Parthia

"This book is the first-ever monograph on the family of royal converts from Adiabene including the broader perspective of the cultural and political environment of Hellenistic and Parthian Adiabene. It collects, arranges and discusses all available sources on the topic.
The study consists of three parts. Part 1 (chapters 1-5) is devoted to the longest ancient account on the Adiabene royalty from all ancient literature – Josephus, Ant. 20:17-96 (“the Adiabene Narrative”). It examines the Adiabene narrative as Josephus’ conscious literary product with all its rhetorical features and ideological agendas.
Part 2 (chapters 6-7) deals with other sources about the family of royal converts from Adiabene. Chapter 6 is devoted to Rabbinic traditions about Queen Helena and King Munbaz. Chapter 7 discusses all Jewish and non-Jewish literary sources which refer to the resting place of Queen Helena and to the palaces of the Adiabene royalty in Jerusalem, what is more, it also provides an updated discussion of relevant archaeological sites in Jerusalem (Le Tombeau des Rois and the Givati Parking Lot).
Part 3 (chapters 8-13) presents the material and political environment of Adiabene from the third century BCE to the third century CE. It discusses all available kinds of sources: geographical and ethnographical texts (chapter 8), archaeological sites (chapter 9), epigraphic and numismatic material (chapter 10), as well as onomastic evidence (chapter 11). Furthermore, chapter 12 provides a basic chronology of the Adiabene royalty in the Hellenistic and Parthian periods, and chapter 13 presents the political environment of Adiabene and Judea in the context of the international relations between Rome and Parthia."
P.S.
So far reviewed by K. Atkinson, Biblica 96 (2015) 635-638; D.M. Jacobson, Palestine Exploration Quarterly 147 (2015) 169-170; E. Kettenhofen, Anabasis. Studia Classica et Orientalia 6 (2015) 297-307; E. Lipiński, Polish Journal of Biblical Research 14 (2015) 201-207;  D.M. Downing, Journal of American Oriental Studies 137 (2017) 428-430; E. Nodet, Revue Biblique 122-124 (2015) 634-635; K. Berthelot, Syria 94 (2017) 415-416; J.-S. Caillou, L’Antiquité Classique 86 (2017) 517-519.

Having gained control of almost the entire circuit of the Black Sea, Mithridates
Eupator spent the last thirty years of his life engaged in a bitter struggle
with Rome. In the meantime, the Parthians under Mithridates II turned their
attention to the situation in Anatolia. Roman expansion was a danger for
the Arsakid domination in Transcaucasia, Mesopotamia and northern Syria.
If Parthia viewed herself as the genuine successor of the Seleukid Empire,
she had a rightful claim to the countries in Asia south of the Tauros range,
i.e. to Kommagene, Kilikia Pedias, and Syria. It seems that the Parthian king
treated Mithridates Eupator as a natural ally in a position to counter the
Roman expansion in Anatolia. In 95 BC a new political constellation, initiated
by Arsakid Iran, and embracing Pontos, Armenia and Parthia, emerged
in Asia, and the anti-Roman actions of the Pontic and Armenian kings were
intensified.
All the activities of Tigranes in the 90’s and early 80’s BC show that he
was at that time a Parthian nominee and a Parthian political agent. Through
Tigranes’ support for Pontos, the Parthians tried indirectly to counter the
Roman advances in Anatolia and the planned Armenian operations in Kappadokia
were against Rome’s interests. Only from about 80 BC, when Parthia
faced internal struggles, did Tigranes become independent. He took part in
the internal Parthian conflicts strengthening his position at the expense of the
Arsakids.
It was decisive support from the Parthians that prompted Mithridates
Eupator to wage an open war on Rome in 89 BC. Politically and militarily
the prospects for Pontos were good. Later, events took a turn for the worse,
both in Pontos, and in Parthia. The civil war in Parthia, in which Tigranes
was involved, annihilated the previous political constellation of the 90’s and
early 80’s, in which Pontos, Armenia, and Parthia constituted a strong and
very dangerous alliance for Rome.
The power of Pontos collapsed for several reasons, but an essential factor
was that Mithridates Eupator was deprived of Parthian assistance in the
70’s and 60’s BC, and had to rely on his own and to some extent on Tigranes’
resources. Mithridates Eupator, aware of Arsakid power, tried to renew the
old alliance with Parthia but the new Parthian rulers, Sinatrukes and Phraates
III, were far more passive in their western policy than Mithridates II. Until
the wars between Rome and Parthia under Orodes (57-38 BC), the Parthian
strategic perspective did not reach beyond the Euphrates.
When in the winter of 69/68 BC Mithridates Eupator and Tigranes approached
the Parthians with a view to an alliance, it was too late to stay the
course of events and bring Roman military advances in Anatolia to a standstill.
The Romans were able to secure their position in Anatolia and in Syria
without Parthian countermeasures. Later they tried to crush and subjugate
Parthia, but this proved impossible for Rome.

