Mental Disorders (History)

One approach that has tried to define mental disorder is called “natural function objectivism” (NFO). According to NFO, it is possible to base the demarcation between normal and pathological mental states using a theory of natural normal function. Although promising, this approach has faced decisive criticisms forcing the search for alternative theories. In this paper, I want to argue that there is still hope for a definition of mental disorder based on the criterion of dysfunction if we rethink the value-freedom ideal usually associated with this notion. One theory of function that has received little attention in the debate about the definition of mental disorder is the causal role approach to function (CR), initially developed by Robert Cummins. CR has usually been rejected as the right theory of function to define mental disorder using a “dysfunction clause.” This is because it was considered too dependent on human interests. In this paper, I want to defend that CR should be amended rather than rejected. More precisely, my claim is that CR’s relativity to human interests should be constrained rather than the whole theory dropped. My aim is to provide a framework for thinking about a notion of dysfunction that is both value-laden and sufficiently objective to provide a basis for distinguishing between healthy and pathological mental conditions, using Alexandrova’s account of “social objectivity.”

Every person in our world adapt with live challenges in different way, but some people cannot develop ways to cope with this challenge which resulted to mental disorders among these persons as a chain of destructive behaviors images. In general, mental illness are inability to cope with different stressors which developed by environment internally or externally, this failure of coping reflected as incongruent feelings, thoughts and behaviors with norms which used locally or culturally, on the same time this maladaptive interfere with people function socially, physically and occupationally [1]. Mental and psychiatric science developed many methods to control this destructives behaviors such as medication, technique, and seclusion, the point here about using seclusion from legal and ethical dimensions, is it acceptable or not? Seclusion defined as involuntary isolation of patient in specific room, this room named as seclusion room, and has many characteristics focusing on non-stimulating place, it must be locked, supervised by window, and contain the safety measurements as a hole (Health Care Commission, 2008), On the other hand the mental health commission defined the seclusion as a place has locked door designed in way which prevent going outside, this person stay in this room alone and on a specific time.

The goal of this paper is to analyze a little-known set of documents referring to a "Dancing Epidemic" that took place in Itapagipe, a suburb of Salvador, capital of the province of Bahia, Brazil, in 1882. Through the studies of a group of physicians, especially Raimundo Nina Rodrigues (1862-1906), a psychiatrist and anthropologist from the Bahia School of Medicine, the medical knowledge built on this unique phenomenon in Brazilian history is examined. The case in particular involved a crowd that spread through the streets of Itapagipe, attracting the interest of the medical classes, who were intrigued by the symptoms of motor incoordination the patients manifested. Inspired by foreign literature, but developing their own theories, Rodrigues and colleagues created a unique body of knowledge about the infirmity.

The phenomenology of typification, as developed by Alfred Schutz, provides a way of demystifying two persistent “mysteries” of psychiatric diagnosis: rapid diagnosis and the praecox feeling.  The criteria of psychiatric disorders which are contained in classification manuals, such as DSM-III, are shown to presuppose in psychiatrists the pre-conceptual ability to typify these disorders.  When employed within the “critical attitude” described by Husserl, these pre-conceptual skills are fully scientific.

The Chaumié circular introduced the notion of « diminished responsibility » in 1905 in order to consider criminal defendants with mental retardations or psychic abnormalities. During the Fourth Republic (1947-1959), psychiatric examinations were almost always conducted in criminal cases, especially when the death penalty was at stake. It was then assumed that the mentally unbalanced and retarded criminals shouldn't be executed. However, a study of the pardon requests indicates that a « diminished responsibility » could not always prevent an execution. The president of the Republic had the right to pardon these criminals but it seems that the conclusions of psychiatric examinations influenced the decisions only to a limited extent.

La circulaire Chaumié de 1905 impose la notion d’atténuation de la responsabilité afin de tenir compte des troubles ou des retards mentaux. Sous la IVe République, l’examen psychiatrique des accusés est quasi-systématique dans les affaires où la peine capitale est encourue. Alors que les déficients et malades mentaux sont réputés ne pas être concernés par l'application de la peine capitale, l'observation des dossiers de grâce montre qu'une expertise concluant à une responsabilité atténuée ne constitue pas une protection absolue contre la guillotine. Le président de la République, détenteur du droit de grâce, se prononce sur l'exécution d’individus désignés par les experts comme « débiles » ou « déséquilibrés ». Si l'atténuation de responsabilité entre dans les éléments d'appréciation de la décision présidentielle, son effet semble limité.

During the nineteenth century, changing conceptions of mental disorder had profound implications for the way that criminal responsibility was conceived. As medical writers and practitioners increasingly drew attention to the complexities of insanity, the grounds on which mentally abnormal offenders could be excused began to seem unduly restrictive. By way of a contribution to our understanding of this development, this article examines how the growing disparity unfolded in Scotland. I argue that the requirements of the insanity defence, as set out within judicial directions, reflect core facets of Scottish Common Sense philosophical thought, including Thomas Reid’s view of human agency and understanding of ‘common sense’. Building on this contention, I suggest that Scottish Common Sense philosophy played an important role in the development of Scottish mental state defences more broadly, and can provide an original interpretation of the way the doctrines of provocation and diminished responsibility changed during this era.

In his essay titled: Are Mental States a Useful Concept? Neurophilosophical Influences on Phenomenology and Psychopathology, Paul Harrison (1991) considers whether the recently emerging field of neurophilosophy, and in particular its "eliminative materialist" branch, will eventually undermine the clinical psychiatric disciplines of descriptive psychopathology and phenomenology. Eliminative materialists classify common sense assumptions and explanations concerning mental life as "folk psychology"; additionally, they consider phenomenological descriptions of normal mental life as a merely more complex version of folk psychology.  Moreover, "the eliminative materialists not only see [folk psychology] theories as largely false, but believe the whole level of explanation to be unnecessary and a hindrance to progress  in understanding the basis of mental processes" (Harrison, 1991). Harrison goes on to clarify that descriptive psychopathology and abnormal phenomenology also qualify as folk psychology. As a result, if eliminative materialists are correct, psychiatrists and psychopathologists must at the very least "reconfigure" (radically alter?) their approaches to abnormal mental events.