PESCO

After a long period of wars that devastated Europe for the first half of the 20th century, Europeans were inspired by a vision of lasting peace. More than 70 years later, Europe has experienced the longest period of peace in its troubled history.

2017.06.01.
Master Thesis for Master of International Security and Law Programme at SDU.
Security strategies are important mediums for narrating the EU as a security actor. The Global Strategy and the ongoing initiatives of the European Parliament, Commission and Council could be conceived as a pledge to remain together as a Union in order to contribute to global security in a particular way. The political events of 2016 and 2017, challenges of Brexit, conflicts in the European neighbourhood with the developments in the foreign policies of Russia and the United States further underlines the relevance for an overview of the EU security strategy. This paper’s aim to answer the question:
“To what extent the proposed and potential policy measures can be realistically implemented in the reform of the EU security and defence policy?”

PESCO, 2017 yılının son çeyreğinde, Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyesi 23 ülkenin ortak
savunma ve güvenlik politikaları hususunda uzlaşmaya varması üzerine ortaya
çıkan bir yapılanmadır.

Daimi bir savuna işbirliği çerçevesi dâhilinde kurulan ve kapsamlı bir savunma
paketi niteliğinde olan PESCO'nun, “AB'nin NATO'su” olarak adlandırılması boşa
yapılmış bir yakıştırma değildir.


Avrupa Konseyi üyelerinin yeterli oyunu alarak yasal zemine kavuşmuş olan
PESCO'nun dayandığı temel yasal zemin, Avrupa Birliği (AB) kurucu andlaşması
olarak da bilinen Lizbon Andlaşması m.42, ona atıf yapan ve uygulamasını
gösteren m.46 ve bu maddelerin detaylı açıklayıcısı niteliğinde olan 10 No'lu
Protokol'dür.

PESCO, Haziran 2016 yılında yayımlanan AB Küresel Stratejisi
neticesinde devreye sokulan Avrupa Savunma Endüstrisi Gelişim Programı çerçevesinde gelişen ve yeni bir program
olan Koordineli Yıllık Savunma Değerlendirmesi (CARD) ve Askeri Plânlama ve Yönetim Kapasitesi
(MPCC) gibi başkaca uygulamalarla beraber AB'nin yeni savunma vizyonunu
gerçekleştirebilmesi için ortaya konan makro plânın birer uzantısı
mahiyetindedir.


PESCO'nun uluslararası alandaki dinamikleri anlamlı bir şekilde
değiştirebilmesi için, oldukça esnek şekilde koordine edilen yüzeysel bir
güvenlik şemsiyesi olarak kalmaması ve sağlam bir iç birlikteliğin sağlanması
gereklidir.


Eğer derinlikli bir entegrasyon gerçekleştirilebilirse, PESCO sayesinde AB'nin
uluslararası alanda elinin güçleneceği, dolayısıyla AB'nin güvenlik ve savunma
alanında otonomisinin artacağı söylenebilir

La mise en œuvre différée, en 2017, de la Coopération structurée permanente (PESCO) donne une nouvelle dimension à l'intégration de la défense de l'Union européenne. 25 États membres se sont engagés à accroître leurs dépenses de défense et à intensifier leur collaboration par des projets communs dans les domaines opérationnel et capacitaire. Six des quarante-six projets de la CSP ont pour ambition de développer des capacités maritimes. Vingt-deux des vingt-cinq participants sont, par ailleurs, Alliés au sein de l'OTAN, qui dispose aussi de son propre processus de planification de défense (NDPP), par lequel elle définit les capacités nécessaires à la réalisation de ses missions.
Dans un contexte sécuritaire en rapide évolution, caractérisé par une diversification des menaces, les États européens sont sollicités de toutes parts pour mettre à disposition leurs capacités militaires. Que ce soit pour leurs missions au sein de l’OTAN, dans le cadre de la Politique de Sécurité et de Défense commune (PSDC) de l’UE, dans le cadre des Nations unies ou pour la participation à des coalitions, les États ne disposent que d’un seul ensemble de forces pour honorer tous leurs engagements. Comme ce sont les États — et non les organisations dont ils sont membres — qui décident souverainement de leurs plans de développement capacitaires, l’objet du présent travail est de répondre à la question :  Les projets capacitaires maritimes de la coopération structurée permanente répondent-ils aux besoins capacitaires de l’UE et de l’OTAN ?