This course presents a broad survey of historical forces at work over the past 6,000 years, examining the manners in which human societies have organized themselves along categories of race, ethnicity, class, and gender to meet the challenges of the increasing human population and its demands on natural resources: thus, it examines continuity and change in societies over time, in different places, and among various peoples.

Investigating ancient calendars and chronological systems can be solution in understanding national and local problems, especially familiarity with people's cultures. Relied on authentic ethics and beliefs, traditions and behaviors would be less garbled and misinterpreted. Chronologies signal lost facts which can study to clarify dark strata of lost ancient cultures. Parthian era is one of the remarkable historic period; brimful of cultural and religious evolution at Iranian Plateau. One of the most important historic times of Iran that can be studied, and pondered from different aspects; so remarkable and glorious that the founders revolted against Greeks and Alexander's successors to found great kingdom for 5 centuries. They ruled the territory where various people lived in with various beliefs and religious attitudes, at the same time, under Hellenistic cultural effects. However, since Parthian kings treated people tolerantly (cultural management), various religious belief was formed in Parthians' territory. Every given nations' religious rites and beliefs have been reflected in chronologies and calendar systems. One of the evidence that can be helpful in understanding parthians' culture and beliefs are common calendar systems at the time. There were four calendar systems at Parthian period, including: Avestan Calendar (central government), Seleucid calendar (economical and central Government), Sheban calendar (Arabs).
Relying on written texts, first time at Parthian period varieties of calendars can be seen that is evidence that Iranian people managed the other people culturally. Various calendars in the period indicate Parthian Zoroastrianism, Hellenistic cultural and economic effects, and varieties of religious groups that were credited politically and culturally by central government. Such policy was obligatory for Achaemenids, where military responsibilities replaced by "Ideological agreement strategy" caused to political advantage of Iran. When established, Achaemenid cultural and political system, gave the opportunity to local groups to sustain native culture and traditions. To achieve more stable and durable results, Iranian Kings had to accept dividing authority that can be seen apparently in Parthian Period, false or true, known as Feudalism.

Abstract
This article examines the longstanding rivalry of Rome and Parthia, which began as an unintended consequence of Crassus’ decisive defeat at Carrhae in 53 BCE. It synthesizes the accounts and opinions of numerous Graeco-Roman writers from the Augustan Age to late antiquity in order to help illustrate the new and interconnected post-Carrhae world and its legacy. The rivalry of the Romans and Parthians became a primary focus of their foreign policies and drastically expanded their perceptions of the world in which they interacted. Even after the fall of the Parthians to the rebellious Sassanid Persians in the 220s CE, the Romans continued to find their three-century-long rivalry with the Parthians of interest and relevant to the changing world of late antiquity.

When the Parthians rebelled against the Seleucid Empire in the middle third century BCE, seizing a large section of northeastern Iran, they inherited the challenging responsibility of monitoring the extensive frontier between the Iranian plateau and the Central Asian steppe. Although initially able to maintain working relations with various tribal confederations in the region, with the final collapse of the Bactrian kingdom in the 1305 BCE, the ever-widening eastern frontier of the Parthian state became increasingly unstable, and in the 1205 BCE nomadic warriors devastated the vulnerable eastern territories of the Parthian state, temporarily eliminating Parthian control of the Iranian plateau. This article is a consideration of the failures of the Parthians to meet and overcome the obstacles they faced along their eastern frontier in the 120s BCE and a reevaluation of the causes and consequences of the events. It concludes that western distractions and the mismanagement of eastern affairs by the Arsacids turned a minor dispute into one of the most costly and difficult struggles in Parthian history.

This volume provides a comprehensive overview of the history and culture of the Parthian Empire, which existed for almost 500 years from 247 BC to 224 AD. The Parthians were Rome's great opponents in the east, but comparatively little is known about them. The Parthians focuses on the rise, expansion, flowering and decline of the Parthian Empire and covers both the wars with the Romans in the west and the nomads in the east. Sources include the small amount from the Empire itself, as well as those from outside the Parthian world, such as Greek, Roman and Chinese documents.

