Possibility

In his article "The Megarian and Aristotelian Concept of Possibility" ("Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff," 1937), Nicolai Hartmann attempts to revive an interpretation of the conception of possibility of the Megarians that stood in opposition to the Aristotelian conception of possibility and thus in opposition to the Aristotelian conception of modality in general. In this introduction, I attempt to situate Hartmann's article in its historical context. Did Hartmann come to adopt this thesis through his study of ancient Greek philosophy? Or did he already have a predilection for the Megarian conception of possibility prior to this? If so, how did this predilection come about? Was there an influence from his friend Vasily Sesemann, who published an article discussing the Megarians the previous year? Or were both Hartmann and Sesemann influenced early on by their mutual Russian teacher Nikolai Lossky, or even by a general tendency pervading Russian thought — itself grounded in the fatalism typical of the Russian collective unconscious — as we find it expressed in the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov, Lev Tolstoy, and other Russian thinkers?

I argue that Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy articulates a radical conception of hope. According to Lear, radical hope is ‘directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is’ (2006:103). Given Adorno’s claim that the current world is radically evil, and that we cannot know or even imagine what the good is, it is plausible that his conception of hope must be radical in this sense. I develop this argument through an analysis of (i) Adorno’s engagement with Kant’s conception of hope, (ii) Adorno’s references to hope, and (iii) his critical diagnosis of a metaphysical need for hope. Having demonstrated that Adorno must reject both ordinary and Kantian hope, I examine why Adorno thinks that we still may have reasons for hope. I also show that Adorno’s conception of hope differs from Lear’s in one important respect.

I give original arguments for the thesis that one believes a proposition only if one's credence in it is 1, as well as respond to several objections to that thesis. Belief implies having a credence of 1 because of the connections between assertoric representation, possibility, and probability.

This is an updated version of the preprint "On the Reasons for the Emergence of the "Platonic" and "Aristotelian" Lines of the Development of the Meanings of the Concept of "Virtual"". According to Ekaterina Taratuta, there are two lines of constructing the meanings of the concepts based on the root vir(t)- – “Platonic” and “Aristotelian”. This paper demonstrates that the formation of the polysemanticity of the Latin concept of virtus (virtue; strength, valor, manliness), and then the concept of virtual, has been possible because of the unique semantics of the word virtus, in which there are two “dominants” – 1) virtue and 2) strength. On the basis of the first semantic “dominant”, the “Platonic” group of meanings of virtual has been formed, on the basis of the second – the “Aristotelian” one.
The first cause of the existence of the “Platonic” group of the meanings of virtual is the translation of the Greek word ἀρετὴ by the Latin word virtus in Roman philosophy, biblical texts and Greek-Byzantine patristics, as a result of which the concept of virtus has been enriched with the meanings of the Platonic and Christian concept of ἀρετὴ. The second cause is that through the Plato’s doctrine of arete-eidos the concept of virtus has been enriched with the meanings of the Platonic concept of είδος. As Hans Kremer has shown, in Plato’s doctrine eidos is the source of order and beauty, which is reflected in the empirical world as arete – virtue, goodness; thus, eidos is inextricably linked with arete. As a result, in the “Platonic” sense the virtual is understood as the eidetic, the ideal.
The first cause of the existence of the “Aristotelian” group of meanings of virtual is the translation of the Greek word δύναμις by the Latin word virtus in biblical texts and in Greek-Byzantine patristics, as a result of which the concept of virtus has been enriched with the Christian meanings of concept of δύναμις. The second cause is the translation of the Aristotelian concept of δύναμις by the Latin word potentia: the word δύναμις has become the medium, linking the words virtus and potentia and, under the influence of the latter, differences in the meanings of virtus and potentia (and especially their derivatives virtualis (virtual) and potentialis (potential)) have gradually disappeared. As a result, in the “Aristotelian” sense the virtual is understood as the potential, the possible.
Keywords: the virtual, the ideal, the potential, virtus, ἀρετὴ (virtue), είδος, δύναμις (ability / possibility), potentia (power), Plato, Aristotle.

