Possibility

The concept of "virtual" widely used today is polysemantic, but the reasons for this are not quite clear. The article is devoted to the study of some linguistic (semantic) and philosophical reasons for the existence of “Platonic” (real, imaginary) and “Aristotelian” (possible, effective) meanings in which the sense of the word "virtual" is expressed in Russian. The word "virtual" is derived from the Latin word "virtus". The semantics of the word "virtus" happens to be interconnected with the meanings of the words "ἀρετή", "δύναμις" and "potentia", since the Latin word "virtus", which has two semantic “dominants” — "virtue" is the “Platonic” dominant and "power" is the “Aristotelian” one, — was used to translate two Greek words: "ἀρετή" (virtue) and "δύναμις" (strength, power, might), and the Greek word "δύναμις" was translated by two Latin words: "virtus" (righteous divine power) and "potentia" / "potentialitas" (ability, power). Through Plato’s doctrine of arete-eidos, the concept of "virtus" is also connected with the concept of "εἶδος". Thus, the “Platonic” line of meanings expressing the sense of the word "virtual" is connected with the concepts of "ἀρετή" and "εἶδος", and the “Aristotelian” line — with the concepts of "δύναμις" and "potentia". All meanings of the words "virtus", "ἀρετή", "δύναμις" and "potentia" can be divided into three groups: “Platonic,” “Aristotelian,” and “Platonic-Aristotelian”. The sense of the English word "virtual" is expressed when translated into Russian by the following four meanings: a) factual, real; being something in essence, really (and not formally); b) imaginary; c) possible; d) effective. The meanings "a" and "b" can be attributed to the “Platonic” line, and the meanings "c" and "d" — to the “Aristotelian” one. It is considered how the mutual influence of the meanings of the words "virtus", "ἀρετή", "δύναμις" and "potentia" in the three specified groups could lead to the formation of the four above-mentioned meanings, in which the sense of the word "virtual" is expressed in Russian. Key words: virtus, ἀρετή (virtue), εἶδος, δύναμις (ability / possibility), potentia (power), the virtual, Plato, Aristotle, ontology, semantics.

Kit Fine has proposed a new solution to what he calls 'a familiar puzzle' concerning modality and existence. The puzzle concerns the argument from the alleged truths 'It is necessary that Socrates is a man' and 'It is possible that Socrates does not exist' to the apparent falsehood 'It is possible that Socrates is a man and does not exist'. We discuss in detail Fine's setting up of the 'puzzle' and his rejection, with which we concur, of two mooted solutions to it. (One of these uses standard, Kripkean, notions, and the other rests on work done by Arthur Prior.) We set out, and reject, the philosophy of modality underlying Fine's new solution, and we defend an alternative response to the alleged puzzle. Our solution follows the work of David Wiggins in distinguishing between the sentential operator 'It is necessary that' and the predicate modifier 'necessarily'. We briefly provide this distinction with a possible-world semantics on which it is neither a necessary truth, in some sense, that Socrates exists nor true, in some sense, that Socrates necessarily exists.

This is an updated version of the preprint "On the Reasons for the Emergence of the "Platonic" and "Aristotelian" Lines of the Development of the Meanings of the Concept of "Virtual"". According to Ekaterina Taratuta, there are two lines of constructing the meanings of the concepts based on the root vir(t)- – “Platonic” and “Aristotelian”. This paper demonstrates that the formation of the polysemanticity of the Latin concept of virtus (virtue; strength, valor, manliness), and then the concept of virtual, has been possible because of the unique semantics of the word virtus, in which there are two “dominants” – 1) virtue and 2) strength. On the basis of the first semantic “dominant”, the “Platonic” group of meanings of virtual has been formed, on the basis of the second – the “Aristotelian” one.
The first cause of the existence of the “Platonic” group of the meanings of virtual is the translation of the Greek word ἀρετὴ by the Latin word virtus in Roman philosophy, biblical texts and Greek-Byzantine patristics, as a result of which the concept of virtus has been enriched with the meanings of the Platonic and Christian concept of ἀρετὴ. The second cause is that through the Plato’s doctrine of arete-eidos the concept of virtus has been enriched with the meanings of the Platonic concept of είδος. As Hans Kremer has shown, in Plato’s doctrine eidos is the source of order and beauty, which is reflected in the empirical world as arete – virtue, goodness; thus, eidos is inextricably linked with arete. As a result, in the “Platonic” sense the virtual is understood as the eidetic, the ideal.
The first cause of the existence of the “Aristotelian” group of meanings of virtual is the translation of the Greek word δύναμις by the Latin word virtus in biblical texts and in Greek-Byzantine patristics, as a result of which the concept of virtus has been enriched with the Christian meanings of concept of δύναμις. The second cause is the translation of the Aristotelian concept of δύναμις by the Latin word potentia: the word δύναμις has become the medium, linking the words virtus and potentia and, under the influence of the latter, differences in the meanings of virtus and potentia (and especially their derivatives virtualis (virtual) and potentialis (potential)) have gradually disappeared. As a result, in the “Aristotelian” sense the virtual is understood as the potential, the possible.
Keywords: the virtual, the ideal, the potential, virtus, ἀρετὴ (virtue), είδος, δύναμις (ability / possibility), potentia (power), Plato, Aristotle.