FOR  DETAILED  TABLE OF  CONTENTS and FOREWORD please open --> download

Conflict in Greece and Rome: The Definitive Political, Social, and Military Encyclopedia, ed. Sara Phang, Douglas Kelly, Peter Londey, and Iain Spence, ABC-CLIO. 2016.

(Note: Severus' arch celebrates his victories over the Parthians; however, the editors preferred to reference the Arsacid Parthians as the Arsacid Persians.)

Tacitus is the only Roman historian who devoted his works to such an extent to Rome's eastern neighbor – the Parthian Empire. Scholars have researched the problem of Taci-tus' attitude towards the Parthians on many occasions. It seems that what is the most important question is not Tacitus' opinion, but the perspective from which he looked at this topic combined with the source he used when describing the Parthians and their history. Another interesting question is also how deep Tacitus' knowledge was of the past of the Parthian Empire and the history of Roman-Parthian relations. The aim of this paper is to verify what Tacitus wrote about the Parthians throughout his works. Without taking into account all this evidence, it is not possible to propose a proper evaluation or balanced observations concerning his presentation of the Roman-Parthian relations and internal history, society and customs of the Arsacid state in the first century CE.

The book analyzes the primary writings of the first centuries CE about the Temple, Jesus, James, the brother of Jesus, Joseph their father, and believers in Christ among the Israelite Diaspora in both the Roman and Parthian empires. Hegesippus, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, Jerome and others emphasize that James had an important position inside the Temple itself and wrote to the twelve tribes of Israel. If James held such a position there, then clearly his father, Joseph, a son of David, also had a similar position because access to the Temple was hereditary, not elective. No one without a registered Israelite genealogy was able to enter even the outer court of the Temple on pain of death. Jesus not only taught priests inside the Temple but exercised discipline on merchants and traders. He  corrected the rules of the high priests. Pilate acknowledged Jesus as King of the Jews and innocent legally of any charge of treason. Emperor Caligula's plan to establish his HQ in Jerusalem was a direct consequence of the ideological effects of the resurrection. Revision of May 2016

In this revealing article of disclosure, historian Dr Daryn Graham examines the theories and reasoning behind the Roman emperor Trajan’s launch of the Parthian War. It is argued, with ancient and modern evidence, that while Trajan planned the invasion of the Parthian Empire for many years, it was not until the last minute that he decided to embark on those long-held plans.

Alexander's adoption of Iranian regalia, garments, customs, and institutions was made in eastern Parthia in late summer or early fall 330. The reforms affected many fundamental questions of government as well as military. Possibly, they had to do with Alexander's founding of his first colony in Iran, Alexandropolis (Plin. 6.113). The reforms in Parthia, followed by other novelties in Central Asia (328-327), in India (327-325), in Persis, at Susa, and at Opis (324), demonstrate that Alexander formulated a comprehensive program of pro-Iranian policy. Alexander deliberate-ly styled himself as an Iranian, not just Persian ruler; significantly he initiated his reforms of court and ceremonial, as well as his colonization, not in Persis, but in north-eastern Iran (Parthia). His pro-Iranian policy remained consistent until 323. Alexander's concept was proclaimed in eastern Iran and first applied to Iranians in that region, later to embrace Bactrians and Sogdians. Eventually, it was extended to all Iranian peoples on the Iranian Plateau and in Central Asia including Persians and Medes

The climactic Battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE was the first major engagement between the Romans and Parthians. In the battle, the mobile Parthian army outmaneuvered and overwhelmed Crassus’ much larger force. There is a longstanding, recently restated scholarly tradition that this battle and the Parthians’ approach to it was anomalous; however, this article rejects the notion that the Parthians’ fought atypically at Carrhae. Instead, it investigates the Parthians’ unique tactical and strategic approach to warfare and its long tradition of success since the reign of Arsaces I in the mid-third century BCE. It also illustrates the Parthians’ implementation of their unique mode of warfare through a close consideration of the decisive events at Carrhae.

Keywords: Alexander’s army, conquest, Iranians, Achaemenids, Media, Parthia

Abstract

The first Iranian units enlisted in Alexander’s army were the cavalry detachments formed in Media; one of them, consisting of Iranian aristocrats, was sent to Arachosia in the autumn of 330. Another cavalry unit, supporting Alexander’s generals in Media, was probably established by the satrap of the country Oxydates. Recruitment of Iranians for Alexander’s army reached large proportions when the king established the hippakontistai division in 330.

