Metaphysics of Morals

The philosopher Immanuel Kant held the idea of ‘duty’ to be of utmost importance when it came to ethics. This duty-centered approach to ethics is known as a “deontological” one, as opposed to an end-result based ethics known as being “teleological.” This essay will define Kant’s use of ‘duty,’ ‘oughts,’ ‘obligations,’ ‘merit,’ and ‘partiality,’ and the application of these terms to such examples as saving a child from drowning and saving a child on the other side of the world by donating to a charitable organization. In each of these two cases, Kant’s concept of ‘merit’ will be considered. Any contentions I have with Kant’s ethical approach with the given examples will be provided respectively.

ABSTRACT (refereed):

Il rapporto tra etica e mondo nella filosofia di Kant può essere affrontato considerando l’esigenza di regolare e determinare la sfera dell’azione morale: tale necessità non può prescindere dal relazionarsi con il mondo esterno, ordinato in modo indipendente dalla volontà umana.
Dopo un richiamo al ruolo che la natura, in quanto ordine dei fenomeni secondo leggi, svolge nell’elaborazione di massime legittime nella Fondazione e nella seconda Critica, l’intervento si concentrerà sulla funzione del giudizio pratico nella Metafisica dei costumi quale elemento di connessione tra l’azione etica e il mondo in cui questa si esplica. Il rapporto tra le due dimensioni sarà affrontato in riferimento alla latitudo implicata nei doveri di virtù e all’ausilio della prudenza quale sapere “mondano” nel definire azioni volte ad un fine morale.
L’indeterminazione attribuita ai doveri etici, si sosterrà, costituisce l’esito anche di una diversa considerazione del mondo di cui l’agente fa esperienza.

The present paper aims to assess the articulated relationship between ethics and right in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. This will be done by discussing Kant’s argument in favor of the capital punishment against C. Beccaria, as it is formulated in the paragraph On the Right to Punish and to Grant Clemency of this text. Our first goal is to emphasize Kant’s thesis that the capital punishment is able to punish any offender «in terms of his sensibilities» [nach seiner Empfindungsart] (MS-RL, AA 06: 332, 334). This could sound strange, since Kant clearly states that ethics cannot penetrate the deep darkness of the human heart and discover his real dispositions (MS-TL, AA 06: 392). Therefore, the obligation of the ethical duty can only be wide, whereas the juridical obligation can be narrow just because the moral disposition of the subject does not matter here. Although the expression «in terms of his sensibilities» cannot be referred to the thorny concept of «disposition» [Gesinnung], it nonetheless draws attention to the subject’s inner dimension also in the domain of criminal law. The second goal of the paper consists in showing that the foregoing does not weaken the distinction between ethics and right, but it rather bears witness to their peculiar organization within the Sittenlehre. Indeed, such a distinction develops – but does not contradict – the assessment provided by Kant in his previous moral writings. This is aptly exemplified by Kant’s distinction between homo phaenomenon and homo noumenon in the same paragraph in which he rejects Beccaria’s argument. The final part of the paper tests the consistency of the first two points by analyzing the way Kant deals with the case of suicide, and the way he judges the self-murderer.

Amuchdebatedpassage in the Metaphysics of Morals often leads commentators to believe that it is not possible to act from juridical duty. On the one hand, Kant says that all lawgiving includes an incentive ‘which connects a ground to determining choice to this action subjectively with the representation of the law’ (MM: 218). On the other hand, he claims that juridical lawgiving ‘does not include the incentive of
duty in the law’ (MM: 219). The first claim seems to entail that agents can perform a juridical duty for the sake of that duty; the second seems to entail that agents cannot perform a juridical duty for the sake of that duty. This paper shows that it is possible to reconcile both passages and to claim that one can act from juridical duty in Kant’s terms. First, it gives an account of what can be called the paradox of juridical duties. Second, it discusses briefly how responses to the paradox remain somewhat unsatisfactory. Finally, it clarifies how agents can act with no other incentive but the actual juridical duty without endangering the Kantian morality law divide.

This presentation will show the relevance of using a framework sourced in Kant's pragmatic anthropology to understand the complex intertwining between gender and citizenship. In his Metaphysics of Morals: Doctrine of Right, Kant described two categories of citizens: the active and the passive, the principal distinguishing factor being social and financial independence. This of course put women in the passive category, but it also included immigrants, labourers, and generally " all men who depended on another for their survival ". I will argue that, both in Stephen T. Leonard and Joan C. Tronto's " The Genders of Citizenship " and in Hege Skjeie and Birte Siim's "Scandinavian Feminist Debates on Citizenship", the notion of passivity, even in the midst of progressive legal frameworks, is still an issue when it comes to empowering women as full citizens. I will focus firstly on the link between civility or sociability and citizenship in Kant by analysing the indirect yet instrumental role he gives to women. This will serve as a springing board to consider the intertwining of gender and politics in the battle between republican and privatist conceptions of citizenship that Leonard and Tronto propose. Finally, informed by Scandinavian feminist literature, I will develop the idea of gendered citizenship today and how it still relies on strict distinctions between the public and the private sphere that perpetuate a certain idea of what it is to be politically engaged and free that is ultimately hindering the democratic ideal of granting full-access to public life to all.