Peripatetics

"Mayall organizes his ideas and examples into ten chapters. Chapter One ('Who are the Gypsies?') and Ten (So, who are the Gypsies?') serve nicely as pre-test and post-test for the reader. In between, Chapter Two introduces his thorough chronology of the social construction of Gypsy identities by outsides for the past five centuries."

The leading theory regarding the number of basic elements in classical natural sciences is formulated in the peripatetic school of philosophy, which assumes four basic elements to exist. They propose three possible explanations in support of this theory: 1) Reasoning based on the position of objects in nature and their natural inclinations, taking into view the qualities of being light or heavy; 2) Reasoning by considering fundamental sensible qualities all objects share (hotness, coldness, wetness, dryness); 3) Reasoning by dint of composition and analysis. Then, instances of the four classical elements (earth, water, air and fire) was determined through an inductive method of reasoning. Abou Reihan al-Biruoni and Suhrawardi were critical of this theory and refused to accept fire as a basic element, calling it hot air. Hence, by modifying the criteria behind the classification of basic elements, Suhrawardi categorized them according to their visual qualities and, therefore, reduced the number of elements to three: opaque (Hajez), translucent (Moghtased) and subtle (Latif). In this paper, the arguments deployed by the philosophers of the peripatetic school and constitutive of Suhrawardi's criticism about the four elements was investigated and it was revealed that Suhrawardi's motive in this new method of categorization, in which fire was removed from among basic elements, was more metaphysical, and did not, in fact, abide by the rules of natural sciences.

El presente artículo trata sobre la postura y consistencia racional de Aristóteles respecto a la legitimidad moral del aborto. El objetivo de lo que presentamos es doble: primero, establecer argumentativamente que hay una inconsistencia en el pensamiento aristotélico, no de manera particular, sino considerando la unidad sistemática de su doctrina; segundo, establecer que, dados los principios metafísicos y éticos aristotélicos, el aborto es moralmente inaceptable, independientemente de lo que Aristóteles haya expresado explícitamente respecto a este punto particular. Para llegar a los objetivos mencionados, procederemos de la siguiente manera. Primero, exponer los pasajes en donde consta, por un lado, que Aristóteles considera moralmente inaceptable el matar a un ser humano inocente, y, por otro, que el aborto es aceptable en ciertas circunstancias. Segundo, derivar las circunstancias en las cuales lo considera aceptable, a saber, antes de que se produzca la vida humana. Tercero, exponer brevemente la doctrina aristotélica respecto a lo que es la vida en general y el tipo de alma que corresponde al ser humano. Cuarto, exponer su postura respecto al comienzo de la vida humana a través de una sucesión de almas en el embrión. Quinto, proceder a argumentar la inconsistencia de esta última postura respecto a los principios metafísicos. Sexto, cerrar la exposición con la conclusión general. Una vez establecido nuestro primer objetivo respecto a la inconsistencia racional de Aristóteles, nuestro segundo objetivo puede también establecerse, el cual se basa en el siguiente argumento central: 1) De acuerdo con los principios metafísicos aristotélicos, se sigue que la vida humana solo puede comenzar en el momento de la concepción. 2) Aristóteles considera moralmente inaceptable que se mate una vida humana inocente. 3) Por lo tanto, de los principios metafísicos y éticos aristotélicos, se sigue que el aborto, o sea, eliminar un embrión en el vientre materno, es moralmente inaceptable.

A complete understanding of ethical and spiritual perfection must be acquired within the context of the metaphysical world-view of any particular school. This is because spiritual and ethical perfection presupposes knowledge of the soul and the means by which it acquires perfections. A comprehensive theory of the soul, therefore, constitutes the theoretical framework through which any coherent argument of spiritual perfection can be posited. The present paper analyses the metaphysical foundations of spiritual perfection as held by Ali ibn Sina and Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi. Since Ibn Sina represents the school of Peripatetic philosophy and Al-Qunawi represents the school of gnosticism (Sufism), this paper will examine and compare the theory of the soul, its divisions, and its perfections, as articulated by two of the most important exponents of these schools.

The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. VI. IN RUSSIAN.

Четвертый век до нашей эры: в 2 полутомах / Под ред. Д.-М.Льюиса и др.; перевод с англ., подготов. текста, предисловие, примечания А.В.Зайкова. – М.: Ладомир, 2017. – Второй полутом. – 720 с. (Кембриджская история древнего мира. Т. VI, второй полутом [625-1344 с.]). ISBN 978-5-86218-544-7  ISBN 978-5-86218-542-3 (п/т. 2). 45 у.п.л.