The monotheistic ideology that Darius imposed on the nascent Achaemenid state resulted in a religious revolution with far reaching effects, as it reverberated on two different levels. At the top level, the imposition of an omnipotent abstract god, Ahura Mazda,created a sharp reaction that led to the general massacre of the opposition termed as Magophonia by Herodotus. Several centuries of doctrinal development led to Zoroastrianism, a religion marked by the art of compromise and virulent rhetoric. While the Zoroastrian influence on Abrahamic religions has mainly been investigated in respect to borrowed concepts such as Paradise or Day of Judgment, its influence on the art of compromise and rhetoric has been neglected. So has been the influence of its underground opposition, organized as brotherhood. The underground opposition affected early Christianity, while the Iranian clergy influenced the Judaic priesthood. Together, they ended up affecting Islam.

Written records relating to the Arsacid period in Iran (c. 240 BC to 226 AD) being relatively few, it is exceed¬ingly important for any knowledge about that time to study the iconography of extant Parthian coinage. The coins of the Arsacids (as well as of their vassals) constitute an important source of knowledge on the Parthian empire which is all the more valuable as it originated from Iran itself . Much of Iranian history, particularly for the Parthian period, is ba¬sed on numismatic evidence. Yet, numismatic research into the Ar¬sa¬cid period is still unsatisfactory. One point that deser¬ves attention is the development of the Arsacid crown; it is best reconstructed using numismatic evidence . For the Parthians, the ruler’s tiara became an important vehicle for religious symbols expressive of royal ideology . The origin of the tiara as royal headgear and the timing of its introduction have a significance of their own in the history of Arsacid political ideology. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between the functions of the tiara and of the dia¬dem. All these aspects are vital in reconstruc¬ting Arsacid political ideology, the origin and nature of which are com¬pa¬ra¬tively obscure and give rise to many controversies . Following what was then a universally accepted practice, the Arsacids drew abundantly from a rich store of religious beliefs and symbols to spread their political propaganda . The Parthian period was a time of great religious syncretism. Various cults and beliefs influenced one another in a mixture of Iranian, Greek, and Semitic populations, each in itself being in no way consistent . As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to interpret the iconography of coins and other relics featuring religious symbols . The Arsacids themselves were Zoroastrians, yet they did not try to make that religion absolutely dominant. The religious aspect in Arsacid ideology is difficult to analyze. Iranian religions of the Parthian era are highly obscure, which forces the re¬searcher to reach for comparative material to the more fa¬miliar neighboring regions (e.g., Armenia and the Kushan state).
The present article attempts to reconstruct some as¬pects of the origin and development of the Arsacid royal headgear in connection with the Parthian conception of royal authority which was a set of concepts to justify and emphasize the special nature of the Arsacid rule. A major source for any such analysis should properly be the largely neglected numismatic material.