What kind of semantics should someone who accepts the epistemicist theory of vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson's Vagueness (1994) give a defi niteness operator? To impose some interesting constraints on acceptable answers to this question, I will assume that the object language also contains a metaphysical necessity operator and a metaphysical actuality operator. I will suggest that the answer is to be found by working within a three-dimensional model theory. I will provide sketches of two ways of extracting an epistemicist semantics from that model theory, one of which I will fi nd to be more plausible than the other.

In this article, I explore narrative building blocks for future-oriented what-if (i.e., possibilities-generating) analysis developed in a health promotion study. The aim of this study was to gain insight into future possibilities for good health among participants known for their poor health status. In narrative inquiry, imagining future possibilities and prospective temporal orientation are seldom regarded as interesting for their own sake, despite ample attention to the role of temporality. The methodological reflection in this article is complemented with a discussion of ethical issues (regarding authorship and representation) in the proposed method of analysis. To see a world in a grain of sand, And a heaven in a wild flower, Hold infinity in the palm of your hand, And eternity in an hour. (Blake 1803/1966, p. 431) My interest in the dilemmas of imagining future possibilities, and the role of narrative research in this process, intensified during my participation in the Aspiring...

This article is a first systematic study of the expression of possibility in Kirundi, more specifically of its verbal markers. Possibility is traditionally seen as one of the core components of the semantic domain of modality. The onomasiological approach of this modal sub‑domain has resulted in the identification of four verbal potential markers, i.e., the auxiliaries ‑bâsh‑ and ‑shóbor‑, the semi‑auxiliary ‑shóbok‑, and the TAM affix ‑oo‑. These four markers of possibility manifest different degrees of grammaticalization along the full verb > auxiliary > affix cline. Grammaticalization in the structural domain seems to be correlated with semantic change, both within and beyond the semantic domain of possibility. The related verbs ‑shóbor‑ and ‑shóbok‑, which have no or little remaining lexical uses, cover the entire semantic domain of possibility in contrast to ‑bâsh‑ which has still clearly distinct lexical uses (‘to be active, to be healthy’) and only conveys participant‑inherent possibility. The inflectional affix ‑oo‑, covering the entire domain of possibility and having developed other modal and non‑modal meanings, manifests the most advanced semantic generalization. Moreover, ‑oo‑ underwent the strongest subjectification within the semantic domain of possibility and even developed different intersubjective uses. Hence, the most grammaticalized marker of possibility in Kirundi not only underwent the strongest semantic generalization, but its meaning is also the most (inter)subjectified.

MM is one of the central ideas in the nowadays mathematics education. In an earlier paper applying ideas from fuzzy logic we have developed a model formalizing the MM process and we have used the total possibilistic uncertainty as a measure of students' MM capacities. In the present paper we develop two alternative fuzzy measures for MM. The first of them concerns an adaptation for use in a fuzzy environment of the well known Shannon's formula for measuring a system's probabilistic uncertainty. The second one is based on the idea of the center of mass of the represented a fuzzy set figure, that is commonly used in fuzzy logic approach to measure performance. The above (three in total) fuzzy measures for MM are compared to each other and a classroom experiment presented in our earlier paper is reconsidered here illustrating our results in practice.

The aim of this narrow-focused text is to argue against the claim that the appresentation of unperceived features of objects that is implied in perceptual intentionality presupposes a reference to perceptions other subjects could have of these objects. This claim, as it has been defended by Dan Zahavi, rests upon an erroneous supposition about the modal status of the perceptual possibilities to which the perceived object refers, which shall not be interpreted as effectively realizable but as mere de jure possibilities, perceptions that could have been realized in principle, but that are maybe beyond one's reach considering one's concrete factual powers and opportunities. Horizontal intentionality is better accounted for in terms of perceptions that one could have had because of one's embodied character and the always open possibility of occupying another position with respect to the object. This modal ubiquity which is inherent to one's being-in-space is what supports the field of de jure possibilities that is implied in horizontal intentionality. The co-presence of the parts and features one does not perceive from here is a counterpoint to one's being-possibly-there.
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This article presents eight different methodologies for directing observations and analyses of the processes involved in gaining knowledge via discovery. The author begins by applying the methodology from systematic philosophy through comparative analyses of opposing systems of thought to reveal concepts and subconcepts that are useful for attaining knowledge, applying systematic doubt with opposing subconcepts that are equivocated via system-thinking rather than problem-thinking.  In §7, the scientific method is demonstrated concisely and presented with examples in radiology, including interviews and the logic of discovery in its applications with professional ethics. In §8.1, the professional ethical geographic analysis for individual workers’ moral orientations at workplaces and the STEEPLED analysis in business management theory are described with comparative international analyses.  Moreover, relevant analyses of white, gray and black markets is added to the latter analysis for methodological advancements.  In §9, three interviews are presented with the technical radiologist, Salvador Torres Pérez.  In §10, an example of qualitative scientific methodology concerning work activity is presented as a preparation for changing types of values in order to reevaluate quantitative analyses and metaanalyses.  In §11, the application of the scientific method within a systematic methodology of ordered gradations of skepticism is demonstrated with philosophical historical methodology applicable to sciences.  In §12, a theoretic framework of scientific observation is provided. In §13, the application of two methodologies is included in the process of professionally whistleblowing at workplaces.  In §14, critical intercultural communicative pedagogy is applied as a necessary addition to the ethical scientific method to continue and improve the global scientific community and democracy at workplaces.

