President Putin

Hat die derzeitige politische Ordnung in Russland mittel- und langfristig Bestand? Die fundamentale Herausforderung der Fortexistenz des heutigen kleptokratischen Regimes Russlands in den kommenden Jahren wird das Zusammenfallen zweier systemunterwandernder Tendenzen – ökonomischer Stagnation und politischer Transition – sein. Deren kombinierter Effekt wird selbst kluge Kremlführung nicht ohne weiteres neutralisieren können. Es wird daher früher oder später wieder zu einem System- und nicht nur Führungswechsel in Russland kommen, worauf der Westen sich bereits heute einstellen sollte.

In political science an accent on individuals (political leaders) in researching politics is neither popular nor advocated one. In authoritarian countries like Russia or China, however, political leaders and their personalities are a crucial factor in trying to understand the political processes there. Both Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China have dominated their respective political systems. This, combined with good state of Russia-China relations makes it an interesting case study of the influence of political leaders on authoritarian countries. Both Putin and Xi are new type of leaders: they both follow the main ideas of political realism (though with "national differences") and they share a 19 th century outlook on the global affairs ("concert of powers") yet they use contemporary means to fulfil these interests. Their personal understanding provides a predictability and stability: both Putin and Xi function in accordance with balance of power and respect for zones of influence concepts. That is why differences in other spheres, like Rus-sia's and China's approaches to the USA do not influence the general good mood of Sino-Russian relationship.

Cтоит ли классифицировать природу «системы Путина», ввиду ее недавней радикализации, как современное проявление фашизма, как это недавно сделали некоторые — в том числе и русские — обозреватели? У этих явно антипутинских комментаторов — напр., А. Мотыль, В. Иноземцев, М. Снеговая и др. — прослеживается своего рода утилитарное отношение и избирательный подход к набору свойств исторического фашизма для как можно более эффектного разоблачения бесспорно террористического, агрессивного и репрессивного характера сегодняшнего российского режима. Типичной ценой применения термина «фашистский» к путинскому режиму в результате этого «сбора вишни» является, однако, чрезмерно широкая дефиниция общего понятия «фашизм». Такого рода инклюзивные определения сути фашизма, как правило, приводят к имплицитному утверждению о существовании десятков независимых «фашистских» режимов в истории человечества — а не только в Германии Гитлера, Италии Муссолини, России Путина. Еще одним последствием такой преднамеренной инфляции этого ключевого исторического понятия является открытие вопроса о том, как же тогда обозначить комбинацию тех характеристик итальянской ПНФ, немецкой НСДАП, румынской «Железной гвардии», венгерской Партии скрещенных стрел, испанской Фаланги и др., которую в сравнительном обществоведении иногда называют «фашистским минимумом» или «ядром».

This time I decided
to draw attention to a
significant role (which was a surprise for many
experts) of Chechen terrorists in a battle of
Islamic state that has become a main threat to
the West. Based on this role, it is not only
possible, but vital to examine the potential li
nks
between the Islamic state and Russian secret
services.