The changing geopolitical landscape, as well as NATO’s shifted focus to expeditionary warfare, encouraged EU Member States to address the EU’s military capability shortfalls via a more binding and cooperative framework . The European Defence Fund’s establishment (EDF) and the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU finally led France and Germany to take the political initiative and activate PESCO by establishing a legal framework for enhanced defence cooperation and integration. Through the fulfilment of the 20 binding commitments in line with Article 42(6) and 46 of the Treaty on European Union, the 25 participating Member States agreed to establish a “permanent structured cooperation” . This initiative aims at boosting operational readiness by improving armed forces’ interoperability, standardising military doctrines and equipment at a higher communitarian level.

статья посвящена анализу внешней политики Италии последних пяти
лет (от принятия Повестки 2030 ООН о реализации целей устойчивого развития до на-
стоящего времени). Автор дает краткую характеристику особенностей современной
внешней политики Италии, далее тезисно рассматривает проблематику реализации
национальных интересов в условиях глобализации и главенства наднациональных
структур и их связь с приоритетными направлениями развития международных орга-
низаций. Выбор организаций обусловлен следующими факторами: 1) «новизна» внеш-
неполитических направлений государства (ЦУР1 реализуются с конца 2015 г., а евро-
пейская структура PESCO2 существует с конца 2017 г.); 2) участие в обеих организациях
является одним из приоритетных направлений внешней политики Италии. Рассматри-
вается участие Италии в организации PESCO как наиболее близкой структуре, позво-
ляющей реализовать итальянские национальные интересы. На основе анализа отчетов
по реализации ЦУР делаются выводы об эффективности итальянской политики в дан-
ной области.

Current relations between Ukraine and Visegrad Four states in the security domain are in stagnation. Even if existing obstacles removed, there is no clear vision of possible cooperation topics and joint projects to be implemented. Cooperation within NATO and EU frameworks are perceived as the most potential, including Ukraine joining PESCO projects, building resilience, cyber security, joint air defence, special forces training, and security experts' cooperation. In all these spheres, Ukraine experience can be an added value so building an equal players' partnership rather than developing donor-clientalism relations.
This analysis was produced within the Think Visegrad Non-V4 Fellowship programme.

Con l'irrompere violento della pandemia dovuta al coronavirus SARS-CoV 2, che, identificato per la prima volta nella città di Whuan, nella Cina meridionale, nel mese di dicembre 2019, si è diffusa a livello mondiale, il mondo ha scoperto questo universo segreto e misterioso dei virus e finora noti ai più solo per essere causa dell'influenza e del raffreddore. I virus, entità biologiche definite "ai margini della vita", con caratteristiche di parassita obbligato, in quanto si replica esclusivamente all'interno delle cellule viventi degli organismi. I virus possono infettare tutte le forme di vita, dall'uomo, agli animali alle piante, ai microrganismi, compresi altri organismi infettanti e persino altri virus. I virus si trovano in tutte gli ecosistemi della Terra e rappresentano l'entità biologica più abbondante in assoluto. Sono costituiti da due parti, il materiale genetico costituito da DNA o RNA, lunghe molecole che trasportano le informazioni genetiche, e un rivestimento protettivo, proteico o lipoproteico. Il primo virus indentificato è stato il virus del Mosaico del tabacco, nel 1892. L'attenzione sui virus è sempre stata massima anche da parte dell'agricoltura. Il recente ritrovamento di virus ad alta patogenicità del sottotipo H5N8 in cigni reali nell'Istria (Croazia) ha preoccupato il mondo degli avicoltori, facendoli ritornare con il pensiero al 2005, quando erano scoppiati focolai di influenza aviaria dal virus H5N1 con le conseguenze mediatiche del crollo dei consumi di carne avicola. Il virus dell'influenza aviaria può colpire tutte le specie di uccelli e si trasmette attraverso il contatto di animali sani con quelli malati, le loro secrezioni e prodotti infetti non trattati termicamente, mangimi contaminati, acqua e lettiere. L'uomo può diffondere il virus attraverso le proprie calzature, attrezzature e veicoli contaminati. Tuttavia il virus H5N8 non è pericoloso per l'uomo, ma altamente patogeno per i volatili. Da ottobre 2010, quando sono stati rilevati i primi casi, la malattia è stata confermata nel pollame e nei volatili in cattività nei Paesi Bassi, Germania, Regno Unito, Danimarca, Francia e Svezia. In sostanza, i virus sono intorno a noi e da tempo sotto la lente anche dei fitopatologi: tutte le più comuni colture sono suscettibili all'attacco dei virus. Alcuni esempi. Nell'orzo è presente il virus del Nanismo giallo, trasmesso dagli afidi, e la cui diffusione è facilitata negli inverni con temperature miti; nelle ortive di pieno campo gli afidi ed i tripidi che si alimentano delle erbe spontanee, importanti sorgenti di inoculo per varie virosi, sono quindi causa di precoci ed estese infezioni virali. Nel pomodoro così al danno provocato dagli afidi alle piante della solanacea, di tipo diretto, perché sono responsabili della sottrazione di sostanze nutritive, arresto dello sviluppo vegetativo, decolorazioni ed accartocciamenti fogliari, deformazione dei germogli, colatura dei frutti, si aggiunge quello indiretto quale agenti vettori di affezioni di natura virale, come il TSWV (virus dell'avvizzimento maculato del pomodoro o Tomato spotted wilt virus) e il TYLCV (tomato yellow leaf curl virus). Il virus TSWV può essere trasmesso anche dai tripidi, specie polifaghe che interessano moltissime colture orticole. Si nutrono di polline per cui raramente procurano danni sui frutti, ma le iniezioni di saliva consentono di trasferire questo pericoloso virus. Da qui l'importanza della lotta con prodotti insetticidi per proteggere le piante sin dalle prime fasi di