Во втором полутоме VI тома русской "Кембриджской истории древнего мира" (посвященного истории IV в. до н. э.) представлены следующие тематические обзоры: общество и экономика, полис и его альтернативы, философские и риторические школы, медицина, развитие искусства, военное дело. Далее идут главы с историческим нарративом: политическая история Сицилии с 367 по 330 г. до н. э.; Македония и становление ее гегемонии в Греции (Филипп македонский) и, наконец, две последние большие главы посвящены истории Александра Великого. В конце тома помещены:  хронологическая таблица, исчерпывающая библиография и "Указатель", который обладает самостоятельным значением: благодаря своему объему и аналитической структуре он может претендовать на роль справочного пособия по истории и культуре IV в. до н. э.

Книга снабжена большим количеством иллюстраций и картами.

Dionysius in Albertus Magnus and his student Thomas Aquinas
Oxford Handbook to Dionysius the Areopagite
Edited Mark Edwards, Dimitrios Pallis, George Steiris
“Dionysius nearly everywhere follows Aristotle as will be evident to anyone diligently examining his books.”
For this judgement, the great Thomist scholar Marie-Dominque Chenu supposed Aquinas “to have been duped by certain external resemblances.”  However, if, in fact, there are dupes here, the first was Albertus Magnus. From his great teacher, Albert, the Dionysian Peripatetic, Aquinas, for whom the Areopagite remained a quasi-Biblical authority but identified as a Platonist, learned the fundamental congruence of the doctrines of the greatest philosophical authority, Aristotle, and his match in the higher realm of theology, Dionysius.

I. Albert, the Dionysian Peripatetic
A. Dionysius and Aristotle juxtaposed in Cologne
Aquinas had been initiated by Albert into what Alain de Libera called “The ‘way’ of Dionysian peripateticism,”  when, from 1245/46  to 1251/52, Thomas was his student, first in Paris and, then, crucially, from 1248, in Cologne. In the advanced studium the Dominicans directed Albert to establish there, “the greatest Dionysian commentator of the XIIIth century,”  exposited the entire Dionysian corpus and began his explanations of the works attributed to Aristotle.  Evidence that Thomas studied both authors with him are manuscripts of Albert’s commentaries on the Dionysian corpus and of his lectures on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.  For the former, we have Thomas’ autographs, written out for Albert as his assistant.  Thus “he copied the whole set of Albert’s [Dionysian] commentaries by hand” and also inserted annotations.  For the Ethics, we have a reportatio by Thomas. Importantly for the differences which evolved between their ways of thinking, Albert did not start his paraphrastic expositions of the Aristotelian corpus until the one devoted to the Physics in 1251/52. Soon after that, Thomas left for Paris. Burger stresses that “when Albert was commenting on the texts of Aristotle, and finally on the Liber de causis, Thomas was in Paris and in Italy. So their ways, like their thinking, were separated.”
“In the autumn of 1251, or at the latest 1252, [Aquinas] commenced his career of teaching at the University of Paris by cursive reading of two books of the Bible.”  These lectures qualified him to comment on the Sentences, obtain the licentia docendi, the status of magister, and a chair. Thomas’ Sentences Commentary is his largest theological system. Commenting on the second Book Thomas made his observation about Dionysius following Aristotle, “during the academic year 1252-53” or the next,  when he was still strongly under the influence of Albert.

The thought of Thomas Aquinas was fundamentally and pervasively hierarchical. This is evident whether one considers his ontology, structured by the tension between being and unity, the interconnected subjectivities which are what fundamentally subsist for him, his hermeneutic of Scripture with its assimilation of scripture and theology producing total system, the ways natural and theological virtues exist in God, angels, and humans, or his understanding of the Church and the relation of the Papacy either to the lower ecclesiastical orders or to the secular. His sources of the Neoplatonic tradition which ran from Iamblichus to Damascius and Simplicius work to produce this mentality. First is the authority of Dionysius the Areopagite and, subordinately, Boethius, the Liber de Causis—at Paris among the writings of Aristotle listed for lecture—, and later Ammonius, Simplicius and Proclus themselves, as well as others. Either assisting those authorities or counterbalancing them in producing this frame of mind are Augustine, Aristotle and the Peripatetics. This paper works out the relation between his doctrine of providence and his hierarchical thinking relative to these sources and authorities.