Keywords: Nicolai Hartmann, modalities, ontology, reality, system, experimentation, possibility theory, Diodoros Cronus, dogma, Cotard syndrome, modal realism, thinker, truth, absolute truth, x-ray, injury, radiology, Monsanto, professional ethics, methodology, rehabilitation, Wilhelm Roentgen, color, observation, environment, observer, object, system-thinking, problem-thinking



Resumen

Este artículo presenta ocho metodologías diferentes para dirigir observaciones y análisis de los procesos involucrados en la obtención de conocimiento a través del descubrimiento. El autor comienza aplicando la metodología de la filosofía sistemática a través de análisis comparativos de sistemas opuestos de pensamiento para revelar conceptos y subconceptos útiles para la adquisición de conocimiento. Se hace aplicando dudas sistemáticas y oponiéndose a subconceptos que se equivocan a través del pensamiento de sistema en lugar del pensamiento de problemas. En §7, el método científico se demuestra de forma concisa y se presenta con ejemplos en radiología.  Incluye entrevistas y la lógica del descubrimiento en sus aplicaciones y la racionalidad de sus partes en el proceso de las ciencias. En §8.1, el análisis geográfico ético profesional y el análisis PESTLE en la teoría de la gestión empresarial se describen con análisis demográficos y comparativos internacionales, incluyendo los análisis de los mercados blancos, grises y negros relevantes. En §9.1 se presentan tres entrevistas con el técnico radiólogo Salvador Torres Pérez. En §10, se presenta un ejemplo de metodología científica cualitativa sobre la actividad laboral como preparación para cambiar tipos de valores con el fin de reevaluar análisis cuantitativos y metaanálisis. En §11, se demuestra la aplicación del método científico dentro de una metodología sistemática de gradaciones ordenadas de escepticismo con la metodología histórica filosófica aplicable a las ciencias. En §12, se proporciona un marco teórico de observación científica. En §13, la aplicación de dos metodologías presenta el proceso para denunciar las irregularidades en los lugares de trabajo. En §14, la pedagogía crítica intercultural comunicativa se aplica como una adición necesaria al método científico ético para continuar y mejorar la comunidad científica global y la democracia en los lugares de trabajo.

Palabras claves: Nicolai Hartmann, modalidades, ontología, realidad, sistema, pensamiento, teoría de posibilidad, método científico, experimentación, Diodoro Cronos, dogma, síndrome de Cotard, realismo modal, pensador, descubrimiento, verdad, verdad absoluto, rayos X, radiografía, lesión, Monsanto, ética profesional, metodología, rehabilitación, Wilhelm Röntgen, color, observación, observador, objeto, ambiente, pensamiento de sistema, pensamiento de problemas