Royal headdress as we know it from coins of most Arsacid rulers starting from Mithradates II was composed of an elon¬ga¬ted domed tiara and a diadem. Apparently each constituent part of the crown served different functions. It is not easy to determine exactly what was the significance of the diadem and the tiara in the ideology of Arsacid kingship. Even for the relatively well recorded Sasanian period, this problem has not been plausibly answered.
The Arsacids often appear in a diadem alone, but never - at least not on coins - in a tiara alone. Written records describing crowning ceremonies of the Arsacids or their vas¬sals usually speak only of the diadem. Plutarch of Cheronea mentions a privilege of the Sren family, who crowned Arsa¬cids with a diadem . Tacitus describes the crowning of Tiri¬dates with a diadem by Vologases I, which made him ruler of Armenia . Josephus Flavius writes of usurper Cinnamus, who handed in the royal diadem to Artabanus II , and of Helen crowning her son Monobazos of Adiabene with a diadem . Parthamasiris, the Arsacid king of Armenia, faces Trajan in a diadem  and usurper Parthamaspates was made king when Trajan placed a diadem on his head . Nero crowned Tiridates with a diadem to make him king of Ar¬menia . Arsacids usually wore one diadem, but Artabanus IV used two . Ancient sources men¬tio¬ned above seem to suggest that handing a diadem equaled con¬ferring power over a land.
On the reverses of many Arsacid coins there appears a woman’s figure similar to the Hellenistic Tyche who presents a diadem to the king . She might likely also be identified - what with the time’s religious syncretism - as a personifica¬tion of the royal farn (kvarnah) . Farn as PHARRO is well known from Kushan coins, where it appears in scenes of inves¬ti¬ture . It is not implausible that the diadem was not only an sign of royal dignity but, in particular, it symbolized the farn .
In Iran, the royal glory of the farn - the key to understanding Iranian royal traditions - was treated as an emanation of the Sun or heavenly fire . The nature of this notion is best rendered by Ammianus Marcellinus’ account of fire from heaven that was conferred on kings of Iran . The notion of king’s glory of the farn combined with sacred fire was in all likelihood in existence under the Achaeme¬nids ; it is also well documented for the early Sasanian period . With the Arsacids themselves, the special Mithra worship seems to have involved the farn and king’s fire .
Studies of religious beliefs in ancient Iran have permitted a better understanding of the “cosmic” dimension in Arsacid power which is also manifested in tiara symbolism and titulature that quotes divine provenance, although this pro¬blem involves many obscure aspects . Ammianus Marellinus wrote of a cult of Arsaces as a deity; from this resulted the peculiar worship that the Arsacids received in their count¬ry . In his account, Arsaces was placed among the stars after he died and from then on kings of Iran called themselves Solis fratres et Lunae . Nevertheless, we need to bear in mind that Ammianus wrote a century and a half after the fall of the Arsacids.
Any reconstruction of how the Arsacid royal ideology developed is a particularly arduous task for we are dealing with a tangle of completely different traditions . A new dynasty drew abundantly from Hellenistic notions . It also had strong ties with nomadic traditions . A more or less conscious reference to the Achaemenid period is discernible already under Arsaces I and II in their use of the so-called “satrapal headgear” and the title krny . The later Arsacids also made references to the Achaemenid period . Decisive for the Arsacid royal ideology were the measures adopted by Mithra¬¬¬dates II: he introduced on coins the title “king of kings” and the tiara. The use by the Arsacids of a tiara made to imitate Median ceremonial headgear of the Achaemenid period fits into the Parthian dynasty’s tradition of recalling old-Persian heritage.
Numismatic evidence and other iconographic and writ¬ten sources substantiate the conclusion that the Arsacids were involved in building a complex and multi-faceted royal ideology. It lent legitimacy to their claims to hegemony throughout the Near and Middle East, while within Parthia it gave them an elevated and privileged sovereign position vis-a-vis their vassals and made them sole rightful rulers of the empire.
As a constituent of the royal crown, the tiara is cer¬tified on coins of many Arsacids starting from Mithradates II. Its use always involved political ideology with many reli¬gious symbols in its repertory ; besides, it often ser¬ved to emphasize king’s singular exploits, which is obvious¬ly true for Mithradates II. Placed on the throne by nomads, Sinatruces decorated his tiara with designs borrowed from nomadic traditions of Central Asia. The true founder of a new Arsacid line, reformer and restorer of Iranian tradition, Vologases I introduced the tall tiara onto coins of the Younger Arsacids. He was then followed by successive rulers of the Parthian empire. Phraates III and Pacorus II adapted the tiaras of their fathers to accentuate their dynastic links. In choosing Sinatruces’ tiara, the Indo-Parthian Gondopha¬res made a clear political statement. These examples serve to illustrate the claim that the tiara was used in connection with the propaganda and political ideology of the Arsacid period.
Under the older Arsacids, vassal rulers of Elymais, Persis, or Charace¬ne commonly used diadems alone; more rarely - especially in Persis - did they don crowns different from the Parthian tiara. This situation changed somewhat in the first and se¬cond centuries AD. Parthian-style tiaras appear on coins of most Persid rulers at the time (they imitate Mithradates II’s crown), recurrently for some Elymaean rulers, and sporadically in Characene.
As opposed to the diadem, the tiara was probably not directly involved in the farn, but instead it was inten¬ded (al¬though realities may have gone amiss) to convey the special nature of the power of the Arsacids as great kings of kings, those who stood higher than local rulers and princes. Much is to be gathered on this from the circumstances in which the tiara was introduced on coins: it was done by Mithradates II after he had successfully restored Parthia’s power in Western and Central Asia and undertaken thoroughly to reform Arsacid political ideology. This is in line with practices known to have existed in the Near East and Central Asia for centu¬ries . The tiara was a vehicle of important propaganda sta¬te¬ments in politi¬cal ideology and its individual nature often reflected the poli¬ti¬cal program of a Parthian ruler.