Gli economisti " liberals " sottolineano con forza le positive tendenze congiunturali dell'economia russa: si stanno riducendo i capitali in libera uscita, lo slancio verso l'alto del prezzo del petrolio, sommato ad un tasso di cambio del rublo stabile e piuttosto basso verso il dollaro, ha funzionato da ricostituente per la fragile struttura economica. Dopo il crack finanziario del 1998, l'economia russa ha ripreso a camminare: l'inflazione è diminuita, il bilancio statale si è rinvigorito, il Pil è cresciuto sino al 7,3% nel 2003. Tuttavia, gli eccezionali tassi di crescita del Pil, negli ultimi cinque anni, sono dovuti essenzialmente all'esportazione del greggio. Questa tendenza, infatti, non ha cancellato i molteplici problemi di natura strutturale, che restano aperti e senza risposta. Già a partire da quest'anno si prevede una flessione del Pil intorno al 6,5%. " La crescita della produzione petrolifera (che ha toccato i 9 milioni di barili al giorno) e il boom del prezzo del greggio hanno ulteriormente illustrato la dipendenza dell'economia russa dal settore energetico, che da solo vale il 25% del Pil pur impiegando l'1% della popolazione. Una vulnerabilità strutturale, dalle conseguenze potenzialmente devastanti se la curva dei prezzi petroliferi dovesse picchiare verso il basso. E soprattutto se dall'apparato produttivo russo non scaturiranno solide alternative al puro export di idrocarburi " 1. Di fatto, l'economia russa si caratterizza ancora per i suoi supermonopoli: essa dipende soltanto da potenti gruppi oligarchici che si sono impadroniti indebitamente delle materie prime (petrolio, gas, oro, diamanti, etc.) e dei prodotti del complesso militare-industriale del paese da destinare ai mercati esteri. E' dominata da aspetti primitivi e corporativi: per non essere strangolate da tagli selvaggi della spesa centrale, le imprese hanno costituito una rete di scambi in natura. La demonetizzazione ha sviluppato un numero crescente di relazioni economiche che avvengono al di fuori della moneta. Accanto al fenomeno spontaneo del ritorno a forme di economia naturale (l'uso del proprio appezzamento privato di terra come forma di sostentamento), va segnalata anche la politica del governo delle consegne obbligatorie in natura, il cui effetto è stato la crescita della differenziazione delle logiche economiche non solo tra i vari settori produttivi, ma anche tra le diverse Regioni. Ci sono, inoltre, Regioni che battono una propria moneta per non dipendere dal rublo. Altre che sono giunte ad istituire un proprio controllo dei prezzi e proprie dogane per proteggere il loro ambito territoriale. Con il risultato che si è formata un'economia parallela, fonte di infinite attività illegali, mafiose e criminali. Siamo, infine, in presenza di un'economia dai tratti semicoloniali: interi settori dei beni di consumo, ivi compresi gran parte dei prodotti dell'agricoltura e della zootecnia, sono dipendenti dall'importazione dall'estero. La maggior parte delle terre appartiene a fattorie collettive (dove si concentra ancora la maggior parte dei lavoratori agricoli), che sono ora tutte a regime privato e che hanno adottato dei modelli di proprietà molto differenti: dalla cooperativa alla società per azioni, passando in certi casi per l'impresa mista, tramite un accordo con un investitore esterno al mondo agricolo. Il problema grave rimane, tuttavia, quello della gestione di queste fattorie, prive d'incentivi e di mezzi per intraprendere una trasformazione dei loro modelli di funzionamento e di produzione. Per concludere, la Russia postsovietica è stata costretta, per recuperare i crediti contratti con le altre Repubbliche ex-sovietiche, a scambiare tali crediti con la partecipazione nelle imprese dei paesi della Csi e a vendere la sua energia al di sotto dei prezzi mondiali, creando vuoti paurosi nelle sue casse. La questione, posta dai leaders liberali, delle trasformazioni strutturali per uscire dai guasti di cui soffre, tuttora, l'economia è ricondotta al solo completamento del processo di privatizzazione con la creazione di un sistema bancario esteso e affidabile e con lo sviluppo delle infrastrutture necessarie per sostenere e regolare il libero mercato. Altre misure sarebbero quelle che puntano a sostituire la pletora di " boiardi " e oligarchi con una classe media imprenditoriale. In tal senso va interpretata l'introduzione di una riforma fiscale che dovrebbe alleggerire la pressione e agevolare la raccolta dei tributi da parte dello Stato e di una sola aliquota fiscale per tutti i contribuenti (13%) indipendentemente dal reddito percepito. E', inoltre, in cantiere una proposta per ridurre le pesanti imposte che gravano sui profitti delle imprese e attenuare l'obbligo di convertibilità delle somme in valuta derivanti da operazioni di esportazione. L'obiettivo è quello di far emergere alla luce del sole il vasto arcipelago delle attività economiche sommerse. Il fenomeno dell'evasione fiscale riguarda soprattutto la classe media (grandi burocrati, top managers) e tutti gli occupati dell'economia diffusa (settore delle piccole e medie imprese) che ricevono stipendi e salari informali. In sostanza, le ricette proposte per uscire dall'impasse degli anni '90 paiono concentrarsi su un liberismo economico provvisto di meccanismi normativi di controllo e regolazione e sulla rivitalizzazione della società, favorendo la nascita di piccoli e medi proprietari. La vera sfida, afferma la Banca mondiale, è costruire fonti di reddito alternative e posti di lavoro, sostenendo lo sviluppo regionale e incentivando l'afflusso di credito alle piccole e medie imprese. In realtà, non c'è all'orizzonte alcuna virata economica. La Russia è ancora ostaggio di un'economia fondata esclusivamente sugli alti prezzi del combustibile e sulla regolare estrazione delle materie prime. E finché i prezzi restano alti e l'estrazione procede regolarmente, persino i peggiori amministratori riescono a gestire bene i loro affari: nel paese