In traditional scholarship, Aristoxenus’ Life of Socrates has been considered very often as an untrustworthy testimony, as the Socrates being described seems to be at odds with what we know about him by our main sources Plato and Xenophon. Recent reassessments, however, note that Aristoxenus’ account provides a balanced picture of Socrates, which is not at odds with earlier Socratic literature. This chapter follows this more positive hypothesis. It reviews all fragments available in the extant editions of Aristoxenus’ Life of Socrates, and provides new texts not included in these collections. I show that Aristoxenus’ characterization of Socrates as an irascible, sex-driven man who eradicates his licentiousness through education is widely confirmed: not only by Aristotle and other Peripatetics, but implicitly also by Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, Phaedo, and other Socratics. Both the account based on Aristoxenus’ father Spintharus, who knew Socrates personally, and the report about Socrates’ youthful association with Archelaus, the historical reliability of which has been shown by recent studies, give us good reasons to claim that Aristoxenus had solid grounds for depicting Socrates the way he did.

This is a working translation of Pseudo-Archytas' treatises On the Universal Logos/On the Ten Categories and On Opposites, two important texts in the history of metaphysics and the philosophy of language, which were probably composed in the mid-1st Century BCE.  The translation is based on the text of Holger Thesleff in the Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (Abo, 1965).

This chapter discusses the afterlife of Demosthenes as a political model in the Hellenistic period, and through his image the afterlife of Athenian democratic values in the Hellenistic world. It shows how political struggles in Athens between the heirs of Demosthenes' 'party' and pro-Macedonian politicians and philosophers shaped the later reception of this figure - the biographical tradition on Demosthenes has its foundation in slanderous assessments of his character and ability by Peripatetic philosophers after his death. Against the scholarly consensus, it argues that this was a minority tradition, and far from ignoring Demosthenes, a flourishing rhetorical and political tradition in the Hellenistic poleis saw Demosthenes as a political and rhetorical model symbolizing the civic virtues of a free city. This tradition is less represented in the works transmitted, but allusions to rhetorical exercises in Polybius and elsewhere and new papyrological finds shed light on its importance and its characters.

The pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems is the earliest known ancient Greek text on mechanics, principally concerned with the explanation of a variety of mechanical phenomena using a particular construal of the principle of the lever. In the introduction, the author (thought to be an early Peripatetic) quotes the tragic poet Antiphon to summarise a discussion of the techne-phusis (art-nature) relationship and the status of mechanics as a techne. I argue that this citation of a poet is an Aristotelian cultural signature, intended to guide its reader(s) towards a better understanding of the nature of mechanics as expounded in the Mechanical Problems. By analysing several instances where Aristotle cites Antiphon (as well as other tragic poets) in the Aristotelian corpus, I propose that both the author of the Mechanical Problems and Aristotle use poets for the purpose of persuasion. This is in turn explained by understanding the homologous relationship between mechanics-as-techne (according to the author of the Mechanical Problems) and poetics-as-techne (according to Aristotle) in terms of their shared status as poietike techne (productive art) and claims to universal knowledge. A final facet of the proposed relationship between mechanics and poetry is hypothesised on the grounds of their mimetic nature

For a long time, the exact nature of Περὶ βίων literature and its relation to biography have been debated. Scholars have considered such works collections of biographies or philosophical treatises on the right way of life. This paper studies all extant fragments across various philosophical schools. Epicurus and Chrysippus seem to have given practical instructions on the right lifestyle. Clearchus, Dicaearchus and the imperial writers Timotheus and Seleucus, by contrast, took a more anecdotal approach. However, the fragments do not support a reconstruction of biographies in the sense of a description of the life of an individual from birth to death. The anecdotes in Clearchus were probably moralising exempla. Moreover, not all biographical fragments of Dicaearchus necessarily belong to his work On Lives. I also argue that Περὶ βίων works were probably the ideal place for debate and polemic against competing schools.

This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.

Cicero's general interest in Dicaearchus’ ethical and political thought can be detected in his letters to Atticus and De legibus. One can also infer from De divinatione that Dicaearchus was a source for Cicero’s De republica. At present, however, we do not possess a clear and detailed picture of Dicaearchus’ influence on Cicero’s own ethical and political thought. Scholars have been hindered by a lack of explicit evidence concerning the nature of Dicaearchus’ philosophical arguments as well as Cicero’s failure to mention Dicaearchus by name in the extant parts of De republica. In this paper I argue that, despite these obstacles, we can construct a positive account of the nature and extent of Dicaearchus’ influence that offers new insights into key aspects of Cicero’s philosophical thought and practice.

