis.  I note that the more like psychoanalysis it becomes, the less like traditional argumentation, philosophical or otherwise, it will be.

Resumen El presente artículo constituye un ejercicio de reconstruc-ción histórica y proyección investigativa en torno a la tradi-ción retórica y la argumentación crítica. En primera instancia se rastrean los orígenes griegos del arte retórico, la sistemati-zación aristotélica del estudio sobre los medios de persuasión disponibles para cada caso y los aspectos centrales que prevé la indagación sobre las técnicas discursivas de comunicación persuasiva. En segundo lugar se discuten y comentan los apor-tes de la nueva retórica o teoría de la argumentación, conside-rada como un neoaristotelismo que intenta reivindicar el am-plio dominio de la retórica antigua, a fin de evidenciar sus límites y alcances. Finalmente, se insinúan algunas líneas po-sibles de investigación y aplicación de la nueva retórica en relación con la comunicación de masas y el discurso publici-tario. La tesis central del artículo sostiene que la retórica no se reduce a la ornamentación y estudio de las figuras, pero tampoco se restringe al estudio de la argumentación y la lógi-ca argumental. Retórica es el nombre para una hermenéutica posible de la praxis vital comunitaria que caracteriza los jue-gos de lenguaje dentro del marco de la interacción comunica-tiva cotidiana en el contexto de la cultura occidental. Abstract The present article is an historic rebuilding and research project exercise concerning to rethoric tradition and critic argumentation. In a first step we follow the beginnings of rethoric greeks art, the systematic aristotelic studies about the available persuasive means to each situation and the main subjects that involve the asking about the argumentatives techniques of persuasive comunication. In a second step we argue and comment the studies of new rethoric or argumen-tation theory consider itself as a neo-aristotelism that pretend reestablish the wide field of the ancient rethoric, showing its reaches and limits. Finally, we trace some possible research lines and application of new rethoric to the mass communication and the publicity reasoning. The main thesis in the article says that rethoric is not only an ornament and figures study, but it is not a argumentation study and reasonig logic neither. Rethoric is the name for an possible hermeneutic (hermeneutik) from a social praxis that is the main feature of the language games (sprachspiele) in the field of a interactive communicative in the ordinary life in the context of occidental culture.

This study aims to critically examine IgnazGolziher’s allegations on the beginnings of Arabic linguistics. According to him, the Arabic short vowel symbols did not originate in the Arab world but were adopted from the Levant. The same he assumed in regard to the three different parts of speech, namely name (ism), verb (fiÑil), and particle (harf), which allegedly presupposed the knowledge of Aristotle’s De Interpretations falsely attributed to ÑAli (Karramallahuwajhah) . Goldziher explained this connection with the scholastic disputes occurring between the different theological schools in the first century AH, with special reference to the dogmatic differences between the Murji´ah and the Qadariyyah sects. Theological debates on various doctrines were held at the same time by Eastern Christians based on the teachings of John of Damascus. In the eyes of Goldziher, these debates – based on the assumption that since they occurred in the same century – they had to be related, and furthermore, St. John of Damascus must have borrowed his ideas from Aristotle. Since no Arabic sources speak of this connection, he raises his own suspicions, namely that Muslim sources refused to admit the borrowing of ideas from the Christians. This study serves the purpose of investigating his allegations in regard to the origin of Arabic grammar and syntax and of deciding the extent of his scholarly bias. The researcher adopts a theoretical and analytical approach based on linguistic studies. In order to arrive at a balanced judgment with regard to this conflict, the linguistic corpus, as well as the historical background of transmission is being analyzed.

This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one can be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.

This paper is a bridge between my interest in the notion of philosophical nonsense and my interest in problems concerning ethics and action.  Geach sees an analogy between philosophical error and moral error, more specifically between the problem of understanding the state of mind of someone who is duped by philosophical nonsense and that of someone who ‘sins’.  In neither case does being confused oneself help one understand the confusion of others.  I argue that Geach gives us no good reason to believe that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and that, even if there is, there will be no real analogy between the states of mind in question.  For one thing, there is no obvious reason why there could not be ‘clear-headed sin’.  For another, one who ‘sins’ and one who does not often have the same sorts of difficulty understanding each other, whereas, if there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense, it is hard to see how there could be any such symmetry between one who is taken in by it and one who is not.

In the last decade Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) has started to focus attention on forms of persuasive interaction where computer technologies have the goal of changing users’ behavior and attitudes according to a predefined direction. In this work, we hypothesize a strong connection between logical fallacies (forms of reasoning which are logically invalid but cognitively effective) and some common persuasion strategies adopted within web technologies. With the aim of empirically evaluating our hypothesis, we carried out a pilot study on a sample of 150 e-commerce websites.