“Creating the future” is a notion introduced by Alfred North Whitehead to define the task of universities and the function of philosophy. Implicitly, it is a rejection of the idea that the future is already determined, and in some sense, already exists, with the appearance of temporal becoming an illusion. “Creation” originally meant “the action of causing to exist”, or “a coming into being”. The “future” is not normally considered to be what can be created. Originally, it meant “yet to be”. It now tends to be defined in relation to time, as “the time to come”, where “time” is assumed to be an independent existent along with space as the “containers” of material beings, with the future in some sense pre-existing its becoming present. The quantity of “matter” or “mass-energy” is assumed to be constant and to change its position and configurations in predictable ways over time. To refer to the future as being created is to reject this view of the universe and the basic concepts that define it, replacing these with concepts that can make intelligible the freedom of and creativity of people, the future as in process of being created, and humans as partially responsible for what future is created. It is to recognize that there are real possibilities that can be envisioned, understood, chosen, and brought into existence, with some process philosophers claiming that new possibilities can also be created.

Siamo abituati a vedere intorno a noi oggetti, la cui esistenza sembra la cosa da dare più per assodata. Eppure, le nostre vite sono sempre più immerse in reti di interazioni: che cosa accadrebbe allora, se cominciassimo ad accorgerci che siamo invece innanzitutto circondati da relazioni e processi, prima che da cose e oggetti? È possibile cominciare a guardare al mondo come se fosse percorso da rapporti e trasformazioni?
Filosofia delle relazioni offre degli strumenti linguistici e concettuali per comprendere la natura e il funzionamento delle relazioni, elaborando una prospettiva in grado tanto di tenere conto di alcune sollecitazioni provenienti dalla scienza contemporanea, quanto di rendere conto di alcuni aspetti che fanno parte della nostra esperienza, anche se spesso in maniera inavvertita.

В докладе будут рассмотрены основные конструкции языка гбан (< южные манде), используемые для передачи модальных значений зон необходимости и возможности. Речь идёт о значениях внутренней, внешней и эпистемической необходимости и возможности. В гбан для выражения значений зоны возможности используются конструкции с глаголом sè ‘мочь’. Одна из этих конструкций обладает нетривиальным морфосинтаксическим поведением — она построена по модели соположения без явного подчинительного маркирования («Я могу я делаю») — и при этом демонстрирует «согласование» между служебной и знаменательной клаузами по некоторым предикативным грамматическим категориям).
Для выражения значений зоны необходимости используется набор слабограмматикализованных конструкций типа «ɛ̏ yȅȅ níí … + оптатив» («это есть [так], чтобы…»).
Отдельно предполагается рассмотреть значения так называемой внутренней и внешней «актуальности» ('Я смог сделать', 'Случилось так, что я сделал').

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’).  To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless.  And often one is left guessing.

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Índice



Introducción............................................................................... 9

Capítulo 1. La relevancia del caso griego .............................. 17

Capítulo 2. Instrumentos de análisis: estrategias
argumentativas y zonas de tensión dialógica  ….................... 25
2.1. "Ocultamiento del adversario" como figura
argumentativa: el reverso del argumento de autoridad
2.2. La noción de "zona de tensión dialógica" y sus elementos 
2.3. Un elemento omitido: el fenómeno de los sokratikoì lógoi

Capítulo 3. Algunos ejemplos de aplicación del enfoque por ZTD …..................................................................................... 49
3.1 La defensa de Sócrates, los ecos de Gorgias
                      y los orígenes del diálogo socrático
3.2. Los socráticos en el relato platónico de la muerte de Sócrates
3.3. Las críticas de Antístenes y la reformulación de la Teoría de las Ideas
3.4. Aristipo y el número del tirano
3.5. La paradoja del Menón y los megáricos
3.6. Aristóteles y los megáricos en torno de lo posible

Capítulo 4. A modo de conclusiones sobre la producción y la enseñanza .............................................................................. 115

Bibliografía …....................................................................... 121