The questions I raise in this paper are of a twofold nature: namely, methodological and historical-philosophical. The subject matter of my study is a reception of the Aristotelian epistemological and cognitive conceptions in Gregory Nazianzen’s teachings. In other words, the issue at stake is how Gregory received and interpreted Aristotle and Aristotelian teaching. It is my methodological standing point that the answer to this question should touch upon an intrinsic culture of the philosophical schools during late antiquity, where Gregory learned a paradigm of dealing with authoritative texts of the ancient philosophers that entitled him to apply and interpret these texts in a rather liberal and creative way.
I believe that general understanding of Gregory’s approach to reception and interpretation of Hellenic philosophical texts should be altered in such a way that his sophisticated transformation of philosophical concepts is not regarded as mere rhetorical stylisation but as typical creative transmission of the authoritative text. To prove this thesis I underpin some principal features of Gregory’s anthropology and cognitive theory, which developed out of a productive dialogue between Peripatetic and Christian conceptions and also involved some of the relevant Platonic philosophical and rhetorical commonplaces.

This article pursues an understanding of what Cicero thought 'Italic' philosophy to be, and proceeds to develop a broader account of how Cicero's version compares with the surviving textual evidence and testimonia from the Hellenistic period of the philosophy of the 'Italic' philosophers, including the Lucanians 'Ocellus', 'Eccelus', and 'Aresas/Aesara', and the Rudian Ennius.  Collocation of 'Italic' with 'Pythagorean' philosophy of this era aids in building a more comprehensive view of what Hellenistic Pythagoreanism may have looked like.

Historical and ethnographic evidence show that categorising the spatiality of Gypsies in Brazil into “sedentary” or “nomadic” modes, as is often done by academics, objectifies categories of socio-scientific thought but fails to grasp the sociality and meaning that lie behind Gypsy spatiality. The world of Calon Gypsies in Bahia is structured according to specific principles of kinship, attributes of social personhood, economic opportunities and fragmentation brought about by violence.

In several recent studies, with respect to its sources and development, Albert
the Great’s theory of intellect has been treated mainly on the basis of works already
available in critical editions. However, Albert’s most important work on
the theory of intellect, De intellectu et intelligibili, is not yet available in a critical
edition. It is therefore not surprising that there is as yet no adequate account
of his theory’s development, sources, and structure. A re-reading of the theory
in light of Albert’s complete works affords some interesting insights into those
subjects, as well as into other questions regarding its content and form. The
following contribution seeks, on the one hand, to illumine the systemic coordinates
and doctrinal elaboration of Albert’s theory of intellect in its mature form
and, on the other hand, to discuss Albert’s answer to the question of whether
the nature of intellect is either superindividual and common to all human beings
or particular and individuated. In so doing it seeks to clarify, relative to
his earlier and later writings, both what remains constant and what undergoes
modification among Albert’s doctrinal perspectives in this work.

KEYWORDS: Albert the Great, Theory of Intellect, Aristotle, Classical
Peripatetic-Arabic philosophical Tradition

SCHLÜSSELWORTE: Albertus Magnus, Intellektlehre, Aristoteles, klassische
peripatetisch-arabische Tradition

The file uploaded is the final proof of the Introduction to the volume. The essays collected focus on the role played by the philosophy of the Hellenistic (from Theophrastus and other Peripatetics, Epicurus, Sceptical Academy and Stoicism, to neo-Pythagoreanism and the schools of Antiochus and Eudorus) in Philo of Alexandria's works. Despite many authoritative studies on Philo's vision og Greek philosophy as an exegetical tool in allegorizing the Scripture, there is not such a comprehensive overview in Philo's treatises that takes in account both the progress achieved in the recent interpretation of Hellenistic philosophy and analysis of ancient doxographical literature

