Mozi

Durante el período de los Reinos Combatientes la reflexión sobre la guerra es de vital importancia para los pensadores chinos. En este trabajo analizaremos las posiciones de Mozi y Mencio al respecto comenzando, en primer lugar, con las diferencias filosóficas entre las propuestas de ambos, en especial en torno al rol de la utilidad o beneficio (li). Luego, con los argumentos que ambos exponen para oponerse a la guerra, en general en diálogos ante gobernantes de estados. Con esto intentaremos mostrar los vínculos entre teoría y estrategias persuasivas que aplicaban, y las similitudes y diferencias entre las posiciones de dos pensadores usualmente vistos como rivales. Palabras clave: MOZI, MENCIO, FILOSOFÍA CHINA, REINOS COMBATIENTES, GUERRA

Chris Fraser has written a comprehensive and well-researched work on Mohist philos- ophy. Those who are not already familiar with Mohist thought will find Fraser’s overview of the primary texts and review of previous research very useful. For example, many interpreters assert that the Mohist state of nature argument to justify government authority is like that of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in assuming that humans are innately self-interested. In contrast, Fraser follows those like FUNG Yu-lan (FENG Youlan 馮友蘭), who argue that, for the Mohists, conflict in the state of nature is driven by disagreement over values, not over conflicts of self-interested desires (86–87; compare Fung, History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952], vol. 1, 101). Fraser also makes a couple of original contribu- tions. He presents a novel account of the assumptions underlying the Mohists’ recom- mendations for transforming human motivations, and he challenges the standard understanding of “impartial caring.” I find the former to be very plausible, while the latter is quite dubious.

In this essay, I hope to explore the idea of the supernatural and its uses in Mozi’s doctrines. Mohism is often characterised as having a belief or rather, utility for the use of the supernatural in its dogma. Supernatural in the context of this essay, would be taken to be in reference to the two main entities that is frequently mentioned in the Mozi, that is ghosts/spirits as well as, Heaven (tian). I would try to explore the philosophical implications of the usage of this supernatural device and also bearing in mind the other prevailing dogmas of the times such as Daoism and Confucianism. I would critique these two particular strands of thought and attempt to argue for the practicality and accessibility of Mozi’s ideas in comparison to both Daoism and Confucianism.

Few words in english since, for italian speakers, all this and more can be found in the Introduction. This work is the result of more than three years of research, conducted literally stealing time to each every moment of the day, when I was not at job - fundamental instrument to earn a living but, at the same time, greedy Moloch demanding more and more energy - or being involved in family life activities. For this reason it represented the greatest possible effort in my whole life, culminated when, more than an year ago, I presented it to the commission for the final examination, and it was awarded with honours. One year passed and life goes on, a carriage is not a pumpkin and a clerk in a transport company remains a clerk. So I decided to “publish” it, to make it public, since to see it covered with dust on my shelf would have been a nonsense and, in last analysis, the umpteenth insult to what I’ve always believed (и всё таки я верю...). It’s in italian but, for interested people, it wouldn’t be a problem for me to translate selected parts into the other languages that I speak. Of course, of all the mistakes that you may (and will) find in it, I am the only responsible.

Because of the paucity of hard facts in our knowledge of early texts such as the Mozi, we inevitably have had to rely on assumptions when interpreting these texts. These assumptions have contributed to the portrayal of Mo Di as a philosopher, the founder of Mohist thought, and promoter of a coherent thought system in0 Ten Core Ideas. We can read the Mozi in a novel way by methodologically putting these assumptions on hold, not necessarily by rejecting them. This approach draws attention to the differences among the Ten Core Ideas, their not quite fixed forms, and their remarkably poor presence in the Mozi. It leads to another, equally plausible portrayal of Mohist thought as gradually shaped by its authors and editors along with the formation of the book.