Wer humanitäre Kriege moralisch beurteilen will, muss sich in einem chaotischen Meer der Möglichkeiten auskennen; er muss (z.B. in der Rückschau) wissen, was geschehen wäre, hätten sich die Akteure anders entschieden. Solche Fragen betreffen keine Fakten, sondern Kontrafakten; mit kühlem Realitätssinn alleine ist diesen Fragen nicht beizukommen. Im Herzstück dieses Aufsatzes steht eine erkenntnistheoretische Analyse kontrafaktischer Sätze. Wenn ich recht liege, müssen wir uns bei der Beurteilung solcher Sätze nicht nur an die harten Fakten halten; zusätzlich brauchen wir weichere Beurteilungskriterien wie Einfühlungsvermögen, narrative Intelligenz, Phantasie – und Werthaltungen. Dass eine bestimmte Form von Pazifismus im Lichte dieser erkenntnistheoretischen These an Plausibilität gewinnt, versuche ich in den Schlussabschnitten anhand des Kosovo-Kriegs plausibel zu machen.

I limiti di ciò che possiamo immaginare sono anche limiti del nostro mondo? Ciò che è rappresentabile definisce l’ambito di ciò che è possibile? E, se sì, in che senso?
Questi sono gli interrogativi di fondo che supportano e motivano la scrittura di questo libro.
Il percorso che conduce dalle domande alle tesi conclusive passa attraverso tre principali nuclei argomentativi.
Il primo nucleo concerne il rapporto tra immaginazione e percezione. Si tratta qui di capire in che misura la sfera dell’immaginario sia in grado di ricreare, ed anticipare, la sfera della realtà sensibile.
In seconda istanza viene esaminata la transizione tra immaginario di tipo sensibile e rappresentazione concettuale. Questo punto viene affrontato attraverso un’analisi della genesi e delle potenzialità della significazione linguistica.
Il terzo nucleo argomentativo riguarda il rapporto tra gli apriori della rappresentazione (ciò che è rappresentativamente necessario o rappresentativamente impossibile) e la sfera dei possibili (ontologici, epistemici e metafisici).
Queste analisi confluiscono nel determinare le condizioni per una rappresentazione dotata di senso, e nel chiarificare il senso dell’attività rappresentativa in quanto tale.
Su questa base si profilano le conclusioni del lavoro, che ridefiniscono il rapporto tra rappresentazione, realtà e verità. Tale ridefinizione porta a rivendicare un senso ed una funzione essenzialmente differenti per l’uso scientifico delle rappresentazioni rispetto all’uso filosofico delle medesime.

A dear friend once told me: the job of a good bookseller, like that of a librarian, is not very different from that of a writer. In each case it is a matter of choosing, of selecting certain books rather than others in the mare magnum of all the books one might consider: all books in print in the bookseller’s case; all existing books in the librarian’s case; all possible books, i.e. all books that could be written, in the writer’s case. Choosing one solution among the many is that part of the job—the most challenging—that unites the writer to the bookseller and the librarian. Indeed, isn’t writing a good book like finding the book we would like to read inside the Library of Babel?

20.Yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren
eser incelemelerinde kullanılan yazar ve metin
odaklı yaklaşımların giderek etkisi azalır, bunun
yerine okur merkezli okumalar edebiyat eleştiri
ve kuramları arasında önem kazanmaya başlar.
Modern ve postmodern yazarlar kurguladıkları
metinlerde bilinçli olarak bir takım boşluklar
bırakırlar. İçeriksel ve biçimsel açıdan bırakılan
bu tür boşlukların tamamlanışı okurun alılmama
yetisine bırakılır. Modern Türk edebiyatının
önemli yazarlarından biri olan Bilge
Karasukaleme aldığı eserleriyle okuru merkeze
alır. Kısmet Büfesi; okurun bakış açısını, hayal
dünyasını ve yorum gücünü öncelemesi
bakımından okur merkezli okumalariçinönemli
bir örnek teşkil eder. Bu çalışma kuramsal okur
modelinin ne olduğunu, yazarın anlattığı metni
b i r o k u r o l a r a k n a s ı l y o r u m l a d ı ğ ı n ı
araştırmaktadır. Kuramsal okur, olabilirlikler
labirentinde her türlü olası durumu göz önünde
bulundurarak metni yorumlayan bir konuma
sahiptir. Kısmet Büfesi'ndeki öykülerin
olasılıklara bağlı olarak kurgulandığını ve
yazarın kuramsal okurun rolüne soyunduğunu
ortaya koymak bu araştırmanın amacını
oluşturmaktadır. İnceleme konusu olan
öykülerde yazar tarafından gösterilen ve
anlatılan her şeyin olabilirliği kadar
olmayabilirliğinin de mümkün olması kurmaca
düzlemdeki mutlak gerçeklik algısının
kırıldığına işaret eder.

