Russia and the West

Executive Summary
Western scholars and politicians struggle
to understand the elements of Russia’s
“hybrid warfare” and how to counter it.
Means for “soft,” non-military Russian influence
in the post-Soviet sphere and the European Union
includes export media such as the television
broadcaster RT and the media platform
Sputnik, the targeted expansion of informal financial networks,
and funding and support for left- and right-wing
populist political parties and organizations. The
chief of the Russian General Staff described new
rules of 21st century warfare in a 2013 speech,
where political goals are to be obtained through
the “widespread use of disinformation... deployed
in connection with the protest potential of the
population.” The Russian government claims it is
merely copying the instruments and techniques that
the West itself employs, and deems legitimate, to
promote democracy in Russia and the post-Soviet
states. It has also cracked down against foreign
influence and dissent in Russia through restricting
the work of Western NGOs and independent
media. This information warfare is an approach
born out of weakness that provides more flexibility
against a challenger with much greater economic
and technological resources.
The possibilities for directly influencing
developments in Russia from outside are limited.
Europeans, on the other hand, are vulnerable
to Russian influence with their open societies,
and Russian efforts can help fuel self-doubt in
increasingly fragile and fragmented Western
societies. The EU can protect itself by reinforcing
its own soft power and improving governance
within Europe, standing firm on sanctions,
improving its knowledge base on Russia and
the other post-Soviet states, and taking steps to
improve pluralism in the Russian-language media
space. It should also come up with a serious
offer for its eastern neighbors including an EU
membership prospect. If reform efforts succeed
in Ukraine, the impact could spread to Russia
and other post-Soviet states. Moscow encourages
destabilization, corruption, and weak states in order
to maintain relationships of dependency. The EU
has something much more attractive than that to
offer the societies of neighboring countries and
should make greater use of its strategic advantage.

The criticism of the concept of modernity in the light of the difference between Russia and the West
L’approche critique que nous avons choisie de pratiquer ici pour aborder le concept de modernité et pour dégager les liens qu’il entretient avec une problématique de multiculturalisme est tout d’abord guidée par le souci de faire surgir de l’analyse un cadre de dialogue devant conduire à mettre en valeur la diversité possible des points de vue sur une même réalité ainsi que la variabilité d’un phénomène suivant les aires culturelles où il se manifeste.
Dans une telle perspective, la critique n’est pas envisagée en tant qu’elle porterait sur le contenu de la modernité ou sur les différents courants qui la traversent. La critique à laquelle nous avons recours est celle qui doit permettre de cerner le phénomène de la modernité dans son ensemble, d’en désigner les limites, et donc de déterminer les liens qu’il entretient avec ce qui lui est extérieur. Car, la modernité étant définie comme la volonté de rejeter l’ancien, de rompre avec la tradition, ce qu’il serait important de se demander dans une perspective de dialogue des cultures et des civilisations pourrait se résumer de la façon suivante : la modernité, coupée de toute tradition serait-elle par là-même le phénomène civilisationnel le plus apte à s’étendre à l’ensemble des cultures, et en ce sens, prédisposerait-elle l’humanité à une perspective de mondialisation ? Ou bien, dans la perspective de son expansion mondiale, serait-elle destinée à condamner les hommes de toutes les cultures aux mêmes errances que celles qui ont assailli les hommes de l’aire culturelle où elle est initialement apparue? Ou bien enfin : la modernité soumise à un phénomène de diversification serait-elle plutôt, dans un tel contexte, condamnée à révéler ses propres limites, et à entrer au contraire dans un processus de désagrégation de ses propres principes ?

The end of the Soviet era gave birth to various conflicts throughout the world. Each of these conflicts has its own peculiarities, but also shares certain similarities. The interpretation of each conflict in the post-Soviet space – as well as throughout the history of mankind – has always been dependent on the particular political viewpoints and vectors of various belligerent, or non-belligerent, parties. The case of Kosovo and that of the Georgian breakaway regions, also have their similarities and differences, also rooted in the political interests of each belligerent party. These conflicts, as well as most post-Soviet era conflicts, are characterised by third party involvement derived from the Cold War period, when the world was divided into the two political camps of East and West.

Seemingly sensible proposals to Kyiv to partially satisfy Moscow’s demands in Eastern Ukraine are counterproductive. They ignore the record of compromising with Russian revanchism, and underestimate the unexplored potential of serious sanctions. They also do not take into account the political mood that has emerged in Ukraine since the start of the war in 2014.

Статья анализирует предпосылки т.н. "поворота России на Восток". Авторы приходят к выводу, что "поворот" имеет закономерный характер и не может рассматриваться исключительно как реакция на посткрымский кризис или какие-либо иные одиночные события. При этом Россия не столько поворачивает, сколько её, как лодку в бурном течении, «разворачивает» на Восток в результате совпадения различных факторов, истоки которых берут своё начало в глобальных геополитических сдвигах и особенностях внутриполитического развития.