La expresión Voluntad del Cielo (天志 Tiān zhì) de Mòzi es parte bien principal para entender su doctrina, sin embargo, en China los estudiantes conocen de Mòzi las expresiones y las triadas del Amor Universal (兼爱 Jiān ài) y Contra la Guerra de Agresión (Fēi gōng 非攻). Estas dos principales doctrinas dejan incompleto el sistema de Mòzi posibilitando su negación, mientras que la voluntad del Cielo se sostiene a si misma, ya que es el modelo o estándar, pero no es 'científica', no puede ser ni probada ni refutada (negada). En cualquier caso, conviene su revisión. Encontramos la expresión Mandato del Cielo, (Tiānmìng 天命) en Confucio que se traspasa o ejecuta el emperador o hijo del Cielo. Sin embargo, la Voluntad del Cielo de Mòzi no implica orden o mandato alguno, tan solo manifiesta una voluntad, un deseo del Cielo expresado en unas reglas de justicia dadas, pero no es ejecutivo y semeja mucho al Logos occidental. Pero, mejor, demos la palabra a Mòzi que se explique: Comienza la primera triada avisando de la imprudencia que es ofender al que aporta el orden, que a la postre el Cielo. Y "lo que el Cielo desea es justicia", lo que implica, se dice, que, como contraparte o consecuencia, "el hará lo que yo deseo", que es proveernos bonanza y librarnos de calamidades. Y ¿qué es la justicia? La no discriminación, así como la injusticia es la violencia. La segunda triada comienza refiriéndose a la justicia como lo que aporta orden al mundo y cómo esta procede del sabio y no del estúpido o el mediocre, de modo que, a la postre, su origen es el Cielo. Así como todos por nuestra simple humanidad entendemos que dañar está mal, Mòzi señala la supremacía del Cielo sobre el hijo del Cielo y de nuevo aconseja la conveniencia de atenernos a la voluntad del Cielo: "en el mundo aquellos que carecen de humanidad son desafortunados", pues no aman universalmente como el Cielo; son desagradecidos, pues "todo está dispuesto para para el bien del ser humano." Concluye como en la anterior triada señalando que el Cielo es el estándar o modelo de la justicia, como lo es el compás para determinar la circularidad o el péndulo para precisar la verticalidad. En la tercera triada comienza repitiendo, como en la primera, lo imprudente que es desobedecer la voluntad del Cielo y nos propone atenernos a ella para vivir con justicia, e igualmente insiste en que el origen de esta está en el Cielo y no en el hijo del Cielo, aunque aquí añade que así lo entienden falsamente los oficiales y caballeros-y también los confucianos. "¿Y cuál es la voluntad del Cielo? Amar a toda la gente del mundo universalmente. Atenerse a la intención del Cielo es ser universal y oponerse a ella es ser parcial, pues en la universalidad está la justicia y en la parcialidad está la fuerza." Finalmente, se pregunta Mòzi por el encomio que hace mucha literatura de lo inhumano, de la guerra, o más bien, claro, de la victoria y recuerda entonces los argumentos que ya esgrimía en Contra la Guerra de Agresión con varios ejemplos de cómo en comunidad (lo contrario de la parcialidad) rechazamos la agresión y el daño

The attitude toward li 利 is often identified as a key difference between the Mencius 孟子 and the Mozi 墨子. A common view is that for the Mencius, rightness (yi 義) and li are incompatible; but for the Mozi they are not necessarily so. In this paper I argue that the Mencius and the Mozi are in broad agreement on the issue of li, and their attitudes toward li are not as different as may seem at first glance. If we take a finer-grained understanding of li in two ways, namely the self-regarding li and the other-regarding li, then both the Mencius and the Mozi would criticize the former but encourage the latter. The term li in the Mencius has a range of meanings, and it is not clear whether the Mencius actually opposes all li-pursuing activities. Mencius would agree with Mozi that, at least in some cases, one is obligated to seek li for others. Furthermore, despite their criticism of self-regarding li, both Mencius and Mozi allow that in some cases it is morally permissible to act from the motive of self-regarding li, as long as this motive coexists with the motive of rightness. That is, self-regarding li and rightness are not always mutually exclusive, even for Mencius, who seems to be more critical of li.

The Mohists develop the concept of yi 義 to denote what is morally right in a normative sense. We argue that this concept has, as one of its necessary conditions, a requirement to not harm others. Additionally, we will show that the motivation of developing this concept is that it can be both universalized and publicly agreed upon, thus serving the Mohists' endeavor to overcome human conflicts that make the world chaotic and unlivable. We argue therefore that the Mohist notion of gongyi 公義 is best captured by the requirement of "not harming." Moreover, we shall show that the Mohists themselves committed to this requirement as the first principle of all their core doctrines. Finally, we argue that due to the justifiability and universalizability of the requirement of "not harming," the Mohists' commitment to it as a prerequisite normatively justifies their other values in a way that was unprecedented at the time.

This paper discusses three lines of argumentation against warfare in the Mozi, with extensive reference to the original text in translation. I explore what the argument in each of the three chapters entails, to whom it may have been addressed, and how persuasive it is from a modern academic perspective. To contextualize the three lines of argumentation, I occasionally refer to other parts of the Mozi and to other early Chinese politico-philosophical writings. In the final section, I give examples of how these arguments were used in practice, at least according to the anecdotes in the latter part of the received Mozi. My ultimate goal is to show how the Mohists actively adapted their argumentative strategies so as to find the best words to end wars.