Mithradates II (122–88/87 B.C.) is among the greatest Parthian kings, and because of his attainments, some ancient accounts call him “the Great.” Mithradates II rose to the throne after the unexpected death of his father Artabanos I. In his early reign, Mithradates II routed a host of the “Guti,” i.e., Tochari, in Baktria, and managed to halt Arab raids in Babylonia. Faced with strong resistance from the Parthians under Artabanos I and Mithradates II, the Sakai wended their way south along the Areios (Harirud) and Margos (Morghab) into Drangiana and the Ariaspian land. Mithradates II pacified and included them in the Arsakid empire. Mithradates’ monetary production in ca. 122–111/110 concentrated in northern Iranian centers: in Ekbatana, Rhaga, and to a lesser extent in Nisa and Merv. Rich Media, and also native Parthia as well as Margiana, became bases of operations for Mithradates II’s great offensives in Central Asia.

Alexander the Great's conquests ushered in the Hellenistic era throughout the ancient Mediterranean and Middle East. In this period, the Seleucids, one of most successful of the Successor dynasties, ruled over most of the Middle East at the height of their power. Yet two rising powers in the ancient world, Rome and Parthia, played a crucial role in the decline and eventual fall of the Seleucids. In a prior article, I argued that geopolitical developments around the Eastern Mediter-ranean in the middle third century BCE were indirectly responsible for the emergence of the Parthian state in Iran. Disastrous military conflicts at home and abroad in the west caused a sudden decline of Seleucid power in the 240s-230s, triggering what political scientists call a power-transition crisis. This article utilizes similar approaches to historical analysis and International Relations theory to contend that, after a period of recovery, a further sudden decline of Seleucid power in the 160s-130s triggered another power-transition crisis that brought an end to Seleucid hegemony over the Middle East permanently. The crisis facilitated the rapid transformation of the Parthian state from a minor kingdom to a major empire, drastically changing the international environment of the ancient world.

This article combines historical analysis with international-relations theory to contend that geopolitical developments around the Eastern Mediterranean in the middle third century BCE were indirectly responsible for the emergence of the Parthian state and a new international system of states in the ancient East. Since the death of Alexander the Great, the Seleucid Empire had ruled over much of the East; however, disastrous military conflicts at home and abroad in the West caused a sudden decline of Seleucid power in the 240s-
230s BCE. The troubles of the Seleucid state caused what political scientists call a power-transition crisis that damaged Seleucid hegemony over the East when the Seleucid satraps of Parthia and Bactria declared their independence. Moreover, the deleterious civil wars between Seleucid dynasts in the West and the rebellions of eastern satraps encouraged the nomadic Parni tribe from the Central Asian steppe (later known as the Parthians), who had been seeking a new homeland for decades, to invade northeastern Iran and establish a new kingdom. With the Parni’s successful conquest of Parthia and its immediate consequences, a new interstate system of tripolarity between the Seleucid Empire, Bactrian Kingdom, and the newly formed Parthian state emerged in the ancient East.

This volume explores the oasis city of Palmyra in the Syrian Desert through an in-depth examination of the site’s unique archeology and history. Palmyra is best known as the Pearl in the Desert of the Roman Empire, a vibrant living center that stood at the heart of flourishing international networks of trade and politics in the first three centuries CE. It is from this period that the vast majority of the material and written sources stem, and it is Palmyra’s position as a city, caught between the empires of Rome and Parthia, that is the main focus of the book. However, the volume also touches on Palmyra before the Roman period as well as after Zenobia’s rebellion and the city’s sack in 272 CE and again in 273 CE, and it traces Palmyra’s developments over the years—from the events of the Umayyad period to the arrival of the first European tourists. Finally, the volume explores the tragic eruption of civil war in Syria in the twenty-first century, showing how in modern times, Palmyra has once again become enmeshed in international political networks as well as being drawn into global debates about the trade and protection of cultural heritage.

From late Hellenistic times until the expansion of Islam, the Middle East was governed by an Iranian empire. This monarchy was initially ruled by the Arsaci dynasty until 224 AD, at which point it found a violent end at the hands of the Sasanians. Despite this, it is wise not to overestimate the impact of this transition of power; in fact, it is useful in more than one sense to view the Persian Sasanian Empire as a direct extension of the Parthian Arsacid Empire. The challenges faced by the Iranian monarchy basically remained the same over the course of the centuries. It is true that there was no discernible alternative to monocracy, and the dynastic principle was powerful and helped stabilize the predominance of the ruling family; however, the individual king constantly found himself in an assailable political position. Moreover, each ruler’s death was necessarily followed by an interregnum as there were no rules governing a devolution upon death, nor was it possible to establish a condominium, at least not in Sasanian times. The empire’s borders were under constant threat of a war on two fronts; this constellation was especially threatening as, when in doubt, the land-owning magnates would obviously demand that their estates be defended. This contributed to constant division among the aristocratic class. Thus, especially after a king’s demise, conflicts escalated all too easily. If unable to prevent this from happening, a king’s inability to guarantee peace within his realm posed a much greater threat than any defeat inflicted by the Romans. The history of the pre-Islamic Iranian monarchy is characterized by the rulers’ changing strategies to deal with these structural problems.