The Russian Federation is currently and will remain, for the foreseeable future, the country that possesses the second largest number of nuclear warheads. This highly armed state has, like the Soviet Union before it and the US today, an overkill capacity. As their communist predecessors in the Kremlin, the political leaders of post-Soviet Russia command enough weapons of mass destruction to destroy humankind several times. Russia's current rulers, moreover, act within a political system in which parliamentary control of the armed forces, checks and balances between branches of power, civil society monitoring of officials, or investigative journalism on top politicians are either absent or underdeveloped. Russia's political system represents a form of electoral authoritarianism in which power holders are only dependent on the integrity of their command chain, and of their public support constantly regenerated by the government's information policies.

Review article on the books:
Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism. By Charles Clover. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016.
The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia. By Mark Bassin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.
Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship. Edited by Marlene Laruelle. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015.
Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir. By Anton Shekhovtsov. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017.

The EU should revert back to its pre-Minsk approach to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. The main raft of sanctions were introduced before both of the Minsk Agreements were negotiated. Back then, the lifting of sanctions had been linked to a full restoration of, at least, mainland Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Only later was the prolongation of the sanctions tied to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements – including those parts that concern Ukrainian domestic affairs.

n this case I decided to
examine not the current
Russian government
structure
, the interrelation of various clans and
th
eir influence to processes in Russia and
worldwide, but rather focus on why Russia can
now be reasonably called a
country that
sponsors terrorism
2
.
I will also discuss the very
suspicious links between the current regime and
international terrorism, and the historical role of
Soviet Union’s KGB (the foundation of Putin’s
regime) in developing an international terrorism
network.

This short article, drawn in part from my forthcoming book Mother of the Lamb, contrast the Virgin of the Passion icon with depictions of Mary sponsoring war in Vladimir Putin's Cathedral of the Armed Forces.  For the article with links, see  https://publicorthodoxy.org/2022/03/25/woman-of-peace-temple-of-war/

This essay,
so
to speak, is about the wolves disguised as
sheep or the influence of Yevgeny Primakov’s
(who is a former Russian Prime Minister, the
head of Foreign Intelligence and Minister of
foreign affairs) clan to Kremlin's foreign policy
in general, and particularl
y the current "Putin's
peace plan” in Ukraine.

Russia has not only violated numerous treaties, especially with Ukraine. It has also devalued important networks and organizations it had been integrating or cooperating with for years, if not decades. While most of these international institutional links are formally still in place, it is unlikely that Russia will become a fully functioning part of them anytime soon. A good-case scenario would be that the Donbas conflict becomes “frozen” and that the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk “republics” develop into more or less peaceful Russian protectorates resembling Transdniester, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia – something the West could, perhaps, live with. However, the issue of Crimea’s annexation will remain open and may persist as a matter of contention for decades. While Western states and international organizations have been willing to put up with Russia’s territorial diversions in Moldova and Georgia, they cannot accept an official territorial seizure by military force.

This article examines the openly adversarial neoconservative foundation under George Bush to the supposedly more ‘engaged’ diplomatic interaction under Barack Obama. What will be exposed is a fairly uninspired and non-innovative American policy that not only fails to consider Russian initiatives from Russia’s own national security perspectives, but aims to contain it within a continued Cold War box that not only sours opportunities for collaboration but guarantees the absence of partnership in areas of global security. This piece examines the consequences of imagining Russia only as nemesis.