The belief that Aristotle opposes potency (dunamis) to actuality (energeia or entelecheia) has gone mostly untested. This essay defines and distinguishes forms of the Opposition Hypothesis—the Actualization, Privation, and Modal—examining the texts and arguments adduced to support them. Using Aristotle's own account of opposition, the texts appear instead to show that potency and actuality are compatible, while arguments for their opposition produce intractable problems. Notably, Aristotle's refutation of the Megarian Identity Hypothesis applies with equal or greater force to the Opposition Hypothesis. For Aristotle, then, potency and actuality are compatible.

Now days due to transient urban development, infill development strategy is considered one of most important urban development strategies that could be end in sustainable urban development. The purpose of this study is identifying Zanjan city deteriorated urban area infill development potential. This study is intrinsically considered kind of applied research, and based on methods are used research is regarded documental - analytical research which uses GIS technique (Model FUZZY-AHP) for data analysis, preparation of the final map and pertinent layers. Research results show high infill development potential for Zanjan city deteriorated urban areas and by attending such potentials city deteriorated texture can be very effective in reducing city’s improper growth and contribute to better housing potential and in this case more sustainable and healthy city will be configured.

In his incarnation as 'Morus' in Utopia, Thomas More asserts his profound disagreement with his fictional character, Raphael Hythlodaeus. Whereas Hythlodaeus extols the merits of commonality and the moral value of pleasure, Morus dismisses the whole project as absurdity, or hopeless wishful thinking. This divergence has been variously interpreted, but mostly played down. This paper argues that the civilized, amicable, and yet genuine discord between Raphael Hythlodaeus and Morus is the key to Utopia. We can appreciate its importance only if we understand who Hythlodaeus is, and what the purpose of the dialogue is. We also have to do justice to Thomas More's politics, which were grounded on the authority of the Christian tradition, in the Old and the New Testament. Over the years, Thomas More maintained a very clear and consistent line of thought on the legitimacy of worldly wealth, the responsibilities inherent in its management, the imperative to curb their enjoyment, the temptation of 'business' and greed, the duty of charity, and the value of penance, remorse, prayer, and other kinds of self-inflicted suffering. In A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation, Anthony, the wiser character, conveys Thomas More's relentless praise of pain. Anthony has the last word. So, too, does Morus.

The most controversial aspect of the interpretation of Scotus’s modal theory concerns the question of whether things are possible because God knows them to be possible, or whether they are possible independently from God. I argue that Scotus thought that the possibles are possibles because of God’s knowledge of them. I adduce a number of relevant texts that previous 20th century discussions of this interpretational problem have not taken into account. In addition, I discuss the modal theory of Francis of Meyronnes (14th century) as well as the reception of Scotus’s modal theory by two Scotists of the 17th century, i.e., John Punch and Bartholomew Mastrius.

The aim of this narrow-focused text is to argue against the claim that the appresentation of unperceived features of objects that is implied in perceptual intentionality presupposes a reference to perceptions other subjects could have of these objects. This claim, as it has been defended by Dan Zahavi, rests upon an erroneous supposition about the modal status of the perceptual possibilities to which the perceived object refers, which shall not be interpreted as effectively realizable but as mere de jure possibilities, perceptions that could have been realized in principle, but that are maybe beyond one's reach considering one's concrete factual powers and opportunities. Horizontal intentionality is better accounted for in terms of perceptions that one could have had because of one's embodied character and the always open possibility of occupying another position with respect to the object. This modal ubiquity which is inherent to one's being-in-space is what supports the field of de jure possibilities that is implied in horizontal intentionality. The co-presence of the parts and features one does not perceive from here is a counterpoint to one's being-possibly-there.
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Adjacent, i.e., nearby, possibilities constantly emerge in a multitude of settings for a multitude of entities. When these possibilities are explored, yet new possibilities emerge. The concept of the "adjacent possible" was introduced by Stuart Kauffman (1996; 2000) in evolutionary biology and complex adaptive systems to explain how biological evolution can be seen as exploration and actualization of what is adjacent possible, i.e., available at hand. The concept has now disseminated into a wide range of research fields including economy, innovation studies, technological evolution, cultural evolution, learning processes, recommender systems, and design studies. The "adjacent possible" can be defined as "the set of possibilities available to individuals, communities, institutions, organisms, productive processes, etc., at a given point in time during their evolution" (Loreto 2015, p. 9). The concept of the "adjacent possible" is useful for understanding how new possibilities emerge, and how they are constrained, discovered, explored, actualized, developed, reconfigured, designed, and so on, in an interplay between what is actual and what is possible for specific entities in specific settings. In this entry, the history and the state of art of research on the "adjacent possible" is briefly outlined. Discussion focuses on four essential aspects of "adjacent possibles": (1) topologies of "adjacent possibles," (2) types of "adjacent possibles," (3) serendipity as actualization of "adjacent possibles," and (4) designing for "adjacent possibles."