The work of Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers exposes a radical asymmetry at the heart of physics: different mathematical formulations of the same problem produce equally valid yet not equivalent representations of matter and the universe.  This chapter examines how this onto-epistemological bifurcation marks thought with the impossibility to reach past the contingency of present knowledge and yet enables a rigorous logic.
When trying to account for the coherence of sense, contemporary philosophy seems unable to let go of the habit of purging thought of all that is historical and contingent, as nothing more than noise that clouds the voice of the ontological ultimate. Prigogine’s asymmetry disrupts this reductionist paradigm. Departing from the absolutist interpretations of contingency proposed by Object Oriented Ontology as well as from Latour’s neo empiricist methodology, this chapter develops Prigogine’s asymmetry to its most extreme consequences.  It explains how a rigorous system of knowledge can function thanks to rather than despite of the contingent complexity of the present. The argument will revisit the thought of Descartes, Husserl, Rorty, Popper, Gödel, Deleuze, and Golding, to propose a daring reorganisation of the logic of sense that takes decidability beyond the true-false dichotomy and introduces a positive interpretation of incompleteness, by retaining rather than cleansing the contingent and entropic roughness of the present as the very condition of knowledge and the possibility of making sense. 
As will be seen, this reversal of the hierarchy between the simplicity of the ultimate and the complexity of the present shows that the patterns of possibility and impossibility encountered in knowledge systems distribute and orientate thought as dimensions logically rigorous and yet radically material. While this newly discovered materiality of knowledge is nothing new for the artist, it blows asunder the ontological edifice that keeps identity and predicate rigorously apart in the subject-object distribution of epistemology.

The metaphysical nature of fictional characters is a matter of extensive philosophical debate. The related positions come in various flavours and are accompanied by more or less controversial analyses. Possible worlds, or possibilia, are a matter of equally extensive debate, and (controversial) theories about their nature abound. I present an approach to fictional characters which takes advantage of an already-developed approach to so-called alien individuals. I argue that fictional characters and alien individuals instantiate the same properties and they should receive the same analysis. First, I present the theory of linguistic ersatzism. Second, I point out the limitations of the theory. Third, I present the so-called ersatz pluriverse hypothesis, which squares linguistic ersatzism with the possibility of distinct alien individuals. Fourth, I generalise the argument.

The article will expose the problem of the nature of reality stablished in the first sections of Wittgenstein"s "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", especially the aphorisms 1 to 2.063 seeking to show points of contact between the Aristotelian-Thomistic and Suarezian thought. Initially, (I) a distinction is made between metaphysics and ontology in order to understand why Wittgenstein, notorious for his anti-metaphysical thought, actually ends up producing a theory of reality. Subsequently, (II) the relationship between reality and language will be drawn from the characteristic isomorphism of the Tractatus in which a structural similarity will appear with the Aristotelian-Thomistic thought. This relationship will be the basis for (III) the construction of an ontological image of reality as the condition of possibility for a meaningful language. With this outlook, the (IV) hypothesis of the influence of Francisco Suárez"s thought as the content behind this Wittgensteinian description of reality will be advanced.

Resumo: O artigo exporá o problema da natureza da realidade desenhada nas primeiras seções do "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", de Wittgenstein, especialmente os aforismos 1 ao 2.063 mostrando pontos de contato entre as tradições aristotélico-tomista e suareziana. Inicialmente, (I) estabelece-se uma distinção entre metafísica e ontologia a fim de entender porque Wittgenstein, notoriamente conhecido por seu pensamento antimetafísico, termina de fato produzindo uma teoria da realidade. Posteriormente, (II) se definirá a relação entre realidade e linguagem a partir do isomorfismo característico do Tractatus em que aparecerá uma semelhança estrutural com o pensamento aristotélico-tomista. Tal relação será a base para (III) a construção de uma imagem ontológica da realidade como condição de possibilidade para uma linguagem com sentido. Diante deste panorama, se avançará (IV) a hipótese da influência do pensamento de Francisco Suárez como horizonte conteudístico desta descrição wittgensteiniana da realidade.

Kit Fine has proposed a new solution to what he calls 'a familiar puzzle' concerning modality and existence. The puzzle concerns the argument from the alleged truths 'It is necessary that Socrates is a man' and 'It is possible that Socrates does not exist' to the apparent falsehood 'It is possible that Socrates is a man and does not exist'. We discuss in detail Fine's setting up of the 'puzzle' and his rejection, with which we concur, of two mooted solutions to it. (One of these uses standard, Kripkean, notions, and the other rests on work done by Arthur Prior.) We set out, and reject, the philosophy of modality underlying Fine's new solution, and we defend an alternative response to the alleged puzzle. Our solution follows the work of David Wiggins in distinguishing between the sentential operator 'It is necessary that' and the predicate modifier 'necessarily'. We briefly provide this distinction with a possible-world semantics on which it is neither a necessary truth, in some sense, that Socrates exists nor true, in some sense, that Socrates necessarily exists.