Angela Merkel war bei ihrem Amtsantritt 2005 wie kaum eine andere westeuropäische Politikerin auf die Herausforderungen an der EU-Ostgrenze vorbereitet. Allerdings hatte Berlin mit seiner Einladung Putins in den Bundestag 2001, der Initiierung der Nord-Stream-Projekte 2005 und seiner Behandlung Georgiens 2008 früh falsche Signale an die neoimperiale Führung in Moskau gesendet. Folgenreiche Fehlentscheidungen vor und nach Merkels Machtantritt brachten die deutsche Ostpolitik auf einen falschen Pfad. 2014 kam es lediglich zu einer Teilkorrektur des von Gerhard Schröder gesetzten Russlandkurses. Heute dürften sich viele Politiker, Diplomaten und Experten in Moskau fragen, was seit der Krim-Annexion in die Deutschen gefahren ist: Waren russische Sonderrechte im postsowjetischen Raum nicht ein von Berlin akzeptiertes ungeschriebenes Gesetz osteuropäischer Geopolitik nach dem Kalten Krieg? 

In Russia, civil society engagement with the petroleum sector is surprisingly rich and varied for a country that is ranked low on most democracy-related indicators. This chapter finds that there is a lively and varied public debate, with business associations, research institutes, independent experts, indigenous organizations and the few surviving independent media actively and often competently analysing and commenting on a broad range of issues related to the oil and gas sector. Russians were early users of social media, which occasionally also function as a platform for discussion of petroleum policy issues. However, the real impact of civil society on decision-making and policy formulation in the petroleum sector is not as great as the diversity of actors and discussion might imply. One key reason is the tight government control over mainstream media outlets. The situation for free speech and civil society worsened steadily from around 2004 to 2016. As in neighbouring Kazakhstan, the Russian population puts a high premium on stability over freedom. While a central concern in this book is whether the media and civil society have any influence on the petroleum sector, in Russia the paradoxical situation is that the relationship is often reversed: the gas company Gazprom, rather than another organizational vehicle, is used by the government to control key mass media; and the oil company Yukos played a central role in promoting civil society until its main owner Mikhail Khodorkovskiy was arrested and the company was carved up.

Researching
the
role,
actions
and
interests
of
various
most
powerful
officials
of
the
Russian
government
can
provide
a
gilmse
into
something
more
than
just
the
state’s
decision
-
making
mechanism.
It also allows to at least make assumptions
about how a
ggression against Ukraine was
initiated, why it is so “unusual”, and why the
Kremlin's actions often seem illogical at first
glance

In
the
first
article
about
Dmitry
Rogozin’s
clan
,
I discussed how this clan developed and gained
strength. However, in the context of aggression
against
Ukraine
it is crucial to focus attention
not just on Rogozin and his clan’s ideology or
rhetoric.
There is plenty of publicly
-
available
information that allows one to make an
assumption that this particular clan of Russian
government was the main axis of executors and
visionaries behind the aggression towards
Ukraine.

There are always unrealistic expectations about either or both of two assumptions: the effectiveness of the sanctions; and/or how many nations are likely to participate (freely or under diplomatic compulsion). Unfortunately, Hartwell and Umland fail on both counts. Yes, Moscow certainly and heavily relies on export revenue from oil and natural gas. But recipient countries also need the energy. By simply advocating a blanket embargo of Russian exports, the suggestion harms a far greater part of the world than the intended target.

In Russia and in the West, when explaining the
differences between Yevtushenkov and
Khodorkovski, it is usually stated that Sistema’s
sharehold
er was never “into politics”, and the
only politician who was supported by this giant
business structure was
Yuri Luzhkov
, the former
mayor of Moscow who was pushed away from
political games a while ago.
Yet it is only a partial truth. When talking about
Y
evtushenkov, his relationship with Primakov is
somehow overlooked. By the way, at the time
when Yevtushenkov openly supported Luzhkov,
Primakov’s clan was actually called
the
Primakov
-
Luzhkov clan
.

Even if the Kremlin ultimately decides against a major war in Ukraine, the next few months are likely to remain tense. Ukraine will—so it looks at present—in any case, emerge from the current escalation with more or less heavy losses. The EU will presumably, as before, rearm rhetorically, but remain passive in its foreign economic policy practice as long as there is no additional Russian mass killing of EU citizens. It will, therefore, largely depend on the United States and the United Kingdom how far Putin will go in Ukraine.

The ongoing (in Russia) and forthcoming (in Ukraine) changes in leadership and direction of both countries may result in, among others, new chances for an end to, or for an escalation of, the war between Russia-led irregular separatists and Russian covert regular troops, on the one side, and Ukrainian governmental forces as well as some paramilitary units, in the Eastern parts of the Ukrainian Donets Basin, on the other.