Objectives:
EU Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that encompasses 29 nations is gaining momentum. The aim of this study is to acknowledge ongoing developments in EU CSDP and define their impact for Lithuanian defence and security policy.

Methods:
Comparative scientific literature and document analysis method was used throughout this study. Article firstly reviews a path of EU CSDP developments, outlines roles and responsibilities of EU structures and examines current activities in CSDP framework with the focus to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Second part is devoted to consider Lithuanian’s role in current EU CSDP context, to outline decisions that Lithuanian authorities made to implement new PESCO initiative.

Results:
Study reveals that: CSDP remains adaptive framework for EU; established procedures ensure CSDP is in compromise with all of nations; PESCO initiative signals positive outcomes while reinforcing idea of “EU Strategic autonomy”. Furthermore it was indentified that: approved National Security Strategy backs current EU initiatives; PESCO could provide flexible response options without duplicating NATO’s efforts; national participation in PESCO initiatives will enable improvements in cyber security and will enable rapid access for possible EU and NATO troops deployments; participation in PESCO negotiation phase reached given political aims to seek more extensive projects and position nation within core members of EU.

Conclusions:
Lithuanian policies’ shift for deeper engagement in CSDP is likely shaped by recognition that strategic trans-Atlantic partnership is not certain anymore, as well as UK role at post-Brexit period as 3rd party.

On 22 June the European Council agreed on the need to launch a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) in the field of security and defence. Thus, the last of the discussed initiatives on the development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) gained political support and will be implemented. Debates on the CSDP have gained momentum since mid-2016 due to a combination of three factors: the UK's decision to leave the EU, the adoption of the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, and some EU member states' dislike of Donald Trump, combined with the conviction that it is necessary to reduce the EU's dependence on the USA. The year-long negotiations have resulted in the creation of military planning and conduct capability, the establishment of the European Defence Fund, and of the coordinated annual review on defence, and the decision to activate PESCO. These initiatives may be an opportunity to increase the military capabilities of EU member states and to boost investment or streamline defence spending. However, in an unfavourable political situation (involving for example long-term tensions between the USA and the Western European allies), the development of these initiatives may have negative consequences for NATO. Therefore, in most states of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea regions, EU initiatives are received with great caution. Less inclined to see themselves as part of the eastern flank, Poland's partners from the Visegrad Group are more enthusiastic about the plan to enhance cooperation. However, it is not certain whether the new EU initiatives will bring measurable results or if they will remain a rather meaningless response to a short-term political demand.