Analysis of the owl, eagle and cockerel coinage previously attributed to Sophytes indicates that it is most probably associated with that of Andragoras, the Seleucid satrap of Parthia who led the secession of the province from the Seleucid realm. The numismatic evidence suggests that following the death of Andragoras, the leadership of Parthia was assumed briefly by Sophytes before the province was completely overrun by the nomadic Parni around 238 BC. This coinage has a number of unusual characteristics. It was struck across eleven typological series in the period c. 250-238 BC. It is composed of a comprehensive range of silver denominations, including uniquely in the Hellenistic east, the didrachm. Nominally struck on a reduced Attic weight standard, defined by a tetradrachm of about 16.8 grams, each smaller denomination was weight adjusted to include a progressively increasing fiduciary component of value. These characteristics are indicative of a local coinage, motivated by political expediency in meeting a monetary necessity arising from Seleucid neglect.

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7836-0733

This article reevaluates the origins of the First Romano-Parthian War (56/5-50 BCE) to better understand the different perspectives, policies, and objectives of the various Parthian and Roman leaders in the early and middle 50 s that helped forge the great rivalry that emerged between Parthia and Rome. This article breaks from the dominate Rome-centric, anti-Crassus traditions concerning the investigation of the origins of this conflict. Centuries of anti-Crassus propaganda have led most scholars to discount or overlook the critical agency of the Parthians in the conflict and the serious implications of Gabinius' actions in 56-55, while blaming Crassus for indefensible Roman aggression and greed. The propensity of modern scholarship to villainize and criticize Crassus follows ancient propaganda and stems in part from a lack of understanding of the geopolitical realities that Parthia and Rome faced in the middle 50 s. Further, this article challenges the misguided traditions that, first, describe the Parthians as feeble, passive, and duplicitous in their interactions with foreign powers and, second, that blame the incompetence or weakness of the Parthians' enemies to explain their actions and successes. Indeed, the Parthians were important, active, and powerful agents in these events, something often obscured or overlooked because of the inherent Roman focus and bias of the Graeco-Roman literary tradition and modern scholarship.

Review of: A.J. Sachs, H. Hunger, Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia. Volume III. Diaries from 164 B.C. to 61 B.C.Vienna 1996.

Review of the historical sections. Demetrius I's accession (162/1 BC), Alexander Balas and Demetrius I (150 BC), Demetrius IÍ's accession and Egypt (145 BC), The Parthian conquest of Babylonia (April-July 141 BC), Antiochus VI and Tryphon (Jan. 140), Demetrius II's attack on Parthia (July/August 138 BC), The death of Mithradates I (now to be corrected to 132 BC - cf. comments at BCHP 18 (www.livius.org > Mesopotamia) with ref. to work of G.R.F. Assar), Marat Sea, the physical condition of Babylon and other Babylonian cities in the Parthian period, Chronological table 162-138 BC.

At its greatest extent the Roman Empire incorporated about 2.5 million square miles. This made it one of the largest empires in the world in antiquity.  To help protect this massive empire, Emperor Augustus implemented a permanent, professional army in the late first century BCE. Unfortunately there are no surviving records that indicate the exact strength of the Roman army as a whole or the exact strength of the Roman imperial legion or auxiliaries. Historians have attempted to reconstruct the military strength of imperial Rome through a mixture of imperfect literary and material evidence, available unit statistics, and speculation. Yet the estimates of the total size of the Roman imperial military have ranged from as little as 200,000 men to as much as 1,000,000 soldiers.  This paper will first attempt to settle upon acceptable army figures for the first three centuries of the Roman Empire; it then will address the judgment of whether or not the Roman imperial army was large or small. It will accomplish this task through a comparative analysis of the Roman imperial army with the armies of the other great imperial powers of antiquity. Due to the time limitations of presenting this paper in a conference forum, I am able only to discuss briefly the military capabilities of the Achaemenid Persians, the Hellenistic empires, the Parthians, the Sassanid Persians, and the ancient dynasties of China. I hope to demonstrate that the Roman imperial army was in fact comparatively massive.

Classical Association of the Middle West and South Annual Conference, Waco, TX, April 2014.