O que quero dizer por “filosofia chinesa”? Por “filosofia”, me refiro a área do conhecimento que, orientada por debates históricos ou contemporâneos, investiga racionalmente problemas fundamentais para a humanidade, em termos metafísicos, epistemológicos, lógicos, éticos e estéticos – e tantas outras abordagens derivadas dessas subáreas básicas, como filosofia da linguagem, filosofia da mente, filosofia política etc. Por “chinês” ou “chinesa”, entendo ser toda expressão humana proveniente da região geográfica ou das culturas do que hoje chamamos de China, reconhecendo que esta teve em sua história diferentes transformações territoriais, linguísticas e socioculturais, ainda que também foi preservada de forma constantemente adaptada algumas dessas características, como sua escrita ou alguns ritos sociais. Assim, filosofia chinesa aqui tem dois sentidos, usados tanto conjuntamente como separadamente nos capítulos desse livro: (1) todo conhecimento de base proposicional ou reflexiva produzido historicamente na China a partir das suas próprias bases terminológica e cultural; (2) todo o esforço intelectual por responder ou esclarecer perguntas fundamentais da humanidade a partir das fontes e indivíduos chineses.

This paper examines two syllogistic arguments contrasted in an ancient Chinese book, the Mozi, which expounds doctrines of the Mohist school of philosophers.  While the arguments seem to have the same form, one of them (the one-horse argument) is valid but the other (the two-horse argument) is not.  To explain this difference, the paper uses English plural constructions to formulate the arguments.  Then it shows that the one-horse argument is valid because it is an instance of the plural cousin of a standard form of valid categorical syllogisms (Plural Barbara), and argues that the two-horse argument involves equivocal uses of a key predicate (the Chinese counterpart of ‘have four feet’) that has the distributive/non-distributive ambiguity.  In doing so, the paper discusses linguistic differences between Chinese and English and explains why the logic of plural constructions is applicable to Chinese arguments that involve no plural constructions.

The paper deals with the problem of dating the birth of Confucius, an outstanding Chinese thinker, teacher and politician who became the founder of the Chinese philosophical tradition. Taking the problem of Mozi’s birth as an example? the paper begins with a description of the typical difficulties of dating the birth of great names of ancient China. Further, all the main sources for the problem are analyzed, and the most authoritative Chinese and Western versions of dating the birth of Confucius are described. As a result of the research, it is concluded that the most correct source to clarify the issue is the commentary on Spring and Autumn entitled Gongyang Zhuan, and the most convincing version on Confucius’ date of birth is October 3, 552 BC.

A proposta é oferecer um panorama das principais filosofias e religiões que emergiram na China a partir dos textos filosóficos, literários e históricos desenvolvidos no período mais ou menos do segundo milênio a.C. até cerca do século XIII d.C. Os encontros serão ao vivo pelo Google Meet, gravados, e disponibilizados na plataforma da Eagle - Gestão de Conhecimento. Abordaremos questões acerca da língua e do relativo isolamento dos chineses arcaicos. Disso, veremos seus mitos fundacionais, os primeiros textos relacionados à filosofia moral e política que se conectam com uma metafísica da contingência. Do humanismo das primeiras dinastias à decadência das guerras e tensões sociais surgem Confúcio, os taoístas, os legalistas, Mozi – e tantos outros tentando restaurar as glórias passadas. Das transições dinásticas da primeira unificação da China, passando pelo classicismo Han e novos períodos de fragmentação, veremos os desenvolvimentos das escolas principais, a introdução do budismo na China, até a chamada “Grande Síntese” neoconfuciana de Zhuxi.

Texto publicado na Coluna ANPOF em 16 de maio de 2021 em que articulei, de um lado, o debate ético sobre pena de morte entre duas escolas filosóficas da China antiga, e, de outro lado, o debate político atual brasileiro que diz que "bandido bom é bandido morto" e que somente o "cidadão de bem" deve ter direitos plenos. Mostrei a falácia contida nesse último discurso, sendo um tipo de falácia já denunciada pelo filósofo Xun na China antiga.

This paper aims at contextualizing historically some parts of the Mò biān, the dialectical part of the Mòzǐ, attributed to the later mohist school or Neo-Mohism. We will try to get a deeper understanding of two texts by linking them with the world view and circumstances of the time. Before going into those texts, first we will briefly review some aspects of today´s interpretation of the Mohist doctrine and compare the experience of the Mohism in China with its Western counterparts, the Cynic and Stoic Schools of Thought, since both shared Cosmopolitanism at the core of their doctrines. Finally, we will conclude that the circumstances preventing the implementation of Cosmopolitanism or the Universal Love policy as proposed by the mohists have been removed by the globalization allowing the possibility of this policy to be carried out.