Great Schism of 1054 was primary a local event of a moderate impact on multi-levelled ties within the world of European Christianity. After some time the bias against „Latins” had nevertheless outweighed the reasons of real politics and practices of everyday communication. Some argue that the change in the perception of the West was caused by the reorientation of the Western religious policy after the IV Crusade. The study of the perception of the Poles and their religion by Rus’ bookmen shows however that the dynamics of inter-confessional relationship in the Eastern Europe was more complicated. The sources give us examples of the dislike against „Latin” neighbours in the 12th century and the religious tolerance in the 13th century as well. It is true that the perception of neighbours was largely determined by the politics, but what we need is a more differentiated approach based on a more detailed view of the relationship between two peoples.

Angesichts seiner zunehmenden ökonomischen Kalamitäten und sinkenden Popularität im Westen wünscht man Russland Erfolg beim Entwickeln alternativer internationaler Partnerschaften. Moskau muss einen außenpolitischen Weg finden, der weitere internationale Abschottung verhindert sowie substantielle ausländische Handelsvolumen und Direktinvestitionen sichert. Doch ist Peking ein problematischer Kandidat für einen engen und nachhaltigen Bund mit Moskau. China könnte als dominierender Verbündeter eines ökonomisch schwächelnden Russlands eine zu große Herausforderung für die Moskauer Führung werden. Weder kulturell noch wirtschaftlich kann China den Westen als Russlands wichtigsten Partner adäquat ersetzen. Vielmehr sind die aus diversen Inkompatibilitäten erwachsenden Risiken für eine langfristige enge Zusammenarbeit der beiden großen Länder mindestens ebenso gewichtig, wie deren ebenfalls nicht zu unterschätzenden Chancen.

This paper explores the ambiguous nature of two principles of international law – self-determination and territorial integrity – illustrating the controversial nuances of international law on a political level, nuances with which the Crimean crisis has been described. Multiple paradigms will be applied to interpret the juristic status of the quoted principles. The foundation of this research is the collision between Russia and the West over the legal interpretation of these two principles throughout history and particularly in the case of Crimea. From the very beginning, the legal interpretation of the situation in Crimea was that Russia's legal rhetoric was groundless and that her legal justification for the secession of Crimea was simply not plausible, and therefore could not be linked to either legal or moral theories. After exposing the fragility of these principles in international law, the paper then concludes by proposing an alternative approach that utilizes a different philosophical logic, thus further illustrating the hidden nature of such contradictions in politics.

Предмет овог рада јесте расвјетљавање настанка и развоја идеје Православне цивилизације, исказивањем њене унутрашње логике, и њене историјске сукобљености са такозваном Западном цивилизацијом. Аутор указује на узроке овог сукоба, полиитичко-теолошки концепт усаглашавања центара свјетовних и духовних центара власти ван којег се овај сукоб не да правилно схватити. Аутор потом указује на историјску утемељеност овог сукоба и све оне његове манифестације које су додатно допринијеле његовом утемељивању, као и на његов допринос у стварању идеје о Трећем Риму, и начин на који се та идеја данас исказује и користи у руском друштву и држави као фактор друштвене кохезије и међународне меке моћи.

Anti-Americanism has become a, if not the major feature of Russian foreign affairs journalism, and incorporates extreme ideas provided by Dugin and other anti-Western theorists. (A brief originally commissioned by "Oxford Analytica") https://www.unian.info/world/6080-the-rise-of-integral-antiamericanism-in-russian-mass-media-and-intellectual-life.html

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze and highlight the different nature of Kosovo and Abkhazian and Tskhinvali region conflicts. Thus, to underline the falseness of the Russian political argument about the "similarities" of these conflicts. To achieve this goal, I will try to give the analysis of this topic based on Georgian, Russian and English language scholarly material and its conclusions, which is divided in seven basic "points of difference" between these conflicts from 1990’s up to now.

Original published at: http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2016/05/12/ce7bb0fb/When%20Do%20Reconciliation%20and%20Cooperation%20Matter%20-%20Polish-German%20lessons%20for%20the%20West%20and%20Russia%20-%20Bartosz%20Rydlinski.pdf

The article is concerned with the vision of the Western Church by Russian intellectuals of the 11th–12th centuries as far as it can be studied on the basis of the “anti-Latin” sermons produced by Russian orthodox clergy of the time. These sermons are often regarded as badly composed and non-original. However, the systematic comparison of such texts with their most probable  prototypes demonstrates that Russian intellectuals were competent enough to add their own observations and estimations to the available information about the West leaning. Our knowledge of political and cultural relations between Rus’ and western Europe extends remarkably when we establish by whom and when the noted amplifications were made.

Sorry for the typo in the title of Kuno of Beichlingen in the note 53.

If the West would not trade with Russia as much as it still does, the Kremlin would not have the financial means to conduct its “hybrid” operations, i.e. military interventions, propaganda campaigns, political manipulations, etc., in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. Without the large raw material and especially oil exports to the West, the Russian government would be busy fulfilling, with the remaining means, its basic functions as a public administrator and social welfare provider.