There are philosophers who think that it is possible to imagine the metaphysically impossible. On the one hand, there are philosophers that think that only knowledge limits what one can imagine. Prior to knowledge of certain facts the imagination is unbounded. On the other hand, there are philosophers who think that the imagination is unconstrained whatever. I shall argue that (a) it is not actually possible to imagine what is metaphysically impossible, though (b) it appears to be possible. I take this to be a defence of the Kripkean view. I aim to develop an understanding of the imagination that can accommodate this view.

The aim of this paper is to make a first approach to the late scholastic debate concerning the love of God towards possible creatures. I start with brief exposition of the historical background of the debate and the main positions of authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as Duns Scotus, Cajetan, Bañez and Suárez. I deal in detail with the essentialist position of the Jesuit Gabriel Vásquez and his followers, who affirmed a necessary love of God towards possible creatures. I also present the arguments of the Thomist theologian Baltasar Navarrete against Vasquez’s position. Finally, I show how the different positions concerning the love of God towards possible creatures reveal diametrically opposed metaphysical positions about the formal constitutive element of being as such and its transcendental affections, anticipating some fundamental trends of modern rationalism.

Computer vision is an ever growing discipline whose ambitious goal is to enable machines with the intelligent
visual skills humans and animals are provided by Nature, allowing them to interact effortlessly
with complex, dynamic environments. Designing automated visual recognition and sensing systems
typically involves tackling a number of challenging tasks, and requires an impressive variety of sophisticated
mathematical tools. In most cases, the knowledge a machine has of its surroundings is at best
incomplete – missing data is a common problem, and visual cues are affected by imprecision. The need
for a coherent mathematical ‘language’ for the description of uncertain models and measurements then
naturally arises from the solution of computer vision problems.

The theory of evidence (sometimes referred to as ‘evidential reasoning’, ‘belief theory’ or ‘Dempster-
Shafer theory’) is, perhaps, one of the most successful approaches to uncertainty modelling, as arguably
the most straightforward and intuitive approaches to a generalized probability theory. Emerging in the
last Sixties from a profound criticism of the more classical Bayesian theory of inference and modelling
of uncertainty, it stimulated in the last decades an extensive discussion of the epistemic nature of both
subjective ‘degrees of beliefs’ and frequentist ‘chances’ or relative frequencies. More recently, a renewed
interest in belief functions, the mathematical generalization of probabilities which are the object of study
of the theory of evidence, has seen a blossoming of applications to a variety of fields of applied science.

In this Book we are going to show how, indeed, the fruitful interaction of computer vision and evidential
reasoning is able stimulate a number of advances in both fields. From a methodological point of
view, novel theoretical advances concerning the geometric and algebraic properties of belief functions as
mathematical objects will be illustrated in some detail in Part II, with a focus on a perspective ‘geometric
approach’ to uncertainty and an algebraic solution of the issue of conflicting evidence. In Part III we will
illustrate how these new perspectives on the theory of belief functions arise from important computer vision
problems, such as articulated object tracking, data association and object pose estimation, to which
in turn the evidential formalism can give interesting new solutions. Finally, some initial steps towards
a generalization of the notion of total probability to belief functions will be taken, in the perspective of
endowing the theory of evidence with a complete battery of estimation and inference tools to the benefit
of scientists and practitioners.

In his article "The Megarian and Aristotelian Concept of Possibility" ("Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff," 1937), Nicolai Hartmann attempts to revive an interpretation of the conception of possibility of the Megarians that stood in opposition to the Aristotelian conception of possibility and thus in opposition to the Aristotelian conception of modality in general. In this introduction, I attempt to situate Hartmann's article in its historical context. Did Hartmann come to adopt this thesis through his study of ancient Greek philosophy? Or did he already have a predilection for the Megarian conception of possibility prior to this? If so, how did this predilection come about? Was there an influence from his friend Vasily Sesemann, who published an article discussing the Megarians the previous year? Or were both Hartmann and Sesemann influenced early on by their mutual Russian teacher Nikolai Lossky, or even by a general tendency pervading Russian thought — itself grounded in the fatalism typical of the Russian collective unconscious — as we find it expressed in the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov, Lev Tolstoy, and other Russian thinkers?