"ABSTRACT: This paper traces the earliest development of the most basic principle of deduction, i.e. modus ponens (or Law of Detachment).
‘Aristotelian logic’, as it was taught from late antiquity until the 20th century, commonly included a short presentation of the argument forms modus (ponendo) ponens, modus (tollendo) tollens, modus ponendo tollens, and modus tollendo ponens. In late antiquity, arguments of these forms were generally classified as ‘hypothetical syllogisms’. However, Aristotle did not discuss such arguments, nor did he call any arguments ‘hypothetical syllogisms’. The Stoic indemonstrables resemble the modus ponens/tollens arguments. But the Stoics never called them ‘hypothetical syllogisms’; nor did they describe them as ponendo ponens, etc. The tradition of the four argument forms and the classification of the arguments as hypothetical syllogisms hence need some explaining. In this paper, I offer some explanations by tracing the development of certain elements of Aristotle’s logic via the early Peripatetics to the logic of later antiquity. I consider the questions: How did the four argument forms arise? Why were there four of them? Why were arguments of these forms called ‘hypothetical syllogisms’? On what grounds were they considered valid? I argue that such arguments were neither part of Aristotle’s dialectic, nor simply the result of an adoption of elements of Stoic logic, but the outcome of a long, gradual development that begins with Aristotle’s logic as preserved in his Topics and Prior Analytics; and that, as a result, we have a Peripatetic logic of hypothetical inferences which is a far cry both from Stoic logic and from classical propositional logic, but which sports a number of interesting characteristics, some of which bear a cunning resemblance to some 20th century theories."

This study is an attempt to make the strongest possible case for the Meinecke-Diels hypothesis that there was a doxographer named “Arius Didymus,” who compiled the three ethical doxographies in Stobaeus 2.7, and also a physical doxography. It offers an analysis of the historiographical, exegetical and logical issues undergirding the Meinecke-Diels hypothesis. For the current state of the question 25 years later and a critical evaluation of the hypothesis and its components see D. E. Hahm, “The Quest for an Author” in W. W. Fortenbaugh, ed., Arius Didymus On Peripatetic Ethics, Household Management and Politics, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. 20  (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2017) 69-74.

This article presents a new edition with an English translation and a commentary of the first few columns of Philodemus’ Historia Academicorum (Phld., Acad. Hist. 1021, coll. 1*-1-2, 7). The edition is based on the multispectral photographs, inspection of the original papyrus preserved in Naples and the Oxford and Neapolitan disegni. This renewed study of the papyrus has made it possible to identify new readings and to call into question the text as reconstructed by Gaiser. This section of the Historia Academicorum is part of Philodemus’ biography of Plato and is an excerpt from Dicaearchus, a pupil of Aristotle. It addresses Plato’s innovations, presenting his dialogues as both a blessing and a curse for philosophy: their protreptic force attracted many people to philosophy but at the same time led many people astray, since they practiced it only in a superficial manner; by consequence, those ignorant people wrongly believe that they are real philosophers.

Resumen: Si bien el presente artículo tiene por objetivo principal sistematizar e introducir al lector en la noética de Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rušd (Averroes) teniendo por base su Gran comentario al tercer libro del 'Tratado sobre el alma', a esta tarea descriptiva y sintetizadora le precede una exposición de la teoría de la sensibilidad y de la imaginación, de modo que aquélla pueda hacerse más comprensible y coherente en virtud de éstas y del resto del corpus del filósofo cordobés. Asimismo, presentamos aquí una hipótesis de trabajo basada en algunas observaciones formuladas tanto por Emanuele Coccia como por Richard C. Taylor, a saber: que en la constatación del carácter comunicable y objetivo del conocimiento humano, el filósofo cordobés debe ceder –en su propio razonamiento– ante la exigencia lógica de quebrar con toda posible centralidad teorética del individuo que lo posicione a modo de agente último del conocimiento (esto es, a modo de sujeto activo del mismo, en el sentido más 'moderno' del término), debiendo consecuentemente perfilar su doctrina del intelecto como una reivindicación radical de las dimensiones comunes a la existencia sensible-racional del humano.

Although it can be said that the main purpose of this article is to systematize and to introduce the reader into the noetic of Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rušd (Averroes), having his Great Commentary on the third book of the 'Treatise on the Soul' by main reference, it precedes to this descriptive and synthesizing task an exposition of his theory of sensibility and imagination, so that it can be made more comprehensible and coherent by virtue of these and the rest of the Cordo-van philosopher. Also we develop here a hypothesis based on some observations formulated by Emanuele Coccia and Richard C. Taylor, namely: that in taking as a fact that human knowledge is communicable and has an objective character, the Cordovan philosopher must supress the possibility of conceiving any theoretical centrality of the human individual that could positions him as the ultimate agent of knowledge (that is, as an active subject of the same, in the most 'modern' sense of the term). In these sense, his doctrine of the intellect appears as a radical defence of the common dimensions of the sensible-rational existence of the human being.