This paper is for critique prior to submission for publication. It draws upon the traditions of numismatists and recommends the sigla used to achieve standardized documentation of Greek numismatic inscriptions. It follows the Leiden Conventions with several exceptions widely used in numismatic publications and considers the different requirements of plain text and decorated (rich) text word processors.

A lo largo de su historia el Imperio romano tuvo que hacer frente a numerosas revueltas, debido al enorme territorio que controlaba. De entre los pueblos que las protagonizaron, los hebreos se contaban entre los que con mayor insistencia lucharon por recuperar su independencia. En cuanto a los diversos conflictos que enfrentaron a judíos y romanos, la que, a la postre, seria recordada como la Primera Guerra Judeo-romana (66-73 d.C.) pasó a la historia como el más importante de todos. Ello se debe tanto a que requirió de la participación de dos futuros emperadores al mando de las tropas romanas que debían restablecer la paz en la provincia de Judea, Vespasiano y su hijo Tito, como al hecho de que la ciudad de Jerusalén y el Gran Templo que albergaba acabaron completamente destruidos.

En el año 66 d.C. numerosos factores se unieron al odio que sectores radicales hebreos sentían hacia sus conquistadores romanos, provocando la caída del procurador de Judea, Gesio Floro, y la derrota del Legado de Siria, Cestio Galo, en Beth Horón, quien acudió con sus tropas a pacificar la región sin conseguirlo. El movimiento fue cobrando fuerza tras estos éxitos, y Jerusalén se convirtió en el epicentro del independentismo judío. Roma no podía permanecer pasiva ante estos acontecimientos y Nerón envió allí a Vespasiano, un general experimentado, para acabar de una vez por todas con el problema. La resistencia implacable que demostraron los rebeldes y los problemas políticos que, durante ese tiempo, se produjeron en Roma, provocaron que la conquista final quedara en manos de su capaz hijo Tito quien, a la postre, consiguió conquistar Jerusalén y acabar con la revuelta. El gran triunfo que se celebró en Roma para conmemorar la victoria era lo que la nueva dinastía Flavia necesitaba para afianzar su poder. Sin embargo, la campaña no finalizó hasta el año 73 d.C., tras la toma de la fortaleza de Masada, donde los últimos insurrectos prefirieron suicidarse antes de ser derrotados. El enfrentamiento se saldaría con una enorme pérdida de vidas, tanto entre los soldados romanos como entre los insurrectos judíos y la población civil. Gracias a la obra de Flavio Josefo, podemos reconstruir lo sucedido para poder así conocer con detalle uno de los grandes episodios de la Historia Antigua.

Who were the wise men? Had they a diplomatic ordern from King Phraates of  Parthia? Where they spays of him? Can a natural star convey a divine message and did the star really stand still?
Jesus born, Christmas, King Phraates, King Herod, Augustus, Bibel, Luke,
King Phraates IV reigned in 7 BC already in the 31st year over the great empire of the Parthians. Reluctantly, he closed in the year 20 BC. with Kaiser Augustus a peace treaty, which set the border to the Roman Empire on the Euphrates. The associated loss of land and the humiliation hurt him. Rome was too powerful to attack again, but subversive means were welcome to destabilize the neighbouring imperial provinces and thereby weaken Rome.
In the former capital Ecbatana, which was conveniently located on the Silk Road, there was not only a lot of trade but also a time-honoured university. Ecbatana is now called Hamdan, a city in western Iran.

As history has proven, sometimes the essence of one’s failure becomes best encapsulated in the way he then celebrates his long-awaited retaliation. In the Parthian case, the above law also seems to find its confirmation. In the following article, we research the topic of foreign relations of the Roman Empire with the Arsacid monarchy (Parthian Empire) in the Ist cent. B. C. The paper regards the overall notion of first diplomatic encounters of the two superpowers, as well as the issue of their military struggles in the period. Starting with the circumstances of the first official embassy between L. Cornelius Sulla and the Parthian emissary Orobazos (first decade of the Ist cent. B. C.), through the defeat of M. Crassus’ legions at Carrhae (53 B. C.), Julius Caesar’s own plans for conducting a Parthian campaign (45–44 B. C.), Mark Antony’s eastern expedition (36 B. C.), as far as to emperor Augustus’ success in restitution of the lost legionary ensigns (20 B. C.), the paper focuses on the matter of the possible position, as well as the origins of the then-stereotypical image, that the Parthians could have had well developed in Roman imperial ideology as in result of the above historical events. What impact did Crassus’ defeat possibly have
on the Roman military elites and populus Romanus as such from that time? Where did the underpinnings of the entire Roman-Parthian conflict lie?