Sovereignty is one of the oldest and most discussed concepts in the history of ideas. It deals at the same time with political philosophy, jurisprudence , epistemology and political studies. Its intricacy concerns, on the one hand, the... more
Sovereignty is one of the oldest and most discussed concepts in the history of ideas. It deals at the same time with political philosophy, jurisprudence , epistemology and political studies. Its intricacy concerns, on the one hand, the theoretical implications of its meaning; on the other, the practical consequences of its use and, in some cases, abuse. In this paper I will analyze this concept as a possible contemporary myth in the critical position of Hans Kelsen, who builds a new paradigm about sovereignty based on the Pure Theory of Law and is still influential to date. This study is conducted on three scientific suggestions: first, the ambiguity of the concept; second, a reading of Ernst Cassirer's myth of the state and, third, an examination of Lambert Wiesing's phenomenological view. Successively, Kelsen's paradigm is compared to Harold Laski's political philosophy , on the basis that both reach the same outcome: the removal of sovereignty. Could Kelsen's philosophy of law represents even now a credible formal model to achieve enduring international peace?
If judicial decisions can be maintained to conform to some logical form, attention should be devoted to fuzzy and/or non monotonic logic rather than to classical logic, usually conceived as the only standard of their «rationality». Such a... more
If judicial decisions can be maintained to conform to some logical form, attention should be devoted to fuzzy and/or non monotonic logic rather than to classical logic, usually conceived as the only standard of their «rationality». Such a contention holds good regardless of the sort of dispute under consideration. Namely, since it might be controversial which of them are to be given judicial protection and how the values they express are to be interpreted, such a contention holds good also when judicial implementation of fundamental rights or, as the case may be, their derogation are at issue. Politically incorrect as they might sound, both the tenet on the logical form of judicial decisions and the tenet on the controversial aspects of fundamental rights aim at providing a better understanding of the distinguishing features of judicial reasoning as well as of the (meta)legal shortcomings challenging the doctrine and culture of rights.
War and law might appear a topic which does not deserve attention any longer either because war is taken to be a straight denial of law or, though quite surprisingly, because «war is supposed to have vanished long ago, with the League of... more
War and law might appear a topic which does not deserve attention any longer either because war is taken to be a straight denial of law or, though quite surprisingly, because «war is supposed to have vanished long ago, with the League of Nations and the outlawing of aggression». Contrary to these two views, the main contention of this paper is that the topic at stake is worth of being paid attention in order to figure out whether law can still be conceived of, along with Kelsen’s famous contention, as a means to maintaing peace. In other words, the aim of this paper is to inquire whether and to what an extent, despite of all the shortcomings it can be blamed of, law can still be taken to be a necessary means to protect fundamental rights, further democracy and secure the maintainance of peace. In order to attempt an aswer to such a query, both a recognition of current international and domestic legal provisions on warfare, and a survey of some main (un)lawful characters of the three main armed conflicts in the last decade will be previously taken into account.
La scelta di dedicare questo numero di “Ragion Pratica” all’interrogativo sulle condizioni che (eventualmente) consentano di giudicare etica una guerra è stata sollecitata dalla guerra in Kosovo. La decisione è stata presa mentre la... more
La scelta di dedicare questo numero di “Ragion Pratica” all’interrogativo sulle condizioni che (eventualmente) consentano di giudicare etica una guerra è stata sollecitata dalla guerra in Kosovo. La decisione è stata presa mentre la guerra era ancora in corso e i dubbi sulla sua liceità, legittimità e giustificabilità particolarmente drammatici e laceranti. Drammatici sia per il bilancio di vittime e di distruzioni di giorno in giorno sempre più grave, sia per i timori sui suoi possibili sviluppi ed esiti; laceranti perché la tutela e la difesa dei diritti umani, nel cui nome si stava combattendo, erano la comune preoccupazione sia di chi consentiva con il ricorso alla guerra, sia di chi da tale ricorso dissentiva. Psicologicamente meno urgenti e coinvolgenti (l’informazione ha bisogno di drammi, tragedie e catastrofi sempre nuove per tener desto l’interesse), i dubbi sulla liceità, legittimità e giustificabilità della guerra in Kosovo ancora oggi sono, però, drammatici e laceranti, nonostante la guerra sia ormai conclusa (formalmente, almeno, dato che violenze e vendette hanno, in realtà, continuato ad essere cronaca quotidiana).