The Mwodz��� �� (MZ) consists of 71 numbered units, conventionally called chapters. The first 39 of these are on ethical or other doctrinal topics. Of them, 30 (MZ 8-37) are grouped in ten sets of three, which I will call triplets, each set having a collective title; 2 (MZ 38-39) form a duplet, also with a collective title; the other 7 (MZ 1-7) are individually titled singlets. Stylistic inconsistencies occur among and within triplets, in a pattern which suggests evolution over time. I here propose an order of composition of the triplets from this internal evidence, and extend that argument to the duplet and singlet chapters. I note the history of the Mician movement which this sequence implies, and compare it with contemporary evidence as a final test of the hypothesis, and as a way of providing the hypothesis with some approximate dates. The Triplet Chapters, MZ 8-37 Some triplet and duplet chapters are lost, but their relative position is given by the table of contents in the Dau...

Mozi’s doctrine of impartial care (jian’ai 兼愛) has been interpreted predominantly through the lens of Mengzi: i.e. as “love without distinctions” vs. “love with distinctions.” However, I think Mengzi saw only half of the picture, since his focus was exclusively on the difference between Confucianism and Mohism in regard to the scope, intensity, and sequence of love. In this essay, I argue that Mozi’s impartial care is also characteristically different in kind from the Confucian notion of humaneness (ren 仁). My analysis and comparison of their usage of the word ai 愛 shows that Mozi’s ai is material-oriented care, while Confucian ai is emotion-oriented care. I further argue that Mozi had this particular understanding of care largely because he held a quite negative view of human emotions. For him, human emotions are unreliable and harmful for the practice of care.

避免战争、争取和平一直是各国政府工作的重心，学界也从未停止过有关的争论。然而，针对和平问题的研究多限于国际政治关系领域，从哲学层面入手的探讨则较为缺乏。实际上，中国古代哲学学派如儒家、道家、法家和墨家都曾对此问题阐述一二，而西方哲学家对和平概念和实现和平方式等方面的论题也多有论述。因此，文章大胆地就中国古代哲学家墨子和西方近代哲学家康德的和平思想进行比较，力图归纳二者的合与异，并寻找其和平理论对现代社会的启示。
War and peace has been the major concern not only for governments around the globe but also the academia; however, pertinent topics are centered around the field of international politics while the contribution of philosophical studies have been undervalued upon this issue. Actually, Chinese classic philosophies such as Confucian, Daoism and Mohist School gave serious thoughts on the concept of peace/harmony, and meanwhile western philosophical schools also made contributions to the theories regarding peace and its actualization. This research attempts to compare the conception of peace respectively from China’s ancient saint Mozi and Modern philosopher Kant and aims to contemplate on their significance to Modern society by considering the potential exchanges between Western and Eastern philosophies.

This article examines two syllogistic arguments contrasted in an ancient Chinese book, the Mozi, which expounds doctrines of the Mohist school of philosophers. While the arguments seem to have the same form, one of them (the one-horse argument) is valid but the other (the two-horse argument) is not. To explain this difference, the article uses English plural constructions to formulate the arguments. Then it shows that the one-horse argument is valid because it has a valid argument form, the plural cousin of a standard form of valid categorical syllogisms (Plural Barbara), and argues that the two-horse argument involves equivocal uses of a key predicate (the Chinese counterpart of ‘have four feet’) that has the distributive/nondistributive ambiguity. In doing so, the article discusses linguistic differences between Chinese and English and explains why the logic of plural constructions is applicable to Chinese arguments that involve no plural constructions.

The MZ 17-19 essays expound a well-known and characteristic tenet of Micianism. They share with MZ 14-16 the fact that each essay is twice the length of the preceding (successively 425, 1,172, and 2,016 words). As a supplement to my 1 previous studies, I here consider the structure and rhetorical strategy of each essay, 2 to show that (1) each is complete in itself, in further refutation of the fragment theory, and that (2) the series is developmental, in further refutation of the idea that they are parallel but geographically separate versions of the same thing. MZ 17 is a tightly argued three-part case. Each part begins with the hypothesis marker ! ! “suppose.” The three parts prove that murder is wrong, extend that wrong to war, and denounce the morally confused persons who lead the state into war: 1. Establishing a Basis (Proving the immorality of killing) a. Theft of fruit. Why is it wrong? It causes injury b. Theft of food animals. Why is it wrong? It causes greater injury c. ...

Because of the paucity of hard facts in our knowledge of early texts such as the Mozi, we inevitably have had to rely on assumptions when interpreting these texts. These assumptions have contributed to the portrayal of Mo Di as a philosopher, the founder of Mohist thought, and promoter of a coherent thought system in0 Ten Core Ideas. We can read the Mozi in a novel way by methodologically putting these assumptions on hold, not necessarily by rejecting them. This approach draws attention to the differences among the Ten Core Ideas, their not quite fixed forms, and their remarkably poor presence in the Mozi. It leads to another, equally plausible portrayal of Mohist thought as gradually shaped by its authors and editors along with the formation of the book.