On the birthday of Peter the Great, June 9, V.V. Putin spoke to young entrepreneurs, engineers and scientists with an analogy between modernity and the reign of the first Russian emperor. This is not the first time that the President of the Russian Federation uses history for political messages, resorting to the techniques and methods of historical politics. What is hidden behind this, in what key they were expressed, and how historical analogies relate to historical reality, all these questions are the subject of clarification in this article.

Blamaža njemačke pseudo-socijaldemokratske istočne politike u Alepu bi trebalo da bude povod za njemačku diskusiju o posljedicama stremljenja ka zaradi u trgovini sa Rusijom, ali i o istorijsko-političkim propustima prema narodima Istočne Evrope kao i pogrešnim procjenama Putinovog režima na početku tzv. „Ukrajinske krize“

Wie konnte es passieren, dass bedeutende Teile des deutschen Bildungsbürgertums über Monate den proeuropäischen Aufstand eines der großen Opfervölker von Deutschlands “Russlandfeldzug” 1941-1944 mit dutzenden Halbwahrheiten, Verdrehungen und Unterstellungen entwürdigten? Wo bleibt die deutsche Fähigkeit zur Kritik, Ausgewogenheit und Balance, wenn es nicht um die Brandmarkung arroganter Amerikaner, nationsversessener Ukrainer oder blinder Eurokraten, sondern um Reue für eigene Aberrationen geht? Ist der demonstrativen „Unparteilichkeit“, welche große Teile der deutschen Öffentlichkeit und Elite 2014-2015 bei der Debatte um die „Ukrainekrise“ in dutzenden Talkshows, Reportagen, Kommentaren, offenen Briefen, Podiumsdiskussionen und Satiren zelebrierte, heute nichts mehr hinzuzufügen?

The enormous financial means that West Germany is still transferring to East Germany, 30 years after re-unification, suggest that Moscow’s grab of Crimea in 2014 has been an ill-calculated adventure. Sustaining over a long period of time the highly-subsidised economy of the annexed peninsula will be beyond the capacities of a more and more crisis-ridden Russian state. With deep historical connections between Russians and Crimea lacking, they will be less and less ready to sacrifice scarce financial resources to the remote peninsula during a time when Russia’s own population is suffering economically.

The continuing international inattention for the Glazyev Tapes was and is surprising. If they are indeed authentic, the Glazyev Tapes should modify our understanding of the origins and nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The most important aspect of the Glazyev Tapes is arguably not their contents. What is remarkable about these conversations is the time of their recording in February-March 2014, i.e. several weeks before the post-Euromaidan civil conflict in eastern Ukraine turned into a pseudo-civil war in the Donbass.

The “Ukraine Crisis” will have various repercussions for international relations beyond Eastern Europe. The crisis, in connection with the devaluation of Ukraine’s 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, is undermining worldwide efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is having an increasingly salient negative impact on Russia’s economy and position in the world, and will thus inflict lasting damage on an important actor in international affairs. The “Ukraine Crisis” is preventing the further European integration of Russia, and thus the creation of a Greater or Wider Europe, as well as a common trade and security area from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The currently popular idea that Moscow would be able to replace its partnership with the West by a Sino-Russian alliance is unsustainable. In view of Russia’s declining economic weight and China’s growing geoeconomic might, a mutually satisfactory, close partnership between Russia and China is unlikely. Russia’s economic recession and political isolation weakens it in its relationships not only with the West, but also with Asia. Moscow’s “turn to the East” has little prospects for success.

Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin, Çin’in 2. Dünya Savaşı sırasında Japonya’ya karşı elde ettiği zaferin 70. yıldönümü için Pekin’de yapılan kutlama törene katılmak için 2-3 Eylül 2015 tarihlerinde Çin’e iki günlük resmi ziyarette bulunmuştur. Bu ziyaret Dünya kamuoyu tarafından da merakla izlenmiştir. Çünkü Putin’in Çin ziyareti sırasında iki ülke arasında 30’a yakın ikili anlaşma imzalanmıştır. Rusya liderinin Çin’e ziyareti uluslararası ve bölgesel istikrar ile güvenliğin korunması ve güçlendirilmesi için de dünya kamuoyunda ilgi çekmiştir.  Bu ziyarette küresel ve bölgesel sorunlara etkili çözümler aranacağı beklentisi olmuştur.
Putin, Pekin’e hareket etmeden önce Xinhua ve Tass haber ajanslarına yaptığı açıklamalarda Batılı devletlerin Rusya’ya uyguladığı yaptırımların Moskova ve Pekin'i birbirine yakınlaştırdığını, Çin'in Rusya'nın kilit ortağı olduğuna vurgu yapmıştır. Putin, karşılıklı güvene dayalı Moskova-Pekin ilişkilerinin günümüzde tarihin en yüksek seviyesinde olduğunu açıklamıştır.
Putin, Rus-Çin ortaklığının genişletilmesinin her iki ülkenin de çıkarlarına cevap verdiğini belirterek iki ülkeyi tarihin de birbirine bağladığına dikkat çekmiştir. Rusya ve Çin’in İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda sadece iki müttefik değil, saldırganların ana hedefi olan iki ülke olduğunu,  bu iki ülkenin Nazizm ve Japon militarizmiyle mücadelede ortaklık yaptıklarını dile getirmiştir. Rusya ve Çin’in bu korkunç savaşta yalnızca ayakta kalmayıp zafer de kazandıklarını ve dünyaya barış getirdiklerini ifade etmiştir.
Putin konuşmasında isim vermeden ABD'yi eleştirerek dünyadaki sistematik sorunların sebeplerinden birinin bazı ülkelerin dünya işlerinde, her ne pahasına olursa olsun üstünlüğünü koruma çabası olduğunu söylemiştir. Konuşmasını “kendi ülkelerinde demokrasi, hukukun üstünlüğü ve insan haklarından bahsedenler uluslararası arenada devletlerin eşitliği ilkesini unutuyorlar."  sözleriyle sürdürmüştür. ABD ve Batı’nın tavırlarının Rus-Çin işbirliğine özel bir anlam da kazandırdığını belirten Putin, böyle koşullarda Rusya-Çin işbirliğinin ulusal ve bölgesel istikrar ve güvenliğin güçlendirilmesi bakımından özel bir önem kazandığını vurgulamıştır. Putin, dünyada artan gerginliğin sebeplerinin belirli ülkelerin uzlaşmaya varmak istememesinden kaynaklandığını belirterek uluslararası durumun gittikçe daha öngörülemez bir hâl aldığını, yeni çok kutuplu bir dünya modelinin oluşum sürecinde bölgesel ve küresel istikrarsızlıkların eşlik ettiğini, bu gerginliğin ana sebebinin de uzlaşma arayışlarının yokluğu olarak açıklamıştır.

Когда развалится "путинская система", появится новый шанс на российскую демократизацию. Запад уже сегодня может способствовать отказу постпутинской России от экспансионизма, предложив россиянам включение будущей неимпериалистической РФ в евро-атлантическую систему экономического сотрудничества и военной безопасности.

There are reasons to believe that we may sooner or later again be offered a chance to draw Russia into the western community of states, and that we should already now prepare for such an optimistic turn of events. A positive agenda for a post-Putinist Russia could itself become a factor of its realisation, and get us away from permanent repetition of doomsday scenarios. For a prophecy to become self-fulfilling, it needs to be stated first. A vision of how a future non-imperialist and democratic Russia could gradually be integrated into the western community of states could become an instrument for Russian democrats, European diplomats, western politicians and international civil society in their furthering of such a scenario.

Diese Erklärung des Willy -Brandt-Kreises und der Brief der 60 Prominenten vom Dezember 2014 unterwandern mit ihren Scheinargumenten und impraktikablen Forderungen die bisherige, mit viel Aufwand gezimmerte Einheitsfront der westlichen Zentrumsparteien, Mainstream-Eliten und Leitmedien gegenüber Moskau. Sie rufen zur Wiederaufnahme einer Beschwichtigungspolitik auf, welche die EU bereits über Jahre hinweg bezüglich der bis dato anhaltenden illegalen russischen Truppenpräsenzen in Transnistrien, Abchasien und Südossetien erfolglos anzuwenden versucht hat. Sie lassen den Westen gegenüber dem Kreml als uneins beziehungsweise schwankend erscheinen. Man fragt sich unwillkürlich, ob der prowestliche Willy Brandt solch einen Brief unterschrieben hätte.