While Navalny is for many Europeans not an ideal alternative to Putin, he has become a significant figure with regards to Europe’s political future. Navalny’s rise over the last few months has severely disrupted Putin’s system of rule. This suggests that the re-emergence of genuine political pluralism in Russia may now be possible.

The paper discusses how popular geopolitics employs gendered rhetoric to represents Russia – the West relations. The author points out that the demand for restoration of the traditional masculinity on the political Olympus is a noticeable trait of today’s geopolitical rhetoric not only in Russia but also in other parts of the world, including the USA and the EU. Regardless the real differences between gender orders in Russia and the Western societies, the popular geopolitics sees the current Russian – Western confrontation, or the “Clash of civilizations”, as a “Clash of masculinities”.

Критический подход, избранный нами для рассмотрения понятия Модерна и современности (modernité, Modernität) и выявления связей, существующих между этим концептом и проблематикой мультикультурализма, обоснован необходимостью диалога, который призван обеспечить, во-первых, учет всего разнообразия возможных точек зрения на одну и ту же реальность, во-вторых, учет вариативности рассматриваемого феномена в рамках тех культурологических направлений, где он проявляется.
В наши задачи не входит критический анализ содержания концепта Модерна и его разнообразных течений. Критика, к которой мы прибегаем, позволяет определить феномен Модерна и современности в его целостности, обозначить его границы и, таким образом, выявить его связи с внешними ему областями. Поскольку «Модерн» определяется как желание отказаться от «старого» и порвать с традициями, нам представляется важным в рамках диалога культур и цивилизаций попытаться ответить на вопрос: является ли Модерн, отрезанный от традиций, феноменом цивилизации, способным распространиться на всю совокупность цивилизаций и, таким образом, обеспечить движение человечества к глобализации? Или в перспективе своей мировой экспансии он обрекает людей разных культур на те же ошибки и заблуждения, которым подверглись люди в эпоху, когда это явление возникло? Или Модерн, рассматриваемый с позиций феномена диверсификации, призван выявить свои собственные границы и приблизиться к процессу разрушения своих собственных принципов?

Арктика долгое время находилась вне системы мирополитических процессов, вследствие своей географической удаленности и климатической труднодоступности. Начало современного этапа международного сотрудничества в Арктике было положено в конце 1980-х гг. В условиях глобальных климатических изменений и появившихся прогнозов об освобождении Арктики ото льда в летний период к 2030-м годам к региону было обращено пристальное внимание со стороны практически всего мирового сообщества: интерес к региону стали проявлять не только восемь арктических стран, но и неарктические страны Европы и Азии, различные международные организации и структуры (Европейский союз, НАТО и т.д.). Данный факт кардинально изменил систему арктического сотрудничества, которое вышло на новый уровень развития. Интерес к богатым залежам природных ресурсов Арктики, которые возможно станут доступны благодаря таянию арктических льдов, ее геополитическому и геостратегическому потенциалу способствует полному включению некогда малоинтересного для мирового сообщества и труднодоступного региона в систему современных мирополитических связей. Как следствие этого на международное сотрудничество в Арктике стали оказывать влияние внешние факторы и мир-системные кризисные явления.

If the West wants to solve the so-called “Ukrainian Crisis,” it will have to increase the stakes for the Kremlin’s mingling in Eastern Ukraine. Should the West, instead, continue with its current timid policies, the Ukrainian crisis could gradually become reminiscent of the Yugoslav one of the 1990s. Ukraine’s 1994 decision to abandon the world’s third largest nuclear weapons arsenal could be seen as one of the most naïve geopolitical decision in recent history.

A book of twenty studies tells about the greatest Christian thinkers of Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries. We have here discussions with Europe and Catholicism, Russian disputes with Poland, Ukraine and Jews. Among the heroes we see, among others Peter Chaadaev, Wladimir Soloveyv, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Nikolay Berdayev, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The author also writes about John Paul II and his passionate adventure with Orthodoxy and Russian thought.

Unlike Russia's exclusion from the SWIFT bank payment system, an EU oil embargo would involve a physical obstacle the Kremlin couldn't easily circumvent. While Russia may have a Plan B in case its banks can no longer use SWIFT, the country cannot redirect its oil trade routes overnight because it relies largely on pipelines to the West. In addition, the EU doesn't depend on Russian oil to the degree many assume. Being fungible, Russian crude could be replaced with oil delivered via tankers and other means from elsewhere. To be sure, Russia could find ways to export its oil elsewhere. Yet, for at least awhile, Moscow would encounter enormous logistic, infrastructure, legal, and financial challenges delivering sufficiently large amounts of oil to non-European customers.

Report on the Conference
“Detention Facilities as Multifunctional
Spaces in Western Europe and Russia
in the 16th–19th Centuries”, 4–5 September 2019 German Historical Institute, Moscow. //Historical
Courier, 2020, No 1 (9), pp. 261–264. [Available
online:] http://istkurier.ru/data/2020/ISTKURIER2020-1-18.pdf