In what follows, I will suggest that Parmenides’ claim concerning the impossibility of what-is-not (and his subsequent denial of change and plurality) leads to a form of monism in which Parmenidean Being can be construed as the totality of what being can be. I will also argue that Being, for Parmenides, is the only possible object of thought, and also, and more controversially, that Being itself thinks. My conclusions are based mainly on what Parmenides says at B3 and B6 1-2, which appear to tell us that what can be thought and what can be are the same. This seems to imply that if I can think of something, then it has some sort of being, i.e., that all possible objects of thought have being, regardless of whether such objects are ‘actual’ beings (although what can count as a genuine object of thought, i.e. an object of thought that has being, might have to be grounded in the object’s being a possible object, i.e., something that can be). I am inclined to interpret B3 and B6 1-2 in this way because I find it hard to believe that Parmenides wanted to say that we are not able to think of non-actual possibilities.

Traditionally, the mental capacity for experiencing, constructing, or manipulating 'mental imagery' (quasi-perceptual experience). Imagination is also regarded as responsible for fantasy, inventiveness, idiosyncrasy, and creative, original, and insightful thought in general, and, sometimes, for a much wider range of mental activities dealing with the non-actual, such as supposing, pretending, 'seeing as', thinking of possibilities, and even being mistaken. The history of conceptions of the imagination is outlined, and its relevance to our intuitions about possibility is briefly considered.

In this article, I explore narrative building blocks for future-oriented what-if (i.e., possibilities-generating) analysis developed in a health promotion study. The aim of this study was to gain insight into future possibilities for good health among participants known for their poor health status. In narrative inquiry, imagining future possibilities and prospective temporal orientation are seldom regarded as interesting for their own sake, despite ample attention to the role of temporality. The methodological reflection in this article is complemented with a discussion of ethical issues (regarding authorship and representation) in the proposed method of analysis. To see a world in a grain of sand, And a heaven in a wild flower, Hold infinity in the palm of your hand, And eternity in an hour. (Blake 1803/1966, p. 431) My interest in the dilemmas of imagining future possibilities, and the role of narrative research in this process, intensified during my participation in the Aspiring...