Despite the notions of possible worlds and substances are very important subjects of contemporary metaphysics, there are relatively few attempts to combine these in a united framework. This paper considers the metaphysical model of the origin and the evolution of possible worlds that occur from an interaction between substances. I involve Leibniz's doctrine of the striving possibles that every possibility of substance has its essence and tendency towards existence. It is supposed that the activities of substances are constantly aimed at using this tendency in all possible ways. Only the consistent and stable interactions between the substances give birth to stable objects in one of many worlds. Thus, the activity of substances changes from the possible modality of being to the actual modality of being in a form of existence of the worlds. I divide substance's possibility into two aspects—dynamic (possible or virtual history) and static (possible or potential mutual state). Thanks to the summation of virtual histories, in the possible modality of being, the maximal number of virtual histories is combined into the actual history in the actual modality.

The paper presents a comparison between Husserl " s phenomenology and Rosmini " s ideology in order to clarify some philosophical steps which, relying on the interpretation of being in terms of possibility, can contribute to a reformulation of the modern notion of " sense " .

The belief that Aristotle opposes potency (dunamis) to actuality (energeia or entelecheia) has gone mostly untested. This essay defines and distinguishes forms of the Opposition Hypothesis—the Actualization, Privation, and Modal—examining the texts and arguments adduced to support them. Using Aristotle's own account of opposition, the texts appear instead to show that potency and actuality are compatible, while arguments for their opposition produce intractable problems. Notably, Aristotle's refutation of the Megarian Identity Hypothesis applies with equal or greater force to the Opposition Hypothesis. For Aristotle, then, potency and actuality are compatible.

Some interpretations of quantum mechanics use notions of possible states and possible trajectories. We investigate how this modal approach correlates with several metaphysical conceptions of a transition from potential to actual existence. The comparison is based on a discussion in contemporary analytical metaphysics of modality. We also consider an analogy between Leibniz's theory of the possibilities striving towards existence, wave mechanics of Schrödinger, and Feynman path integral.

Понятия возможных состояний или возможных траекторий используются в нескольких интерпретациях квантовой механики. В статье исследуется возможность сопоставления этих интерпретаций с метафизическими концепциями перехода от потенциального существования к актуальному. Анализ проводится на примере дискуссии в современной аналитической метафизике модальностей. Рассмотрены аналогии между концепцией Лейбница о стремлении к существованию соревнующихся возможностей, волновой механикой Шредингера и интегралом по траекториям Фейнмана

There are philosophers who think that it is possible to imagine the metaphysically impossible. On the one hand, there are philosophers that think that only knowledge limits what one can imagine. Prior to knowledge of certain facts the imagination is unbounded. On the other hand, there are philosophers who think that the imagination is unconstrained whatever. I shall argue that (a) it is not actually possible to imagine what is metaphysically impossible, though (b) it appears to be possible. I take this to be a defence of the Kripkean view. I aim to develop an understanding of the imagination that can accommodate this view.

The theory of belief functions, sometimes referred to as evidence theory or Dempster-Shafer theory, was first introduced by Arthur P. Dempster in the context of statistical inference, to be later developed by Glenn Shafer as a general framework for modelling epistemic uncertainty. The methodology is now well established as a general framework for reasoning with uncertainty, with well-understood connections to related frameworks such as probability, possibility, random set and imprecise probability theories. Importantly, in recent years the number of papers published on the theory and application of belief functions has been booming (reaching over 800 in 2014 alone), displaying strong growth in particular in the East Asian community and among practitioners working on multi-criteria decision making, earth sciences, and sensor fusion. Belief functions are a natural tool to cope with heavy uncertainty, lack of evidence and missing data, and extremely rare events.

An early debate on the rationale of belief functions gave a strong contribution to the growth and success of the UAI community and series of conference in the Eighties and Nineties, thanks to the contribution of scientists of the caliber of Glenn Shafer, Judea Pearl, Philippe Smets and Prakash Shenoy, among others. Ever since the UAI and BELIEF community have somewhat diverged, and the proposers’ effort has been recently directed towards going back to a closer relationships and exchange of ideas between the two communities. This was one of the aims of the recent BELIEF 2014 International Conference of which the proposers were General Chair and member of the Steering Committee, respectively. A number of books are being published on the subject as we speak, and the impact of the belief function approach to uncertainty is growing.