Malgrado il presente articolo si propone di sistematizzare e di introdurre al lettore alla noetica di Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rušd (Averroè) avendo come base il suo Gran Commento sul terzo libro del «Trattato sull'Anima», questo compito descrittivo e di sintesi è preceduto da una discussione della sua teoria della sensibilità e dell'immaginazione, in modo che quella (la sua noetica) possa diventare più comprensibile e coerente insieme ad essi ed al resto del suo corpus filosofico. In aggiunta presentiamo qua una ipotesi di lavoro sulla base di alcuni commenti fatti da Emmanuele Coccia e Richard C. Taylor, vale a dire: che dalla constatazione che la conoscenza umana è trasmissibile ed obbiettiva, il filosofo di Cordoba deve rompere -per un requisito logico nel suo ragionamento- con ogni possibile centralità teorica dell'individuo che lo posizionasse come l'ultimo agente di conoscenza (ovvero, come soggetto attivo di essa, nel senso «moderno» della parola), devendo formare pertanto la sua dottrina dell'intelletto come una riaffermazione radicale delle dimensioni sensibile-razionale dell'esistenza umana.

ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that the ‘discovery’ of the problem of causal determinism and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a combination and mix-up of Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of Stoic theory of determinism and moral responsibility. The (con-)fusion originates with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd century AD. It undergoes several developments, absorbing Epictetan, Middle-Platonist, and Peripatetic ideas; and it leads eventually to a concept of freedom of decision and an exposition of the ‘free-will problem’ in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Fate and in the Mantissa ascribed to him.

Patika yürüyüşü zorlu, bir o kadar da keyifli bir dinlenme aracıdır. İşaretli rotalarda yürümek bu zorluğu bir derece azaltır. Peki bu parkurlar nasıl hazırlanıyor? Türkiye’nin en uzun yürüyüş rotası olarak anılan Karia Yolu 2009 yılında resmî olarak açıldı. Yolu hazırlayan üç kişiden biri olan Altay Özcan ile yol açmanın inceliklerini, yürüyüşü ve doğanın çağrısını konuştuk.

ABSTRACT: The 3rd BCE Stoic logician “Chrysippus says that the number of conjunctions constructible from ten propositions exceeds one million. Hipparchus refuted this, demonstrating that the affirmative encompasses 103,049 conjunctions and the negative 310,95[4].” After laying dormant for over 2000 years, the numbers in this Plutarch passage were recently identified as the 10th (and a derivative of the 11th) Schröder number, and F.Acerbi showed how the 2nd BCE astronomer Hipparchus could have calculated them. What remained unexplained is why Hipparchus’ logic differed from Stoic logic, and consequently, whether Hipparchus actually refuted Chrysippus. This paper closes these explanatory gaps. (1) I reconstruct Hipparchus’ notions of conjunction and negation, and show how they differ from Stoic logic. (2) Based on evidence from Stoic logic, I reconstruct Chrysippus’ calculations, thereby (a) showing that Chrysippus’ claim of over a million conjunctions was correct; and (b) shedding new light on Stoic logic and – possibly – on 3rd century BCE combinatorics. (3) Using evidence about the developments in logic from the 3rd to the 2nd centuries, including the amalgamation of Peripatetic and Stoic theories, I explain why Hipparchus, in his calculations, used the logical notions he did, and why he may have thought they were Stoic.

This article discusses the fragments of the Peripatetic philosopher Dicaearchus on Alcaeus. Most are found in Athenaeus, who knows Dicaearchus indirectly, through a Homeric commentator, a lexicon and the grammarian Hegesander. The fragments deal with ancient drinking habits, the kottabos game and a specific reading in Alcaeus. A biographical discussion recurs in P.Oxy. XXIX 2506, but it is uncertain whether Dicaearchus’ name should be restored in this papyrus. On Alcaeus was probably a monograph and neither a lemmatized commentary nor a full-scale biography.

A passage from Theon's Expositio reveals the systematic exegesis of Aristotle's cosmology provided by Adrastus. By referring to the De caelo, Adrastus affirms the importance of the fifth element for the physical model of heavenly motion. This is the ground for his reading of Metaphysics Λ, which is focused on counteracting spheres: Adrastus aims to reconcile the homocentric model with the epicycle one. This exegesis must be seen in the wider context of the Peripatetic debate on astronomical topics: Adrastus shows a strict allegiance to Aristotle, who ought to be considered the only real auctoritas for him.