Doctoral Dissertation, official submission 25.05.2017. Outline: "Chapter 1: "The Ontology of Possibility" presents Lewis's modal realism (LMR)
and its analysis of possibility. In particular, it discusses Lewis's stance on modal
truth, which he takes to be absolutely literal. For Lewis, if it is true that there
could have been talking donkeys, then it is literally true that there is world
where there are real donkeys that talk. I argue that it is this view on truth
that lies at the heart of Lewis's rejection of representational, so-called ersatz
approaches to modality and possible worlds, as it is only in virtue of the literal
truth at Lewis's worlds that he can reduce modality to non-modal facts.
This has been challenged, of course. Scott Shalkowski in 'The Ontological
Ground of the Alethic Modality' maintains that no such reduction is possible.
According to Shalkowski, also LMR has to presuppose an unanalysed notion of
possibility, since if it doesn't, its ontological foothold for modality---the plurality
of concrete possible worlds proposed by Lewis---is arbitrary. In the section 'On
Bottlecaps in Hackensack', I show that Shalkowski's argument is unsound, as
it fails to appreciate what Divers has called 'extraordinary' modalities. These
extraordinary cases are exactly the point where modal notions reduce to nonmodal
notions in LMR, and this is ultimately why Lewis's reduction succeeds.
Chapter 2 "LMR and Impossibility" embarks on the actual topic of this thesis,
which is, after all, not possibility but its contrary. It first discusses whether
Lewis in his argumentation for concrete possible worlds accidentally committed
himself also to impossible worlds. After debating the (few) strengths and
(manifold) weaknesses of the so-called 'argument from paraphrase' of everyday
language quantifications over 'ways things could, and could not have been', it
turns to a critical evaluation of the most elaborate proposal for concrete worlds
that are not possible: Kiourti's 'Impossibilist Genuine Realism' (IGR). It is argued
that even though LMR's literalness provides the strongest motivation to
introduce concrete impossible objects into ones ontology, IGR fails to elucidate
what the literal truth amounts to in inconsistent descriptions. It falls prey to a
dilemma: either, truth at its non-Lewisian6 worlds is merely assigned, or IGR
itself is literally inconsistent.
But that IGR is unsatisfactory as an extension of LMR does not mean that
LMR has no need to incorporate impossible content. The second half of the
chapter therefore addresses LMR's virtues and drawbacks as a foundation for a
semantics of intentionality. It is argued that one of LMR's biggest virtues as such
a foundation is that its ontology does not distort the intentional content---or, as
I will call it, that it is faithful to the intentional act in question. Nevertheless,
it is unable to do so in many cases of impossible content. Despite Lewis's
ingenious attempts to incorporate impossible content into his possibilist setting,
some impossible content cannot be accounted for. This content includes what I
have called 'extraordinary impossibilities', which are negations of a specific class
of literal ontological truths of LMR, over which already IGR stumbled. Since
IGR cannot fulfil its ambition to provide a literal semantics for impossibility
statements, and it seems that ersatz 'impossible worlds' are in principle unable
to do so, the discussion turns to a very different approach to intentionality which
nevertheless promises the literal truth of impossibilities: Meinong's theory of
objects.
Chapter 3 lays out the foundations of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie and
the intentional semantics built on them. It elucidates how Meinong's theory,
though very different from Lewis's, is driven by similar considerations on truth
and literal predication. One of Meinong's core principles is the so-called Principle
of the Independence of the Sosein from Being, according to which objects
need not exist in order to literally possess (or instantiate) the properties intentionally
attributed to them---the totality of these properties being what he
calls the object's 'Sosein', its 'being-so'. This principle is similar to Lewis's approach
to truth as explained in the discussion of his rejection of representational
approaches to modality in chapter 1, and, as will be shown at the end of the
chapter, the demand of literalness leads to the demise of object theory.
Furthermore, Meinong's theory stipulates a plenitude principle for objects.
His Intentionality Thesis claims that every intentional act is directed to an
object. However, this object need not exist, and may well have incompatible
properties, i.e. it can be an impossible object. It is this principle that together
with the Principle of Independence of the Sosein from Being leads the theory
of objects into a dilemma it cannot solve without sacrificing its demand of
the literal truth of intentional property ascriptions. This dilemma is in fact
very similar to the problem IGR encounters: IGR had to accept that either, it
cannot claim that every (impossible) statement whatsoever is true at some of
its concrete worlds, or it is an inconsistent theory. In both cases, then, it is the
double burden of literalness and plenitude that leads to a dilemma.
Chapter 4 Plenitude and Faithfulness returns to the question of how LMR
can be amended to account non-trivially for impossible content. It assesses
which of the two demands, literalness or plenitude, ought to be given up. I
argue that plenitude should not be abandoned if the aim is to provide a materially
adequate semantics for intentionality, and I also argue that this should be
our aim. Since literalness is what prevents both IGR and object theory from
providing a sufficient plenitude of impossibilities to do justice to intentional phenomena,
the conclusion that intentionality and impossibility discourse require
a representational semantics is inevitable. However, the sacrifice of literalness
requires some adjustments in the interpretation of intentional content, i.e. what
was called intentional faithfulness in chapter 2. These changes are discussed in
section 4.2.
Chapter 5 Veracity, Mendacity, and Granularity then discusses so-called 'hybrid'
approaches to 'impossible worlds', viz. theories that add abstract representational
world-surrogates to LMR in order to account for impossible content.
Surprisingly, it turns out that a representational interpretation of 'impossible
worlds' on its own is still insufficient for providing plenitudinous impossible content
while maintaining Lewis's analysis of possibility and its literal account of
truth. The proposals by Greg Restall (1997) and Francesco Berto (2010) build
their truth about impossibility on Lewisian literal truth, and thus inherit the
expressive limitations that derive from it. A different approach by Edwin Mares
(1997) is much better equipped to overcome those obstacles, as it provides the
means to systematically misrepresent the Lewisian ontology, or, as I want to call
it, to lie about it. Section 5.2.3 Systematic Mendacity at Work develops a formal
system along the lines of (Mares 1997) and (Priest 2005), which incorporates
these systemic misrepresentations.
As Mares's theory is coached in the framework of Barwise and Perry's theory
of situations, Barwise and Perry's situation semantics is discussed to answer
the ontological questions that Mares leaves open about his approach. Lastly,
I will reply to an objection put forward by Kiourti against Mares's approach,
which claims that its expressive power is too limited to provide an impossibilist
plenitude.
The concluding chapter of this thesis summarizes its most important points
and the advantages of (Mares 1997) over its competitors. The main conclusion
to be drawn is that there is no literal truth to tell about impossibility, but that
this is not all there is to say about it.

I argue that Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy articulates a radical conception of hope. According to Lear, radical hope is ‘directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is’ (2006:103). Given Adorno’s claim that the current world is radically evil, and that we cannot know or even imagine what the good is, it is plausible that his conception of hope must be radical in this sense. I develop this argument through an analysis of (i) Adorno’s engagement with Kant’s conception of hope, (ii) Adorno’s references to hope, and (iii) his critical diagnosis of a metaphysical need for hope. Having demonstrated that Adorno must reject both ordinary and Kantian hope, I examine why Adorno thinks that we still may have reasons for hope. I also show that Adorno’s conception of hope differs from Lear’s in one important respect.