The tutorial aims at bridging the gap between researchers in the field and the wider AI and Uncertainty Theory community, with the longer term goal of a more fruitful collaboration and dissemination of ideas.

This paper discusses different strategies of participant-internal and participant-external
possibility opposition in a language. Logically, there are four cases of a dedicated opposition (a
dedicated opposition means that the markers used in it have nothing but the intended meanings):
only lexical, lexico-grammatical, no opposition, only grammatical. Though the first three
oppositions can be easily found in reference grammars or typological studies of modality, the
fourth opposition appears to be a rarer case.
In the paper, I analyze Iron Ossetic (Eastern Iranian), which has a grammatical opposition of
participant-internal and participant-external possibility, viz. the dedicated participant-external
possibility construction and the dedicated participant-internal possibility construction. After
discussion of their morphological and syntactic peculiarities, I show that the Ossetic
constructions are unique in the Iranian and Caucasian language areas and offer their
grammaticalization paths.

I limiti di ciò che possiamo immaginare sono anche limiti del nostro mondo? Ciò che è rappresentabile definisce l’ambito di ciò che è possibile? E, se sì, in che senso?
Questi sono gli interrogativi di fondo che supportano e motivano la scrittura di questo libro.
Il percorso che conduce dalle domande alle tesi conclusive passa attraverso tre principali nuclei argomentativi.
Il primo nucleo concerne il rapporto tra immaginazione e percezione. Si tratta qui di capire in che misura la sfera dell’immaginario sia in grado di ricreare, ed anticipare, la sfera della realtà sensibile.
In seconda istanza viene esaminata la transizione tra immaginario di tipo sensibile e rappresentazione concettuale. Questo punto viene affrontato attraverso un’analisi della genesi e delle potenzialità della significazione linguistica.
Il terzo nucleo argomentativo riguarda il rapporto tra gli apriori della rappresentazione (ciò che è rappresentativamente necessario o rappresentativamente impossibile) e la sfera dei possibili (ontologici, epistemici e metafisici).
Queste analisi confluiscono nel determinare le condizioni per una rappresentazione dotata di senso, e nel chiarificare il senso dell’attività rappresentativa in quanto tale.
Su questa base si profilano le conclusioni del lavoro, che ridefiniscono il rapporto tra rappresentazione, realtà e verità. Tale ridefinizione porta a rivendicare un senso ed una funzione essenzialmente differenti per l’uso scientifico delle rappresentazioni rispetto all’uso filosofico delle medesime.

The aim of this paper is to make a first approach to the late scholastic debate concerning the love of God towards possible creatures. I start with brief exposition of the historical background of the debate and the main positions of authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as Duns Scotus, Cajetan, Bañez and Suárez. I deal in detail with the essentialist position of the Jesuit Gabriel Vásquez and his followers, who affirmed a necessary love of God towards possible creatures. I also present the arguments of the Thomist theologian Baltasar Navarrete against Vasquez’s position. Finally, I show how the different positions concerning the love of God towards possible creatures reveal diametrically opposed metaphysical positions about the formal constitutive element of being as such and its transcendental affections, anticipating some fundamental trends of modern rationalism.

Neste ensaio, pretendemos mostrar o que é a possibilidade metafísica, distinguindo-a da possibilidade lógica e da possibilidade física, e depois indicar que há pelo menos dois tipos de possibilidades metafísicas, a saber, as potencialidades das coisas e as possibilidades de ocorrência de eventos. E isso é um objetivo importante, pois torna mais clara a discussão sobre possibilidades. Para indicar o que é a possibilidade metafísica, tentarei mostrar que é preciso uma modalidade absoluta para o debate sobre o que é possível não seja trivial. E para indicar que há dois tipos de possibilidades metafísicas, mostrarei que podemos falar de modo independente dessas duas noções de possibilidade, e que o debate sobre determinismo e indeterminismo pressupõe essa distinção. A conclusão que chegamos é que há realmente esses dois tipos de possibilidades metafísicas, e que, se não quisermos ser ambíguos, teremos boas razões para utilizarmos essa distinção em nossas teorias sobre possibilidades.