This will be an invitation to adventurous readers  who  seek  new  creative,  hopeful  and  speculative  modes  of  understanding  and  intervening  in  a  world  of  crisis.  Written  by  Yoko  Akama,  Sarah Pink and Shanti Sumartojo, with contributions  from  Debora  Lanzeni,  Elisenda  Ardevol,  Katherine  Moline,  Ann  Light,  Tom  Jackson  and  David  Carlin,  the  book  was  launched  on  11  December  2018  at  RMIT  University  in Melbourne. It is not just a book that offers  new  perspectives  on  the  central  issues  of  uncertainty  and  possibility,  but a compilation of diverse experiences that embark on new research methods, profiting  from  disruptive  and  experimental techniques.

Abstract: The modal ontological argument, without justification for the central premise of possibility, is not feasible. This article intends to explore new versions of the modal ontological argument in which one seeks to justify, a priori or a posteriori, this central premise of possibility. It is argued that a posteriori reasoning will be more plausible than a priori reasoning. However, such a strategy will turn the ontological argument into an evidential or probabilistic argument, unlike the traditional version.

I give original arguments for the thesis that one believes a proposition only if one's credence in it is 1, as well as respond to several objections to that thesis. Belief implies having a credence of 1 because of the connections between assertoric representation, possibility, and probability.

The focal point of the paper is the problem of the relation of possibility to negativity. Negativity has been linked to possibility ever since Aristotle and there is a long tradition, leading up to Heidegger and beyond that deals with their relationship. In this tradition, however, there are two dominant oppositions, which a vigorous study should overcome. The first one is the opposition between negativity and positivity; the second, the opposition between possibility and impossibility. Opposing negativity to positivity opens the way for an affirmative interpretation of negativity and in fact predetermines the meaning of negativity through the concept of negation seen as an act. This means that negativity is seen as having affirmative force of its own, which makes it affirmative. Negativity is negative only to the extent that it is not an act. It is not opposed to the act (and, therefore to affirmativity), because it is not posed at all. If negativity is not an act, it should be thought of on the side of possibility, or potentiality. But in the possible it is what cannot be actualized, and therefore, what remains impossible. The impossible is not opposed to the possible; it traverses it as its own impotentiality and thus marks its internal limits. It is for this reason that possibility is never reducible to what was already conditioned, or predetermined, or pregiven.
I believe, that it is precisely the relationship of negativity and possibility that couldl help philosophy overcome the simple opposition between possibility and impossibility, on the one hand, and to grasp better the actualization which does not presuppose anything pregiven, on the other.

The article is dedicated to the actual problem of the relation between the imaginary and the potential in the context of the philosophical theory of elements (primary elements). The aim of the work is to study the spontaneous nature of imagination. The category of possibility is involved for the ontological explication of the concept of elements.
The study is conducted on the basis of the method of potentiation (developed, in particular, by M.N. Epstein), using the concept of the material-dynamic imagination of G. Bachelard, presented in his famous pentalogy on the elements. An attempt is made to combine the approaches of both thinkers with the goal of an ontological
definition of the category of elements, as well as to identify the mechanisms for the interaction of elements that generate new spontaneous processes. The article analyzes the historical concepts of the elements, beginning with the natural philosophy of pre-Socratics, and also examines the attempts to revive the explanatory and prognostic potential of the archaic category of elements in modern philosophy and science. The possibility of the appearance of new primary elements appears as a result of the interaction and transformation of the basic elements. Imagination is the cognitive
ability that operates according to the laws of potentiation of the elements. The results can be used as a heuristic methodology in those areas of scientific knowledge and philosophy that are relevant to spontaneous processes in nature, society and in the
anthropological dimension.

In this article the semantic evolution of the modal verb -sóból- in Luganda is examined through the analysis of a diachronic corpus spanning the last 120 years. It is shown that the usage frequency of this verb increased exponentially between the early 20th century and the present, and that its use as a lexical verb has dramatically decreased during the same time span. The corpus data furthermore substantiate that its modal uses have been extended from the exclusive expression of dynamic possibility until the 1960s to deontic possibility. Methodologically, this is the first full-scale article within the young field of Bantu corpus linguistics in which a corpus-driven study is performed on a diachronic corpus. The approach is not only shown to be feasible, but the encouraging results will hopefully entice colleagues working on the Bantu languages to undertake the building and analysis of such diachronic corpora for linguistic purposes.